
## PERSONAL MEMOIRS

OF

U. S. GRANT





# PERSONAL MEMOIRS

OF

# U.S. GRANT

9

VOLUME TWO



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RIGHT PROFILE OF GENERAL GRANT, 1873. LEFT PROFILE OF GENERAL GRANT, 1873. IMPORTANT BATTLES OF THE CIVIL WAR.

## PERSONAL MEMOIRS

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#### CHAPTER I

PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE—THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF THE ENEMY—SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE—BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN—GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT

ON the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage,—rains falling so heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at Brown's ferry, and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming of a battle raging at Knoxville, and of Willcox being threatened by a force from the east,—a letter was received from Bragg which contained these words: "As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early

CHAP. I Bragg was leaving our front, and on Buckner's division was sent to reinforce I at Knoxville, and another division start low, but was recalled. The object of Bragno doubt, was in some way to detain Knoxville could be captured and his tro

Nov. 1863 During the night of the 21st the rest of toon-boats, completed, one hundred and all, were carried up to and placed in Chickamauga. The material for the road these was deposited out of view of the energy of the series of the series

be returned to Chattanooga.

Hearing nothing from Burnside, and much of the distress in Washington on hi I could no longer defer operations for his determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, Army of the Cumberland, what had been to be done on the 24th.

a few hundred yards of the bank of the Twhere the north end of the bridge was to

The position occupied by the Army of berland had been made very strong for during the months it had been besieged. was about a mile from the town, and extendition Creek—a small stream running base of Missionary Ridge and emptying Tennessee about two miles below the mo

South Chickamauga—on the left to Ch Creek on the right. All commanding poi line were well fortified and well equip

#### THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE

Wood. It owed its importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and Missionary Ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was. Fort Wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach the nearer points of the enemy's line. On the morning of the 23d, Thomas, according to instructions, moved Granger's corps of two divisions, Sheridan and T. J. Wood commanding, to the foot of Fort Wood, and formed them into line as if going on parade, Sheridan on the right, Wood to the left, extending to or near Ger Citico Creek. Palmer, commanding the Fourteenth Corps, held that part of our line facing south and southwest. He supported Sheridan with one division (Baird's), while his other division, under John- All son, remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be moved to any point. Howard's corps was moved in rear of the center. The picket-lines were within a few hundred yards of each other. At two o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. By this time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position all that was going on. The signal for advance was given by Bell as bearing of connon from Fort Wood and other XX a booming of cannon from Fort Wood and other points on the line. The rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and detached heights between the main ridge and our lines. These, too, were carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to rein-

force their advance guards. But it was not with-

Ser

4

Tbid. 598

the firing of artillery, kept up from

more easily. But we were doing the b

By the night of the 23d Sherman's co

cations were rapidly turned to face the CHAP. I During the following night they were r We lost in this preliminary action a hundred killed and wounded, while probably lost quite as heavily, includi oners that were captured. With the

Ridge and Fort Wood until night clo ended the fighting for the first day. The advantage was greatly on our si if I could only have been assured th could hold out ten days longer I should

W. R. XXXI (2) 572 in a position to move, though one div haus's) had not yet crossed the river The continuous rise in the Te rendered it impossible to keep the br point in condition for troops to cross determined to move that night even


for him and the cause.

first given to him. General W. F. Smith had been assig as Chief Engineer of the Military Divisi

division. Orders were sent to Osterh

ingly, to report to Hooker if he could: eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th of the break in the bridge, Hooker's again changed, but this time only be

were given the general direction of mo



L. Smith's division was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the brigade of Giles A. Smith was selected for the delicate duty of manning the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of the river. During this night, also, General J. M. Brannan, chief of artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the Army of the Cumberland, and placed them on the north side of the river so as to command the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to the point where the south end of the bridge was to rest. He had to use Sherman's artillery horses for this purpose, W.R.XXXI Thomas having none.

At two o'clock in the morning, November 24th, Giles A. Smith pushed out from the North Chickamauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. The boats with their precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid attracting the attention of any one who could convey information to the enemy, until arriving near the mouth of the South Chickamauga. Here a few boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the picket-guard known to be at that point. guard were surprised and twenty of their number The remainder of the troops effected a landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good results. The work of ferrying over Sherman's command from the north side of the Tennessee was at once commenced, using the

CHAP. I M. L. Smith, Col. 8th Mo. July, 1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols.July16, 1862

J. M. Brannan, W. P. 1837-41; Mexico. 1846-48; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Sept. 28, 1861

Ibid. 73

6

put to work intrenching their possible the two entire divisions were covered by the works they had be The work of laying the bridge on the artillery and cavalry was now ferrying over the infantry was consteamer and the pontoons, taking however, as fast as they were was

Chickamauga, connecting the troo side with their comrades below, and and artillery were on the south banessee.

Sherman at once formed his troo

their place in the bridge. By a littl bridge was completed, as well as one

Sherman at once formed his troon Missionary Ridge. By one o'c with M. L. Smith on his left, keep course of Chickamauga River; J. E the right and a little to the rear; a farther to the right and also a little J. E. Smith's command, in column, to the right if an enemy should direction. A good skirmish-line

reached; the skirmishers pushed of lowed closely by their supports. By Sherman was in possession of the

of these columns. Soon the foot

having sustained much loss. A bring sustained much loss.

sionary Ridge were obscured from the view of pe

sons in the valley. But now the enemy opened frupon their assailants, and made several attemp with their skirmishers to drive them away, by without avail. Later in the day a more determine attack was made, but this, too, failed, and Sherma was left to fortify what he had gained.

its way to strike the enemy's communications: Chickamauga station. All of Sherman's comman was now south of the Tennessee. During the after noon General Giles A. Smith was severely wounder and carried from the field.

Thomas having done on the 23d what was experimental to the second statement of the second se

Sherman's cavalry took up its line of march so after the bridge was completed, and by half-pa three the whole of it was over both bridges and of

pected of him on the 24th, there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his position. Howard, however, effected a crossing of Citico Cree and a junction with Sherman, and was directed report to him. With two or three regiments of he command he moved in the morning along the bank of the Tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid. He went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end, and

additional boat was put in and the roadway pupon it. Howard reported to his new chief acrothe chasm between them, which was now narround in a function to characteristic of the chasm between them.

saw Sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving himself south as fast as a

8

teenth Corps, Army of the CHAP. I Twelfth Corps, Army of the F Chas. Cruft, Col.31st Ind. Fourteenth Corps, Army of the July, 1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols.July16, was on the right at Wauhatel 1862; Maj.-Gen. Mar. 5, ter, and Osterhaus near Br 1865 troops were all west of Looko had the east bank of the cre and intrenched, and three brig rear to reinforce them if attac occupied the summit of the Carter L. Stevenson was in co C.L. Stevenson, Maj.-Gen. C. S. A. Why any troops, except artil

ccupied the summit of the Carter L. Stevenson was in co Why any troops, except artil fantry guard, were kept on the not see. A hundred men could mit—which is a palisade for down—against the assault of from the position Hooker occur.

Lookout Mountain

The side of Lookout Mountain er's command was rugged, he full of chasms, making it differences to the command was rugged, he full of chasms, making it differences to the command was rugged.

nooga with the summit.

Nov. 1863
Early on the morning of the w.R. XXXII Geary's division, supported by

level, and was in cultivation. slope is much more gradual, road zigzagging up it connect

up Lookout Creek, to effect mainder of Cruft's division we over the creek, near the cross

#### BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN

This attracted the enemy, so that Geary's move ment farther up was not observed. A heavy mis obscured him from the view of the troops on the

top of the mountain. He crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the picket of over forted men on guard near by. He then commenced as cending the mountain directly in his front. Be this time the enemy was seen coming down from his camps on the mountain slope and filing into his rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge By eleven o'clock the bridge was complete. Oster haus was up, and after some sharp skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss it killed and captured.

ing, Geary was pushing up the hill over great of stacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his from and in face of the guns on top of the mountain. The enemy, seeing his left flank and rear menaced gave way, and was followed by Cruft and Oster haus. Soon these were up abreast of Geary, and the whole command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance. By noon Geary had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain with his right close up to the base of the upper

While the operations at the bridge were progress

the mouth of Chattanooga Creek.

Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knoll Hooker's advance now made our line a continu

palisade; but there were strong fortifications in his front. The rest of the command coming up, a lin was formed from the base of the upper palisade t

W.P.Carlin, W.P.1846-50;

Capt. 6th Inf. Mar. 2, Col. 38th III.

over the top of the north end of the ri CHAP, I tanooga Valley, then along parallel a mile or more, across the valley to t Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slop Mountain to the foot of the upper pa day was hazy, so that Hooker's operati visible to us except at moments whe would rise, but the sound of his artille ketry was heard incessantly. The e front was partially fortified, but was

which had so obscured the top of Loc as to hide whatever was going on fr of those below, settled down and made W.R.XXXI where Hooker was as to stop operat time. At four o'clock Hooker reported

> as impregnable. By a little after five munication was established, and a brig

> out of his works. During the afternoo

was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce troops had to cross Chattanooga Cre with some opposition, but soon over by night the commander, General Car to Hooker and was assigned to his lef-

egraphed to Washington: "The fight

Aug. 15, 1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Nov. gressed favorably. Sherman carried 29, 1862 Missionary Ridge, and his right is now nel, and his left at Chickamauga Cre W.R. XXXI from Lookout Valley carried the x (2)24

mountain, and now hold the eastern point high up. Hooker reports two th oners taken hesides which a small r

#### DAVIS'S POSITION

Well done. Many thanks to all. Remember Bury

side." And Halleck also telegraphed: "I congraulate you on the success thus far of your plans. fear that General Burnside is hard pushed, and the any further delay may prove fatal. I know that you will do all in your power to relieve him."

The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the Cumberland, had been sent to the North Chick mauga to guard the pontoons as they were deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of citizens. On the night of the 24th his division having crossed with Sherman, occupied our extrem left from the upper bridge over the plain to the north base of Missionary Ridge. Firing continue to a late hour in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point.

## CHAPTER II

BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA-A GALLAN COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY-THE CONFEDERATES—GENERAL BRAG ON CHATTANOOGA

AT twelve o'clock at night, when all I began to give orders for the ne W.R. XXXI sent a despatch to Willcox to encourage

w.r. xxxx Sherman was directed to attack at daylig was ordered to move at the same he deavor to intercept the enemy's retre remained; if he had gone, then to mov

Rossville and operate against the left the force on Missionary Ridge. Thoma move until Hooker had reached Missic

As I was with him on Orchard Knob, I move without further orders from me.

The morning of the 25th opened clear Nov., 1863 and the whole field was in full view f

of Orchard Knob. It remained so all d headquarters were in full view, and or sumably staff-officers—could be seen

#### BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA

which there is a wagon-road crossing the hill, and near which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. The problem now was to get to the main ridge. The enemy was fortified on the point; and back farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification commanding Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held the hill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, supported by two brigades of John E. Smith's division; and Corse with his brigade was between the i two, moving directly toward the hill to be captured. The ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where M. L. Smith's troops were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west side. The troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the rebel works. Morgan L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy off from the railroad-bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by rail from Chickamauga station, where the main depot was located. The enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the position we had gained, but with-The contest lasted for two hours. out success. Corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in this assault. Sherman now threatened both Bragg's flank and his stores, and made it

necessary for him to weaken other points of his

Union forces was concentrated upo CHAP. II J. E. Smith's Rep. W. R. XXXI (2)644 Smith, with two brigades, charged up of the ridge to the support of Cors over open ground and in the face of a both artillery and musketry, and rea parapet of the enemy. He lay here f the enemy coming with a heavy for right flank, he was compelled to fall l by the foe. A few hundred yards bro troops into a wood, where they wer formed, when they charged and drove party back to his intrenchments. Seeing the advance, repulse, and se of J. E. Smith from the position

the right of Orchard Knob. It had considerable distance directly under the enemy to reach its position. Bragg menced massing in the same direction what I wanted. But it had now got the afternoon, and I had expected beff Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighbor.

Rossville and compelling Bragg to

nooga Creek, and did all he could to roads behind him. Hooker was of

directed Thomas to send a division

Baird's division was according

The enemy had evacuated Looked during the night, as I expected he would ing the valley he burned the bridge

direction also.

Brag Rep. V XXXI (

#### A GALLANT CHARGE

his forces. His reaching Bragg's flank and extending across it was to be the signal for Thomas's assault of the ridge. But Sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer.

Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directed Thomas to order the charge at once. I watched eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any charge being made. The center of the line which was to make the charge was near where Thomas and I stood, but concealed from view by an intervening forest. Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay, I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders who was to make the charge, standing talking to him. I spoke to General Wood, asking him why he did not charge ordered an hour before. He replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. I told him to make the charge at once. He was off in a moment, and in an incredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and Sheridan were driving the enemy's advance before them toward Missionary Ridge. The Confederates

were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. Our men drove the troops

and Re X

18 81 Me followed them so closely, that rebel troops went over the first line of wor the same time. Many rebels were c sent to the rear under the fire of their higher up the hill. Those that were i retreated, and were pursued. The retre being between friends and pursuers

> the enemy was in the safest positio awaiting further orders or stopping to our troops went to the second line of that and on for the crest—thus effectua

> enemy to fire high to avoid killing the In fact, on that occasion the Union so

> out my orders of the 18th for the batt 24th<sup>1</sup> for this charge. I watched their progress with inte

> The fire along the rebel line was terrif

and musket-balls filled the air; but done was in small proportion to the expended. The pursuit continued un was reached, and soon our men were se over the Confederate barriers at different

front of both Sheridan's and Wood's div

either carry ther:

directly in front

to the left, as the

enemy may requ

position on the n be maintained] w

and it is found

carry the top fro

would be edvis

retreat of the enemy along most of <sup>1</sup> CHATTANOOGA, Nov. 24, 1863. MAJ.-GEN. GEO. H. THOMAS,

Chiekamanca Creak I have in-

W.R. XXXI (2) 44

Ante, I, 518 519

Chattanooga: General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel

with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill, his left at

#### COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY

precipitate, and the panic so great that Bragg and his officers lost all control over their men. Many were captured, and thousands threw away their arms in their flight.

Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a point above where the enemy crossed. He met some resistance from troops occupying a second hill in rear of Missionary Ridge, probably to cover the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. now getting dark, but Sheridan, without halting on that account, pushed his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right and left to surround the position. The enemy discovered the movement before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat, leaving artillery, wagon-trains, and many prisoners in our hands. To Sheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation, are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small arms that day. Except for his prompt pursuit so much in this way would not have been accomplished.

While the advance up Missionary Ridge was going forward, General Thomas with staff, General Gordon Granger, commander of the corps making the assault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard Knob, from which the entire field could be observed. The moment the troops were seen going over the

She

CHAP. II suit of the enemy east of the rid commanded the division to the laccompanied his men on horsebace but did not join Sheridan in the left, in Baird's front, where Bramassed against Sherman, the resistubborn and the contest lasted lo Granger to follow the enemy with but he was so much excited, and roar of musketry in the direction

enemy had got well out of the w confronting Sherman, now seein their left giving way, fled also. She was not aware of the extent of cafter nightfall, when he received at daylight in the morning.

As soon as Sherman discovered

taken, that by the time I could st

had left his front he directed his division of the Army of the Cum over the pontoon-bridge at the mountained, and to move forward station. He ordered Howard to stream some two miles to where

bridge, repair it during the night, at four o'clock in the morning. I was ordered to reconnoiter the tur was still held. Nothing was foun

bodies of men of both armies. T man's command was directed to f

### PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES

He got his troops over, with the exception of the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock. Leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on with the remainder of his command. At Rossville he came upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could make but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many of them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were captured. Hooker's position during the night of the 25th was near Rossville, and as many of them as could do so escaped.

left, on the road to Graysville.

During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that Bragg had been defeated, and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if he could hold out; to Halleck I sent an announcement of our victory, and winformed him that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve Burnside.

extending east of the ridge. Palmer was on his

Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for the relief of Burnside the moment the way should be clear. Thomas was we directed to have the little steamer that had been built at Chattanooga loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. Granger's corps was to move by the south bank of the Tennessee River to the mouth of the Holston, and up that to Knoxville, accompanied by the boat. In addition to the supplies transported by boat the men were

CHAP. II Army of the Potomac, from the Army of the participated. In fact, the accidents the heavy rains and the sudden rise the heavy rains and the sudden rise that the toops the tions were not kept together, under commanders, during the battle. right, had Geary's division of the Army of the Potomac; Osterhaus's Fifteenth Corps, Army of the Cruft's division of the of the Cruft's divisio

Howard's corps from the Army of and Jefferson C. Davis's division the Cumberland. There was no jet rivalry. Indeed, I doubt whether took any note at the time of the famingling of commands. All saw a rounding them, and took it for gramove was intended to dislodge him, difference where the troops came for the corps are formally and took it.

Sherman had three divisions of

great odds, considering the advantable had of position, and was accomplist than was expected, by reason of 1

The victory at Chattanooga wa

several grave mistakes: first, in se ablest corps commander with over t troops; second, in sending away a di on the eve of battle; third, in place

end was accomplished.

Gen.

21

reaching Chattanooga. It was reported and believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between Bragg and Longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned the campaign against Knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general. I had known both Bragg and Longstreet before the war, the latter very well. We had been three years at West Point together, and, after my graduation, for a time in the same regiment. Then we served together in the Mexican war. I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him occasionally subsequently. I could well understand how there might be an irreconcilable difference between them.

Gen. Bragg's character

Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionally and otherwise. He was also thoroughly upright. But he was possessed of an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. A man of the highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army he was in frequent trouble. As a subordinate he was always on the lookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest neglect, even of the most trivial order.

I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of Bragg. On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded by a field-officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary. He was first

he declined to fill the requisition the back of it his reasons for se pany commander he responded to his requisition called for nothin entitled to, and that it was the d master to fill it. As quartermast that he was right. In this co Bragg referred the whole matter ing officer of the post. The la the nature of the matter referre God, Mr. Bragg, you have qua officer in the army, and now y with yourself!"

Gen. Long-Longstreet was an entirely of street was brave, honest, intelligent, a v subordinate to his superiors, ju subordinates, but jealous of his

> the lookout to detect a slight, b as anybody when intentionally It may be that Longstreet was ville for the reason stated, but

> had an exalted opinion of his ov and thought he saw a chance of

> he had the courage to maintain.

with one stone." On several oc war he came to the relief of the means of his superior military

I speak advisedly when I say himself on his military capacity Cf. Davis, self virtually in his answer to

Rise and Fall, I, 230

battle of Chattanooga were as fought. Sherman was to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did; Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain, as he did, sweep across Chattanooga Valley, and get across the south end of the ridge near Rossville. When Hooker had secured that position the Army of the Cumberland was to assault in the center. Before Sherman arrived, however, the order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to come to Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River. The waters in the river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown's ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing troops upon it. For this reason Hooker's orders were changed by telegraph back to what they were originally.

Note.—From this point on this volume was written (with the exception of the campaign in the Wilderness, which had been previously written) by General Grant

after his great illness in April, and the present arrangement of the subject-matter was made by him between the 10th and 18th of July, 1885.—F. D. G.

# CHAPTER III

TO NASHVILLE—VISITING KNOXV
DESPATCHES—WITHHOLDING ORDER

HATTANOOGA now being secu

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE --- HEADQUA

CHAP. III

tional troops beyond any double diately turned my attention to relieve about the situation of which the Presticular, was very anxious. Prior to had made preparations for sending relief of Burnside at the very earliest securing Chattanooga. We had the steamers which had been built and find the remains of old hearts and put in

steamers which had been built and fi the remains of old boats and put in run. General Thomas was directed t these boats loaded with rations and and move up the Tennessee River to the Holston, keeping the boat all the of the troops. General Granger, wit Corps reinforced to make twenty the was to start the moment Missionar

carried, and under no circumstances w

# THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE

Tennessee would furnish abundance of food for Burnside's army and his own also.

While following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the 27th, part of the time by the road to Ringgold, I directed Thomas, verbally, not to start Granger until he received further orders from me; advising him that I was going to the front to more fully see the situation. I was not right sure but that Bragg's troops might be over their stampede by the time they reached Dalton.

In that case Bragg might think it well to take the road back to Cleveland, move thence toward Knoxville, and, uniting with Longstreet, make a sudden dash upon Burnside.

When I arrived at Ringgold, however, on the

27th, I saw that the retreat was most earnest. The enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons, and small arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be moving like a disorganized mob, with the exception of Cleburne's division, which was acting as rear-guard to cover the retreat.

When Hooker moved from Rossville toward

Ringgold, Palmer's division took the road to Graysville, and Sherman moved by the way of Chickamauga station toward the same point. As soon as I saw the situation at Ringgold I sent a staff-officer back to Chattanooga to advise Thomas of the condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to

were already on the march for the relief of Burnside I was in no hurry to get healt but stayed at

start Granger at once. Feeling now that the troops

CHAP. II

between East Chickamauga Creek a Ridge, and about twenty miles sour Chattanooga. I arrived just as the a Hooker had left behind at Chattanoog

up. His men were attacking Cleburn which had taken a strong position in

Hooker's Rep. W. R. XXXI(2)320

hills, so as to cover the retreat of the army through a narrow gorge which prat that point. Just beyond the gorge narrow, and the creek so tortuous that crossed a great many times in the cours mile. This attack was unfortunate, some men unnecessarily. Hooker cap ever, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 pri 130 rebel dead were left upon the field.

I directed General Hooker to collect t

wheat in the neighboring mills for the troops, and then to destroy the mills a property that could be of use to the not to make any wanton destruction.

Sherman, Memoirs, I, 365

At this point Sherman came up, have Graysville with his troops, where he for had preceded him. Palmer had picked prisoners and much abandoned proper route. I went back in the evening to with Sherman, remained there overnigh not return to Chattanooga until the following the statement of the stat

I then found that Thomas

I deemed of so much importance in the fate of Knowyilla. The mag and G

started Granger, thus having lost a full

#### THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE

out against Longstreet, but if not relieved within the time indicated he would be obliged to surrender or attempt to retreat. To effect a retreat would have been an impossibility. He was already very low in ammunition, and with an army pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies.

Finding that Granger had not only not started, but was very reluctant to go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, I sent word to General Sherman of the situation, and directed him to march to the relief of Knoxville. I also gave him the problem that we had to solve—that Burnside had now but four to six days' supplies left, and that he must be relieved within that time.

Sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from Graysville, having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from Dalton to Cleveland and Knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and these troops had not yet returned to camp. I was very loath to send Sherman, because his men needed rest after their long march from Memphis and hard fighting at Chattanooga. But I had become satisfied that Burnside would not be rescued if his relief depended upon General Granger's movements.

Sherman had left his camp on the north side of the Tennessee River, near Chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days' cooked rations in their haversacks. Expecting to be back

Sherman's Rep. W. R. XXXI(2)577

CHAP, III

The two days' rations had already lasted days; and they were now to go through which had been run over so much by (

ing much food. They did, however, capturing some flour. They also found of bran in some of the mills, which the up into bread; and in this and other

eked out an existence until they could re

troops that there was but little probabil

ville. I was so very anxious that Burnside news of the steps being taken for his thus induce him to hold out a little long came necessary, that I determined to s

Thid.

staff, Colonel J. H. Wilson, to get into E he could, report to Burnside the situa and give him all the encouragement pos Charles A. Dana was at Chattanooga battle, and had been there even before

sage to him. I therefore sent a mem

command. Mr. Dana volunteered to Colonel Wilson, and did accompany h the information of what was being do relief of Knoxville into writing, and dis in some way or other it must be secretl so as to have a copy of this fall into the

General Longstreet did learn of Sherma in advance of his reaching there, and Bu prepared to hold out even for a longer

General Longstreet. They made the t

Dana's and

#### THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE

the loyal people of East Tennessee, were placed

flour and corn, with forage and provisions generally, and were thus secured for the use of the Union troops. They also drove cattle into Knoxville by the east side, which was not covered by the enemy; so that when relief arrived Burnside had more pro-

visions on hand than when he had last reported.

Our total loss (not including Burnside's) in all

these engagements amounted to 757 killed, 4529 wounded, and 330 missing. We captured 6142 prisoners—about fifty per cent. more than the enemy reported for their total loss—40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons, and over 7000 stands of small arms. The enemy's loss in arms was probably much greater than here reported, because we picked up a great many that were found abandoned.

I had at Chattanooga, in round numbers, about sixty thousand men. Bragg had about half this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable. It was his own fault that he did not have more men present. He had sent Longstreet away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to over twenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one third, and depriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command. He did this, too, after our troops had

opened a line of communication by way of Brown's and Kelly's ferries with Bridgeport, thus securing full rations and supplies of every kind; and also

Ante, I, 524

have fallen into his hands without a shave never been able to see the wisd move.

Then, too, after Sherman had arrived Bragg knew that he was on the north

before it reached Knoxville, Bragg orde It had got so far, however, that it could to Chattanooga in time to be of service is possible this latter blunder may have by Bragg having become confused as t going on on our side. Sherman had, stated, crossed to the north side of the River at Brown's ferry, in full view troops from Lookout Mountain, a few of the attack. They then disappeared be hills, and did not come to the view of th Missionary Ridge until they met the Bragg knew it was Sherman's troops crossed, and, they being so long out of have supposed that they had gone up bank of the Tennessee River to the relic

ville, and that Longstreet was therefore But the first great blunder, detaching leannot be accounted for in any way. If he had captured Chattanooga, East would have fallen without a struggle, have been a victory for us to have got away from Chattanooga safety. It was

Tennessee River, he sent Buckner's reinforce Longstreet. He also started at sion a day later; but our attack having

### THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE

The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we were the attacking party. enemy reported his loss in killed at 361; but as he reported his missing at 4146, while we held over 6000 of them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds, if not thousands, who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report. was certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg on the part of the soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away if they could. Then, too, Chattanooga following in the same halfyear with Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in the West, there was much the same feeling in the South at this time that there had been in the North the fall and winter before. If the same license had been allowed the people and press in the South that was allowed in the North, Chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for the preservation of the Union.

General William F. Smith's services in these battles had been such that I thought him eminently entitled to promotion. I was aware that he had previously been named by the President for promotion to the grade of major-general, but that the Senate had rejected the nomination. I was not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly recommended him for a major-generalcy. My recommendation was heeded and the appointment made.

Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville, I, of

relieved 1 without further bloodshed of Burnside's army and the loyal p Tennessee had been the subject of mu the President for several months time he was doing all he could to eli J. G. Foster, W.P.1842-46; tion—sending a new commander wit Mexico, sand troops by the way of Cumberle 1847-48; Brig.-Gen. telegraphing me daily, almost hourly Vols. Oct. 23, 1861; Maj.-Gen.July 18, ber Burnside," "do something for B 1862 other appeals of like tenor. He saw East Tennessee until after our victo nooga. Even then he was afraid t

> intense until he heard that Longstr driven from the field. Burnside followed Longstreet only t Plains, some twenty miles or more e

> might be out of ammunition, in a st tion, or overpowered; and his anxi

> State. The latter did not do so, stopped only a short distance farther sisted his army for the entire winter

stopped, believing that Longstreet wo

made disposition of his troops along to River in accordance with instruct

Thomas in command at Chattanoog the 20th of December, moved my heavy Nashville, Tennessee.

Sherman, Memoirs, I,

nashvine, rennes

W.R. XXXI 1 WASHINGTON, D. C., —myprofounder S, 1863, 10:2 A.M. the skill, coura

#### HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE

Nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with my entire military division, and also with the authorities at Washington. While remaining at Chattanooga I was liable to have my telegraphic communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my command and Washington.

Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention during the winter; so I set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies, so as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon the appearance of the first good weather in the spring. I expected to retain the command I then had, and prepared myself for the campaign against Atlanta. I also had great hopes of having a campaign made against Mobile from the Gulf. I expected after Atlanta fell to occupy that place permanently, and to cut off Lee's army from the West by way of the road running through Augusta to Atlanta and thence southwest. I was preparing to hold Atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my expectation to push through to Mobile if that city was in our possession; if not,

to Savannah; and in this manner to get possession of the only east-and-west railroad that would then

Congress also gave him a vote

of the battles in which General

Grant had participated.

<sup>1</sup> During this winter the citizens of Jo Daviess County, Illinois, subscribed for and had a diamond-hilted sword made for Gen-

of thanks for the victories at eral Grant, which was always Chattanooga, and voted him a

 $\mathbf{W}$ inter

CHAP. III be left to the enemy. But the spring of against Mobile was not made.

The Army of the Ohio had been getting

over Cumberland Gap until their animearly all starved. I now determined to get to see if there was any possible chance that route in the spring, and if not, to ab Accordingly I left Nashville in the latted December by rail for Chattanooga. From

ante, I, 500 nooga I took one of the little steamers possible spoken of as having been built there, and my horses aboard, went up to the junction Clinch with the Tennessee. From that

railroad had been repaired up to Knoxville east to Strawberry Plains. I went by ra fore, to Knoxville, where I remained for days. General John G. Foster was then coing the Department of the Ohio. It was

tensely cold winter, the thermometer bei as low as zero every morning for more tha while I was at Knoxville and on my w there on horseback to Lexington, Kentu first point where I could reach rail to carry

The road over Cumberland Gap, and ba was strewn with débris of broken wagons a animals, much as I had found it on my first

to my headquarters at Nashville.

animals, much as I had found it on my first Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge. The been cut up to as great a depth as clay cou mules and wagons, and in that condition

### THE CIPHER CODE

route, both in Tennessee and Kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal. They would collect in little places where we would stop of evenings to see me, generally hearing of my approach before The people naturally expected to see we arrived. the commanding general the oldest person in the party. I was then forty-one years of age, while mymedical director was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior. The crowds would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of quietly dismounting and getting into the house. It also gave me an opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another about their general. Those remarks were apt to be more complimentary to the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his being muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were all in after a hard day's ride. was back in Nashville by the 13th of January, 1864.

When I started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person along who could turn despatches into cipher, and who could also read the cipher despatches which I was liable to receive daily and almost hourly. Under the rules of the War Department at that time, Mr. Stanton had taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and determining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone, should have the ciphers. The operators possessed of the ciphers, as well as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders whom they were servered.

36 I was obliged to leave the telegraph CHAP. III back at Nashville, because that was the which all despatches to me would come warded from there. As I have said, it sary for me also to have an operator inspection who had possession of this enable me to telegraph to my division War Department without my despatches by all the operators along the line of which they were transmitted. Accord dered the cipher operator to turn over Captain Cyrus B. Comstock, of the Co 1st Lt. Eng July 1, 1860; Lt.-Col. gineers, whom I had selected as a wise a

Staff.A.D.C. man who certainly could be trusted with to Gen. in Ch. Mar. 29, if the operator at my headquarters coul The operator refused point-blank to the key to Captain Comstock as direc stating that his orders from the War I were not to give it to anybody—the co general or any one else. I told him l whether he would or not. He said that

he would be punished. I told him if he most certainly would be punished. Fin that punishment was certain if he refuse obey my order, and being somewhat re if he was not protected altogether from quences of his disobedience to his order War Department, he yielded. When

> from Knoxville I found quite a commo operator had been reprimanded very se

### THE SECRETARY OF WAR

absolutely necessary for me to have the cipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished if he had not delivered it; that they would have to punish me if they punished anybody, or words to that effect.

This was about the only thing approaching a dis-

agreeable difference between the Secretary of War and myself that occurred until the war was over, when we had another little spat. Owing to his natural disposition to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, while issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out of the adjutant-general's office until he had approved it. This was done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came from me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examined them and given his approval. He never disturbed himself, either, in examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so that orders which I had prepared would often lie there three or four days before he would sanction them. I remonstrated against this in writing, and the Secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of General-in-chief of the Army. But he soon lapsed again and took control much as before. After the relief of Knoxville, Sherman had pro-

posed to Burnside that he should go with him to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee; but Burnside

CHAP. III stated, Sherman's command had Ante, II, 27 north of the Tennessee, near Clause or blankets, and without many we to return to their camps by the earther was now cold and the but still they were ready to make fice, had it been required, for the gwhich had brought them into see having accomplished the object from seet, marched back leisurely to his Tennessee River.

# CHAPTER IV

OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI—LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE—COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT-GENERAL—COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES—FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN

Soon after his return from Knoxville I ordered Sherman to distribute his forces from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north to Nashville. Sherman suggested that he be permitted to go back to Mississippi, to the limits of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the purpose of clearing out what Confederates might still be left on the east bank of the Mississippi River to impede its navigation by our boats. He expected also to have the coöperation of Banks to do the same thing on the west shore. Of course I approved heartily.

About the 10th of January Sherman was back in Memphis, where Hurlbut commanded, and got together his Memphis men, or ordered them collected and sent to Vicksburg. He then went to Vicksburg and out to where McPherson was in command, and

40 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U.S. two divisions of infantry with a con CHAP. IV of cavalry scattered west of him. I therefore, to move directly upon Me Sherman, Memoirs, I, I had sent some twenty-five hu 389 under General Sooy Smith to Sher ment, and they had mostly arrived b got to Memphis. Hurlbut had se cavalry, and Sherman ordered him W. S. Smith, W.P.1849-53; Smith so as to give the latter a f Col. 13th seven thousand with which to go as Ohio, June 26, 1861; who was then known to be southea Brig.-Gen Vols.Apr.15, 1862 phis. Smith was ordered to move a February. While Sherman was waiting at Vic Tbid. 390 arrival of Hurlbut with his surplus out scouts to ascertain the position a the enemy and to bring back all th

they could gather. When these sco was through them that he got the: General Polk's being at Meridian

strength and disposition of his con Forrest's Forrest had about four thousand cavalry him, composed of thoroughly well-di who under so able a leader were Smith's command was nearly doubl rest, but not equal, man to man, for successful experience such as Forr The fact is, troops who have battles and won, and followed up

improve upon what they were befor

# OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI

the particular kind of warfare which Forrest had carried on neither army could present a more effective officer than he was.

Sherman got off on the 3d of February and moved out on his expedition, meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the Big Black, and with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached Jackson, Mississippi. This latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon on the 8th, and Morton on the 9th. Up to this time he moved in two columns to enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the march. Here, however, there were indications of the concentration of Confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close together. He had no serious engagement; but he met some of the enemy, who destroyed a few of his wagons, about Decatur, Mississippi, where, by the way, Sherman himself came near being picked up. He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month,

the enemy having retreated toward Demopolis, Alabama. He spent several days in Meridian in thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also for the purpose of hearing from Sooy Smith, who, he supposed, had met Forrest before this time, and, he hoped, had gained a decisive victory because of a superiority of numbers. Hear-


ing nothing of him, however, he started on his return trip to Vicksburg. There he learned that Smith, while waiting for a few of his men who had 42

Sherman had written a letter to CHAP. IV ing a coöperative movement w W. R. XXXII (2) Shreveport, subject to my approva 113 of Sherman's going himself, been important work for him to do, bu he might send a few troops to the though their time to remain absent We must have them for the spring trans-Mississippi movement prove My eldest son, who had accomp F. D. Grant Vicksburg campaign and siege, contracted disease, which grew we grown so dangerously ill that on t ary I obtained permission to go to

> peeting to find him alive on my was permitted to go, I was not p over my command to any one else, to keep the headquarters with me nicate regularly with all parts of with Washington, just as though at Nashville. When I obtained this leave I wa having gone there again to make

he was staying at the time, to see

have the troops of Thomas in the Tennessee cooperate with Sherma Mississippi. I directed Thomas an 193, 198 at Scottsborough, Alabama, to ke ing movement to the south again: who had again relieved Bragg, fe



#### LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE

and two more divisions to Longstreet in East Ten-

nessee. Seeing that Johnston had depleted in this way, I directed Thomas to send at least ten thousand men, besides Stanley's division, which was already to the east, into East Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now in command in East Tennessee, of this movement of troops into his department, and also of the reinforcements Longstreet had received. My object was to drive Longstreet had received.

About this time General Foster, who had been in command of the Department of the Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved him, advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep Longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in East Tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped army would

street out of East Tennessee as a part of the prep-

arations for my spring campaign.

be free to go to any place where it could effect the most for their cause. I thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view, countermanded the orders for pursuit of Longstreet.

On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold it, if possible; and I directed him to move without delay. Finding that he had not moved, on the 17th I urged him again to start, telling him how important it was, that the object

December 29, 1863.

his successor? It is possible that

of the movement was to coöperate with Sherman,

1 Washington, D. C., granted, who would you like as

Nicolay & Hay, Life of

Lincoln,

VIII, 334 et Hera.

who was moving eastward and might be CHAP, IV W. R. XXXII (2) Then again on the 21st, he not yet hav 442 I asked him if he could not start the ne: finally got off on the 22d or 23d. The back from his front without a battle, new position quite as strong and fart rear. Thomas reported that he could Ibid, 480, 482 farther, because it was impossible wit teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplied railroads were repaired. He soon fell b Schofield also had to return for the sa 1bid, 464, 472 He could not carry supplies with him,

> be moving toward his supplies, while following, would be receding from their 2d of March, however, I learned of Sher cess, which eased my mind very much. day, the 3d, I was ordered to Washingte The bill restoring the grade of Lient eral of the Army had passed through Ce became a law on the 26th of February.

> street was between him and the suppli in the country. Longstreet, in his ret

> March and confirmed the next day (the ordered to Washington on the 3d to a

nation had been sent to the Senate on W. R. XXXII (3) 13, 26 commission, and started the day follow The commission was handed to me on t was delivered to me at the Executive A President Lincoln in the presence of h my eldest son, those of my staff who we

#### COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT-GENERAL

that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public, and handed me a copy in advance so that I might prepare a few lines of reply. The President said:

"General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done, in the existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you Lieutenant-General in the Army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add that, with what I here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence."

commission, with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and, above all, to the favor of that Providence which

To this I replied: "Mr. President, I accept the

On the 10th I visited the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at Brandy station; then returned to Washington, and pushed west at once to make my arrangements for turning over the com-

leads both nations and men."

mands there and giving general directions for the preparations to be made for the spring campaign.

CHAP, IV W. R. XXXII (2) 442 who was moving eastward and might be in a Then again on the 21st, he not yet having a I asked him if he could not start the next datinally got off on the 22d or 23d. The ene

back from his front without a battle, but new position quite as strong and farther

Ibid. 480, 482

rear. Thomas reported that he could not farther, because it was impossible with h teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplies w railroads were repaired. He soon fell back.

Schofield also had to return for the same

1bid. 464, 472

He could not carry supplies with him, and street was between him and the supplies s in the country. Longstreet, in his retreat be moving toward his supplies, while our following, would be receding from theirs. 2d of March, however, I learned of Sherman cess, which eased my mind very much. The day, the 3d, I was ordered to Washington.

The bill restoring the grade of Lieutena.

Nicolay & Hay, Life of Lincoln, VIII, 334 of 804.

W. R. X X X 11 (3) 13, 26 eral of the Army had passed through Congrue became a law on the 26th of February. My nation had been sent to the Senate on the March and confirmed the next day (the 2d), ordered to Washington on the 3d to rece commission, and started the day followin The commission was handed to me on the 9 was delivered to me at the Executive Mann President Lincoln in the presence of his Comy eldest son, those of my staff who were we and a few other visitors.

Life of Lincoln, VIII, 340 et seq.

The President in presenting my commissifrom a paper—stating, however, as a prelimand prior to the delivery of it, that he had

that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public, and handed me a copy in advance so that I might prepare a few lines of reply. President said:

"General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what pers, II, 493 remains to be done, in the existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you Lieutenant-General in the Army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add that, with what I here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence."

Lincoln's

To this I replied: "Mr. President, I accept the commission, with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies. and, above all, to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."

Thid.

On the 10th I visited the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at Brandy station; then returned to Washington, and pushed west at once to make my arrangements for turning over the commands there and giving general directions for the preparations to be made for the spring campaign.

Mar. 1864

It had been my intention before this to remain Plansforre in the West, even if I was made lieutenant-general; but when I got to Washington and saw the situa-

organiza-

CHAP. IV

tion it was plain that here was the point for the commanding general to be. No one else could, probably, resist the pressure that would be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and I determined, therefore, before I pursue others. started back, to have Sherman advanced to my late position, McPherson to Sherman's in command of the department, and Logan to the command of McPherson's corps. These changes were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation. My commission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of March, 1864. On the following day, as already stated, I visited General Meade. commanding the Army of the Potomac, at his headquarters at Brandy station, north of the Rapidan. I had known General Meade slightly in the Mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit. I was a stranger to most of the Army of the Potomac, I might say to all except the officers of the regular army who had served in the Mexican war. There had been some changes ordered in the organization of that army before my promotion. One was the consolidation of five corps into three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands. Meade evidently thought that I might want to make still one more change not yet ordered. He said to me that I might want an officer who had served with me in the West, mentioning Sherman specially, to take his place. so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change. He urged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the way of selecting the right men for all positions.

G. G. Meade, W.P.1831-35; Mexico, 1846-47; Capt. Top. Eng. May 17, 1856; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Aug.31,1861; Maj.-Gen. U. S. A. Aug. 18, 1864; d. Nov. 6, 1872

Meade's patriotism

For himself, he would serve to the best of his abil- CHAP. IV ity wherever placed. I assured him that I had no thought of substituting any one for him. Sherman, he could not be spared from the West.

This incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of Meade than did his great victory at Gettysburg the July before. It is men who wait to be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the most efficient service.

Meade's position afterward proved embarrassing to me, if not to him. He was commanding an army, and, for nearly a year previous to my taking command of all the armies, was in supreme command of the Army of the Potomac—except from the authorities at Washington. All other general officers occupying similar positions were independent in their commands so far as any one present with them was concerned. I tried to make General Meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been if I had been in Washington or any other place away from his command. I therefore gave all orders for the movements of the Army of the Potomac to Meade to have them executed. To avoid the necessity of having to give orders direct, I established my headquarters near his, unless there were reasons for locating them elsewhere. This sometimes happened, and I had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected. 11th I returned to Washington, and on the day after orders were published by the War Department w.R. XXXII(3)5 placing me in command of all the armies. I had left Washington the night before to return to my old command in the West and to meet Sherman, whom I had telegraphed to join me in Nashville.

CHAP. IV W. R. XXXII(3) 87

Sherman, Memoirs, I, 400-402; II, 6, 7

Shorman assumed command of the Military Division of the Mississippi on the 18th of March, and we left Nashville together for Cincinnati. I had Sherman accompany me that far on my way back to Washington so that we could talk over the matters about which I wanted to see him without losing any more time from my new command than was necessary. The first point which I wished to discuss was particularly about the cooperation of his command with mine when the spring campaign should commence. There were also other and minor points, minor as compared with the great importance of the question to be decided by sanguinary war-the restoration to duty of officers who had been relieved from important commands, namely, McClellan, Burnside, and Fremont in the East, and Buell, McCook, Negley, and Crittenden in the West.

W. R. XXXII (2) 40-42 Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been invited by the general-in-chief to give my views of the campaign I thought advisable for the command under me—now Sherman's. General J. E. Johnston was defending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia with an army, the largest part of which was stationed at Dalton, about thirty-eight miles south of Chattanooga. Dalton is at the junction of the rail-road from Cleveland with the one from Chattanooga to Atlanta.

There could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty of the armies of the Military Division of the Mississippi. Johnston's army was the first objective, and that important railroad center, Atlanta, the second. At the time I wrote General Halleck giving my views of the approaching cam-

Ibid. 99 101

paign, and at the time I met General Sherman, it was expected that General Banks would be through with the campaign which he had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all the armies, and would be ready to cooperate with the armies east of the Mississippi, his part in the programme being to move upon Mobile by land while the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of its ability.1 The plan, therefore, was for Sherman to attack Johnston and destroy his army if possible, to capture Atlanta and hold it, and with his troops and those of Banks to hold a line through to Mobile, or at least to hold Atlanta and command the railroad running east and west, and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points on the southern road, the only east-and-west road that would be left in the possession of the enemy. This would cut the Confederacy in two again, as our gaining possession of the Mississippi Banks was not ready in River had done before. time for the part assigned to him, and circumstances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign which was afterward made, the success and grandeur of which has resounded throughout all lands.

In regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from important commands to duty again, I left Sherman to look after those who had been removed in the West while I looked out for the rest. I directed, however, that he should make no assign- Sherman, Memoirs, II, ment until I could speak to the Secretary of War about the matter. I shortly after recommended to

Plan of Sherman's spring cam-paign

and in the Official Records as cited 1 See letter to Banks, in Genin the margin.-F. D. G. eral Grant's report, Appendix,

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duty. I received the assurance that duty offered to him; and afterward the Secre me that he had offered Buell an assigns that the latter had declined it, saying that be degradation to accept the assignment of understood afterward that he refused to ser either Sherman or Canby because he had them both. Both graduated before him and him in the old army. Sherman ranked brigadier-general. All of them ranked to old army, and Sherman and Buell did as he The worst excuse a soldier can make for service is that he once ranked the communication.

the Secretary the assignment of General

On the 23d of March I was back in War and on the 26th took up my headquarter peper Court House, a few miles south of t quarters of the Army of the Potomae.

ordered to report to.

First meeting with Lincoln Although hailing from Illinois myself, of the President, I never met Mr. Lines called to the capital to receive my commulicutenant-general. I knew him, however, and favorably from the accounts given bunder me at the West who had known him lives. I had also read the remarkable ser bates between Lincoln and Douglas a few fore, when they were rival candidates for the States Senate. I was then a resident of and by no means a "Lincoln man" in that but I recognized then his great ability.

Lincoln's military policy In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln stated to me that he had never professed military man or to know how campaigns a

conducted, and never wanted to interfere in them; but that procrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from the people at the North and Congress, which was always with him, forced him into issuing his series of "Military Orders"—one, two, three, etc. He did not know but they were all wrong, and did know that some of them were. All he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take the responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed, pledging himself to use all the power of the government in rendering such assistance. Assuring him that I would do the best I could with the means at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the War Department, our first interview ended.

The Secretary of War I had met once before only, but felt that I knew him better.

While commanding in West Tennessee we had occasionally held conversations over the wires, at night, when they were not being otherwise used. He and General Halleck both cautioned me against giving the President my plans of campaign, saving that he was so kind-hearted, so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would be sure to get from him all he knew. I should have said that in our interview the President told me he did not want to know what I proposed to do. But he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wanted me to hear and then do as I pleased about. He brought out a map of Virginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by the Federal and Confederate armies up to that time. He pointed out on the map two streams which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that the

The Presi-

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army might be moved on boats and landed the mouths of these streams. We would t the Potomae to bring our supplies, and t taries would protect our flanks while w out. I listened respectfully, but did no that the same streams would protect be while he was shutting us up.

I did not communicate my plans to t dent, nor did I to the Secretary of War o eral Halleck.

1864

March the 26th my headquarters were, at Culpeper, and the work of preparing for campaign commenced.

# CHAPTER V

THE MILITARY SITUATION—PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN
—SHERIDAN ASSIGNED TO COMMAND OF THE CAVALRY—FLANK MOVEMENTS—FORREST AT FORT PILLOW—GENERAL BANKS'S EXPEDITION—COLONEL
MOSBY—AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN

HEN I assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this: The Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth. The line of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the Northwest north of that river. A few points in Louisiana not remote from the river were held by the Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the Rio Grande. East of the Mississippi we held substantially all north of the Memphis and Charleston railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the State of Tennessee. Virginia was in our hands; and that part of old Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge we also held. On the sea-coast we had Fortress Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia; Plymouth, Washington, and New Berne in North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port Royal, and Fort Pulaski in South Carolina and

CHAP. V

The situation in March, 1864 CHAP.  $\nabla$ 

Georgia; Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key V Pensacola in Florida. The balance of the S territory, an empire in extent, was still in the of the enemy.

In the West

Sherman, who had succeeded me in t mand of the Military Division of the Mis commanded all the troops in the territory the Alleghanies and north of Natchez, with movable force about Chattanooga. His c

Schofield, Thomas, McPherson, Steele manders all reported to Sherman and were to his orders. This arrangement, however, the better protection of all lines of commuthrough the acquired territory, for the rea these different department commanders of promptly in case of a sudden or unexpecwithin their respective jurisdictions without

ing the orders of the division commander.

In the East the opposing forces stood in

tially the same relations toward each other

was subdivided into four departments, but

In the East

years before, or when the war began; the both between the Federal and Confederate. It is true, footholds had been secured by usea-coast, in Virginia and North Carolina; yond that, no substantial advantage had been by either side. Battles had been fought of severity as had ever been known in wiground from the James River and Chickan near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambin Pennsylvania, with indecisive results, so favorable to the National army, sometimes

Confederate army; but in every instance, I claimed as victories for the South by the ern press, if not by the Southern general

Northern press, as a whole, did not discourage these claims; a portion of it always magnified rebel success and belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest in their desire for the preservation of the Union and the overwhelming success of the Federal armies, would nevertheless generally express dissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they were not more complete.

That portion of the Army of the Potomac not In Virginia engaged in guarding lines of communication was on the northern bank of the Rapidan. The Army of Northern Virginia, confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river, was strongly intrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ablest gen-R.E.Lee, W. P. 1825-29; eral in the Confederate army. The country back to the James River is cut up with many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except where bridged. The region is heavily timbered, and the roads narrow and very bad after the least rain. Such an enemy was not, of course, unprepared with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all the way back to Richmond, so that when driven from one fortified position he would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into.

To provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe through such a country, from wagous alone seemed almost impossible. System and discipline were both essential to its accomplishment.

The Union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though four of them in the West had been concentrated into a single military division. The Army of the Potomac was a separate command and had no territorial limits. There were CHAP. V

Mexico, 1846-47; Col. 1stCav.Mar. 16,1861; Gen. C. S. A. May, 1861; d. Oct. 12,1870

Reorganizing the

CHAP. V

thus seventeen distinct commanders. Beftime these various armies had acted separatindependently of one another, giving the enopportunity often of depleting one comma pressed, to reinforce another more actively expressed, to reinforce another more actively expressed to the Army of the Potomac as the center, west to Memphis along the line described position at the time, and north of it, the right the Army of the James, under General But

B. F. Butler, Maj.-Gen. Vols.May16, 1861; d. Jan. 11, 1893 the Army of the James, under General Buthe left wing; and all the troops south as in rear of the enemy. Some of these lattoecupying positions from which they conrender service proportionate to their nustrength. All such were depleted to the mecessary to hold their positions as a guard blockade-runners; where they could not their positions were abandoned altogether. way ten thousand men were added to the Athe James from South Carolina alone, with Gillmore in command. It was not content that General Gillmore should leave his depart but as most of his troops were taken, pres

Q. A. Gillmore, W. P. 1845-49; Capt. Eng. Aug. 6, 1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Apr. 28, 1862; Maj. Gen. July 10,


was permitted to do so. Officers and sold furlough, of whom there were many the were ordered to their proper commands; tration was the order of the day, and to accomplished in time to advance at the

for active service, he asked to accompany th

The Ninth

As a reinforcement to the Army of the Poor to act in support of it, the Ninth Army over twenty thousand strong, under General side, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis

moment the roads would permit was the p



Снар. У

land. This was an admirable position for such a reinforcement. The corps could be brought at the last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of Norfolk, in Virginia or North Carolina, to operate against Richmond from that direction. In fact, Burnside and the War Department both thought the Ninth Corps was intended for such an expedition up to the last moment.

General

My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against the Confederate armies in the field. There were but two such, as we have seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north. The Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the south bank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac; the second, under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to Sherman, who was still at Chattanooga. Besides these main armies the Confederates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to feed their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmond to Tennessee. Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the West with a large force, making a larger command necessary to hold what we had gained in Middle and West Tennessee. We could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy, because it would lay the Northern States open to invasion. But as the Army of the Potomac was the principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while it was moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of the James, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as when remaining at them. Better, indeed,

CHAP, V

for they forced the enemy to guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and with a greater force. Little expeditions could not so well be sent out to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. Accordingly I arranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line. Sherman was to move from Chattanooga, Johnston's army and Atlanta being his objective points. Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was

Geo. Crook, W.P.1848-62; Capt.4thInf. May 14, Col. 36th Ohio, Sept.12,1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Sept.7, 1862; Maj.-Gen.July 18, 1864

<sup>1</sup> [Private and Confidential.]
Headquarters, Armies of
The United States,
Washington, D. C.,
April 4, 1864.

MAJ.-GEN. W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

W. R. XXXII (3) 245 GENERAL: It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat toward a common center. For your information I now write you my programme, as at present determined upon.

I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up his present expedition against Shreveport with all despatch; to turn over the defense of Red River to General Steele and the navy. and to return your troops to you and his own to New Orleans: to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to hold that with not to exceed four thousand men: to reduce the number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it; and to collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men. To this I will add five thousand men from Missouri. With this force he is to commence operations against Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for him to commence too early.

him to commence too early.

Gillmore joins Bufler with ten thousand men, and the two operate against Richmond from the south side of the James River. This will give Butler thirty three thousand men to operate with, W. F. Smith communiding the right wing of his forces and Gill more the left wing. I will stay with the Army of the Potenne, increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty five thousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army wherever it may be found.

Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under Ord and Averell, to start from Boverly, Virginia, and the other, under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, to move against the Virginia and Tennes see railroad.

Crook will have all envalry, and will endeavor to get in about Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force will be all envalry, while Ord will have to move from the mouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, the Virginia and Tennessee railroad to be his objective. Either the enemy would have to keep a large force to protect his communications, or see them destroyed, and a large amount of forage and provision, which he so much needed, fall into our hands. Sigel was in command in the Valley of Virginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the North from an invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining near Harper's Ferry. Every mile he advanced also gave us possession of stores on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance by the James River, having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective.

Chap. V

Grant to Sigel, W. R. XXXIII,765

Franz Sigel, Col. 3d Mo. Inf. May 4, Brig.-Gen. Vols. May 17, 1861; Maj.-Gen. Mar. 21,

from ten to twelve thousand men of all arms.

You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done, and leave you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations.

As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel is concentrating now. None will move from their places of rendezvous until I direct, except Banks. I want to be ready to move by the 25th inst., if possible. But all I

can now direct is that you get ready as soon as possible. I know you will have difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish it.

From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I can take troops from there. With the long line of railroad Sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move directly to his front. In this way he must get through to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words, if Sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some one else skins.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. CHAP, V

Before the advance commenced I visited I at Fort Monroe. This was the first time I had met him. Before giving him any order as to part he was to play in the approaching campa invited his views. They were very much such intended to direct, and as I did direct, in wr before leaving.

General W. F. Smith, who had been promot

Grantto Butler, W. R. XXXIII 794

the rank of major-general shortly after the I of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had yet been confirmed. I found a decided prejugainst his confirmation by a majority of the Sebut I insisted that his services had been such he should be rewarded. My wishes were not luctantly complied with, and I assigned him to command of one of the corps under General But was not long in finding out that the objection Smith's promotion were well founded.

W. R. XXXIII, 861, 916

In one of my early interviews with the Presidence of a satisfaction with the little had been accomplished by the cavalry so far in war, and the belief that it was capable of accomping much more than it had done if under a thor leader. I said I wanted the very best man in army for that command. Halleck was present spoke up, saying, "How would Sheridan do replied, "The very man I want." The Presided I could have anybody I wanted. Sher was telegraphed for that day, and on his ar was assigned to the command of the cavalry of with the Army of the Potomac. This relieved eral Alfred Pleasonton. It was not a reflection

W. R. XXXII (3)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See instructions to Butler, in dix, and in the Official Reco General Grant's report, Appendited in the margin. — F. I

that officer, however, for I did not know but that he had been as efficient as any other cavalry commander.

CHAP. V Nicolay & Hay, Life of Lincoln, VIII, 353

Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all the troops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general move, Mobile to be his objective.

W.R.

At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should move the Army of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy or by his left. Each plan presented advantages.1 If by his right

1 IN FIELD, CULPEPER C. H., VIRGINIA,

April 9, 1864.

MAJ.-GEN. GEORGE G. MEADE, Com'd'g Army of the Potomac: For information and as instruction to govern your preparations for the coming campaign, the following is communicated conidentially for your own perusal

alone.

So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and toward one common center. Banks has been instructed to turn over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and the navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and to concentrate all the force he can -not less than twenty-five thousand men-to move on Mobile. This he is to do without reference From the to other movements. scattered condition of his command, however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans before the 1st of May, if Sherman will move at so soon. the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, Joe Johnston's army being his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his ultimate aim. If successful he will secure the line from Chattanooga to Mobile with the aid of Banks.

Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front. This he has been directed to do, and is now making preparations for it. Two columns of his . command will make south at the same time with the general move: one from Beverly, from ten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord; the other from Charleston, Virginia, principally cavalry, under Brigadier-General Crook. The former of these will endeavor to reach the Tennessee and Virginia railroad, about south of Covington, and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or join you. The other will strike at Saltville, Virginia, and come eastward to join Ord. The cavalry from Ord's command will try to force a passage southward, if they are successful in CHAP. V

-my left-the Potomac, Chesapeake Bay, a tributaries would furnish us an easy line or which to bring all supplies to within easy hauli distance of every position the army could occu from the Rapidan to the James River. But I could, if he chose, detach or move his whole arr north on a line rather interior to the one I wou have to take in following. A movement by left—our right—would obviate this; but all the was done would have to be done with the suppl and ammunition we started with. All idea adopting this latter plan was abandoned when t limited quantity of supplies possible to take w us was considered. The country over which would have to pass was so exhausted of all fo or forage that we would be obliged to carry even thing with us.

reaching the Virginia and Tennessee railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting Richmond with all the South and Southwest.

Gillmore will join Butler with about ten thousand men from South Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take twenty-three thousand men into the field directly to his front. The force will be commanded by Major-General W. F. Smith. With Smith and Gillmore, Butler will seize City Point, and operate against Richmond from the south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneous with yours.

Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in doubt is whether it will be better

to cross the Rapidan above below him. Each plan prese great advantages over the oth with corresponding objection By crossing above, Lee is cut from all chance of ignoring Ri mond and going north on a ra But if we take this route all we must be done whilst the rati we start with hold out. We s arate from Butler, so that he c not be directed how to coopera By the other route Brandy Stat can be used as a base of supp until another is secured on York or James rivers.

These advantages and obtions I will talk over with more fully than I can write the

Burnside, with a force of prably twenty-five thousand m will reinforce you. Immediate upon his arrival, which will

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. In the West, Forrest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio. While he was able to enter the city, he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison. On the first intelligence of Forrest's raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at Fort Pillow, a station for the protec- Apr. 12, 1864 tion of the navigation of the Mississippi River. The garrison consisted of a regiment of colored

CHAP. V Mar.16 to Apr. 14, 1864

W. R. XXXII (1) 501-623; (3) passim

W. R. XXXII (3)

W. R. XXXII (1), (3) passim

shortly after the 20th inst., I will give him the defense of the road from Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it. This will enable you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the front.

There will be naval cooperation on the James River, and transports and ferries will be provided, so that should Lee fall back into his intrenchments at Richmond, Butler's force and yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such. What I would direct, then, is that you commence at once reducing baggage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to a regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should be allowed for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and one to division headquarters is sufficient, and about two to corps headquarters.

Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to White House on the Pamunkey. Your estimates for this contingency should be made at once. If not wanted there, there is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or elsewhere.

If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made for ordnance stores. I would say not much short of five hundred rounds of infantry ammunition would do. By the other, half the amount would be sufficient.

> U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

troops, infantry, and a detachmen CHAP, V cavalry. These troops fought bra overpowered. I will leave Forre. patches to tell what he did with "The river was dyed," he says, " W. R. 610 of the slaughtered for two hundred proximate loss was upward of five but few of the officers escaping. about twenty killed. It is hoped to will demonstrate to the Northern pe soldiers cannot cope with Souther quently Forrest made a report in w the part which shocks humanity to At the East, also, the rebels wer W. R. XXXIII.947 said to Halleck that Plymouth an

tended our arms, both places, and of fall into our hands naturally. The been occupied by Federal troops command of the armies, and I knew ecutive would be reluctant to aban therefore explained my views; h views were carried out the rebels ca Apr. 20, 1864 W. R. XXXIII, 278-305 rison at Plymouth. I then ordered ment of Washington, but directed Thid. 946, 967

> cause New Berne was a port into w runners could enter. General Banks had gone on an av

> New Borne at all hazards. This wa

North Carolina, were unnecessary would be better to have the gar there added to Butler's command.

Executive Marsion Washington, April 30, 1864

Sieutenant General Grant.

Not expecting to see you again before the Spring campaign opens, I wish to express. in this way, my entire setisfaction with what you have done up to this time, so far as I understand to. The particulars of your plans I neither know, or seek to know. You are regilant and seef-reliant; and, pleas: es with the, I wish not to obtained any constraints or restractits upon you. While I am very anxious that any great disector, of the cepture of our men in great numbers, shall be avoided, I know these points are less likely to escape your attention then they would be min- If there is guything wanting which is with in my power to give, do not fail to let me know to. And now with a breve army, and a just cause, may God pustain you. yours very truly

LINCOLN'S GOD-SPEED TO GRANT. (FAC-SIMILE OF THE ORIGINAL, SLIGHTLY REDUCED IN SCALE.)

[This remarkable letter was received by General Grant on the 1st of May, three days before the Wilderness campaign began. He was always careless about his papers, and private or semi-official ones were often thrust into his pockets, where they remained its existence, until in 1866 I came across it in my researches for my history of his campaigns. He was so pleased at the discovery, or recovery, that he gave me the original letter at the time. It is my intention eventually into his pockets, where they remained

my superior at the time. By direction of Halleck I had reinforced Banks with a corps of about ten thousand men from Sherman's command. reinforcement was wanted back badly before the forward movement commenced. But Banks had got so far that it seemed best that he should take Shreveport on the Red River, and turn over the line of that river to Steele, who commanded in Arkansas, to hold instead of the line of the Arkan-Orders were given accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended in time for Banks to return A. J. Smith's command to where it belonged and get back to New Orleans himself in time to execute his part in the general plan. But the expedition was a failure. Banks did not get back in time to take part in the programme as laid down. Nor was Smith returned until long after the movements of May, 1864, had been begun. The services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number required to hold all that was necessary in the Department of the Gulf, were thus paralyzed. It is but just to Banks, however, to say that his expedition was ordered from Washington, and he was in no way responsible except for the conduct of it. I make no criticism on this point.

By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to justify me in fixing a day for the great move. On that day Burnside left Annapolis to occupy Meade's position between Bull Run and the Rap-

He opposed the expedition.

CHAP. V W. R. XXXII (2) 41, 122

Sherman, Memoirs,II,

Fed. & Conf. Rep. W. R. XXXIV (1) 162-638

> W. R. XXXIII 955, 994

66

CHAP. V

move the night of the same day and ge

the James River as possible by daylight on from there to accomplish the task He was also notified that reinforcemen ing collected in Washington City, which forwarded to him should the enemy fal the trenches at Richmond. The same da Sherman Memoirs, II, was directed to get his forces up ready on the 5th. Sigel-was in Winchester and W. R. XXXIII, fied to move in conjunction with the otl The criticism has been made by wri campaign from the Rapidan to the Ja that all the loss of life could have been c moving the army there on transports.

was fortified and intrenched so perfectly man inside to defend was more than equation outside besieging or assaulting. To get of Lee's army was the first great object, capture of his army Richmond would follow. It was better to fight him out stronghold than in it. If the Army of the had been moved bodily to the James water, Lee could have moved a part of

south to reinforce it, and with the bala on to Washington. Then, too, I ordere simultaneous with that of the Army of tomac, up the James River by a formic already collected at the mouth of the

back to Richmond, called Beauregard

While my headquarters were at Culp

occurred which came near postponing my part in the campaign altogether. Colonel John S. Mosby had for a long time been commanding a partizan corps, or regiment, which operated in the rear of the Army of the Potomac. On my return to the field on this occasion, as the train approached Warrenton Junction, a heavy cloud of dust was seen to the east of the road, as if made by a body of cavalry on a charge. Arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiries made as to the cause of the dust. There was but one man at the station, and he informed us that Mosby had crossed a few minutes before at full speed in pursuit of Federal eavalry. Had he seen our train coming. no doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train. I was on a special train, if I remember correctly, without any guard.

Since the close of the war I have come to know Mosby'sper-smallty Colonel Mosby personally, and somewhat intimately. He is a different man entirely from what I had supposed. He is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could endure any amount of physical He is able, and thoroughly honest and truthful. There were probably but few men in the South who could have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the rear of an opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he did without losing his entire command.

On this same visit to Washington I had my last Nicolay & Hay, Life of Lincoln, interview with the President before reaching the vIII, 347, 348

Capt.Cav.C.

William

CHAP. V necessary to have a great number of guard and hold the territory we had exto prevent incursions into the North These troops could perform this ser well by advancing as by remaining a advancing they would compel the end detachments to hold them back, or else

does."

There was a certain incident connec
Wilderness campaign of which it may r
place to speak; and to avoid a digressio
I will mention it here.

A few days before my departure from the Honorable E. B. Washburne visite

territory open to invasion. His answeyes! I see that. As we say out Wescan't skin he must hold a leg while so

and remained with my headquarters f tance south, through the battle in the and, I think, to Spottsylvania. He panied by a Mr. Swinton, whom he pr literary gentleman who wished to according with a view of writing a history when it was over. He assured me—ar

literary gentleman who wished to accompany with a view of writing a history when it was over. He assured me—andoubt Swinton gave him the assuran was not present as a correspondent of expressed an entire willingness to have ton) accompany the army, and would him to do so as a correspondent, rest ever, in the character of the informat

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therefore, that correspondents should not be privileged spies of the enemy within our lines.

Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters, and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so. At all events, he was not invited, and soon I found that he was corresponding with some paper (I have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word either expressed or implied. He knew of the assurance Washburne had given as to the character of his mission. I never saw the man from the day of our introduction to the present that I recollect. accompanied us, however, for a time at least.

The second night after crossing the Rapidan (the night of the 5th of May), Colonel W. R. Rowley, of my staff, was acting as night-officer at my headquarters. A short time before midnight I gave him verbal instructions for the night. Three days later I read in a Richmond paper a verbatim report of these instructions.

A few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after the second, day's fighting in the Wilderness) General Meade came to my tent for consultation, bringing with him some of his staff-officers. his staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some yards in front of the tent, thinking our conversation should be private. There was a stump a little to one side, and between the front of the tent and the camp-fire. One of my staff, Colonel T. S. Bow- 1st Lt. 48th ers, saw what he took to be a man seated on the

An eavesdropping correspon-

III. Mar. 24,

CHAP. V

asked him, in language more forci what he was doing there. The ma Swinton, the "historian," and his question were evasive and unsatis was warned against further eavesd

The next I heard of Mr. Swint-Harbor. General Meade came to n saying that General Burnside had ar who at some previous time had give and had ordered him to be shot tha

promptly ordered the prisoner to be that he must be expelled from the line not to return again on pain of puni

Swinton ordered to be shot

## CHAPTER VI

COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN—GENERAL BUTLER'S POSITION—SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID

THE armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a single object. They were acting as a unit, so far as such a thing was possible over such a vast field. Lee, with the capital of the Confederacy, was the main end to which all were working. Johnston, with Atlanta, was an important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at, and was therefore almost an independent objective. It was of less importance only because the capture of Johnston and his army

Note.— At this stage of the work the final decline in General Grant's strength became clearly manifest, and it was found necessary to bring his task to a close as soon and as easily as possible. For this reason the notes and memorandar which he had collected for the purpose of refreshing his memory, and of forming the framework upon which the narrative might be constructed

ferent circumstances; and the scheme of presenting the final scenes of the war as a panorama of one vast campaign directed by the central power—the Lieutenant-General of the Army of the United States—had to be abandoned. Had this plan for the book been followed, the separate armies would have been treated as but parts of one, of which the Army of the Potonne would have formed

CHAP. V

Plan of t campai

would not produce so immediate a CHAP. VI sult in closing the rebellion as wou of Richmond, Lee, and his army. were employed exclusively in sup movements. This was the plan; endeavor to give, as concisely as I of its execution, outlining first t minor detached but coöperative As stated before, Banks faile Ante, II, 65 what he had been sent to do or and eliminated the use of forty the whose cooperation in the grand ca

> Sigel's record is almost equally out, it is true, according to prog when I was hoping to hear of done in the valley, I received inst announcement from Halleck: "S

treat on Strasburg. He will do

The plan had been for an ad

Though 1

thousand against Mobile.

expected—ten thousand with She

May 15, 1864 never did anything else." The cepted him about New Market a W. R. XXXVII (1) roughly, leaving him short six gur hundred men out of his six thousa

forces in two columns.

immediate command failed inglor proved more fortunate. Under C his western column advanced fro

West Virginia at the appointed


more hanny regults. They read

olš. Sept. 26, 1862

W. R. XXXVI (2)

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Having accomplished this, they recrossed the Alleghanies to Meadow Bluffs and there awaited further orders.

CHAP. VI

Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his command, except the cavalry and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the James River. His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and York River as if threatening the rear of Lee's army. At midnight they turned back, and Butler by daylight was far up the James River. He seized City Point and Bermuda Hundred early in the day, without loss, and, no doubt, very much to the surprise of the enemy.

Fed. & Conf. Rep. W. R. XXXVI (2) 6-269

This was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in my instructions to Butler. He was to act from here, looking to Richmond as his objective point. I had given him to understand that I should aim to fight Lee between the Rapidan and Richmond if he would stand; but should Lee fall back into Richmond I would follow up and make a junction of the armies of the Potomac and the James on the James River. He was directed to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could, at as early a date as possible.

Grant to Butler, W. R. XXXIII, 794, 1009

Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had begun intrenching, and on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from Suffolk to cut the Weldon railroad. He also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond, but no

great success attended these latter efforts. He

W. R. XXXVI (2) ut supra, passim 4 TT

about half-way between Bermuda Hi CHAP, VI Richmond. In the mean time Beau been gathering reinforcements. On t attacked Butler with great vigor, and success as to limit very materially the fulness of the Army of the James as a tor in the campaign. I afterward ordere of it to join the Army of the Potoma sufficient force with Butler to man his

the Confederate capital. The position which General Butler between the two rivers, the James and tox, was one of great natural strength, e Butler's polarge area of ground might be thorough

by means of a single intrenched line,

could again safely make an order t

securely the footing he had already maintain a threatening front toward

very short one in comparison with th torritory which it thoroughly protected was protected by the James River, his Appointtox, and his rear by their jur two streams uniting near by. The be two streams shortened the line that chosen for intrenchments, while they in area which the line inclosed.

J. G. Bar-nard, W. P. 1829-33; Previous to ordering any troops fro sent my chief engineer, General Barnar Mexico, 1846-48; Maj. Jeng. Dec. 18, Army of the Potomac to that of the J 1858; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Sept. 23, 1861 spect Butler's position and ascertain

sition

## GENERAL BUTLER'S POSITION

and having them brought round by water to White House to join me and reinforce the Army of the Potomac. General Barnard reported the position very strong for defensive purposes, and that I could do the latter with great security; but that General Butler could not move from where he was, in coöperation, to produce any effect. He said that the general occupied a place between the James and Appointtox rivers which was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it for an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he could do nothing offensively. I then asked him why Butler could not move out from his lines and push across the Richmond and Petersburg railroad to the rear and on the south side of Richmond. He replied that it was impracticable, hecause the enemy had substantially the same line across the neck of land that General Butler had. He then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like a bottle, and that Butler's line of intrenchments across the neck represented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of him across the neck; and it was therefore as if Butler was in a bottle. He was perfectly safe against an attack; but, as Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a small force could hold the cork in its place. This struck me as being very expressive of his position, particularly when I saw the hasty sketch which

1 21 5 E - 3

Melga

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PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U.S. GRA

of General Butler, and, I know, very mown. I found afterward that this was momentum the notes of General Badeau's book, withey were shown to me, I asked to have out; yet it was retained there, though a wishes.

I make this statement here because, have often made it before, it has never power until now to place it where it whistory; and I desire to rectify all injust may have done to individuals, particular cers who were gallantly serving their conting the trying period of the war for the property services.

the rebellion.

The further operations of the Army of can best be treated of in connection with the Army of the Potomac, the two betimately associated and connected as

tions of the center, I will briefly men dan's first raid upon Lee's communicati though an incident of the operations of

very earnest support to the war; and lown best efforts personally to the sup

stantially one body in which the indiversal the supporting wing is merged.

Before giving the reader a summary of great Atlanta campaign, which must condescription of the various cooperative in preparatory to proceeding with that of

By thus anticipating, in point of time, I will be able to more perfectly observe the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when I shall have undertaken to describe our advance from the Rapidan.

On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the Wilderness, and when we were moving on Spottsylvania, I directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac, pass around the left of Lee's army, and attack his cavalry; to cut the two roads—one running west through Gordonsville, Charlottesville, and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond—and, when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to the James River and draw these from Butler's supplies. This move took him past the entire rear of Lee's army. These orders were also given in writing through w.R. (2) Meade.

The object of this move was threefold. successfully executed—and it was—he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line of supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his own use supplies in store in the rear and coming up. Second, he would draw the enemy's cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear, and trains than by remaining with the army. Third, his absence would save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from Fredericksburg, which had now become our base. He started at daylight the next morning, and

accomplished more than was expected. It was

Sheridan, Memoirs, I, 365 et seq.

Sheridan, Memoirs, I, 327 et seq.

CHAP. VI mond. Before night Stuart, commandidated art, W. P.

1830-54:
Brig-Gen.
C.S.A. Sept.
24,1851;
Mai-Gen.
July 25, 1882
Central railroad, recaptured four hund prisoners on their way to Richmond, de

Sheridan's Rep. W. R. XXXVI (1)
XXXV

were captured.

and more supplies at Ashland, and o arrived in Stuart's front. A severe ensued in which the losses were heavides; but the rebels were beaten, their tally wounded, and some guns and man

north of the city. Sheridan destroyed to

Sheridan passed through the outer Richmond, and could, no doubt, have passethe inner ones. But having no support could not have remained. After carried

wounded he struck for the James Rive

city, to communicate with Butler and men and horses, as well as to get food for them.

He moved first between the Chickal the James, but in the morning (the 12

stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville

May, 1864

W. R. XXXVI (1) 777, 778

CHAP. VI

occupying the opposite side. The panic created by his first entrance within the outer works of Richmond having subsided, troops were sent out to attack his rear.

He was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals could have extricated them-The defenses of Richmond, manned, were to the right; the Chickahominy was to the left, with no bridge remaining and the opposite bank guarded; to the rear was a force from Richmond. This force was attacked and beaten by Wilson's and Gregg's divisions, while Sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily built a bridge over the Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced a crossing, and soon dispersed the Confederates he found there. The enemy was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not

On the 13th Sheridan was at Bottom's Bridge, over the Chickahominy. On the 1-4th he crossed this 1646, 777, 778 stream, and on that day went into camp on the James River at Haxall's Landing. Heatonee put himself into communication with General Butler, who directed all the supplies he wanted to be furnished.

engaged in bridge-building.

Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomae at Spottsylvania, but did not know where either this or Lee's army was now. Great caution, therefore, had to be exercised in getting back. On the 17th, 15id. 779, 786 after resting his command for three clays, he started

on his return. He moved by the way of White

W. R. XXXVI (1) 854, 879

CHAP. VI May, 1864 where he learned the position of the t On the 24th he joined us on the march t Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity

field.

Sheridan in this memorable raid pass around Lee's army; encountered his cava engagements, and defeated them in all; four hundred Union prisoners and kille tured many of the enemy; destroyed and supplies and munitions of war; destroy railroad and telegraph; and freed us france by the cavalry of the enemy for more weeks.

## CHAPTER VII

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA—SIEGE OF ATLANTA
—DEATH OF GENERAL MCPHERSON—ATTEMPT TO
GAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE—CAPTURE OF ATLANTA

AFTER separating from Sherman in Cincinnati A I went on to Washington, as already stated. while he returned to Nashville to assume the duties of his new command. His military division was now composed of four departments and embraced all the territory west of the Alleghany Mountains and east of the Mississippi River, together with the State of Arkansas in the trans-Mississippi. The most easterly of these was the Department of the Ohio, General Schofield commanding; the next was the Department of the Cumberland, General Thomas commanding; the third the Department of the Tennessee, General McPherson commanding; and General Steele still commanded the trans-Mississippi, or Department of Arkansas. The last-named department was so far away that Sherman could not communicate with it very readily after starting on

CHAP. VII
Ante, II, 48

Sherman, Memoirs, II, 7

his spring campaign, and it was therefore soon E.R.S.Car

May 4, 1864

Sherman, Memoirs, II, 7 et seq.

chap.vii a former chapter, were to be simultand Ante, II, 58 the day to start, when the season si enough advanced, it was hoped, for the in a condition for the troops to march.

General Sherman at once set him preparing for the task which was assistant.

preparing for the task which was assist accomplish in the spring campaign. lay at Huntsville with about twenty-formen, guarding those points of Tennesses regarded as most worth holding; Thom sixty thousand men of the Army of the

teen thousand men, was at Knoxville. three armies, numbering about one husand men in all, Sherman was to mov fixed for the general advance, with a stroying Johnston's army and captur He visited each of these commands to

was at Chattanooga; and Schofield, wit

speaking generally, good.

One of the first matters to turn his was that of getting, before the time starting, an accumulation of supplies Chattanooga sufficiently large to warr ment. He found, when he got to that the trains over the single-track railroad.

frequently interrupted for a day or two were only sufficient to meet the daily

self as to their condition, and it was:

troops, without bringing forward any any kind. He found, however, that

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everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched, and used the road exclusively for transporting supplies. In this way he was able to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon for the move, the 4th of May.

Johnston's position

As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton, which was nearly one fourth of the way between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The country is mountainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in mountain streams, some of them of considerable volume. Dalton is on ground where water drains toward Atlanta and into one of the main streams rising northeast from there and flowing southwest—this being the general direction which all the main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering into them. Johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign during the entire winter. The best positions for defense had been selected all the way from Dalton back to Atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; so that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he would have another to fall into in his rear. His position at Dalton was so very strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped, to hold Sherman there and prevent him from getting any farther. With a less skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, I have no doubt that he would have succeeded.

paign

Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was plan of camfarthest back a few days in advance from KnoyCHAP, VII

This furlough had no

That departmen

sorb troops to no purpose to the This left McPherson so weak th plan above indicated had to be

move him south from there so as

into the road running from Chat a good distance to the rear of t was occupying; but when that it was hoped that McPherson troops enough to cope with Joh should move against him while u balance of the army. In this he Two of McPherson's veteran divis on the express provision that the


they were not back. Then, again, Sherman had len Ante, II, 65. Memoirs, II, 13, 14 sions under A. J. Smith, the win erate with the trans-Mississippi f the express pledge that they sh time specified, so as to be preg campaign. It is hardly necessar

not returned.

furlough.

therefore brought up to Chatta from there on a road to the righ two coming together about I Sherman, Memoirs, II, armies were abreast, all ready to 14 et sea. time.

Sherman soon found that Dala fortified that it was useless to ma carry it by account, and arrow to



prise to Johnston, and about the 13th he decided to

Pee Re

abandon his position at Dalton. On the 15th there was very hard fighting about Resaca; but our cavalry, having been sent around to the right, got near the road in the enemy's rear. Again Johnston fell back, our army pursuing. The pursuit was continued to Kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very little fighting, except that Newton's division overtook the rear of Johnston's army and engaged it. Sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of bringing up his railroad-trains. He was depending upon the railroad for all of his supplies, and as, of course, the railroad was wholly destroyed as Johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt. This work was pushed forward night and day, and caused much less delay than most persons would naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so many bridges to be rebuilt.

The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, the enemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there. It is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting—some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very important battles—

chap. VII ished up to the rear of Sherman's arm pursuit renewed. This pursuit brough to the vicinity of Allatoona. This place strongly intrenched, and naturally a very position. An assault upon it was not the but preparations were made to flank the of it. This was done by sending a later around our right, by the way of Dallas the rear of the enemy. Before reach however, they found the enemy fortifie way, and there resulted hard fighting for week at a place called New Hone Church

way, and there resulted hard fighting for week at a place called New Hope Church left our troops also were fortified, and a to the enemy as they could get. They keep ing still farther around to the left towar road. This was the case more particularly

cavalry. By the 4th of June Johnston f he was being hemmed in so rapidly that off, and Allatoona was left in our posses. Allatoona, being an important place, was intrenched for occupation by our troops vancing farther, and made a secondary by

for food, and the army got in readiness fo advance. The rains, however, were fallitorrents that it was impossible to move the the side roads which they would have to in order to turn Johnston out of his new

plies. The railroad was finished up to t the intrenchments completed, storehouse

While Sherman's army lay here, Gen

x

TOT .

1864

At this latter place our troops made an assault upon the enemy's lines after having got their own lines up close to him, and failed, sustaining considerable loss. But during the progress of the battle Schofield was gaining ground to the left: and the cavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear. These operations were completed by the 3d of July, when it was found that Johnston had evacuated the place. He was pursued at once. Sherman had made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strong guard in his intrenchments. He had intended. moving out with twenty days' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad again at the Chattahoochee River. Johnston frustrated this plan by himself starting back as above stated. This time he fell back to the Chattahoochee.

About the 5th of July he was besieged again, Sherman getting easy possession of the Chattahoochee River both above and below him. The enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened by flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across the river.

Here Johnston made a stand until the 17th, when Sherman's old tactics prevailed again and the final movement toward Atlanta began. Johnston was now relieved of the command, and Hood superseded him.

m. Capt.Cay.C. 8. A. May,
Johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem den. Mar. 3; to have met with much favor, either in the eyes of June 27,1862;

CHAP, VII Memoirs, II, 51 et seet.

IRBA

J. B. Hood, W.P.1849 53; Maj. Gen.

an indication of a change of policy, and they would become the aggressors—the v our troops wanted. For my own part, I think that Johnston

Anything that could have p were right. the war a year beyond the time that it d close would probably have exhausted the such an extent that they might then ha doned the contest and agreed to a separ

Atlanta was very strongly intrenched al

On the 20th he came out and atta

around in a circle about a mile and a half of

In addition to this, there were intrenchments which had to be taken before siege could be commenced. Sure enough, as indicated by the chang Van Horne, Army of Cumbermanders, the enemy was about to assume

Army of the Cumberland most furiously. R. W. John-son, W. P. 1844-49; Capt. 5th corps and Newton's and Johnson's divisions principal ones engaged in this contest, who Cav. Aug. 3, more than an hour; but the Confederates Brig.-Gen. Vols.Oct.11, forced to fall back inside their main lin 1861 losses were quite heavy on both sides. Or

> General Gresham, since our Postmaster was very badly wounded. During the nig abandoned his outer lines, and our troops vanced. The investment had not been reli

During the night of the 21st Hood m again, passing by our left flank, which wa motion to get a position farther in rear of

land, II, 112 et seq.

Siege of Atlanta

W. Q. Gresham, Col. 53d Ind. Dec. 1861; Brig. Gen. Vols. Aug. 11, 1863

for a moment during the day.

sive.

what surprised. While our troops were advancing of they were struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped. But they had become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion by an unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon they were in order and engaging the enemy, with the advantage now of knowing where their antagonist was. The field of battle continued to expand until it embraced about seven miles of ground. Finally, however, and before night, the enemy was driven back into the city.

It was during this battle that McPherson, while passing from one column to another, was instantly killed. In his death the army lost one of its ablest, purest, and best generals.

Garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the railroad east of Atlanta and to cut it in the direction of Augusta. He was successful in this, and returned about the time of the battle. Rousseau had also come up from Tennessee with a small division of cavalry, having crossed the Tennessee River about Decatur and made a raid into Alabama. Finally, when hard pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear of Sherman, and reported to him about this time.

The battle of the 22d is usually known as the

The General John A. Logan, upon whom devolved the command of the Tennessee during this battle, in his report gave our total loss in killed, wounded, and missing at 3521, and estimated under Fuller and Mersy they took J.

Battle of Atlanta, although the city did into our hands until the 2d of September arations went on, as before, to flank the e of his position. The work was tedious, and that had to be maintained were very lo troops were gradually worked around to until they struck the road between Dec These lines were strongly for were those to the north and west of the

> move by our right and try to get upon the down south of Atlanta. On the 27th the movement by the rig commenced. On the 28th the enemy st

> as close up to the enemy's lines as practic order to hold them with the smallest possi ber of men, the design being to detach ar

right flank, General Logan commanding, w vigor. Logan intrenched himself hastily that means was enabled to resist all assault flict a great deal of damage upon the enemy assaults were continued to the middle of t noon, and resumed once or twice still lat

saults were fearful.

During that evening the enemy in Loga withdrew into the town. This now left S army close up to the Confederate lines, e

day. The enemy's losses in these unsucce

from a point directly east of the city ar the north and west of it for a distance of Geo. stone- miles; the whole of this line being intrene

prisoners about Andersonville. There were painful stories current at the time about the great hardships these prisoners had to endure in the way of general bad treatment, in the way in which they were housed, and in the way in which they were fed. Great sympathy was felt for them; and it was thought that even if they could be turned loose upon the country it would be a great relief to them. the attempt proved a failure. McCook, who commanded a small brigade, was first reported to have istCav.May been captured; but he got back, having inflicted a Apr. 27, 1864 good deal of damage upon the enemy. He had also taken some prisoners; but encountering afterward a largely superior force of the enemy, he was obliged to drop his prisoners and get back as best he could with what men he had left. He had lost several hundred men out of his small command. On the 4th of August Colonel Adams, commanding a little brigade of about a thousand men, returned reporting Stoneman and all but himself as lost. I myself had heard around Richmond of the capture of Stoneman, and had sent Sherman word, which he received. The rumor was confirmed there, also, from other sources. A few days after Colonel Adams's return Colonel Capron also got in with a small detachment and confirmed the report of the capture of Stoneman with something less than a thousand

CHAP. VII

E. M. Mo-Cook, 2d Lt. 8,1861; Brig.-

> w. r. xxxviii (2) 762 764

Silas Ad ams, Col. 1st Ky. Cav.

Horace Capron, Col. comdg. 3d Brig. Cav.3d Div.

W. R. XXXVIII (2) 913

It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was impossible, had made arrangements to the many of two divisions. He governed the

mon.

CHAP. VII

Ibid. 103

commanding Confederate. In this ra

much damage was inflicted upon th the destruction of cars, locomotives, a manufactories of military supplies, etc On the 4th and 5th Sherman endea Aug. 1864 upon the railroad to our right, whe was in command, but these attempts fa Sherman, Memoirs, II, General Palmer was charged with bei 99 et sea. of this failure, to a great extent, by l Sherman and General Schofield; but I pared to say this, although a question s arisen with Palmer as to whether Schot

right to command him. If he did rai tion while an action was going on, th was exceedingly reprehensible. About the same time Wheeler got u


road north of Resaca and destroyed it

Sherman made preparations for a rep

This cut Sherman off from tion with the North for several day responded to this attack on his lines cation by directing one upon theirs. Kilpatrick started on the night of H.J. Kilpatrick, W. P.

1856-61; Col. 2d N. Y. August to reach the Macon road abou Cav. Dec. 6. He succeeded in doing so, passed ent 1862; Brig.-Gen. Vols. the Confederate lines of Atlanta, ar June 13, 1863 w. r. xxxviii again in his former position on our lef (2)858

These little affairs, however, contribu little to the grand result. They annoy but any damage thus done to a ra cavalry expedition is soon repaired.



movement on the 25th of August, and on the 1st of CHAP. VII September was well up toward the railroad twenty miles south of Atlanta. Here he found Hardee intrenched, ready to meet him. A battle ensued, but he was unable to drive Hardee away before night set in. Under cover of the night, however, Hardee left of his own accord. That night Hood blew up his military works, such as he thought would be valuable in our hands, and decamped.

Sherman,

The next morning at daylight General H. W. Slocum, who was commanding north of the city, moved in and took possession of Atlanta, and notified Sherman. Sherman then moved deliberately back, taking three days to reach the city, and occupied a line extending from Decatur on the left to Atlanta in the center, with his troops extending out of the city for some distance to the right.

Memoirs, II, 108

The campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the most memorable in history. was but little, if anything, in the whole campaign, now that it is over, to criticize at all, and nothing to criticize severely. It was creditable alike to the general who commanded and the army which had executed it. Sherman had on this campaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders whose alertness added a host to the efficiency of his command.

H. W. Slocum, W. P. 1848-52; Col. 27th N. Y. May 21, Brig.-Gen. 1861; Maj.-Gen. July 4 1862

The troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable and to enjoy a little rest after The city of Atlanta was their arduous campaign.

Sherman, Memoirs, II. Sherman.

the citizens and getting the money of the for articles of but little use to them, and they are made to pay most exorbitant pr

limited the number of these traders to one of his three armies.

instantaneously and set the country all agle was the first great political campaign for publicans in their canvass of 1864. It was later by Sheridan's campaign in the She Valley; and these two campaigns prob more effect in settling the election of the November than all the speeches, all the bon all the parading with banners and bands in the North.

The news of Sherman's success reached

### CHAPTER VIII

GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC—
CROSSING THE RAPIDAN—ENTERING THE WILDERNESS—BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS

SOON after midnight, May 3d-4th, the Army of the Potomac moved out from its position of the Potomac moved out from its position north of the Rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign destined to result in the capture of the Confederate capital and the army defending it. This was not to be accomplished, however, without as desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed; not to be consummated in a day, a week, a month, or a single season. The losses inflicted and endured were destined to be severe; but the armies now confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a period of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness, captured and wounded; and neither had made any real progress toward accomplishing the final end. It is true the Confederates had, so far, held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object. But previously they had boldly proclaimed their

CHAP. VIII
Orders, W.
R. XXXVI
(2) 331-334.—
Humphreys, Virginia Campaign, p. 18
et seq.

chap. VIII contemplation by the loyal North come near losing their own capit occasion. So here was a stand-or now begun was destined to result to both armies, in a given time, th suffered; but the carnage was to single year, and to accomplish a anticipated or desired at the begin We had to have hard fighting to a two armies had been confronting e without any decisive result, that which could whip.

\*\*EXXYI (2)\*

Ten days' rations, with a suppose to the suppose to the


which could whip.

Ten days' rations, with a suppression amount on, were taken in wag were driven with the trains as wanted. Three days' rations in a sacks, and fifty rounds of cartrid on the person of each soldier.

Topography

The country over which the as ate, from the Rapidan to the cross River, is rather flat, and is cut by rewhich make their way to the Chesse crossings of these streams by the ally made not far above tide-water formed a considerable obstacle to the contract of training areas.

crossings of these streams by the ally made not far above tide-water formed a considerable obstacle to to of troops even when the enemy of opposition. The country roads a poor. Most of the country is coverest, in places, like the Wilderne Chickahominy, almost impenetra



### CROSSING THE RAPIDAN

infantry and one cavalry corps, commanded respec-

tively by Generals W. S. Hancock, G. K. Warren, John Sedgwick, and P. H. Sheridan. The artillery was commanded by General Henry J. Hunt. This arm was in such abundance that the fourth of it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we were destined to pass through. The surplus was much in the way, taking up, as it did, so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of the forage and other stores brought up by the trains.

The Fifth Corps, General Warren commanding, was in advance on the right, and marched directly for Germanna Ford, preceded by one division of

# UNION ARMY ON THE RAPIDAN, MAY 5, 1864.

[Compiled.]

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE, commanding Army of the
Potomac.

	C. Barlow.
MajGen. W. S. Hancock,	Second Division,
commanding	BrigGen. John
Second Army-corps.	Gibbon.

Third Division, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney.

First Division,

Brig.-Gen. Francis

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. H. H. Ward. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alex. Hays.

Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll.

Brig.-Gen. Joshua T. Öwen.

Brigade,

First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles. Second Brigade, Col.

Thomas A. Smyth. Third Brigade, Col.

Paul Frank.
Fourth Brigade, Col.
John R. Brooke.
First Brigade, Brig.Gen.Alex.S.Webb.

Second

16, 1861;

Brig.-Gen. Vols. Nov.

29,1862

CHAP. VIII cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson. Gen wick followed Warren with the Sixth Co. manna Ford was nine or ten miles below of Lee's line. Hancock, with the Seco moved by another road, farther east, dire Elv's Ford, six miles below Germanna, pr Gregg's division of cavalry, and follow-

A. T. Tor-bert, W. P. 1851-55; Col. 1stN.J.Sept. artillery. Torbert's division of cavalry north of the Rapidan, for the time, to river and prevent the enemy from cro

> getting into our rear. The cavalry seize crossings before daylight, drove the enem guarding them away, and by 6 A.M. had toons laid ready for the crossing of the

> and artillery. This was undoubtedly a s The fact that the movement was u proves this.

> > First Division.

Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John C.

Robinson.

Third Division,

Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.

First 1 Gen

Ayr Secon

Jaco Third Gen First Sam ard.

Second Brig

Bax Third


And

son.

 $\mathbf{Wm}$ 

First

Third Jose First 1 Gen



### CROSSING THE RAPIDAN

Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, was left back at Warrenton, guarding the railroad from Bull Run forward to preserve control of it in case our crossing the Rapidan should be long delayed. He was instructed, however, to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed; and a despatch was sent to him a little after 1 P.M. giving the information that our crossing had been successful.

The country was heavily wooded at all the points


First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown. Second Brigade, Col.

Thos. C. Devin.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry E. Da-

Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt.

Reserve



Brig.-Gen. A. T. A.

Torbert.

Second Division.

MAJ.-GEN. P. H. SHERIDAN.

commanding

river. The battle-field from the crossin Rapidan until the final movement from derness toward Spottsylvania was of the sacter. There were some clearings and sm within what might be termed the battle-generally the country was covered with forest. The roads were narrow and bad.

CHAP. VIII of crossing, particularly on the south si

There are two roads, good for that paginia, running from Orange Court House battle-field. The most southerly of these known as the Orange Court House Plank

> First : Sumi Second Danie First 1 Zenas Second Simo First 1 John Second Benj. First 1 Joshu Second Henr Provisi-Col. E shall. First 1 J. H. Second J. A. First B Art., Rober Second HorseD. R. Third I R. H. Provost Gen. I

Volunte neers H. W

conditions were favorable for defensive or

MajGen. A. E. Burnside, commanding Ninth Army-corps.	First Division. BrigGen. T. G. Stevenson.  Second Division, BrigGen. Robert B. Potter.  Third Division, BrigGen. Orlando B. Willcox.  Fourth Division, BrigGen. Edward Ferrero.
BRIGGEN. HENRY J. HUNT, commanding Artillery.	Reserve Col. H. S. Burton.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.....

northern one as the Orange Turnpike. There are CHAP. VI also roads from east of the battle-field running to Spottsylvania Court House—one from Chancellorsville, branching at Aldrich's; the western branch going by Piney Branch Church, Alsop's, thence by the Brock road to Spottsylvania; the east branch

#### CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, August 31, 1864.

First Army-corps: Lieut.-Gen. R. H. Anderson, Commanding.

```
Brig.-Gen. Seth M. Barton's Brigade. (a)
                                                M. D. Corse's
MAJ.-GEN. GEO. E. PICKETT'S
                                         "
                                                Eppa Hunton's
  Division.
                                                Wm. R. Terry's
                                    Brig.-Gen. G. T. Anderson's Brigade.
E. M. Law's (c)
MAJ.-GEN. C. W. FIELD'S Divi-
                                                John Bratton's
                                    Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford's Brigade.
B. G. Humphreys's "
Maj.-Gen. J. B. Kershaw's Di-
                                         ..
                                                Goode Bryan's
  vision. (d)
                                                Kershaw's (Old)
     Second Army-corps: Maj.-Gen. Jubal A. Early, Commanding.
                                    Brig.-Gen. H. T. Hays's Brigade. (e)
                                                John Pegram's
Maj.-Gen. John B. Gordon's
                                                 Gordon's
                                                                        (g)
   Division.
                                     Brig.-Gen. R. F. Hoke's
                                     Stonewall Brig. (Brig.-Gen. J. A. Walker).
                                       (h)
Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson's
                                     Brig.-Gen. J. M. Jones's Brigade. (h)
Geo. H. Stewart's (h)
   Division.
                                                 L. A. Stafford's
                                                                         (e)
                                     Brig.-Gen. J. Daniel's Brigade. (i)
                                                 Geo. Dole's
 MAJ.-GEN. R. E. Rodes's Divi-
                                                 S. D. Ramseur's Brigade.
                                          "
   sion.
                                                 C. A. Battle's
```

NOTE.

"

R. D. Johnston's

<sup>(</sup>a) Colonel W. R. Aylett was in command August 29th, and probably at above date.

Inspection report of this division shows that it also contained Benning's and Gregg's Brigades.

Commanded by Colonel P. D. Bowles.

Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not indicated. Constituting York's Brigade.
In Ramseur's Division.

OHAP. VIII goes by Gates's, thence to Spottsylvania road runs from Germanna Ford throug field and on to the Court House. As S is approached the country is cut up wi roads, some going to the town direct

Ford in the Wilderness.

there. Lee's headquarters were at Orange ( From there to Fredericksburg he had t two roads above described running me to the Wilderness. This gave him unus for that country, for concentrating his

right. These roads strike the road fro

erossing so as to connect the farms with

Third Army-corps: Linux, Ges. A. P. Hual, Co.

Brig. Gen. J. C. San Maluanto Maj. Gen. Wm. Mahone's Divi-Brig. Gen. N. H. Har A. R. Wra sion. (/) Jemegelt Par Brig. Gen. E. L. Thon Maj.-Gen. C. M. Wilcox's Di Jahn SH. I .. Samil Meta vision. Altred M : f Briggetten, J. R. Davi John R Co Maj.-(len. H. Hern's Division. 44 D. McRac'

Unattached: Fifth Alabama Battalion

J. J. Arch H. H. Wall

Cavalry Corps: Ligger, Gree, Ward Hampton, Con-

MAL-GEN. PITZICOH LIEPS DI A Brig. Gen. W. C. Wie 4, 1, Lom MALGER, M. C. Buttank's Di f Brig. Gen. John Dune P. M. D. Y

vision. Themas L MAL GEN. W. H. F. Luchs Di & Brig then Rufus Bar J. R. Chan

vision.

(o)

## ENTERING THE WILDERNESS

As soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry pushed forward, Wilson's divi-

sion by Wilderness Tavern to Parker's Store, on the Orange plank road; Gregg to the left toward Chancellorsville. Warren followed Wilson and reached the Wilderness Tavern by noon, took position there, and intrenched. Sedgwick followed Warren. He was across the river and in camp on the south bank, on the right of Warren, by sundown. Hancock, with the Second Corps, moved parallel with Warren and

Artillery Reserve: BRIG.-GEN. W. N. PENDLETON, Commanding. Manly's Battery. First Co. Richmond Howitzers. Cabell's Battalion. Carleton's Battery. Calloway's Branch's Battery. Nelson's Haskell's Battalion. Garden's Rowan Brig.-Gen. E. P. Smith's Battery. ALEXANDER'S Moody " Division.1 Woolfolk Huger's Battalion. Parker's Taylor's Fickling's Martin's Davidson's Battery. Gibb's Battalion. Dickenson's Otey's Lee Battery. First Maryland Artillery. Braxton's Battalion. Stafford Alleghany Charlotteville Artillerv. Cutshaw's Battalion. Staunton Courtney Morris Artillery. BRIG.-GEN. Orange Carter's Battalion. A. L. King William Artillery. Long's Divi-Jeff Davis SION. Amherst Artillery. Nelson's Battalion. Milledge Fluvauna Powhatan Artillery.

ocand Richmond

camped about six miles east of him. CHAP. VIII XXXVI (1) all the troops, and by the evening of trains of more than four thousand safely on the south side of the riv The wagon-There never was a corps better o trains was the quartermaster's corps with the Potomac in 1864. With a way would have extended from the Ray mond, stretched along in single file an the teams necessarily would be whe

could still earry only three days' for ten to twelve days' rations, beside ammunition. To overcome all difficulties R. Ingalls, W. P. 1839-43; Mexico, quartermaster, General Rufus Ingall on each wagon the corps badge wit 1846-47; Maj. Staff. Q. M. Jan. 12, 1862; Brig.-Gen. color and the number of the brigade the particular brigade to which any w Vols. May 23, 1863

could be told. The wagons were a note the contents: if ammunition, wh lery or infantry; if forage, whether if rations, whether bread, pork, bear coffee, or whatever it might be. I

Cutt's Battalion.

Richardson's Battalion. McIntosh's Battalion.

Ross's Batt

Patterson's Irwin Artil Lewis Arti Donaldson


Norfolk Li Huger Johnson's Hardaway

Danville

Second Ro

( Poodea Art

Con. R. I. Walker's DIVISION.



were never allowed to follow the army or stay in CHAP. VIII camp. As soon as a wagon was empty it would return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same article that had been taken from it. Empty trains were obliged to leave the road free for loaded ones. Arriving near the army, they would be parked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to. Issues, except of ammunition, were made at night in all cases. By this system the hauling of forage for the supply-trains was almost wholly dispensed with. They consumed theirs at the depots.

I left Culpeper Court House after all the troops had been put in motion, and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the Rapidan in advance of Sedg- J.Sedgwick, W.P. 1833- wick's corps, and established headquarters for the office of Sedg- J.Sedgwick, W.P. 1833- 37; Mexico, 1847; Berg- Sedgwick, W.P. 1833- 37; Mexico, 1847; Mexico, 1 afternoon and night in a deserted house near the river.

Orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut down the baggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible. Notwithstanding this I saw scattered along the road from Culpeper to Germanna Ford wagon-loads of new blankets and overcoats, thrown away by the troops to lighten their knapsacks—an improvidence I had never witnessed before.

Lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a very early hour on the morning of the 4th of May that the Army of the Potomac was moving, evidently did not learn until about one o'clock in the afternoon by what route we would

Aug. 31, 1861; Maj.-Gen. k. Spottsyl vania, May

A.P.Hill, W. P. 1842-47;

W. R. XXXVI(2)

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CHAP, VIII seen to be an order to his troops to or trenchments at Mine Run. Hore at night despatches were rece

ing that Sherman, Butler, and Croc according to programme. On discovering the advance of the Potomac, Lee ordered Hill, Ewell, ar Virg.Camp. p. 22 each commanding corps, to move to t

tack us, Hill on the Orange Plank Ro Mexico, 1847-48; Maj.-Gen. C. S. A. May 5, to follow on the same road. Longstr 1862; Lt.-Gen. May 20, time-middle of the afternoon-at 1863; k. Petwenty or more miles away. Ewel tersburg, Apr. 1, 1865 by the Orange Pike. He was near b

> some four miles east of Mine Run be ing for the night. My orders were given through Gen an early advance on the morning of t

ren was to move to Parker's Store, eavalry—then at Parker's Store—t

Craig's meeting-house. Sedgwick fol closing in on his right. The Army o was facing to the west, though our made to the south, except when faci Hancock was to move southwestwa the left of Warren, his left to reach to

At six o'clock, before reaching I 539; (2) 413 Warren discovered the enemy. He's to this effect, and was ordered to ha to meet and attack him. Wright, wi

Church.

W. R. XXXVI (1)

CI YOU CLASSES

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on his left. This was the speediest way to reinforce Chap. VIII Warren, who was confronting the enemy on both the Orange plank and turnpike roads.

Burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that the Army of the Potomac had safely crossed the Rapidan. By making a nightmarch, although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the 5th.

Meade moved his headquarters on to Old Wilderness Tavern, four miles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the road. I remained to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him in position. Burnside at this time was not under Meade's command, and was his senior in rank. Getting information of the proximity of the enemy, I informed Meade, and, without waiting to see Burnside, at once moved forward my headquarters to where Meade was.

It was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take the initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments, if we were not intrenched ourselves. Warren had not yet reached the point where he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by. Neither party had any advantage of position. Warren was therefore ordered to attack as soon as he could prepare for it. At nine o'clock Hancock was ordered to come up to the support of Getty. He himself arrived at Getty's front about noon, but his troops were yet

W. R. XXXVI (1) isolated from Warren and was in a prodition for a time. Wilson, with his dialry, was farther south, and was cut rest of the army. At two o'clock Har began to arrive, and immediately he was join Getty and attack the enemy. I timber and narrow roads prevented by ting into position for attack as prompt

ting into position for attack as promperally did when receiving such orders to account o'clock he again received his orders from minutes later to attack whether Hance

or not. He met the enemy under Hetl

hundred yards.

Hancock immediately sent two di manded by Birney and Mott, and l gades, Carroll's and Owen's, to the sup Brig-cten.

May, 1861; This was timely and saved Getty. Di tle Getty and Carroll were wounded, on the field. One of Birney's most gates.

commanders—Alexander Hays—was

A. Hays, W.
P. 1840-44:
Mexico,
1846-48:
Gol. 63d Pa.
Aug. 25, 1861:
Brig-Gen.
Vols. Sept.
29, 1802

He was a most gallant officer, ready to mand wherever ordered. With him is

H. Baxter, Capt. 7th Wadsworth's division and Baxter's Mich. Aug. second division were sent to reinforce Gen. Vols. Gotty: but the density of the inter-

boys," not "Go,"

# BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS

During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregg's divi-

sion of cavalry to Todd's Tavern in search of Wilson. This was fortunate. He found Wilson engaged with a superior force under General Rosser, supported by infantry, and falling back before it. Together they were strong enough to turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive. They soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond Corbin's Bridge.

Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued until night put a close to it. Neither side made any special progress.

After the close of the battle of the 5th of May my

orders were given for the following morning. We knew Longstreet with twelve thousand men was on his way to join Hill's right, near the Brock road, and might arrive during the night. I was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiative in the morning, and therefore ordered Hancock to make an assault at 4:30 o'clock. Meade asked to have the hour changed to six. Deferring to his wishes as far as I was willing, the order was modified and

Hancock had now fully one half of the Army of the Potomac. Wadsworth, with his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a line perpendicular to that held by Hill, and to the right of Hancock. He was directed to move at the same time, and to attack Hill's left.

five was fixed as the hour to move.

Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions,

that Lee would not have made another stand out- CHAP. VIII side of his Richmond defenses.

Gibbon commanded Hancock's left, and was ordered to attack, but was not able to accomplish much.

John Gib-bon, W. P. 1842-47; Mexico. 1847–48; Brig.-Gen. Vols. May 2, 1862; Maj.-Gen. June 7.

On the morning of the 6th Sheridan was sent to connect with Hancock's left and attack the enemy's cavalry, who were trying to get on our left and rear. He met them at the intersection of the Furnace and Brock roads and at Todd's Tavern, and defeated them at both places. Later he was attacked, and again the enemy was repulsed. Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and

Stuart, and thinking the enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his position guarding the entrance to the Brock road. Another incident happened during the day to further induce Hancock to weaken his attacking column. Word reached him that troops were seen moving toward him from the direction of Todd's Tavern, and Brooke's J.R. Brooke, brigade was detached to meet this new enemy; but Brig. Gen. the troops approaching proved to be several hundred convalescents coming from Chancellorsville, by the road Hancock had advanced upon, to join their respective commands. At 6:50 a.m., Burnside, who had passed Wilderness Tavern at six o'clock, was ordered to send a division to the support of Hancock, but to continue with the remainder of his command in the execution of his previous order. The difficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented Burnside from getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of the 6th.

Tbid. 322

Vols. May 12

Hancock followed Hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a mile or more. He maintained this posi-

CHAP. VIII enemy as they could, and to take advantage of any attempt to reinforce Hill from that quarter. Burnside was ordered, if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's center, to swing around to the left and envelop the right of Lee's army. Hancock was informed of all the movements ordered.

Burnside had three divisions; but one of them a colored division—was sent to guard the wagontrain, and he did not see it again until July.

Lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on his right until Longstreet got up. This is evident from the fact that notwithstanding the early hour at which I had ordered the assault, both for the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike before Longstreet got up, Lee was ahead in his assault on our right. His purpose was evident, but he failed.

Virg. Camp. p. 37

W. R. XXXVI (1)

F. C. Bar-low,Col.61st N. Y. Apr. Gen. Vols. Sept. 19, 1862

Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in time that Longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the Catharpin road, thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded by General Barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches by which Longstreet was expected. This disposition was made in time to attack as ordered. Hancock moved by the left of the Orange Plank Road, and Wadsworth by the right of it. The fighting was desperate for about an hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion.

I believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that if the country had been such that Hancock and his command could have seen the confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have been taken advantage of so effectually

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held by Hancock's command, swept down the whole CHAP. VI length of them from left to right. A brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move; but it broke and disappeared without a contest.

Firing was continued after this, but with less fury. Burnside had not yet been able to get up to render any assistance; but it was now only about nine in the morning, and he was getting into position on Hancock's right.

At 4:15 in the afternoon Lee attacked our left. His line moved up to within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire. This status was maintained for about half an hour. Then a part of Mott's division and Ward's brigade of Birney's division gave way and retired in disorder. The enemy under R. H. Anderson took advantage of this and pushed through our line, planting their flags on a part of the intrenchments not on fire. But owing to the efforts of Hancock their success was but temporary. Carroll, of Gibbon's division, moved at a double-quick with his brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting great loss. Fighting had continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line, at other times only in places. ground fought over had varied in width, but averaged three quarters of a mile. The killed and many of the severely wounded of both armies lay within this belt, where it was impossible to reach them. The woods were set on fire by the bursting shells, and the conflagration raged. The wounded who had not strength to move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death. Finally the fire communicated with our breastworks in places. constructed of wood, they burned with great fury.

W. R.

Ward, M ico, 1846-Col. 38th Y. May 1861; Br Gen. Vc Oct. 4. 1

S. S. Cari W. P.1853 Col.8thO Dec.15, 1 Brig.-G Vols.Ma 1864

> W. F XXXV 324

W.R. XXXVI(1)

CHAP. VIII tion until, along in the afternoon, Longstreet came upon him. The retreating column of Hill, meeting reinforcements that had not yet been engaged, became encouraged and returned with them. were enabled from the density of the forest, to approach within a few hundred vards of our advance before being discovered. Falling upon a brigade of Hancock's corps thrown to the advance, they swept it away almost instantly. The enemy followed up his advantage and soon came upon Mott's division, which fell back in great confusion. Hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, but after holding it for a time fell back into the position that he had held in the morning, which was strongly intrenched. In this engagement the intrepid Wadsworth, while trying to rally his men, was mortally wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. The enemy followed up, but made no immediate attack.

J. S. Wadsworth, Brig.-Gén Vols. Aug. 9, 1861

Brig.-Gen. Micah Jenkins

The Confederate General Jenkins was killed and Longstreet seriously wounded in this engagement. Longstreet had to leave the field, not to resume command for many weeks. His loss was a severe one to Lee, and compensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misapprehensions, which had fallen to our lot during the day.

After Longstreet's removal from the field Lee took command of his right in person. He was not able, however, to rally his men to attack Hancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the purpose of reforming. Hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnants that might be left of Longstreet's or Hill's commands. This brigade, having been formed at right angles to the intrenchments

we might have brought fresh troops to his great discourse viii comfort. Many officers who had not been attacked by Early continued coming to my headquarters even after Sedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news of the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was pushing on and would soon be upon me.

During the night all of Lee's army withdrew within their intrenchments. On the morning of the 7th General Custer drove the enemy's cavalry. from Catharpin Furnnee to Todd's Tavern. Pickets. and skirmishers were sent along our entire front to find the position of the enemy. Some went as far as a mile and a half before finding him. But Lee showed no disposition to come out of his works. There was no battle during the day, and but little firing except in Warren's front, he being directed about noon to make a reconnaissance in force. This drew some sharp firing, but there was no attempt on the part of Lee to drive him back. This ended the battle of the Wilderness.

G. A. Custer, W. P. 1857 61; udld adday. June 23,1861; Bilg. toni. Volo June ps, 1561; Maj. Gen. Apr. 15, 1865 CHAP. VIII

But the battle still raged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot to remain longer.

Lee was now in distress. His men were in confusion, and his personal efforts failed to restore order. These facts, however, were learned subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and no doubt gained a decisive success. His troops were withdrawn now; but I revoked the order, which I had given previously to this assault, for Hancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition and did not have time to replenish from the train, which was at some distance.

W. R. XXXVI (2) 445, 447

W. R. XXXVI (1) 540, 906 Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up an assault during all this time; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent the enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front.

I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the Rapidan to be taken up, except one at Germanna Ford.

The troops on Sedgwick's right had been sent to reinforce our left. This left our right in danger of being turned, and us of being cut off from all present base of supplies. Sedgwick had refused his right and intrenched it for protection against at-But late in the afternoon of the 6th Early tack. came out from his lines in considerable force and got in upon Sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and created considerable confu-Early captured several hundred prisoners, among them two general officers. The defense, however, was vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as much confusion as our troops, engaged, were. Early says in his "Memoirs" that if we had discovered the confusion in his lines

Virg. Camp. pp. 49, 50

J. A. Early, W.P.1833-37; Mexico, 1847-48; Brig.-Gen. C. S. A. 1863; Lt.-Gen. 1864; d. Mar. 2, 1894

or not, the moment arms were stacked the men intrenched themselves. For this purpose they would build up piles of logs or rails if they could be found in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on the timber. Thus the digging they did counted in making a depression to stand in, and increased the elevation in front of them. wonderful how quickly they could in this way construct defenses of considerable strength. When a halt was made with the view of assaulting the enemy, or in his presence, these would be strengthened or their positions changed under the direction of engineer officers. The second was the use made of the telegraph and signal corps. Nothing could be more complete than the organization and discipline of this body of brave and intelligent men. Insulated wires—insulated so that they would transmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water-were wound upon reels, making about two hundred pounds' weight of wire to each reel. men and one mule were detailed to each reel. The pack-saddle on which this was carried was provided with a rack like a sawbuck placed crosswise of the saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with its wire, would revolve freely. There was a wagon supplied with a telegraph-operator, battery, and telegraph instruments for each division, each corps, each army, and one for my headquarters. There were wagons also loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall-tent pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires up when laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run over them. The mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always kept with the command

CHAP. IX
Intrenching

Telegraph and signal corps

### CHAPTER IX

AFTER THE BATTLE—TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SER-VICE—MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK

CHAP. IX

MORE desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent than that of the 5th and 6th of May. Our victory consisted in having successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of an enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit. We gained an advantage on the morning of the 6th which, if it had been followed up, must have proven very decisive. In the evening the enemy gained an advantage, but was speedily repulsed. As we stood at the close the two armies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as when the river divided them. But the fact of having safely crossed was a victory.

Returns of Union casualties, W. R. XXXVI (1) 119-136 Our losses in the Wilderness were very severe. Those of the Confederates must have been even more so; but I have no means of speaking with accuracy upon this point. The Germanna Ford bridge was transferred to Ely's Ford to facilitate the transportation of the wounded to Washington.

It may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things connected with all movements of the Army of the Potomac. First, in every change of position or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy The signal service was used on the march. The men composing this corps were assigned to specified commands. When movements were made, they would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points of ground giving a commanding view of the country if cleared, or would climb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote, by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and often the movements of the enemy. They would also take off the signals of the enemy and transmit them. It would sometimes take too long a time to make translations of intercepted despatches for us to receive any benefit from them; but sometimes they gave useful information.

On the afternoon of the 7th I received news from Washington announcing that Sherman had probably attacked Johnston that day, and that Butler had reached City Point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th. I had given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that Lee might move rapidly to Richmond to crush Butler before I could get there.

My order for this movement was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, May 7, 1864, 6:30 a.m.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding Army of the Potomac:

Make all preparations during the day for a night-march to take position at Spottsylvania Court House with one army-corps, at Todd's Tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the Piney Branch and Spottsylvania road with the road from Alsop's to Old Court House. If this move is made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the Ny River.

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
May, 1864

Capture of City Point

W. R. XXXVI (2) 481 CHAP. IX

they were assigned to. The operators were also assigned to particular headquarters, and never changed except by special orders.

The moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the men connected with this branch of service would proceed to put up their wires. A mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear of the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to, and would be led in a line parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire and uncoil it as the mule was led off. When he had walked the length of the wire the whole of it would be on the ground. This would be done in rear of every brigade at the same time. The ends of all the wires would then be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army. The men attached to brigades or divisions would all commence at once raising the wires with their telegraph-poles. This was done by making a loop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to a perpendicular position. At intervals the wire would be attached to trees, or some other permanent object. so that one pole was sufficient at a place. In the absence of such a support two poles would have to be used, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in its place. While this was being done the telegraph-wagons would take their positions near where the headquarters they belonged to were to be established, and would connect with the wire. Thus, in a few minutes' longer time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil, telegraphic communication would be effected between all the headquarters of the army. No orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph.



CHAP. IX

I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave Hancock where he is until Warren passes him. He could then follow and become the right of the new line. Burnside will move to Piney Branch Church. Sedgwick can move along the pike to Chancellorsville and on to his destination. Burnside will move on the plank road to the intersection of it with the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, then follow Sedgwick to his place of destination.

All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops move, and then move off quietly.

It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attack on Hancock this afternoon. In case they do we must be prepared to resist them, and follow up any success we may gain with our whole force. Such a result would necessarily modify these instructions.

All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellors-ville.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

W. R. XXXVI (1) 774, 775

During the 7th Sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at Todd's Tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that were to go by that route at night. Soon after dark Warren withdrew from the front of the enemy, and was soon followed by Sedgwick. Warren's march carried him immediately behind the works where Hancock's command lay on the Brock road. With my staff and a small escort of cavalry I preceded the troops. Meade with his staff accompanied me. The greatest enthusiasm was manifested by Hancock's men as we passed by. No doubt it was inspired by the fact that the movement was south. It indicated to them that they had passed through the "beginning of the end" in the battle just fought. The cheering was so lusty that the enemy must have taken it for a night-attack. At all events, it drew from him

ous fusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly care ix , but not felt, by us.

ade and I rode in advance. We had passed little way beyond our left when the road d. We looked to see, if we could, which road dan had taken with his cavalry during the

It seemed to be the right hand one, and acngly we took it. We had not gone far, howwhen Colonel C. B. Cornstock, of my staff, with istinct of the engineer, suspecting that we were road that would lead us into the lines of the ly if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at id gallop and all alone. In a few minutes he med and reported that Lee was moving, and the road we were on would bring us into his in a short distance. We returned to the forks acroad, left a man to indicate the right road to iend of Warren's column when it should come and continued our journey to Todd's Tavern, re we arrived after midnight.

y object in moving to Spottsylvania was two-: first, I did not want Lee to get back to Richd in time to attempt to crush Butler before I d get there; second, I wanted to get between army and Richmond, if possible; and if not, raw him into the open field. But Lee, by accit, beat us to Spottsylvania. Our wagon-trains been ordered easterly of the roads the troops e to march upon before the movement comreed. Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of Army of the Potomic to Fredericksburg, and so ormed his government. Accordingly he ordered igstreet's corps — now commanded by Anderson

o move in the morning (the 8th) to Spottsyl-

CHAP. IX R. H.Ander-son, W. P. 1838-42; Mexico. 1846-48; Brig.-Gen. C. S. A. Mar. 1861; Maj.-Gen. Aug. 1862; Lt.-Gen. May, 1864

vania. But the woods being still on fire, Anderson could not go into biyoune, and marched directly on to his destination that night. By this accident Lee got possession of Spottsylvania. It is impossible to say now what would have been the result if Lee's orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain that we would have been in Spottsylvania and between him and his capital. My belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to see which could reach Richmond first, and the Army of the Potomac would have had the shorter Thus twice since crossing the Rapidan we line. came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from the Rapidan to the James River or Richmond. The first failure was caused by our not following up the success gained over Hill's corps on the morning of the 6th, as before described: the second, when fires caused by that battle drove Anderson to make a march during the night of the 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th. But accident often decides the fate of battle.

Ante, II, 111

Sheridan, Memoirs, I,

363 et seq.

Wesley Merritt, W. P. 1855-60; Brig.-Gen. Vols. June 29, 1863; Maj.-Gen. Apr. 1, 1865

Sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon of the 7th, lasting at Todd's Tavern until after night, with the field his at the He issued the necessary orders for seizing close. Spottsylvania and holding the bridge over the Po River, which Lee's troops would have to cross to get to Spottsylvania. But Meade changed Sheridan's orders to Merritt-who was holding the bridge-on his arrival at Todd's Tavern, and thereby left the road free for Anderson when he came up. Wilson, who was ordered to seize the town, did so with his division of cavalry; but he could not hold it against

nfederate corps, which had not been detained crossing of the Po, as it would have been but unfortunate change in Merritt's orders. Had n permitted to execute the orders Sheridan im, he would have been guarding with two es of cavalry the bridge over the Po River Anderson had to cross, and must have dehim long enough to enable Warren to rein-Wilson and hold the town.

erson soon intrenched himself—if, indeed, Badeau, Mil. Hist. II, 141 renchments were not already made—immeacross Warren's front. Warren was not of his presence, but probably supposed it e cavalry which Merritt had engaged earlier day. He assaulted at once, but was repulsed. on organized his men, as they were not pury the enemy, and made a second attack, this ith his whole corps. This time he succeeded ning a position immediately in the enemy's s. W. Crawford, Maj.

where he intropeded. His right and left 13th Inf. where he intrenched. His right and left May 14,1861; ns—the former Crawford's, the latter Wads
Brig.-Gen.
Vols.Apr.25, s, now commanded by Cutler—drove the back some distance.

his time my headquarters had been advanced ey Branch Church. I was anxious to crush son before Lee could get a force to his sup-To this end Sedgwick, who was at Piney a Church, was ordered to Warren's support. ck, who was at Todd's Tavern, was notified rren's engagement, and was directed to be in ess to come up. Burnside, who was with the -trains at Aldrich's on our extreme left, rethe same instructions. Sedgwick was slow ing up for some reason,—probably unavoid-

L. Cutler, Col. 6th Wis. June 25, 1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Nov. 29, 1862

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Ibid. 531

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able, because he was never at fault when serious work was to be done,—so that it was near night before the combined forces were ready to attack. Even then all of Sedgwick's command did not get into the engagement. Warren led the last assault, one division at a time, and of course it failed.

Warren's characteristics

Warren's difficulty was twofold. When he received an order to do anything it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of the army should be engaged so as properly to cooperate with him. His ideas were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him orders had thought of others at the time he had of him. In like manner, when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division, holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an order without his presence. His difficulty was constitutional and beyond his control. He was an officer of superior ability, quick perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could be done with a small command.

Lee had ordered Hill's corps—now commanded by Early—to move by the very road we had marched upon. This shows that even early in the morning of the 8th Lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, but still thought that the Army of the Potomae had gone to Fredericksburg. Indeed, he informed the authorities at Richmond that he had possession of Spottsylvania and was thus on my flank. Anderson was in possession of Spottsylvania, through no foresight of Lee, however. Early only found that he had been following us when he

XXXVI (2)

ran against Hancock at Todd's Tavern. His coming detained Hancock from the battle-field of Spottsylvania for that day; but he, in like manner, kept Early back and forced him to move by another route.

Had I ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, it would have put Hancock in the lead. It would also have given us an hour or more earlier start. It took all that time for Warren to get the head of his column to the left of Hancock after he had got his troops out of their line confronting the enemy. This hour, and Hancock's capacity to use his whole force when necessary, would no doubt have embled him to crush Anderson before he could be reinforced. But the movement made was tactical. It kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by the enemy. Our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to the right passed. If an attack had been made by the enemy he would have found the Second Corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the Fifth and Sixth corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed. By a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while still passing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by it would have been very much exposed. Then, too. I had not yet learned the special qualifications of the different corps commanders. At that time my judgment was that Warren was the man I would suggest to succeed Meade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him from the field. As I have before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, an able man; and he was besides thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and importance of the duty he had to perform.

CHAP.

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## CHAPTER X

BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA—HANCOCK'S POSITION—ASSAULT OF WARREN'S AND WRIGHT'S CORPS—UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD—GOOD NEWS FROM BUTLER AND SHERIDAN

CHAP. X
Topography
of Spottsylvania

THE Mattapony River is formed by the junction of the Mat, the Ta, the Po, and the Ny rivers. the last being the northernmost of the four. takes its rise about a mile south and a little east of the Wilderness Tayern. The Po rises southwest of the same place, but farther away. Spottsylvania is on the ridge dividing these two streams, and where they are but a few miles apart. The Brock road reaches Spottsylvania without crossing either of these streams. Lee's army, coming up by the Catharpin road, had to cross the Po at Wooden Bridge. Warren and Hancock came by the Brock road. Sedgwick crossed the Ny at Catharpin Fur-Burnside, coming by Aldrich's to Gates's nace. House, had to cross the Ny near the enemy. found pickets at the bridge; but they were soon driven off by a brigade of Willcox's division, and the stream was crossed. This brigade was furiously attacked; but the remainder of the division coming up, they were enabled to hold their position, and soon fortified it

Burnside's Rep. W. R. XXXVI (1)

About the time I received the news of this attack, word came from Hancock that Early had left his front. He had been forced over to the Catharpin road, crossing the Po at Corbin's and again at Wooden Bridge. These are the bridges Sheridan had given orders to his cavalry to occupy on the 8th, while one division should occupy Spottsylvania. These movements of the enemy gave me the idea that Lee was about to make the attempt to get to, or toward, Fredericksburg to cut off my supplies. I made arrangements to attack his right and get between him and Richmond if he should try to execute this design. If he had any such intention it was abandoned as soon as Burnside was established south of the Nv.

The Po and the Ny are narrow little streams, but deep, with abrupt banks, and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy bottoms,—at the time we were there,—and difficult to cross except where bridged. The country about was generally heavily timbered. but with occasional clearings. It was a much better country to conduct a defensive campaign in than an offensive one.

By noon of the 9th the position of the two armies Positions of the armies was as follows: Lee occupied a semicircle facing north, northwest, and northeast, inclosing the town. Anderson was on his left extending to the Po. Ewell came next, then Early. Warren occupied our right, covering the Brock and other roads converging at Spottsylvania; Sedgwick was to his left and Burnside on our extreme left. Hancock was yet back at Todd's Tayern, but as soon as it was known that Early had left Hancock's front the latter was ordered up to Warren's right. He formed a line with three


CHAP. X

divisions on the hill overlooking the Po early in the afternoon, and was ordered to cross the Po and get on the enemy's flank. The fourth division of Hancock's corps, Mott commanding, was left at Todd's when the corps first came up; but in the afternoon it was brought up and placed to the left of Sedgwick's—now Wright's—Sixth Corps. In the morning General Sedgwick had been killed near the right of his intrenchments by rebel sharpshooters. His loss was a severe one to the Army of the Potomac and to the nation. General H. G. Wright succeeded him in the command of his corps.

Hancock was now, 9 p.m. of the 9th of May, across the left flank of Lee's army, but separated from it, and also from the remainder of Meade's army, by the Po River. But for the lateness of the hour and the darkness of the night he would have attempted to cross the river again at Wooden Bridge, thus bringing himself on the same side with both friend and foe.

The Po at the points where Hancock's corps crossed runs nearly due east. Just below his lower crossing—the troops crossed at three points—it turns due south, and after passing under Wooden Bridge soon resumes a more easterly direction. During the night this corps built three bridges over the Po; but these were in rear.

The position assumed by Hancock's corps forced Lee to reinforce his left during the night. Accordingly on the morning of the 10th, when Hancock renewed his effort to get over the Po to his front, he found himself confronted by some of Early's command, which had been brought from the extreme right of the enemy during the night. He succeeded in effecting a crossing with one brigade, however,



but finding the enemy intrenched in his front, no more were crossed.

Снар. Х

Hancock reconnoitered his front on the morning of the 10th, with the view of forcing a crossing if it were found that an advantage could be gained. The enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high ground overlooking the river, and commanding the Wooden Bridge with artillery. Anderson's left rested on the Po, where it turns south; therefore for Hancock to cross over—although it would bring him to the same side of the stream with the rest of the army—would still further isolate him from it.

The stream would have to be crossed twice in the face of the enemy to unite with the main body.

W. R. XXXVI (1) 331

The idea of crossing was therefore abandoned. Lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this movement of Hancock's, and I determined to take advantage of it. Accordingly in the morning orders were issued for an attack in the afternoon on the center by Warren's and Wright's corps, Hancock to command all the attacking force. Two of his divisions were brought to the north side of the Po. Gibbon was placed to the right of Warren, and Birney in his rear as a reserve. Barlow's division was left south of the stream, and Mott, of the same corps, was still to the left of Wright's corps. Burnside was ordered to reconnoiter his front in force, and, if an opportunity presented, to attack with vigor. The enemy, seeing Barlow's division isolated from the rest of the army, came out and attacked with fury. Barlow repulsed the assault with great slaughter and with considerable loss to himself. But the enemy reorganized and renewed the assault. Birney was now moved to the high

W. R. XXXVI (2)

XXXVI (1) 331

D.B.Birney, Col. 23d Pa. Aug. 2, 1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Feb. 3, 1862; May.-Gen. May 20,

XXXVI (2) 610 CHAP. X

W. R. XXXVI (1) ground overlooking the river crossings built by our troops, and covered the crossings. The second assault was repulsed, again with severe loss to the enemy, and Barlow was withdrawn without further molestation. General T.G. Stevenson was killed in this move.

Between the lines, where Warren's assault was to take place, there was a ravine grown up with large trees and underbrush, making it almost impenetrable by man. The slopes on both sides were also covered with a heavy growth of timber. Warren, before noon, reconnoitered his front twice, the first time with one and the second with two divisions. He was repulsed on both occasions, but gained such information of the ground as to induce him to report recommending the assault.

Wright also reconnoitered his front and gained

a considerably advanced position from the one he started from. He then organized a storming party, consisting of twelve regiments, and assigned Colonel Emory Upton, of the One Hundred and Twenty-first New York Volunteers, to the command of it. About four o'clock in the afternoon the assault was ordered, Warren's and Wright's corps, with Mott's division of Hancock's corps, to move simultaneously. The movement was prompt, and in a few minutes the fiercest of struggles began. The battle-field was so densely covered with forests that but little could be seen, by any one person, as to the progress made. Meade and I occupied the best position we could get, in rear of Warren.

Upton's Rep. W. R. XXXVI (1) 667-669

W. P. 1856-61 ; Brig.-Gen. Vols.

May 12, 1864

667-669

J. C. Rice, Id.-Col. 44th N. Y. Oct. 1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Aug. 17,1863; k. May 11, 1864

Warren was repulsed with heavy loss, General J. C. Rice being among the killed. He was not followed, however, by the enemy, and was thereby en-

abled to reorganize his command as soon as covered from the guns of the enemy. To the left our success was decided, but the advantage was lost by the feeble action of Mott. Upton with his assaulting party pushed forward and crossed the enemy's in-Turning to the right and left, he trenchments. captured several guns and some hundreds of prison-Mott was ordered to his assistance, but failed utterly. So much time was lost in trying to get up the troops which were in the right position to reinforce that I ordered Upton to withdraw; but the officers and men of his command were so averse to giving up the advantage they had gained that I withdrew the order. To relieve them I ordered a renewal of the assault. By this time Hancock, who 151d. 333, 334 had gone with Birney's division to relieve Barlow, had returned, bringing the division with him. corps was now joined with Warren's and Wright's in this last assault. It was gallantly made, many men getting up to, and over, the works of the enemy; but they were not able to hold them. night they were withdrawn. Upton brought his prisoners with him, but the guns he had captured he was obliged to abandon. Upton had gained an important advantage, but a lack in others of the spirit and dash possessed by him lost it to us. Before leaving Washington I had been authorized to promote officers on the field for special acts of gallantry. By this authority I conferred the rank of brigadier-general upon Upton on the spot, and this act was confirmed by the President. Upton had been badly wounded in this fight.

Burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards of Spottsylvania Court House, comCHAP. X

W. R. XXXVI (1)

Promotion on the field

CHAP. X W. R. XXXVI (1) pletely turning Lee's right. He was not aware of the importance of the advantage he had gained, and I, being with the troops where the heavy fighting was, did not know of it at the time. He had gained his position with but little fighting, and almost without loss. Burnside's position now separated him widely from Wright's corps, the corps nearest to him. At night he was ordered to join on to this. This brought him back about a mile, and lost to us an important advantage. I attach no blame to Burnside for this, but I do to myself for not having had a staff-officer with him to report to me his position.

The enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to follow up his advantage, except in the single instance of his attack on Barlow. Then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an entire corps against two brigades. Barlow took up his bridges in the presence of this force.

On the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none except by Mott, who made a reconnaissance to ascertain if there were a weak point in the enemy's line.

I wrote the following letter to General Halleck:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, May 11, 1864, 8:30 a.m.

Major-General Halleck, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C.:

Cf. W. R. XXXVI (2) 627 We have now ended the sixth day of very hard fighting. The result up to this time is much in our favor. But our losses have been heavy as well as those of the enemy. We have lost to this time eleven general officers killed, wounded, and missing, and probably twenty thousand men. I think the loss of the enemy must be greater—we

g taken over four thousand prisoners in battle, whilst s taken from us but few except a few stragglers. I ow sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons for a supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose it it out on this line if it takes all summer.

arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouge to the men, and I hope they will be sent as fast as de, and in as great numbers. My object in having sent to Belle Plain was to use them as an escort to apply-trains. If it is more convenient to send them y train, to march from the railroad to Belle Plain or ricksburg, send them so.

n satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part ir officers, and by keeping them intrenched in every on they take.

to this time there is no indication of any portion of army being detached for the defense of Richmond.

U. S. Grant, Licutenant-General.

d, also, I received information, through the Department, from General Butler that his ry under Kautz had cut the railroad south of shurg, separating Beauregard from Richmond, and whipped Hill, killing, wounding, and capg many; also that he was intrenched and could tain himself. On this same day came news Sheridan to the effect that he had destroyed alles of the railroad and telegraph between Lee Richmond, one and a half million rations, and of the medical stores for his army.

the 8th I had directed Sheridan verbally to bose from the Army of the Potomac and passed the left of Lee's army and attack his cavalry communications, which was successfully exel in the manner I have already described.

CHAP. X

W. R. CXXVI (2)

Ibid, 615

Ante, II, 77-80

## CHAPTER XI

HANCOCK'S ASSAULT—LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES

— PROMOTIONS RECOMMENDED — DISCOMFITURE

OF THE ENEMY—EWELL'S ATTACK—REDUCING

THE ARTHLERY

CHAP. XI May, 1864

XXXVI (2)

In the reconnaissance made by Mott on the 11th a salient was discovered at the right center. I determined that an assault should be made at that point. Accordingly in the afternoon Hancock was ordered to move his command by the rear of Warren and Wright, under cover of night, to Wright's left, and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the next morning. The night was dark, it rained heavily, and the road was difficult, so that it was midnight when he reached the point where

<sup>1</sup> Headquarters Armies U. S., May 11, 1864, 3 p.m.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac:

Tbid. 629

Move three divisions of the Second Corps by the rear of the Fifth and Sixth corps, under cover of night, so as to join the Ninth Corps in a vigorous assault on the enemy at 4 o'clock A.M. to-morrow. I will send one or two staff-officers over to-night to stay with Burnside, and impress him with the importance of a

prompt and vigorous attack. Warren and Wright should hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any opportunity presents itself. There is but little doubt in my mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been heartily entered into by Mott's division and the Ninth Corps.

> U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

he was to halt. It took most of the night to get the men in position for their advance in the morning. The men got but little rest. Burnside was ordered xxxyr(2) to attack 1 on the left of the salient at the same hour. I sent two of my staff-officers to impress upon him the importance of pushing forward vigorously. Hancock was notified of this. Warren and Thid. 637, 638 Wright were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in the assault if circumstances made it advisable. I occupied a central position most convenient for receiving information from all points. Hancock put Barlow on his left, in double column, and Birney to his right. Mott followed Birney, and Gibbon was held in reserve.

CHAP. XI

The morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than half an hour.

The ground over which Hancock had to pass to reach the enemy was ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of the enemy's intrenchments. In front of Birney there was also But notwithstanding all these a marsh to cross.

1 HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S., May 11, 1864, 4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE, Commanding Ninth Army-corps:

Major-General Hancock has been ordered to move his corps under cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the enemy at 4 o'clock A.M. tomorrow. You will move against the enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible vigor at precisely 4 o'clock A.M. to-morrow, the 12th inst. Let your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy.

I send two of my staff-officers -Colonels Comstock and Babcock. in whom I have great confidence, and who are acquainted with the direction the attack is to be made from here-to remain with you and General Hancock, with instructions to render you every assistance in their power. Generals Warren and Wright will hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by yours and Hancock's attack, and will push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself.

> U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

ΣŢ

difficulties the troops pushed on in quick time without firing a gun, and when within four or five hundred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud cheers, and with a rush went up to and over the breastworks. Barlow and Birney entered almost simultaneously. Here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took place. The men of the two sides were too close together to fire, but used their guns as clubs. The hand-conflict was soon over. Hancock's corps captured some four thousand prisoners, among them a division and a brigade commander, —twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, and ammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and many colors. Hancock, as soon as the handto-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines. About six o'clock I ordered Warren's corps to the support of Hancock's. Burnside, on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to the r, very parapet of the enemy. Potter, commanding one of his divisions, got over, but was not able to remain there. However, he inflicted a heavy loss upon the enemy, but not without loss in return.

This victory was important, and one that Lee could not afford to leave us in full possession of. He made the most strenuous efforts to regain the position he had lost. Troops were brought up from his left and attacked Hancock furiously. Hancock was forced to fall back; but he did so slowly, with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss, until behind the breastworks he had captured. These he turned, facing them the other way, and continued to hold. Wright was ordered up to reinforce Hancock, and arrived by six o'clock. He was wounded soon after coming up, but did not relinquish the command of his corps, although the fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning. At eight o'clock Warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making his dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and with emphasis. At eleven o'clock I gave Meade written orders to relieve Warren from his command if he failed to move promptly. Hancock placed batteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy, firing over the heads of his own troops.

CHAP, XI

Burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature, but negatively a great deal. He kept Lee from reinforcing his center from that quarter. If the Fifth Corps, or rather if Warren, had been as prompt as Wright was with the Sixth Corps, better results might have been obtained

Lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line. Five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodging our troops from their new position. His losses must have been fearful. Sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet. In one place a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by musket-balls. All the trees between the lines were very much cut to pieces by artillery and musketry. It was three o'clock next morning be- May 13, 1864 fore the fighting ceased. Some of our troops had then been twenty hours under fire. In this engagement we did not lose a single organization, not even a company. The enemy lost one division with its commander, one brigade, and one regiment, with

CHAP, XI

heavy losses elsewhere. Our losses were heavy, but, as stated, no whole company was captured. At night Lee took a position in rear of his former

May 13, 1864

At night Lee took a position in rear of his former one, and by the following morning he was strongly intrenched in it.

A. A. Humphreys, W. P. 1827-31; Maj. Top. Eng. Aug. 6, 1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Apr. 28,1862; Maj.-Gen. July 8, 1863 Warren's corps was now temporarily broken up, Cutler's division sent to Wright, and Griffin's to Hancock. Meade ordered his chief of staff, General Humphreys, to remain with Warren and the remaining division, and authorized him to give it orders in his name.

During the day I was passing along the line from wing to wing continuously. About the center stood a house which proved to be occupied by an old lady and her daughter. She showed such unmistakable signs of being strongly Union that I stopped. She said she had not seen a Union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look upon it again. She said her husband and son, being Union men, had had to leave early in the war, and were now somewhere in the Union army, if alive. She was without food or nearly so, so I ordered rations issued to her, and promised to find out, if I could, where the husband and son were.

May. 1864

There was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little skirmishing between Mott's division and the

<sup>1</sup> Headquarters Armies U. S., May 12, 1864, 6:30 p.m.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,

Washington, D. C.:

The eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work, including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of artillery. The

enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the last ditch. We have lost no organizations,—not even that of a company,—whilst we have destroyed and captured one division (Johnson's), one brigade (Doles's), and one regiment entire from the enemy.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. enemy. I was afraid that Lee might be moving out, and I did not want him to go without my knowing it. The indications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was only taking his new position back from the salient that had been captured. Our dead were buried this day. Mott's division was reduced to a brigade and assigned to Birney's division.

CHAP. XI

During this day I wrote to Washington recommending Sherman and Meade 1 for promotion to the grade of major-general in the regular army; Hancock for brigadier-general; Wright, Gibbon, and Humphreys to be major-generals of volunteers; and Upton and Carroll to be brigadiers. Upton had already been named as such, but the appointment Ante, II, 131 had to be confirmed by the Senate on the nomina-

<sup>1</sup>SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, May 13, 1864.

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War,

Washington, D. C.:

tion of the President.

I beg leave to recommend the following promotions to be made for gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days' battles, to wit: Brigadier-General H. G. Wright and Brigadier-General John Gibbon to be major-generals; Colonel S. S. Carroll, Eighth Ohio Volunteers; Colonel E. Upton, One Hundred and Twentyfirst New York Volunteers; Colonel William McCandless, Second Pennsylvania Reserves, to be brigadier-generals. I would also recommend Major-General W. S. Hancock for brigadier-general in the regular army. His services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this recognition. In making these recommendations I do not wish the claims of General G. M. Dodge for promotion forgotten, but recommend his name to be sent in at the same time. I would also ask to have General Wright assigned to the command of the Sixth Army-corps. I would further ask the confirmation of General Humphreys to the rank of major-general.

General Meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations. He and Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands I have come in contact with. If their services can be rewarded by promotion to the rank of majorgenerals in the regular army the honor would be worthily bestowed, and I would feel personally gratified. I would not like to see one of these promotions at this time without seeing both.

> U. S. GRANT. Lieutenant-General.

The night of the 13th Warren and Wright were

CHAP. XI

W. R. 541

Thid. 669

R. B. Ayres, W. P. 1843-47; Mexico,

1847-48; Capt. 5th Art. May 14,

1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Nov. 29, 1862

moved by the rear to the left of Burnside. night was very dark and it rained heavily; the roads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and cordurov the road a part of the way to get through. It was midnight before they got to the point where they were to halt, and daylight before the troops could be organized to advance to their position in They gained their position in line, however, line. without any fighting, except a little in Wright's Here Upton had to contend for an elevafront. tion which we wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield. Upton first drove the enemy, and was then repulsed in turn. Ayres coming to his support with his brigade (of Griffin's division, Warren's corps), the position was secured and fortified. There was no more battle during the 14th. This brought our line east of the Court House and running north and south and facing west.

During the night of the 14th-15th Lee moved to cover this new front. This left Hancock without an enemy confronting him. He was brought to the rear of our new center, ready to be moved in any direction he might be wanted.

771, 803

Sherman to Halleck, W. R. XXXVIII

(4) 172, 178

On the 15th news came from Butler and Averell. The former reported the capture of the outer works at Drury's Bluff, on the James River, and that his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of Richmond on the Danville road; and the latter, the destruction of a depot of supplies at Dublin, West Virginia, and the breaking of New River Bridge on the Virginia and Tennessee railroad. The next day news came from Sherman and Sheridan Sherman had forced Johnston out of Dalton, Georgia, and

W. R. XXXVI (2)

was following him south. The report from Sheridan embraced his operations up to his passing the outer defenses of Richmond. The prospect must now have been dismal in Richmond. The road and telegraph were cut between the capital and Lee. The roads and wires were cut in every direction from the rebel capital. Temporarily that city was cut off from all communication with the outside except by courier. This condition of affairs, however, was of but short duration.

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Sheridan to Meade, W. R. XXXVI

I wrote Halleck:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, May 16, 1864, 8 a.m.

Major-General Halbeck, Washington, D. C.:

We have had five days' almost constant rain without any prospect yet of its clearing up. The roads have now become so impassable that ambulances with wounded men can no longer run between here and Fredericksburg. All offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty four hours of dry weather. The army is in the best of spirits, and feels the greatest confidence of ultimate success.

W. R. XXXVI (2)

You can assure the President and Secretary of War that the elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner due to weakness or exhaustion on our part.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

The condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the 17th. But that night Hancock and Wright were to make a night-march back to their old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock in the morning. Lee got troops back in time to protect his old line, so the assault was unsuccess-

W. R. XXXVI (1) 837, 338 CHAP. XI

ful. On this day (18th) the news was almost as discouraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital. As stated above, Hancock's and

Wright's corps had made an unsuccessful assault. News came that Sigel had been defeated at New

Market badly, and was retreating down the valley. 840 Not two hours before I had sent the inquiry to

Halleck whether Sigel could not get to Staunton to 475 stop supplies coming from there to Lee. I asked at once that Sigel might be relieved and some one

1bid. 485, 492 else put in his place. Hunter's name was suggested. and I heartily approved. Further news from Butler

reported him driven from Drury's Bluff, but still in possession of the Petersburg road. Banks had been

defeated in Louisiana, relieved, and Canby put in his place. This change of commander was not on

my suggestion. All this news was very discouraging. All of it must have been known by the enemy before it was by me. In fact, the good news (for

moment I thought he was in despair, and his anguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying

the enemy) must have been known to him at the

his supposed discomfiture. But this was no time for repining. I immediately gave orders for a movement by the left flank on toward Richmond, to

commence on the night of the 19th. I also asked Halleck to secure the cooperation of the navy in

changing our base of supplies from Fredericksburg

to Port Royal, on the Rappahannock.

Up to this time I had received no reinforcements, except six thousand raw troops under Brigadier-General Robert O. Tyler, just arrived. They had not yet joined their command, Hancock's corps, but were on our right. This corps had been brought to

W. R. XXXVI (2)

W. R. XXXVII (1)

W. R. XXXVI (2)

W. R. XXXIV (3) 490, 543

W. R. XXXVI (2)

R. O. Tyler, W. P. 1849-53; Col. 4th Conn. Art. Sept. 17, 1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Nov. 29, 1862 the rear of the center, ready to move in any directural chap. XI tion. Lee, probably suspecting some move on my part, and seeing our right entirely abandoned. moved Ewell's corps about five o'clock in the afternoon, with Early's as a reserve, to attack us in that quarter. Tyler had come up from Fredericksburg, and had been halted on the road to the right of our line, near Kitching's brigade of Warren's corps. Tyler received the attack with his raw troops, and they maintained their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy of veterans.

J. H. Kitch-ing, Capt. 2d N. Y. Art.

W. R. XXVI (1)

Hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the soldier to do it without waiting to make dispositions. Birney was thrown to Tyler's right and Crawford to his left, with Gibbon as a reserve; and Ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss.

Warren had been ordered to get on Ewell's flank and in his rear, to cut him off from his intrench-But his efforts were so feeble that under the cover of night Ewell got back with only the loss of a few hundred prisoners, besides his killed and wounded. The army being engaged until after dark. I rescinded the order for the march by our left flank that night.

As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, I naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains. withdrawal of Hancock from the right uncovered one road from Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies. This was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by Gen- E. Ferrero, Col. 51st. eral Ferrero, belonging to Burnside's corps. Ferrero was therefore promptly notified, and ordered sept.19, 1862

## PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U.S. GRANT

ow his cavalry pickets out to the south and be red to meet the enemy if he should come; if d to retreat, to do so toward Fredericksburg. nemy did detach as expected, and captured y-five or thirty wagons, which, however, were retaken.

onsequence of the disasters that had befallen the past few days Lee could be reinforced y, and I had no doubt he would be. Beaurenad come up from the south with troops to the Confederate capital when it was in dan-Butler being driven back, most of the troops be sent to Lee. Hoke was no longer needed th Carolina; and Sigel's troops having gone to Cedar Creek, whipped, many troops could ared from the valley.

Wilderness and Spottsylvania battles con-

I me that we had more artillery than could be brought into action at any one time. It ed much of the road in marching, and taxed hins in bringing up forage. Artillery is very when it can be brought into action, but it is burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. I leaving Spottsylvania, therefore, I sent back defenses of Washington over one hundred of artillery, with the horses and caissons, relieved the roads over which we were to of more than two hundred six-horse teams, ill left us more artillery than could be advantally used. In fact, before reaching the James I again reduced the artillery with the army

lieved that if one corps of the army was exon the road to Richmond, and at a distance

the main army, Lee would endeavor to attack exposed corps before reinforcements could come in which case the main army could follow Lee and attack him before he had time to intrench. I issued the following orders:

CHAP. XI

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, VIRGINIA, May 18, 1864.

OR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding Army of the Potomac:

efore daylight to-morrow morning I propose to draw cock and Burnside from the position they now hold, put Burnside to the left of Wright. Wright and nside should then force their way up as close to the ny as they can get without a general engagement, or a general engagement if the enemy will come out of r works to fight and intrench. Hancock should march take up a position as if in support of the two left s. To-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, he will roved southeast with all his force and as much cavalry an be given to him, to get as far toward Richmond on line of the Fredericksburg railroad as he can make, ting the enemy in whatever force he can find him. If enemy make a general move to meet this, they will be owed by the other three corps of the army, and attacked, ossible, before time is given to intrench.

W. R. XXXVI (2)

uitable directions will at once be given for all trains surplus artillery to conform to this movement.

U. S. GRANT.

On the 20th, Lee showing no signs of coming out his lines, orders were renewed for a left-flank vement, to commence after night.

## CHAPTER XII

MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK—BATTLE OF NORTH

ANNA—AN INCIDENT OF THE MARCH—MOVING ON
RICHMOND—SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY—POSITION OF THE NATIONAL ARMY

CHAP. XII

E were now to operate in a different country from any we had before seen in Virginia. The roads were wide and good and the country well cultivated. No men were seen except those bearing arms, even the black man having been sent The country, however, was new to us, and we had neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were or where they led to. Engineer and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty of supplying the place of both maps and guides. By reconnoitering they were enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army-corps. Our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that direction which would not separate the army too widely.

W. R. XXVI (1) 340, 341 Hancock, who had the lead, had marched easterly to Guiney's Station on the Fredericksburg railroad, thence southerly to Bowling Green and Milford. He was at Milford by the night of the 21st. Here he met a detachment of Pickett's division coming from Richmond to reinforce Lee. They were speed-

ily driven away and several hundred captured. Warren followed on the morning of the 21st, and reached Guiney's Station that night without molestation. Burnside and Wright were retained at Spottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an intended assault, and to hold Lee, if possible, while Hancock and Warren should get start enough to interpose between him and Richmond.

CHAP. XII W. R. XXXVI (1)

Lee had now a superb opportunity to take the Lee's lost opportunity initiative either by attacking Wright and Burnside alone, or by following by the Telegraph Road and striking Hancock's and Warren's corps, or even Hancock's alone, before reinforcements could come But he did not avail himself of either opportunity. He seemed really to be misled as to my designs; but moved by his interior line—the Telegraph Road—to make sure of keeping between his capital and the Army of the Potomac. He never again had such an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow.

The evening of the 21st, Burnside, Ninth Corps, moved out, followed by Wright, Sixth Corps. Burnside was to take the Telegraph Road; but finding Stanard's Ford, over the Po, fortified and guarded, he turned east to the road taken by Hancock and Warren, without an attempt to dislodge the enemy. The night of the 21st I had my headquarters near the Sixth Corps, at Guiney's Station, and the enemy's cavalry was between us and Hancock. There was a slight attack on Burnside's and Wright's corps as they moved out of their lines; but it was easily repulsed. The object, probably, was only to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow upon the rear of the Confederates.

CHAP. XII

By the morning of the 22d Burnside and Wright were at Guiney's Station. Hancock's corps had now been marching and fighting continuously for several days, not having had rest even at night much of the time. They were therefore permitted to rest during the 22d. But Warren was pushed to Harris's Store, directly west of Milford, and connected with it by a good road, and Burnside was sent to New Bethel Church. Wright's corps was still back at Guiney's Station.

I issued the following order for the movement of the troops the next day:

> New Bethel, Virginia, May 22, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding Army of the Potomae:

W. R. XXXVI (3) Direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march at 5 A.M. to-morrow. At that hour each command will send out cavalry and infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain, if possible, where the enemy is. If beyond the South Anna, the Fifth and Sixth corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads to Beaver Dam Station, the other to Jericho Bridge, then south by roads reaching the Anna, as near to and east of Hawkins's Creek as they can be found.

The Second Corps will move to Chesterfield Ford. The Ninth Corps will be directed to move at the same time to Jericho Bridge. The map only shows two roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use of plantation roads and pressing in guides, others can be found, to give one for each corps.

The troops will follow their respective reconnoitering parties. The trains will be moved at the same time to Milford Station.

Headquarters will follow the Ninth Corps.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

Warren's corps was moved from Harris's Store to Jericho Ford, Wright's following. Warren arrived at the ford early in the afternoon, and by five o'clock effected a crossing under the protection of sharpshooters. The men had to wade in water up to their waists. As soon as enough troops were over to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artillery and the rest of the troops crossed. The line formed was almost perpendicular to the course of the river—Crawford on the left, next to the river. Griffin in the center, and Cutler on the right. was found intrenched along the front of their line. The whole of Hill's corps was sent against Warren's right before it had got in position. A brigade of Cutler's division was driven back, the enemy following; but assistance coming up, the enemy was in turn driven back into his trenches with heavy loss in killed and wounded, with about five hundred prisoners left in our hands. By night Wright's corps was up ready to reinforce Warren.

On the 23d Hancock's corps was moved to the wooden bridge which spans the North Anna River just west of where the Fredericksburg railroad crosses. It was near night when the troops arrived. They found the bridge guarded, with troops intrenched, on the north side. Hancock sent two brigades, Egan's and Pierce's, to the right and left, and when properly disposed they charged simultaneously. The bridge was carried quickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved into the river, and some of them were drowned. Several hundred prisoners were captured. The hour was so late that Hancock did not cross until next morning.

CHAP. XII W. R. XXXVI (1) 543

Tbid, 612


Tbid. 341

T. W. Egan, Lt.-Col. 40th N. Y. June 14, 1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Sept. 3, 1864

B. R. Pierce, Capt. 3d Mich. 1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols. June 7, 1864 Burnside's corps was moved by a middle road running between those described above, and which strikes the North Anna at Ox Ford, midway between Telegraph Road and Jericho Ford. The hour of its arrival was too late to cross that night.

On the 24th Hancock's corps crossed to the south side of the river without opposition, and formed line facing nearly west. The railroad in rear was taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible. Wright's corps crossed at Jericho early the same day, and took position to the right of Warren's corps, extending south of the Virginia Central railroad. This road was torn up for a considerable distance to the rear (west), the ties burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating them over the burning ties. It was found, however, that Burnside's corps could not cross at Ox Ford. Lee had taken a position with his center on the river at this point, with the two wings thrown back, his line making an acute angle where it overlooked the river.

Before the exact position of the whole of Lee's line was accurately known I directed Hancock and Warren each to send a brigade to Ox Ford by the south side of the river. They found the enemy too strong to justify a serious attack. A third ford was found between Ox Ford and Jericho. Burnside was directed to cross a division over this ford, and to send one division to Hancock. Crittenden was crossed by this newly discovered ford, and formed up the river to connect with Crawford's left. Potter joined Hancock by way of the Wooden Bridge. Crittenden had a severe engagement with some of Hill's corps on his crossing the river, and lost heavily. When joined to Warren's corps he was



no further molested. Burnside still guarded Ox CHAP. XII Ford from the north side.

Lee now had his entire army south of the North Our lines covered his front, with the six miles separating the two wings guarded by but a single division. To get from one wing to the other the river would have to be crossed twice. Lee could reinforce any part of his line from all points of it in a very short march, or could concentrate the whole of it wherever he might choose to assault. We were. for the time, practically two armies besieging.

Lee had been reinforced and was being reinforced largely. About this time the very troops whose coming I had predicted had arrived or were coming in. Pickett with a full division from Richmond was up; Hoke from North Carolina had come with a brigade; and Breckinridge was there—in all probably not less than fifteen thousand men. But he did not attempt to drive us from the field.

G. E. Pick-ett, W. P. 1862; Maj.-Gen. Oct. 10.

On the 22d or 23d I received despatches from Washington saying that Sherman had taken Kingston, crossed the Etowah River, and was advancing into Georgia.

Sherman, Memoirs, II, 41-43

I was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house waiting for Burnside's corps to Meade and his staff, besides my own staff, were with me. The lady of the house, a Mrs. Tyler, and an elderly lady were present. Burnside, seeing us, came up on the porch, his big spurs and saber rattling as he walked. He touched his hat politely to the ladies, and remarked that he supposed they had never seen so many "live Yankees" before in their lives. The elderly lady spoke up promptly, saying, "Oh yes, I have; many more." "Where?" said CHAP. XII

Burnside. "In Richmond." Prisoners, of course, was understood.

I read my despatch aloud, when it was received. This threw the younger lady into tears. I found the information she had received (and I suppose it was the information generally in circulation through the South) was that Lee was driving us from the State in the most demoralized condition, and that in the Southwest our troops were but little better than prisoners of war. Seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof that a part of her information was incorrect, and she asked me if my news from Sherman was true. I assured her that there was no doubt about it. I left a guard to protect the house from intrusion until the troops should have all passed, and assured her that if her husband was in hiding she could bring him in and he should be protected also. But I presume he was in the Confederate army.

W. R. (XXVI (3) On the 25th I gave orders, through Halleck, to Hunter, who had relieved Sigel, to move up the Valley of Virginia, cross over the Blue Ridge to Charlottesville, and go as far as Lynchburg, if possible, living upon the country and cutting the railroads and canal as he went. After doing this he could find his way back to his base, or join me.

On the same day news was received that Lee was falling back on Richmond. This proved not to be true. But we could do nothing where we were unless Lee would assume the offensive. I determined, therefore, to draw out of our present position and make one more effort to get between him and Richmond. I had no expectation now, however, of succeeding in this; but I did expect to hold him

enough west to enable me to reach the James or high up. Sheridan was now again with the y of the Potomac.

or the 26th I informed the government at Washon of the position of the two armies; of the rereements the enemy had received; of the move oposed to make; and directed that our base of CHAP. XII

W. R. XXXVI (3) 206

UARLES'S MILLS, VIRGINIA,
May 26, 1864.
R-GENERAL HALLECK,
Vashington, D. C.:
Prelative position of the two
s is now as follows: Lee's
rests on a swamp east of the

nond and Fredericksburg and south of the North , his center on the river at ord, and his left at Little , with the crossings of Little guarded as far up as we gone. Hancock with his and one division of the i Corps crossed at Chester-Ford and covers the right of Lee's army. One division Ninth Corps is on the north of the Anna at Ox Ford, bridges above and below at s nearest to it where both s are held by us, so that it reinforce either wing of army with equal facility. Fifth and Sixth corps, with livision of the Ninth Corps, from the south bank of the t from a short distance above ord to Little River, and parwith and near to the enemy.

make a direct attack from

r wing would cause a slaugh-

f our men that even success

d not justify. To turn the

ly by his right, between the

Annas, is impossible on ac-

t of the swamp upon which

his right rests. To turn him by the left leaves Little River, New Found River, and South Anna River—all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the movement of our army—to be crossed. I have determined, therefore, to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near Hanover Town. This crosses all three streams at once, and leaves us still where we can draw supplies.

During the last night the teams and artillery not in position, belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of that wing, were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river and moved down to the rear of the left. As soon as it is dark this division, with most of the cavalry, will commence a forced march for Hanover Town, to seize and hold the crossings. The balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and follow as rapidly as possible. The left wing will also withdraw from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of the right wing.

Lee's army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. A battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. Our men

CHAP. XII

supplies should be shifted to White House, on the Pamunkey. The wagon-train and guards moved directly from Port Royal to White House. Supplies moved around by water, guarded by the navy. Orders had previously been sent, through Halleck, for Butler to send Smith's corps to White House. This order was repeated on the 25th, with directions that they should be landed on the north side of the Pamunkey, and marched until they joined the Army of the Potomae.

W. R. XXXVI (3) 77, 183

> It was a delicate move to get the right wing of the Army of the Potomac from its position south of the North Anna in the presence of the enemy. To accomplish it I issued the following order:

Ibid. 183

Quarles's Miles, Virginia, May 25, 1864.

Major-General Meade, Commanding A. P.:

Direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams and artillery not in position to the north side of the river to-morrow. Send that belonging to General Wright's corps as far on the road to Hanover Town as it

feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already assured. The promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the enemy.

We are destroying all the rails we can on the Central and Fredericksburg roads. I want to leave a gap on the roads north of Richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to import rail from elsewhere.

Even if a crossing is not effected at Hanover Town, it will probably be necessary for us to move on down the Pamunkey until a crossing is effected. I think it advisable, therefore, to change our base of supplies from Port Royal to the White House. I wish you would direct this change at once, and also direct Smith to put the railroad-bridge there in condition for crossing troops and artillery, and leave men to hold it.

U. S. GRANT, Licutenant-General. go, without attracting attention to the fact. Send with

right's best division or division under his ablest comder. Have their places filled up in the line so, if pose, the enemy will not notice their withdrawal. eavalry to-morrow afternoon, or as much of it as you deem necessary, to watch, and seize if they can, Littlee's Bridge and Taylor's Ford, and to remain on one or er side of the river at these points until the infantry and llery all pass. As soon as it is dark to-morrow night t the division which you withdraw first from Wright's os to make a forced march to Hanover Town, taking them no teams to impede their march. At the same this division starts commence withdrawing all of the h and Sixth corps from the south side of the river, and ch them for the same place. The two divisions of the th Corps not now with Hancock may be moved down north bank of the river, where they will be handy to port Hancock if necessary, or will be that much on

r road to follow the Fifth and Sixth corps. Hancock ald hold his command in readiness to follow as soon as way is clear for him. To-morrow it will leave nothfor him to do, but as soon as he can he should get all teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which will have to take. As soon as the troops reach Hanr Town they should get possession of all the crossings y can in that neighborhood. I think it would be well make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy's

CHAP. XII

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

Vilson's division of cavalry was brought up from left and moved by our right south to Little ver. Here he manœuvered to give the impression t we were going to attack the left flank of Lee's ay.

to-morrow afternoon, also.

Under cover of night our right wing was withwn to the north side of the river, Lee being comCHAP. XII

W. R. XXXVI (1) pletely deceived by Wilson's feint. On the afternoon of the 26th Sheridan moved, sending Gregg's and Torbert's cavalry to Taylor's and Littlepage's fords toward Hanover. As soon as it was dark both divisions moved quietly to Hanover ferry, leaving small guards behind to keep up the impression that crossings were to be attempted in the morning. Sheridan was followed by a division of infantry under General Russell. On the morning of the 27th the crossing was effected with but little loss, the enemy losing thirty or forty, taken prisoners. Thus a position was secured south of the Pamunkey.


D.A. Russell, W. P. 1841–45; Mexico, 1847; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Nov. 29, 1862; k. Opequan, Sept. 19, 1864

Rufus Barringer, Brig.-Gen. C. S. A. Russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry pushed on to Hanover Town. Here Barringer's, formerly Gordon's, brigade of rebel cavalry was encountered, but it was speedily driven away.

Warren's and Wright's corps were moved by the rear of Burnside's and Hancock's corps. When out of the way these latter corps followed, leaving pickets confronting the enemy. Wilson's cavalry followed last, watching all the fords until everything had recrossed; then, taking up the pontoons and destroying other bridges, became the rear-guard.

Two roads were traversed by the troops in this move. The one nearest to and north of the North Anna and Pamunkey was taken by Wright, followed by Hancock. Warren, followed by Burnside, moved by a road farther north, and longer. The trains moved by a road still farther north, and had to travel a still greater distance. All the troops that had crossed the Pamunkey on the morning of the 27th remained quiet during the rest of the day, while the troops north of that stream marched to reach the crossing that had been secured for them.

May, 1864



Lee had evidently been deceived by our movement from North Anna; for on the morning of the 27th he telegraphed to Richmond: "Enemy crossed to north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at Hanover Town." The troops that had then crossed left his front the night of the 25th.

The country we were now in was a difficult one to move troops over. The streams were numerous. deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out into swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of trees and underbrush. The banks were generally low and marshy, making the streams difficult to approach except where there were roads and bridges.

Hanover Town is about twenty miles from Rich- Topography mond. There are two roads leading there; the most direct and shortest one crossing the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, near the Virginia Central railroad, the second going by New and Old Cold Har-A few miles out from Hanover Town there is a third road by way of Mechanicsville to Richmond. New Cold Harbor was important to us because while there we both covered the roads back to White House (where our supplies came from), and the roads southeast over which we would have to pass to get to the James River below the Richmond defenses.

W. R. XXXVI (1) 343, 543, 913

On the morning of the 28th the army made an early start, and by noon all had crossed except Burnside's corps. This was left on the north side temporarily to guard the large wagon-train. A line was at once formed extending south from the river, Wright's corps on the right, Hancock's in the center, and Warren's on the left, ready to meet the enemy if he should come.

CHAP. XII W. R. XXXVI (3) 273

W. R. XXXVI (1) 821, 854

At the same time Sheridan was directed to reconnoiter toward Mechanicsville to find Lee's position. At Hawes's Shop, just where the middle road leaves the direct road to Richmond, he encountered the Confederate cavalry dismounted and partially intrenched. Gregg attacked with his division, but was unable to move the enemy. In the evening Custer came up with a brigade. The attack was now renewed, the cavalry dismounting and charging as infantry. This time the assault was successful, both sides losing a considerable number of men. But our troops had to bury the dead, and found that more Confederate than Union soldiers had been The position was easily held, because our infantry was near.

Tbid. 343, 543, 913 On the 29th a reconnaissance was made in force, to find the position of Lee. Wright's corps pushed to Hanover Court House. Hancock's corps pushed toward Totopotomoy Creek; Warren's corps to the left on the Shady Grove Church road; while Burnside was held in reserve. Our advance was pushed forward three miles on the left with but little fighting. There was now an appearance of a movement past our left flank, and Sheridan was sent to meet it.

May, 1864

On the 30th Hancock moved to the Totopotomoy, where he found the enemy strongly fortified. Wright was moved to the right of Hancock's corps, and Burnside was brought forward and crossed, taking position to the left of Hancock. Warren moved up near Huntley Corners on the Shady Grove Church road. There was some skirmishing along the center, and in the evening Early attacked Warren with some vigor, driving him back at first, and

threatening to turn our left flank. As the best means of reinforcing the left, Hancock was ordered to attack in his front. He carried and held the rifle-pits. While this was going on Warren got his men up, repulsed Early, and drove him more than a mile.

CHAP. XII

XXXVI (1) 343

On this day I wrote to Halleck ordering all the pontoons in Washington to be sent to City Point. In the evening news was received of the arrival of Smith with his corps at White House. I notified Meade, in writing, as follows:

XXXVI (3) 322

NEAR HAWES'S SHOP, VIRGINIA, 6:40 P.M., May 30, 1864.

Major-General Meade, Commanding A. P.:


Ibid, 323

General Smith will debark his force at the White House to-night and start up the south bank of the Pamunkey at an early hour, probably at 3 A.M. in the morning. It is not improbable that the enemy, being aware of Smith's movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank for the purpose of cutting him off, or by a dash to crush him and get back before we are aware of it. Sheridan ought to be notified to watch the enemy's movements well out toward Cold Harbor, and also on the Mechanicsville road. Wright should be got well massed on Hancock's right, so that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place of the latter readily whilst troops are being thrown east of the Totopotomoy if necessary.

I want Sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a brigade, if not a whole brigade, at 5 o'clock in the morning, to communicate with Smith and to return with him. I will send orders for Smith by the messenger you send to Sheridan with his orders.

U. S. GRANT.

I also notified Smith of his danger and the precautions that would be taken to protect him. Ibid. 371



The night of the 30th Lee's position was substantially from Atlee's Station on the Virginia Central railroad south and east to the vicinity of Cold Harbor. Ours was: The left of Warren's corps was on the Shady Grove road, extending to the Mechanics ville road and about three miles south of the Totopotomoy; Burnside to his right, then Hancock, and Wright on the extreme right, extending toward Hanover Court House, six miles southeast of it. Sheridan with two divisions of eavalry was watching our left front toward Cold Harbor. Wilson with his division on our right was sent to get on the Virginia Central railroad and destroy it as far back as possible. He got possession of Hanover Court House the next day after a skirmish with Young's eavalry brigade. The enemy attacked Sheridan's pickets, but reinforcements were sent up and the attack was speedily repulsed, and the enemy followed some distance toward Cold Harbor.

CHAP, XI

W. R. X X X V I (t) 872, 874

P. M. R. Young, Maj. Gen, C. S. A. Dec. 13, 1804

W. R. XXXVI (t)

## CHAPTER XIII

ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR—AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAR—BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR—CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE—RETROSPECTIVE

CHAP. XIII W. R. XXXVI (1) On the 31st Sheridan advanced to near Old Cold Harbor. He found it intrenched and occupied by cavalry and infantry. A hard fight ensued, but the place was carried. The enemy well knew the importance of Cold Harbor to us, and seemed determined that we should not hold it. He returned with such a large force that Sheridan was about withdrawing without making any effort to hold it against such odds; but about the time he commenced the evacuation he received orders to hold the place at all hazards until reinforcements could be sent to him. He speedily turned the rebel works to face against them and placed his men in position for defense. Night came on before the enemy was ready for assault.

W. R. XXXVI (3) 404 Wright's corps was ordered early in the evening to march directly to Cold Harbor, passing by the rear of the army. It was expected to arrive by daylight or before; but the night was dark and the distance great, so that it was nine o'clock the 1st of June before it reached its destination. Before the arrival of Wright the enemy had made two as-

W. R. XXXVI (1) saults on Sheridan, both of which were repulsed CHAP.XIII with heavy loss to the enemy. Wright's corps coming up, there was no further assault on Cold Harbor.

W. R. XXXVI (3) 466

Smith, who was coming up from White House, was also directed to march directly to Cold Harbor, and was expected early on the morning of the 1st of June; but by some blunder the order which reached Smith directed him to New Castle instead of Cold Harbor. Through this blunder Smith did not reach his destination until three o'clock in the afternoon, and then with tired and worn-out men from their long and dusty march. He landed twelve thousand five hundred men from Butler's command, but a division was left at White House temporarily and many men had fallen out of ranks in their long march.

Ibid. 371

Before the removal of Wright's corps from our right, after dark on the 31st, the two lines, Federal and Confederate, were so close together at that point that either side could detect directly any movement made by the other. Finding at daylight that Wright had left his front, Lee evidently divined that he had gone to our left. At all events, soon after light on the 1st of June, Anderson, who commanded the corps on Lee's left, was seen moving along Warren's front. Warren was ordered to attack him vigorously in flank, while Wright was directed to move out and get on his front. Warren fired his artillery at the enemy, but lost so much time in making ready that the enemy got by; and at three o'clock he reported the enemy was strongly intrenched in his front, and, besides, his lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to move with. He seemed to have forgotten that lines in rear of

Tbid. 448

CHAP, XIII an army hold themselves while their defenders are fighting in their front. Wright reconnoitered some distance to his front; but the enemy, finding Old Cold Harbor already taken, had halted and fortified some distance west.


By six o'clock in the afternoon Wright and Smith were ready to make an assault. In front of both the ground was clear for several hundred vards. and then became wooded. Both charged across this open space and into the wood, capturing and holding the first line of rifle-pits of the enemy, and also capturing seven or eight hundred prisoners.

While this was going on the enemy charged Warren three separate times with vigor, but was repulsed each time with loss. There was no officer more capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than Warren when the enemy forced him to it. There was also an attack upon Hancock's and Burnside's corps at the same time; but it was feeble and probably only intended to relieve Anderson, who was being pressed by Wright and Smith.

During the night the enemy made frequent attacks with the view of dispossessing us of the important position we had gained, but without effecting his object.

Tbid. 344

Hancock was moved from his place in line during the night and ordered to the left of Wright. expected to take the offensive on the morning of the 2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so excessive, and the roads so intricate and hard to keep, that the head of the column only reached Old Cold Harbor at six o'clock, but was in position at 7:30 A.M. Preparations were made for an attack in the afternoon, but it did not take place until the



next morning. Warren's corps was moved to the CHAP. XIII left to connect with Smith; Hancock's corps was got into position to the left of Wright's; and Burnside was moved to Bethesda Church in reserve. Warren and Burnside were making these changes the enemy came out several times and attacked them, capturing several hundred prisoners. attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been. I was so annoyed at this that I directed Meade to instruct his corps commanders that they should seize all such opportunities when they occurred, and not wait for orders, all of our manœuvers being made for the very purpose of getting the enemy out of his cover.

On this day Wilson returned from his raid upon the Virginia Central railroad, having damaged it considerably. But, like ourselves, the rebels had become experts in repairing such damage. Sherman, in his Memoirs, relates an anecdote of his campaign vol. 11, p. 151 to Atlanta that well illustrates this point. The rebel cavalry, lurking in his rear to burn bridges and obstruct his communications, had become so disgusted at hearing trains go whistling by within a few hours after a bridge had been burned that they proposed to try blowing up some of the tun-One of them said, "No use, boys; old Sherman carries duplicate tunnels with him, and will replace them as fast as you can blow them up; better save your powder."

Sheridan was engaged reconnoitering the banks of the Chickahominy, to find crossings and the condition of the roads. He reported favorably.

During the night Lee moved his left up to make his line correspond to ours. His lines extended CHAP, XIII

now from the Totopotomoy to New Cold Harbor; mine from Bethesda Church by Old Cold Harbor to the Chickahominy, with a division of cavalry guarding our right. An assault was ordered for the 3d, to be made mainly by the corps of Hancock, Wright, and Smith; but Warren and Burnside were to support it by threatening Lee's left, and to attack with great carnestness either if he should reinforce more threatened points by drawing from that quarter, or if a favorable opportunity should present itself.<sup>1</sup>

XXXVI (3) 526

W. R. XXXVI (1) 344, 345, 369, 432, 433

The corps commanders were to select the points in their respective fronts where they would make their assaults. The move was to commence at halfpast four in the morning. Hancock sent Barlow and Gibbon forward at the appointed hour, with Birney as a reserve. Barlow pushed forward with great vigor, under a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, through thickets and swamps. Notwithstanding all the resistance of the enemy and the natural obstructions to overcome, he carried a position occupied by the enemy outside their main line, where the road makes a deep cut through a bank, affording as good a shelter for troops as if it had been made for that purpose. Three pieces of artillery had been captured here, and several hundred prisoners. The guns were immediately turned against the men who had just been using them. No

<sup>4</sup> NEAR COLD HARDON, June 3, 1864, 7 a.m.

Majou-General Meade, Commanding A. P. :

The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it vigorously, and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken. I shall go to where you are in the course of an hour.

> U.S. Ghant, Lieutenant-General,

W. R. XXXVI (3)

assistance coming to him, he (Barlow) intrenched CHAP. XIII under fire and continued to hold his place. Gibbon was not so fortunate in his front. He found the ground over which he had to pass cut up with deep ravines, and a morass difficult to cross. But his men struggled on until some of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy. Gibbon gained ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, and here he intrenched and held fast.

Wright's corps, moving in two lines, captured the outer rifle-pits in its front, but accomplished nothing more. Smith's corps also gained the outer riflepits in its front. The ground over which this corps (Eighteenth) had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges were made. An open plain intervened between the contending forces at this point, which was exposed both to a direct and a cross fire. Smith, however, finding a ravine running toward his front, sufficiently deep to protect men in it from cross-fire, and somewhat from a direct fire, put Martindale's division in it, and, with J.H.Martindale's Brooks supporting him on the left and Devens on the right, succeeded in gaining the outer—probably picket-rifle-pits. Warren and Burnside also advanced and gained ground-which brought the whole army on one line.

This assault cost us heavily, and probably without benefit to compensate; but the enemy was not cheered by the occurrence sufficiently to induce him to take the offensive. In fact, nowhere after the battle of the Wilderness did Lee show any disposition to leave his defenses far behind him.

Fighting was substantially over by half-past seven in the morning. At eleven o'clock I started to visit

W. R. XXXVI (1) 1002-1005

dale W. T. H. Brooks Chas. De-

W. R. XXXVI (1) 544, 914

CHAP.XIII all the corps commanders to see for myself the different positions gained, and to get their opinion of the practicability of doing anything more in their respective fronts.

Hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too strong to make any further assault promise success. Wright thought he could gain the lines of the enemy, but it would require the cooperation of Hancock's and Smith's corps. thought a lodgment possible, but was not sanguine. Burnside thought something could be done in his front, but Warren differed. I concluded, therefore, to make no more assaults, and a little after twelve directed in the following letter that all offensive action should cease.

COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864, 12:30 P.M.


MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE.

Commanding A. P.:

The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of further advance for the present. most advanced positions and strengthen them. Whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right if practicable. Reconnaissances should be made in front of every corps, and advances made to advantageous positions by regular approaches. To aid the expedition under General Hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army now with Lee until the former gets well on his way to Lynchburg. To do this effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the intrenchments of Richmond than to have them go back there.

Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should break through General Smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist an assault.

> U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General



AL GRANT AND STAFF AT BETHESDA CHURCH. GENERAL GRANT IS SITTING WITH HIS BACK TO THE SMALLER TREE. (FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.)

he remainder of the day was spent in strength- CHAP.XIII ag the line we now held. By night we were as ng against Lee as he was against us.

uring the night the enemy quitted our right it, abandoning some of his wounded, and withburying his dead. These we were able to care

But there were many dead and wounded men ween the lines of the contending forces, which e now close together, who could not be cared without a cessation of hostilities.

o I wrote the following:

COLD HARBOR, VIRGINIA, June 5, 1864.

ERAL R. E. LEE,

Commanding Confederate Army:

is reported to me that there are wounded men, probof both armies, now lying exposed and suffering been the lines occupied respectively by the two armies.
Inanity would dictate that some provision should be
ee to provide against such hardships. I would propose,
efore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either
by be authorized to send to any point between the
eets or skirmish-lines unarmed men bearing litters to
up their dead or wounded, without being fired upon
the other party. Any other method, equally fair to
a parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired
be accepted by me.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

ee replied that he feared such an arrangeat would lead to misunderstanding, and proed that in future, when either party wished remove their dead and wounded, a flag of see be sent. I answered this immediately by ang: W. R. XXXVI (3)

Tbid.

HAP. XIII

Cold Harbor, Virginia, June 6, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE,

Commanding Army of Northern Virginia:

W. R. XXVI (3) 638 Your communication of yesterday's date is received. I will send immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between the lines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed to do the same. I propose that the time for doing this be between the hours of 12 m. and 3 p.m. to-day. I will direct all parties going out to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

Ibid.

Lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of the dead and removal of the wounded in the way I proposed, but when either party desired such permission it should be asked for by flag of truce; and he had directed that any parties I might have sent out, as mentioned in my letter, be turned back. Tanswered:

> Cold Harbor, Virginia, June 6, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE,

Commanding Army Northern Virginia:

Ibid.

The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention, between the two armies, compels me to ask a suspension of hostilities for sufficient time to collect them in—say two hours. Permit me to say that the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, and the same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish to send out on the same duty without further application.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

Lee accoded to this; but delays in transmitting charking the correspondence brought it to the 7th of June -forty-eight hours after it commenced-before parties were got out to collect the men left upon the field. In the mean time all but two of the wounded had died. And I wrote to Lee:

W. R. XXXVI (3) 639

COLD HARBOR, VIRGINIA, June 7, 1864, 10:30 A.M.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding Army of Northern Virginia:

Ibid. 666

I regret that your note of 7 p.m. yesterday should have been received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was delivered, after the hour which had been given for the removal of the dead and wounded had expired; 10:45 P.M. was the hour at which it was received at corps headquarters, and between eleven and twelve it reached my headquarters. As a consequence, it was not understood by the troops of this army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of collecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected. Two officers and six men of the Eighth and Twenty-fifth North Carolina Regiments, who were out in search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, were captured and brought into our lines, owing to this want of understanding. I regret this, but will state that as soon as I learned the fact I directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but must be returned to their commands. These officers and men having been carelessly brought through our lines to the rear, I have determined whether they will be sent back the way they came, or whether they will be sent by some other route.

Regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the suffer ings of wounded men left upon the battle-field have been rendered nugatory, I remain, etc.,

> U. S. Grant. Licutenant-General

I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. I might say the same

The last asmuilt at Cold

CHAP.XIII thing of the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses were on the Confederate side. Before that the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fight them "one Confederate to five Yanks." Indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open field. They had come to much prefor breastworks in their front to the Army of the Potomac. This charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared.

The assault on Vicks-burg, May22, 1863

There was more justification for the assault at Vicksburg. We were in a Southern climate, at the beginning of the hot season. The Army of the Tennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of Vicksburg in the three preceding weeks. They had driven a portion of that army from Port Gibson with considerable loss, after having flanked them out of their stronghold at Grand Gulf. They had attacked another portion of the same army at Raymond, more than fifty miles farther in the interior of the State, and driven them back into Jackson with great loss in killed, wounded, captured, and missing, besides loss of large and small arms. They had captured the capital of the State of Mississippi,

with a large amount of materials of war and manu- CHAP. XII factures. Only a few days before, they had beaten the enemy, then penned up in the town, first at Champion's Hill, next at Big Black River Bridge, inflicting upon him a loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from returning), besides large losses in arms and ammunition. Army of the Tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist under any circumstances. There was no telling how long a regular siege might last. As I have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in a Southern climate. There was no telling what the casualties might be among Northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface-water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. If Vicksburg could have been carried in May it would not only have saved the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and officered, to operate elsewhere with. These are reasons justifying the assault. The only benefit we gained—and it was a slight one for so great a sacrifice—was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. Had the assault not been made I have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the siege of Vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it would have proven successful, and would have saved life, health, and comfort.

## CHAPTER XIV

LEFT-FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY
AND JAMES—GENERAL LEE—VISIT TO BUTLER—
THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG—THE INVESTMENT OF PETERSBURG

HAP. XIV

LEE'S position was now so near Richmond, and the intervening swamps of the Chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in the face of an enemy, that I determined to make my next left-flank move carry the Army of the Potomac south of the James River.<sup>1</sup> Preparations for this

<sup>1</sup> COLD HARBOR, June 5, 1864. Major General Halleck, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C.:

A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be impracticable to hold a line northeast of Richmond that would proteet the Fredericksburg railroad, to enable us to use that road for supplying the army. To do so would give us a long vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our strength to guard it. and would leave open to the enemy all of his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army, if possible, north of Richmond; then, after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the James River, to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retrent.

I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make, all cannot be necomplished that I had designed outside of the city.



were promptly commenced. The move was a haz- Chap. XIV ardous one to make: the Chickahominy River, with its marshy and heavily timbered approaches, had to be crossed; all the bridges over it east of Lee were destroyed: the enemy had a shorter line and better roads to travel on to confront me in crossing; more than fifty miles intervened between me and Butler, by the roads I should have to travel, with both the James and the Chickahominy unbridged to cross; and last, the Army of the Potomac had to be got out of a position but a few hundred vards from the enemy at the widest place. Lee, if he did not choose to follow me, might, with his shorter distance to

travel and his bridges over the Chickahominy and the James, move rapidly on Butler and crush him before the army with me could come to his relief. Then, too, he might spare troops enough to send

I have therefore resolved upon the following plan:

I will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorable circumstance that may present itself, until the cavalry can be sent west to destroy the Virginia Central railroad from about Beaver Dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west. When this is effected I will move the army to the south side of the James River, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on north side and crossing there. To provide for this last and most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest class ought to be immediately provided.

Once on the south side of the James River, I can cut off all sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the canal. If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will be lost to him also. Should Hunter not succeed, I will still make the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south side of the river with a pontoon-train to cross wherever they can.

The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever and whenever he can be found without this protection.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

CHAP. XIV against Hunter, who was approaching Eynchburg, living upon the country he passed through, and without ammunition further than what he carried with him.

But the move had to be made, and I relied upon Lee's not seeing my danger as I saw it. Besides, we had armies on both sides of the James River and not far from the Confederate capital. I knew that its safety would be a matter of the first consideration with the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the so-called Confederate government, if it was not with the military commanders. But I took all the precaution I knew of to guard against all dangers.

Grant to Meade, W. R. XXXVI (3) 599,— Mende to Sheridan, 1bid. 628, 629 Sheridan was sent with two divisions to communicate with Hunter and to break up the Virginia Central railroad and the James River Canal, on the 7th of June, taking instructions to Hunter to come back with him.<sup>1</sup> Hunter was also informed by way

 Cold Harbor, Virginia, June 6, 1864.
 Major-General D. Hunter, Commanding Department of

W. R. XXXVII (1)

West Virginia: General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with instructions to proceed to Charlottesville, Virginia, and to commence there the destruction of the Virginia Central railroad, destroying this way as much as possible. The complete destruction of this road and of the canal on James River is of great importance to us. According to the instructions I sent to General Halleck for your guidance, you were to proceed to Lynchburg and commence there. It would be of great value to us to get possession of Lynchburg

for a single day. But that point is of so much importance to the enemy that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met as to defeat your getting on to the road or canal at all. I see, in looking over the letter to General Halleck on the subject of your instructions, that it rather indicates that your route should be from Staunton via Charlottesville, you have so understood it, you will be doing just what I want. The direction I would now give is that if this letter reaches you in the valley between Staunton and Lynchburg, you immediately turn east by the most practicable road until you strike the Lynchburg branch of the Virginia Central road. From thence move eastof Washington and the Valley that Sheridan was on CHAP. XIV the way to meet him. The canal and Central road, and the regions penetrated by them, were of vast importance to the enemy, furnishing and carrying a large per cent of all the supplies for the Army of Northern Virginia and the people of Richmond. Before Sheridan got off on the 7th news was re- w.R. (1) ceived from Hunter reporting his advance to Staunton and successful engagement with the enemy near that place on the 5th, in which the Confederate commander, W. E. Jones, was killed. On the 4th W. E. Jones, was killed. On the 4th W. E. Jones, of June, the enemy having withdrawn his left Col. 1st Va. Cav. Sept. 28, 1861; Brig. Corps, Burnside, on our right, was moved up between Warren and Smith. On the 5th Birney returned to Hancock, which extended his left now to the Chickahominy, and Warren was withdrawn to Cold Harbor. Wright was directed to send two divisions to the left to extend down the banks to that stream to Bottom's Bridge. The cavalry extended still farther east to Jones's Bridge.

On the 7th Abercrombie—who was in command at White House, and who had been in command at our base of supplies in all the changes made from the start—was ordered to take up the iron from

Sept.19,1862; Maj.-Gen. 1863

J. J. Abercrombie, W. P. 1817-22; Mexico, 1846-48; Col. 7th Inf. Feb. 25, Brig.-Gen. Vols. Aug. 31, 1861

ward along the line of the road, destroying it completely and thoroughly, until you join General Sheridan. After the work laid out for General Sheridan and yourself is thoroughly done, proceed to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid out in General Sheridan's instructions.

If any portion of your force -especially your cavalry-is needed back in your department, you are authorized to send it back.

If on receipt of this you should be near to Lynchburg and deem it practicable to reach that point, you will exercise your judgment about going there.

If you should be on the railroad between Charlottesville and Lynchburg, it may be practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal. Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. CHAP. XIV

W. R.

XXXVI (3)

the York River railroad and put it on boats, and to be in readiness to move by water to City Point.

Ibid. 695

On the 8th Meade was directed to fortify a line down the bank overlooking the Chickahominy, under cover of which the army could move.

Thid. 716

On the 9th Abercrombie was directed to send all organized troops arriving at White House, without debarking from their transports, to report to Butler. Halleck was at this time instructed to send all reinforcements to City Point.

On the 11th I wrote:

Cold Harbor, Virginia, June 11, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER,

Commanding Department of Virginia and North Carolina:

Ibid. 754

The movement to transfer this army to the south side of the James River will commence after dark to-morrow night. Colonel Comstock, of my staff, was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your position secure in the interval, during which the enemy might use most of his force against you, and also to ascertain what point on the river we should reach to effect a crossing if it should not be practicable to reach this side of the river at Bermuda Hundred. Colonel Comstock has not yet returned, so that I cannot make instructions as definite as I would wish; but the time between this and Sunday night being so short in which to get word to you, I must do the best I can. Colonel Dent goes to make arrangements for gunboats and transportation to send up the Chickahominy to take to you the Eighteenth Corps. The corps will leave its position in the trenches as early in the evening tomorrow as possible, and make a forced march to Cole's Landing or Ferry, where it should reach by 10 A.M. the following morning. This corps numbers now 15,300 men. They take with them neither wagons nor artillery, these latter marching with the balance of the army to the James

River. The remainder of the army will cross the Chicka-enar. x hominy at Long Bridge and at Jones's, and strike the river at the most practicable crossing below City Point.

I directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army should be sent to you. I am not advised of the number that may have gone, but suppose you have received from six to ten thousand. General Smith will also reach you as soon as the enemy could, going by the way of Richmond.

The balance of the force will not be more than one day behind, unless detained by the whole of Lee's army, in which case you will be strong enough.

I wish you would direct the proper staff-officers, your chief engineer and your chief quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of all the means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival. If there is a point below City Point where a pontoon-bridge can be thrown, have it laid.

Expecting the arrival of the Eighteenth Corps by Monday night, if you deem it practicable, from the force you have, to seize and hold Petersburg, you may prepare to start on the arrival of troops to hold your present lines. I do not want Petersburg visited, however, unless it is held, nor an attempt to take it unless you feel a reasonable degree of confidence of success. If you should go there, I think troops should take nothing with them except what they can carry, depending upon supplies being sent after the place is secured. If Colonel Dent should not succeed in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the Eighteenth Corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied.

U. S. Grant, Licutenant-General.

P. S.—On reflection I will send the Eighteenth Corps by way of White House. The distance which they will have to march will be enough shorter to enable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty of navigation on the Chickahominy will be avoided.

U. S. GRANT.

CHAP. XIV

Cold Harbor, Virginia, June 11, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL G. G. MEADE,

Commanding Army of the Potomae:

W. R. XXXVI (2) 745 Colonel Comstock, who visited the James River for the purpose of ascertaining the best point below Bermuda Hundred to which to march the army, has not yet returned. It is now getting so late, however, that all preparations may be made for the move to-morrow night without waiting longer.

The movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon; that is, the Eighteenth Corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their wagons and artillery accompanying the balance of the army to Cole's Landing or Ferry, and there embark for City Point, losing no time for rest until they reach the latter point.

The Fifth Corps will seize Long Bridge and move out on the Long Bridge road to its junction with Quaker road, or until stopped by the enemy.

The other three corps will follow in such order as you may direct, one of them crossing at Long Bridge and two at Jones's Bridge. After the crossing is effected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reach about Fort Powhattan. Of course this is supposing the enemy makes no opposition to our advance. The Fifth Corps, after securing the passage of the balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps which crosses the same bridge with themselves. The wagon-trains should be kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or made, lower down than Jones's, they should take it.

U. S. Grant, Licutenant-General.

P.S.—In view of the long march to reach Cole's Landing, and the uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, the direction of the Eighteenth Corps may be changed to White House. They should be directed to load up transports, and start them as fast as loaded without waiting for the whole corps or even whole divisions to go together.

U.S. GRANT.

About this time word was received (through the Richmond papers of the 11th) that Crook and Averell had united and were moving east. This, with the news of Hunter's successful engagement near Staunton, was no doubt known to Lee before it was to me. Then Sheridan's leaving with two divisions of cavalry looked indeed threatening, both to Lee's communications and to his supplies. Much of his cavalry was sent after Sheridan, and Early, with Ewell's entire corps, was sent to the Valley. Supplies were growing scarce in Richmond, and the sources from which to draw them were in our hands. People from outside began to pour into Richmond to help eat up the little on hand. Consternation reigned there.

On the 12th Smith was ordered to move at night to White House, not to stop until he reached there, and to take boats at once for City Point, leaving his trains and artillery to move by land.

Soon after dark some of the cavalry at Long Bridge effected a crossing by wading and floundering through the water and mud, leaving their horses behind, and drove away the cavalry pickets. A pontoon-bridge was speedily thrown across, over which the remainder of the army soon passed, and pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain any advance that might be made from the other side. Warren followed the cavalry, and by the morning of the 13th had his whole corps over. Hancock followed Warren. Burnside took the road to Jones's Bridge, followed by Wright. Ferrero's division, with the wagon-train, moved farther east, by Window Shades and Cole's ferry, our rear being covered by cavalry.

W. R. XXXVII (1) 120, 146

Ibid. 95, 96

W. R. XXXVI (1) 795

W. R. XXXVI (3) 748, 754, 755 CHAP. XIV

It was known that the enemy had some gunboats at Richmond. These might run down at night and inflict great damage upon us before they could be sunk or captured by our navy. General Butler had, in advance, loaded some vessels with stone, ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channel in an emergency. On the 13th I sent orders to have these sunk as high up the river as we could guard them and prevent their removal by the enemy.

As soon as Warren's corps was over the Chicka-

W. R. XL (2) 12

hominy it marched out and joined the cavalry in holding the roads from Richmond while the army passed. No attempt was made by the enemy to impede our march, however, but Warren and Wilson reported the enemy strongly fortified in their front. By the evening of the 13th Hancock's corps was at Charles City Court House, on the James River. Burnside's and Wright's corps were on the Chickahominy, and crossed during the night, Warren's corps and the cavalry still covering the army. The material for a pontoon-bridge was already at hand, and the work of laying it was commenced immediately, under the superintendence of Brigadier-General Benham, commanding the Engineer Brigade. On the evening of the

W. R. XL (1)

Ibid. 521

H. W. Benham, W. P. 1833-37; Moxico, 1847-48; Maj. Eng. Aug.6, Brig.-Gen. Vols. Aug. 13, 1861

Boo W. R. XXXVI (1) 106 ot seq. When the Wilderness campaign commenced the Army of the Potomac, including Burnside's corps,—which was a separate command until the 24th of May, when it was incorporated with the main army,—numbered about 116,000 men. During the progress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforcements were received. At the crossing of the James

14th the crossing commenced, Hancock in advance,

using both the bridge and boats.

CHAP. X

River, June 14th-15th, the army numbered about 115,000. Besides the ordinary losses incident to a campaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, about one half of the artillery was sent back to Washington, and many men were discharged by reason of the expiration of their term of service. In estimating our strength every enlisted man and every commissioned officer present is included, no matter how employed: in bands, sick in field-hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks, and all. Operating in an enemy's country, and being supplied always from a distant base, large detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not only to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roads leading to our flanks and rear. We were also operating in a country unknown to us, and without competent guides, or maps showing the roads accurately.

The manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially. In the Confederate army often only bayonets are taken into account; never, I believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns of the artillery and armed with muskets or carbines. Generally the latter are far enough

<sup>1</sup> FROM A STATEMENT OF LOSSES COMPILED IN THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE.

FIELD OF ACTION AND DATE.	KHLED.	WOUNDED.	MISSING.	AGGREGATE.
Wilderness, May 5th to 7th Spottsylvania, May 8th to 21st. North Anna, May 23d to 27th Totopotomoy, May 27th to 31st Cold Harbor, May 31st to June 12th.	186 99	8,785 9,360 792 358 6,752	2,902 1,970 165 52 1,537	13,948 13,601 1,143 509 10,058
Total	6,586	26,047	6,626	39,259


CHAP. XIV

away to be excluded from the count in any one field. Officers and details of enlisted men are not included. In the Northern armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connected with the army and drawing pay.

See W. R. XXXVI (1) 1021 et seq. Estimated in the same manner as ours, Lee had not less than eighty thousand men at the start. His reinforcements were about equal to ours during the campaign, deducting the discharged men and those sent back. He was on the defensive, and in a country in which every stream, every road, every obstacle to the movement of troops, and every natural defense was familiar to him and his army. The citizens were all friendly to him and his cause, and could and did furnish him with accurate reports of our every move. Rear-guards were not necessary for him, and having always a railroad at his back, large wagon-trains were not required. All circumstances considered, we did not have any advantage in numbers.

General Lee

General Lee, who had led the Army of Northern Virginia in all these contests, was a very highly estimated man in the Confederate army and States, and filled also a very high place in the estimation of the people and press of the Northern States. His praise was sounded throughout the entire North after every action he was engaged in; the number of his forces was always lowered, and that of the National forces exaggerated. He was a large, austere man, and, I judge, difficult of approach to his subordinates. To be extolled by the entire press of the South after every engagement, and by a pertion of the press North with equal vehemence, was calculated to give him the entire confidence of his



GENERAL GRANT AT HEADQUARTERS DURING THE VINGINIA CAMPAIGN.

(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BEADY.)

1

troops and to make him feared by his antagonists. CHAP. X It was not an uncommon thing for my staff-officers to hear from Eastern officers, "Well, Grant has never met Bobby Lee yet." There are good and true officers who believe now that the Army of Northern Virginia was superior to the Army of the Potomac man to man. I do not believe so, except as the advantages spoken of above made them so. Before the end I believe the difference was the other way. The Army of Northern Virginia became despondent and saw the end. It was not pleased thereby. The National army saw the same thing, and was encouraged by it.

The advance of the Army of the Potomac reached the James on the 14th of June. Preparations were at once commenced for laying the pontoon-bridges and crossing the river. As already stated, I had Ante, II. previously ordered General Butler to have two vessels loaded with stone and carried up the river to a point above that occupied by our gunboats, where the channel was narrow, and sunk there so as to obstruct the passage and prevent Confederate gunboats from coming down the river. Butler had had these boats filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk before my arrival. I ordered this done, and also directed that he should turn over all material and boats not then in use in the river to be used in ferrying the troops across.

I then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to Bermuda Hundred to see General Butler for the purpose of directing a movement against Petersburg, while our troops of the Army of the Potomae were crossing.

I had sent General W. F. Smith back from Gold Ante, II. i

CHAP. XIV

W. R. XXXVI (3) Harbor by the way of White House, thence on steamers to City Point, for the purpose of giving General Butler more troops with which to accomplish this result. General Butler was ordered to send Smith, with his troops reinforced, as far as that could be conveniently done, from other parts of the Army of the James. He gave Smith about six thousand reinforcements, including some twenty-five hundred cavalry under Kautz, and about thirty-five hundred colored infantry under Hinks.

The distance which Smith had to move to reach

Brig.-Gen. E. W. Hinks

> the enemy's lines was about six miles, and the Confederate advance-line of works was but two miles outside of Petersburg. Smith was to move. under cover of night, up close to the enemy's works. and assault as soon as he could after daylight. believed then, and still believe, that Petersburg could have been easily captured at that time. had only about twenty-five hundred men in the defenses, besides some irregular troops, consisting of citizens and employees in the city who took up arms in case of emergency. Smith started as proposed, but his advance encountered a rebel force intreuched between City Point and their lines outside of Petersburg. This position he carried, with some loss to the enemy; but there was so much delay that it was daylight before his troops really got off from there. While there I informed General Butler that Hancock's corps would cross the river and move to Petersburg to support Smith in case

705

W. R. X L (2)

his position.

I returned down the river to where the troops of

the latter was successful, and that I could reinforce there more rapidly than Lee could reinforce from the Army of the Potomac now were, communicated CHAP. XIV to General Meade, in writing, the directions I had given to General Butler, and directed him (Meade) to cross Hancock's corps over under cover of night, and push them forward in the morning to Petersburg, halting them, however, at a designated point until they could hear from Smith. I also informed General Meade that I had ordered rations from Ber- W.R. XL (2) muda Hundred for Hancock's corps, and desired him to issue them speedily, and to lose no more time than was absolutely necessary. The rations did not reach him, however, and Hancock, while he got all his corps over during the night, remained W.R. XL (1) until half-past ten in the hope of receiving them. He then moved without them, and on the road received a note from General W. F. Smith asking him to come on. This seems to have been the first information that General Haucock had received of the fact that he was to go to Petersburg, or that anything particular was expected of him. Otherwise he would have been there by four o'clock in the afternoon.

Smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early in the forenoon of the 15th, and spent the day until after seven o'clock in the evening in reconnoitering what appeared to be empty works. The enemy's line consisted of redans occupying commanding positions, with rifle-pits connecting them. To the east side of Petersburg, from the Appointatox back, there were thirteen of these redans, extending a distance of several miles—probably three. If they had been properly manned they could have held out against any force that could have attacked them, at least until reinforcements could have got up from the north of Richmond.

W. R. XL (2)

Ibid. 705

HAP. XIV 7. R. XL (2) 705 Smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with success. By nine o'clock at night he was in possession of five of these redans and, of course, of the connecting lines of rifle-pits. All of them contained artillery, which fell into our hands. Hancock came up and proposed to take any part assigned to him; and Smith asked him to relieve his men who were in the trenches.

R. XL (1)

Next morning, the 16th, Hancock himself was in command, and captured another redan. Meade came up in the afternoon and succeeded Hancock, who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the command of his corps on account of the breaking out afresh of the wound he had received at Gettysburg. During the day Meade assaulted and carried one more redan to his right and two to his left. In all this we lost very heavily. The works were not strongly manned, but they all had guns in them, which fell into our hands, together with the men who were handling them in the effort to repel these assaults.

Up to this time Beauregard, who had commanded south of Richmond, had received no reinforcements, except Hoke's division from Drury's Bluff, which

. R. XL (2)

J CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,
June 17, 1864, 11 A.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.:

The enemy, in their endeavor to reinforce Petersburg, abandoned their intrenchments in front of Bermuda Hundred. They no doubt expected troops from north of the James River to take their place before we discovered it. General Butler took advan-

tage of this and moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank road between Richmond and Petersburg, which I hope to retain possession of. Too much credit cannot be given to the troops and their commanders for the energy and fortitude displayed during the last five days. Day and night has been all the same, no delays being allowed on any account.

U. S. Grant,
Lieutenant-General.

had arrived on the morning of the 16th; though he CHAP. XIV had urged the authorities very strongly to send them, believing, as he did, that Petersburg would be a valuable prize which we might seek.

During the 17th the fighting was very severe and W.R. XL (1) 306, 522 the losses heavy; and at night our troops occupied about the same position they had occupied in the morning, except that they held a redan which had been captured by Potter during the day. During the night, however, Beauregard fell back to the line which had been already selected, and commenced fortifying it. Our troops advanced on the 18th to the line which he had abandoned, and found that the Confederate loss had been very severe, many of the enemy's dead still remaining in the ditches and in front of them.

Gen. Cham-berlain

Colonel J. L. Chamberlain, of the Twentieth Maine, was wounded on the 18th. He was gallantly leading his brigade at the time, as he had been in the habit of doing in all the engagements in which he had previously been engaged. He had several times been recommended for a brigadiergeneralcy for gallant and meritorious conduct. On this occasion, however, I promoted him on the spot, and forwarded a copy of my order to the War Department, asking that my act might be confirmed and Chamberlain's name sent to the Senate for confirmation without any delay. This was done, and at last a gallant and meritorious officer received partial justice at the hands of his government, which he had served so faithfully and so well.

If General Hancock's orders of the 15th had been communicated to him, that officer, with his usual promptness, would undoubtedly have been upon

CHAP. XIV the ground around Petersburg as early as four o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th. The days were long, and it would have given him considerable time before night. I do not think there is any doubt that Petersburg itself could have been earried without much loss; or, at least, if protected by inner detached works, that a line could have been established very much in rear of the one then occupied by the enemy. This would have given us control of both the Weldon and South Side railroads. This would also have saved an immense amount of hard fighting which had to be done from the 15th to the 18th, and would have given us greatly the advantage in the long siege which ensued.

June, 1864

I now ordered the troops to be put under cover and allowed some of the rest which they had so long needed. They remained quiet, except that there was more or less firing every day, until the 22d, when General Meade ordered an advance toward the Weldon railroad. We were very anxious to get to that road, and even round to the South Side railroad, if possible.

W. R. XL (2) 241, 274

W. R. XL (1)

Meade moved Hancock's corps, now commanded by Birney, to the left, with a view to at least force the enemy to stay within the limits of his own line. General Wright, with the Sixth Corps, was ordered, by a road farther south, to march directly for the Weldon road. The enemy passed in between these two corps and attacked vigorously, and with very serious results to the National troops, who were then withdrawn from their advanced position.

The Army of the Potomac was given the investment of Petersburg, while the Army of the James held Bermuda Hundred and all the ground we possessed north of the James River. The Ninth Corps, Burnside's, was placed upon the right at Petersburg; the Fifth, Warren's, next; the Second, Birney's, next; then the Sixth, Wright's, broken off to the left and south. Thus began the siege of Petersburg.

## CHAPTER XV

RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD—RAID ON THE WELDON RAILROAD EARLY'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON—MINING THE WORKS BEFORE PETERSBURG—EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG—CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY—CAPTURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD

HAP. XV

O'N the 7th of June, while at Cold Harbor, I had, as already indicated, sent Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to destroy as much as he could of the Virginia Central railroad. General Hunter had been operating up the Shenandoah Valley with some success, having fought a battle near Staunton, where he captured a great many prisoners, besides killing and wounding a good many men. After the battle he formed a junction at Staunton with Averell and Crook, who had come up from the Kanawha or Gauley River. It was supposed, therefore, that General Hunter would be about Charlottesville, Virginia, by the time Sheridan could get there, doing on the way the damage that he was sent to do.

I gave Sheridan instructions to have Hunter, in case he should meet him about Charlottesville, join and return with him to the Army of the Potomac. Lee, hearing of Hunter's success in the Valley, started Breckinridge out for its defense at once. Learning later of Sheridan's going with two divisions, he also sent Hampton with two divisions of cavalry, his own and Fitz-Hugh Lee's.

Sheridan moved to the north side of the North Gen. Aug. 3 Anna to get out west, and learned of the movement of these troops to the south side of the same stream almost as soon as they had started. He pushed on to get to Trevillian Station to commence his destruction at that point. On the night of the 10th he bivouacked some six or seven miles east of Trevillian, while Fitz-Hugh Lee was the same night at Trevillian Station, and Hampton but a few miles awav.

During the night Hampton ordered an advance on Sheridan, hoping, no doubt, to surprise and very badly cripple him. Sheridan, however, by a countermove, sent Custer on a rapid march to get between the two divisions of the enemy and into their rear. This he did successfully, so that at daylight, when the assault was made, the enemy found himself at the same time resisted in front and attacked in rear, and broke in some confusion. The losses were probably very light on both sides in killed and wounded, but Sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners and sent them to City Point.

During that day, the 11th, Sheridan moved into Trevillian Station, and the following day proceeded to tear up the road east and west. There was considerable fighting during the whole of the day, but the work of destruction went on. In the mean time, at night, the enemy had taken possession of the crossing which Sheridan had proposed to take

Wade Hampton, Brig.-Gen. C.S.A. June, 1862; Maj. 1863; Lt.-Gen. Aug.

Thid.

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to go north when he left Trevillian. Sheridan learned, however, from some of the prisoners he had captured here, that General Hunter was about Lynchburg, and therefore that there was no use of his going on to Charlottesville with a view to meet him.

W. R. XXXVI (1) Sheridan started back during the night of the 12th, and made his way north and farther east, coming around by the north side of White House, and arriving there on the 21st. Here he found an abundance of forage for his animals, food for his men, and security while resting. He had been obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in the field-hospital which he had established near Trevillian, and these necessarily fell into the hands of the enemy.

White House up to this time had been a depot:

but now that our troops were all on the James River it was no longer wanted as a store of supplies. Sheridan was therefore directed to break it up, which he did on the 22d of June, bringing the garrison and an immense wagon-train with him. All these were over the James River by the 26th of the month, and Sheridan ready to follow.

(bid. 786

W. R. X L (1)

In the mean time Meade had sent Wilson's division on a raid to destroy the Weldon and South Side roads. Now that Sheridan was safe and Hampton free to return to Richmond with his eavalry, Wilson's position became precarious. Meade therefore, on the 27th, ordered Sheridan over the river to make a demonstration in favor of Wilson. Wilson got back, though not without severe loss, having struck both roads; but the damage done was soon repaired.

W. R. XL (2)

After these events comparative quiet reigned

about Petersburg until late in July. The time, however, was spent in strengthening the intrenchments and making our position generally more secure against a sudden attack. In the mean time I had to look after other portions of my command, where things had not been going on so favorably, always, as I could have wished.

General Hunter, who had been appointed to succeed Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley, immediately took up the offensive. He met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and defeated him. the 8th he formed a junction with Crook and Averell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct on Lynchburg via Lexington, which he reached and invested on the 16th. Up to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march through a hostile country, he would no doubt have captured Lynchburg. The destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had been very great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sent Early with his corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg before Hunter. After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. W.R. (1) Unfortunately this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of the Gauley and Kanawha rivers, thence up the Ohio River, returning to Harper's Ferry by way of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. A long time was consumed in making this movement. Meantime the Valley was left open to Early's troops and others in that quarter; and Washington also was uncovered.

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June, 1864

Early took advantage of this condition of affairs and moved on Washington.

In the absence of Hunter, General Lew. Wallace. with headquarters at Baltimore, commanded the department in which the Shenandoah lay. surplus of troops with which to move against the enomy was small in number. Most of these were raw, and consequently very much inferior to our veterans and to the veterans which Early had with nim; but the situation of Washington was prearious, and Wallace moved with commendable promptitude to meet the enemy at the Monocaey. He could hardly have expected to defeat him badly. out he hoped to cripple and delay him until Washngton could be put into a state of preparation for is reception. I had previously ordered General Meade to send a division to Baltimore for the purpose of adding to the defenses of Washington, and ne had sent Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps Wright's), which arrived in Baltimore on the 8th of July. Finding that Wallace had gone to the ront with his command, Ricketts immediately took he cars and followed him to the Monocaey with nis entire division. They met the enemy and, as night have been expected, were defeated; but they succeeded in stopping him for the day on which he battle took place. The next morning Early started on his march to the capital of the nation, urriving before it on the 11th.

Learning of the gravity of the situation, I had lirected General Meade to also order Wright with the rest of his corps directly to Washington for the relief of that place, and the latter reached there the very day that Early arrived before it. The Nine-

teenth Corps, which had been stationed in Louisiana, having been ordered up to reinforce the armies about Richmond, had about this time arrived at Fortress Monroe, on their way to join us. I diverted them from that point to Washington, which place they reached, almost simultaneously with Wright, on the 11th. The Nineteenth Corps was commanded by Major-General Emory.

Early made his reconnaissance with a view of attacking on the following morning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our intrenchments, which were very strong, fully manned. He at once commenced to retreat, Wright following. There is no telling how much this result was contributed to by General Lew. Wallace's leading what might well be considered almost a forlorn hope. If Early had been but one day earlier he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements I had sent. Whether the delay caused by the battle amounted to a day or not, General Wallace contributed on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him, a greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory.

Farther west, also, the troubles were threatening. Some time before, Forrest had met Sturgis in command of some of our cavalry in Mississippi and handled him very roughly, gaining a very great victory over him. This left Forrest free to go almost where he pleased, and to cut the roads in rear of Sherman, who was then advancing. Sherman was abundantly able to look after the army that he was immediately with, and all of his military division so long as he could communicate with

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XXXVII (2)

W. H. Emory, W. P. 1826-31; Lt.-Col. 6th Cav. May 14, 1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Mar. 17, 1862

XXXVII (1) 348

8.D. Sturgis, W. P. 1842– 46; Mexico, 1846–48; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Aug. 10, 1861

Brice's Cross Roads, June 10, 1864. See

XXXIX (1) passim CHAP. XV

it: but it was my place to see that he had the means with which to hold his rear. Two divisions under A. J. Smith had been sent to Banks in Louisiana some months before. Sherman ordered these back.

W. R. XXXIX (1) 250, 320

W. R. XXXIX (2)

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with directions to attack Forrest. Smith met and defeated him very badly. I then directed that Smith should hang to Forrest and not let him go. and to prevent by all means his getting upon the Memphis and Nashville railroad. Sherman had

anticipated me in this matter, and given the same orders in substance; but receiving my directions

for this order to Smith, he repeated it.

W. R. XL (1)

On the 25th of June General Burnside had commenced running a mine from about the center of

Henry Pleasants, his front under the Confederate works confronting him. He was induced to do this by Colonel Pleasants, of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, whose regiment was mostly composed of miners, and who was himself a practical miner. Burnside had submitted the scheme to Meade and myself, and we both approved of it, as a means of keeping the men His position was very favorable for carrying on this work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow its completion. The positions of the two lines at that point were only about a hundred yards apart, with a comparatively deep ravine intervening. In the bottom of this ravine the work commenced. The position was unfavorable in this particular: that the enemy's line at that point was reëntering, so that its front was commanded by his own lines both to the right and Then, too, the ground was sloping upward back of the Confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumable that the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this highest point. The work progressed, and on the 23d of July the mine was finished ready for charging; but I had this work of charging deferred until we were ready for it.

W. R. XL (3) Tbid. 305

On the 17th of July several deserters came in and said that there was great consternation in Richmond, and that Lee was coming out to make an attack upon us - the object being to put us on the defensive so that he might detach troops to go to Georgia, where the army Sherman was operating against was said to be in great trouble. I put the army commanders, Meade and Butler, on the look- 15id. 290, 307 out, but the attack was not made.

I concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way of offensive movement myself, having in view something of the same object that Lee had had. Wright's and Emory's corps were in Washington, and with this reduction of my force Lee might very readily have spared some troops from the defenses to send West. I had other objects in view, however, besides keeping Lee where he was. The mine was constructed and ready to be exploded, and I wanted to take that occasion to carry Petersburg if I could. It was the object. therefore, to get as many of Lee's troops away from the south side of the James River as possible. Accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a move-ment with Hancock's corps and Sheridan's cavalry dan, Me-moirs, I, 446 to the north side by the way of Deep Bottom, where Butler had a pontoon-bridge laid. The plan, in the main, was to let the cavalry cut loose, and, joining with Kautz's cavalry of the Army of the James. get by Lee's lines and destroy as much as they could of the Virginia Central railroad, while, in

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the mean time, the infantry was to move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat back when they should have got through with their work. We were successful in drawing the enemy's troops to the north side of the James, as I expected. The mine was ordered to be charged, and the morning of the 30th of July was the time fixed for its explosion. I gave Meade minute orders on the

Battles & Leaders, IV, 545-567

> <sup>1</sup> City Point, Virginia, July 24, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding, etc.:

W. R. XL (3)

The engineer officers who made a survey of the front from Bermuda Hundred report against the probability of success from an attack there. The chances, they think, will be better on Burnside's front. If this is attempted it will be necessary to concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's line we expect to penetrate. All officers should be fully impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy's present line if they should succeed in penetrating it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they should not succeed in break ing through.


To the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front during the assault. Their lines would be sufficient for the support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought on the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault, ready to follow in if successful. The field artillery and infantry held in the lines during the first assault

should be in readiness to move nt a moment's notice either to their front or to follow the main assault, as they should receive One thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders: if they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they should take advantage such knowledge and promptly without waiting for orders from army commanders. General Ord can cooperate with his corps in this movement, and about five thousand troops from Bermuda Hundred can be sent to reinforce you, or can be used to threaten an assault between the Appointation and James rivers, as may be deemed best.

This should be done by Tuesday morning, if done at all. If not attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy the railroad as far as Hicksford at least, and to Weldon if possible.

Whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at Petersburg, Burnside's mine will be blown up. . . .

U. S. Ghant, Licutenant-General.



24th, directing how I wanted the assault conducted, which orders he amplified into general instructions for the guidance of the troops that were to be engaged.

W. R. XL (3) 596, 597

Meade's instructions, which I, of course, approved most heartily, were all that I can see now was necessary. The only further precaution which he could have taken, and which he could not foresee, would have been to have different men to execute them.

The gallery to the mine was over five hundred 15id. 476, 477 feet long from where it entered the ground to the point where it was under the enemy's works, and with a cross-gallery of something over eighty feet running under their lines. Eight chambers had been left, requiring a ton of powder each to charge them. All was ready by the time I had prescribed; and on the 29th Hancock and Sheridan were brought back near the James River with their troops. Under cover of night they started to recross the bridge at Deep Bottom, and to march directly for that part of our lines in front of the mine.

Ibid. 602

Warren was to hold his line of intrenchments with a sufficient number of men, and concentrate the balance on the right next to Burnside's corps, while Ord, now commanding the Eighteenth Corps, temporarily under Meade, was to form in the rear of Burnside to support him when he went in. were to clear off the parapets and the abatis in their front, so as to leave the space as open as possible, and be able to charge the moment the mine had been sprung and Burnside had taken possession. Burnside's corps was not to stop in the crater at all, but push on to the top of the hill, supported on the right and left by Ord's and Warren's corps.

Tbid. 596

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Warren and Ord fulfilled their instructions perfeetly so far as making ready was concerned. Burnside seemed to have paid no attention whatever to the instructions, and left all the obstruction in his own front for his troops to get over in the best way they could. The four divisions of his corps were commanded by Generals Potter, Willcox, Ledlie. and Ferrero. The last was a colored division; and Burnside selected it to make the assault. Mende interfered with this. Burnside then took Ledlie's division—a worse selection than the first could have been. In fact, Potter and Willeox were the only division commanders Burnside had who were equal to the occasion. Ledlie, besides being otherwise inefficient, proved also to possess a disqualification less common among soldiers.

J. H. Ledlie, Maj. 19th N. Y. May 17, 1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Dec. 24, 1862

W. R. XL (1) 527

Ibid. 536

There was some delay about the explosion of the mine, so that it did not go off until about five o'clock in the morning. When it did explode it was very successful, making a crater twenty feet deep and something like a hundred feet in length. Instantly one hundred and ten cannon and fifty mortars, which had been placed in the most commanding positions covering the ground to the right and left of where the troops were to enter the enemy's lines, commenced playing. Ledlie's division marched into the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men stopped there in the absence of any one to give directions, their commander having found some safe retreat to get into before they There was some delay on the left and right in advancing, but some of the troops did get in and turn to the right and left, carrying the riflepits, as I expected they would do.

There had been great consternation in Peters- CHAP. XV burg, as we were well aware, about a rumored mine that we were going to explode. They knew we were mining, and they had failed to cut our mine off by countermining, though Beauregard had taken the precaution to run up a line of intrenchments to the rear of that part of their line fronting where they could see that our men were at work. We had learned through deserters who had come in that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on our side. They said that we had undermined the whole of Petersburg; that they were resting upon a slumbering volcano, and did not know at what moment they might expect an eruption. I somewhat based my calculations upon this state of feeling, and expected that when the mine was exploded the troops to the right and left would flee in all directions, and that our troops, if they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen themselves before the enemy had come to a realization of the true situation. It was just as I expected it would be. We could see the men running without any apparent object except to get away. It was half an hour before musketry firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon our men in the crater; it was an hour before the enemy got artillery up to play upon them; and it was nine o'clock before Lee got up reinforcements from his right to join in expelling our troops.

The effort was a stupendous failure. It cost us see I about four thousand men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the part of the corps commander, and the incompetency of the division commander who was sent to lead the assault.

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W. R. XL (3) 637, 638

After being fully assured of the failure of the mine, and finding that most of that part of Lee's army which had been drawn north of the James River was still there, I gave Meade directions to send a corps of infantry and the cavalry next morning, before Lee could get his forces back, to destroy fifteen or twenty miles of the Weldon railroad. But misfortunes never come singly. Hearned during that same afternoon that Wright's pursuit of Early was feeble because of the constant and contrary orders he had been receiving from Washington, while I was cut off from immediate communication by reason of our cable across Chesapeake Bay being broken. Early, however, was not aware of the fact that Wright was not pursuing until he had reached Strasburg. Finding that he was not pursued, he turned back to Winchester. where Crook was stationed with a small force, and drove him out. He then pushed north until he had reached the Potomac; then he sent McCausland across to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, to destroy that town. Chambersburg was a purely defenseless town, with no garrison whatever, and no fortifications; yet McCausland, under Early's orders. burned the place and left about three hundred families houseless. This occurred on the 30th of July. I rescinded my orders for the troops to go out to destroy the Weldon railroad, and directed them to embark for Washington city. After burning Chambersburg, McCausland retreated, pursued by our eavalry, toward Cumberland. He was met

W. B. XXXVII (1) 286

Brig.-Gen. John Me-Causland

W. R. XXXVII (1) 333-335, 355

W. R. XL (3) 639, 641

B.F. Kelley, Brig.-Gen. Vols. May 17, 1861 W. R. XXXVII (1)

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Virginia.

The Shenandoah Valley was very important to

and defeated by General Kelley and driven into

the Confederates, because it was the principal CHAP. XV storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about Richmond. It was well known that they would make a desperate struggle to maintain it. It had been the source of a great deal of trouble to us heretofore to guard that outlet to the north, partly because of the incompetency of some of the commanders, but chiefly because of interference from Washington. It seemed to be the policy of General Halleck and Secretary Stanton to keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving right and left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital; and, generally speaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy was lost. were left, therefore, free to supply themselves with horses, beef-cattle, and such provisions as they could carry away from western Maryland and Pennsylvania. I determined to put a stop to this. I started Sheridan at once for that field of opera- w. R. (2) tion, and on the following day sent another division of his cavalry.

I had previously asked to have Sheridan assigned to that command, but Mr. Stanton objected, on the Memoirs, I, ground that he was too young for so important a command. On the 1st of August, when I sent reinforcements for the protection of Washington, I sent the following orders:

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, August 1, 1864, 11:30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK. Washington, D. C.:

I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty W.R. XXXVII (2) whilst the enemy is being expelled from the border. Unless General Hunter is in the field in person, I want

CHAP, XV

Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also. Once started up the Valley, they ought to be followed until we get possession of the Virginia Central railroad. If General Hunter is in the field, give Sheridan direct command of the Sixth Corps and cavalry division. All the cavalry, I presume, will reach Washington in the course of to-morrow.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General,

The President in some way or other got to see this despatch of mine directing certain instructions to be given to the commanders in the field operating against Early, and sent me the following very characteristic despatch:

> OFFICE U. S. MILITARY TELEGRAPH, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., August 3, 1864.

Cipher. 6 P.M.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT, City Point, Virginia:

XXXVII (2) 582 I have seen your despatch in which you say, "I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also." This, I think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move. But please look over the despatches you may have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here of "putting our army south of the enemy," or of "following him to the death" in any direction. I repeat to you, it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day and hour, and force it.

A. Lincoln.

I replied to this that "I would start in two hours for Washington"; and soon got off, going directly to the Monocacy without stopping at Washington on my way. I found General Hunter's army encamped there, scattered over the fields along the banks of the Monocacy, with many hundreds of cars and locomotives, belonging to the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, which he had taken the precaution to bring back and collect at that point. I asked the general where the enemy was. He replied that he did not know. He said the fact was that he was so embarrassed with orders from Washington moving him first to the right and then to the left that he had lost all trace of the enemy.

I then told the general that I would find out where the enemy was, and at once ordered steam got up and trains made up, giving directions to push for Halltown, some four miles above Harper's Ferry, in the Shenandoah Valley. The cavalry and the wagon-trains were to march, but all the troops that could be transported by the cars were to go in that way. I knew that the Valley was of such importance to the enemy that, no matter how much he was scattered at that time, he would in a very short time be found in front of our troops moving south.

I then wrote out General Hunter's instructions. I told him that Sheridan was in Washington, and still another division was on its way; and suggested that he establish the headquarters of the department at any point that would suit him best,—Cumberland, Baltimore, or elsewhere,—and give Sheridan command of the troops in the field. The general replied to this that he thought he had better

CHAP. XV W. R. XLII (2) 38

W. R. XLIII (1) 57, and post, Appx. CHAP. XV

be relieved entirely. He said that General Halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the position he was in that he thought somebody else ought

Cf. Hunter to Grant, Doc. 6, 1864, W. R. XXXVII (2) 366, 367

to be there. He did not want in any way to embarrass the cause; thus showing a patriotism that was none too common in the army. There were not many major-generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of a department taken from them on the supposition that for some particular reason, or for any reason, the service I told him, "Very would be better performed. well, then," and telegraphed at once for Sheridan to come to the Monocaey, and suggested that I would wait and meet him there.

W. R. XLIII (1) 695, 696

Sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after the troops were all off. I went to the station and remained there until he arrived. Myself and one or two of my staff were about all the Union people, except General Hunter and his staff, who were left at the Monocaey when Sheridan arrived. I hastily told Sheridan what had been done and what I wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, the written instructions which had been prepared for General Hunter and directed to that officer.

Sheridan, Memoirs, I, 464

Ibid. 471 of SOG.

Sheridan now had about thirty thousand men to move with, eight thousand of them being cavalry. Early had about the same number; but the superior ability of the National commander over the Confederate commander was so great that all the latter's advantage of being on the defensive was more than counterbalanced by this circumstance. predicted, Early was soon found in front of Sheridan in the Valley, and Pennsylvania and Maryland

were speedily freed from the invaders. The importance of the Valley was so great to the Confederates that Lee reinforced Early, but not to the extent that we thought and feared he would.

To prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent out from Richmond, I had to do something to compel Lee to retain his forces about his capital. I therefore gave orders for another move to the north side of the James River, to threaten Richmond. Hancock's corps, part of the Tenth Corps under Birney, and Gregg's division of cavalry were crossed to the north side of the James during the night of the 13th-14th of August. A threatening position was maintained for a number of days, with more or less skirmishing and some tolerably hard fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anything like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should present themselves which would insure great success. General Meade was left in command of the few troops around Petersburg, strongly intrenched; and was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side. There was no particular victory gained on either side; but during that time no more reinforcements were sent to the Valley.

I informed Sheridan of what had been done to W.R. XLIII prevent reinforcements being sent from Richmond against him, and also that the efforts we had made had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone to the Valley was still at Richmond, because we had captured six or seven hundred

W. R. XLII (1) 216, 677

1864

risoners from that division, each of its four briades having contributed to our list of captures. It is informed him that but one division had gone, and it was possible that I should be able to prevent ne going of any more.

To add to my embarrassment at this time, Sheran, who was now near Atlanta, wanted reinforceents. He was perfectly willing to take the raw roops then being raised in the Northwest, saving nat he could teach them more soldiering in one ty among his troops than they would learn in a eek in a camp of instruction. I therefore asked at all troops in camps of instruction in the Northest be sent to him. Sherman also wanted to be sured that no Eastern troops were moving out gainst him. I informed him of what I had done, id assured him that I would hold all the troops ere that it was possible for me to hold, and that o to that time none had gone. I also informed im that his real danger was from Kirby Smith, ho commanded the trans-Mississippi Department. Smith should escape Steele and get across the ississippi River, he might move against him. ad, therefore, asked to have an expedition ready move from New Orleans against Mobile in case irby Smith should get across. This would have a andency to draw him to the defense of that place,

stead of going against Sherman.
Right in the midst of all these embarrassments alleck informed me that there was an organized sheme on foot in the North to resist the draft, and aggested that it might become necessary to draw roops from the field to put it down. He also adised taking in sail and not going too fast.

The troops were withdrawn from the north side of the James River on the night of the 20th. Before they were withdrawn, however, and while most of Lee's force was on that side of the river, Warren had been sent with most of the Fifth Corps to capture the Weldon railroad. He took up his line of march well back to the rear, south of the enemy, while the troops remaining in the trenches extended so as to cover that part of the line which he had vacated by moving out. From our left, near the old line, it was about three miles to the Weldon railroad. A division was ordered from the right of the Petersburg line to reinforce Warren, while a division was brought back from the north side of the James River to take its place.

This road was very important to the enemy. The limits from which his supplies had been drawn were already very much contracted, and I knew that he must fight desperately to protect it. Warren carried the road, though with heavy loss on both sides. He fortified his new position, and our trenches were then extended from the left of our main line to connect with his new one. Lee made repeated attempts to dislodge Warren's corps, but without success, and with heavy loss.

As soon as Warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him, troops were sent south to destroy the bridges on the Weldon railroad; and with such success that the enemy had to draw in wagons, for a distance of about thirty miles, all the supplies he got thereafter from that source. It was on the 21st that Lee seemed to have given up the Weldon railroad as having been lost to him; but along about the 24th or 25th he made renewed

CHAP. XV

W. R. XLII (1) 428

Tbid. 429

enap. XV

attempts to recapture it. Again he failed, and with very heavy losses to him as compared with ours.

On the night of the 20th our troops on the north

7. R. XIJT )221 ot soq., 306 ot soq. side of the James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg were sent south to destroy the Weldon railroad. They were attacked on the 25th at Reams's Station, and after desperate fighting a part of our line gave way, losing five pieces of artillery. But the Weldon railroad never went out of our possession from the 18th of August to the close of the war.

## CHAPTER XVI

SHERIDAN'S ADVÂNCE - VISIT TO SHERIDAN - SHERI-DAN'S VICTORY IN THE SHENANDOAH - SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER-CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE WINTER

TE had our troops on the Weldon railroad CHAP. XV. contending against a large force that regarded this road of so much importance that they could afford to expend many lives in retaking it; Sherman just getting through to Atlanta with great losses of men from casualties, discharges, and detachments left along as guards to occupy and hold the road in rear of him; Washington threatened but a short time before, and now Early being strengthened in the Valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt. It kept me pretty active in looking after all these points.

On the 10th of August Sheridan had advanced W.R. XLII on Early up the Shenandoah Valley, Early falling back to Strasburg. On the 12th I learned that Lee had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions of infantry, and a considerable cavalry force to strengthen Early. It was important that Sheridan should be informed of this; so I sent the informa- 1514. 775, 78 tion to Washington by telegraph, and directed a courier to be sent from there to get the message to

MAP. XVI

Sheridan at all hazards, giving him the information. The messenger, an officer of the army, pushed through with great energy and reached Sheridan just in time. The officer went through by way of Snicker's Clap, escorted by some cavalry. He found Sheridan just making his preparations to attack Early in his chosen position. Now, however, he was thrown back on the defensive.

Visit to Sheridan

On the 15th of September I started to visit General Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley. My purpose was to have him attack Early, or drive him out of the Valley and destroy that source of supplies for Lee's army. I knew it was impossible for me to get orders through Washington to Sheridan to make a move, because they would be stopped there, and such orders as Halleck's caution (and that of the Secretary of War) would suggest would be given instead, and would no doubt be contradictory to mine. I therefore, without stopping at Washington, went directly through to Charlestown, some ten miles above Harper's Ferry, and waited there to see General Sheridan, having sent a courier in advance to inform him where to meet, me.

theridan, emoirs, II, 9 When Sheridan arrived I asked him if he had a map showing the positions of his army and that of the enemy. He at once drew one out of his side-pocket, showing all roads and streams, and the camps of the two armies. He said that if he had permission he would move so and so (pointing out how) against the Confederates, and that he could "whip them." Before starting I had drawn up a plan of campaign for Sheridan, which I had brought with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so

positive in his views, and so confident of success, I CHAP. XV. said nothing about this, and did not take it out of my pocket.

Sheridan's wagon-trains were kept at Harper's Ferry, where all of his stores were. By keeping the teams at that place, their forage did not have to be hauled to them. As supplies of ammunition, provisions, and rations for the men were wanted, trains would be made up to deliver the stores to the commissaries and quartermasters encamped at Winchester. Knowing that he, in making preparations to move at a given day, would have to bring up wagon-trains from Harper's Ferry, I asked him if he could be ready to get off by the following Tuesday. This was on Friday. "Oh yes," he said. he "could be off before daylight on Monday." I told him then to make the attack at that time and according to his own plan; and I immediately started to return to the army about Richmond. After visiting Baltimore and Burlington, New Jersey, I arrived at City Point on the 19th.

On the way out to Harper's Ferry I had met Mr. Robert Garrett, president of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. He seemed very anxious to know when workmen might be put upon the road again so as to make repairs and put it in shape for running. It was a large piece of property to have standing idle. I told him I could not answer then positively, but would try and inform him before a great while. On my return Mr. Garrett met me again with the same question, and I told him I thought that by the following Wednesday he might send his workmen out on his road. I gave him no further information, however, and he had no susCHAP. XVI picion of how I expected to have the road cleared for his workmen.

W. R. XLIII (1) 24, 46, 554

Shoridan moved at the time he had fixed upon He met Early at the crossing of Opequan Creek. and won a most decisive victory—one which electrified the country. Early had invited this attack himself by his bad generalship, and made the victory easy. He had sent G. T. Anderson's division east of the Blue Ridge before I went to Harper's Ferry; and about the time I arrived there he started with two other divisions (leaving but two in their camps) to march to Martinsburg for the purpose of destroying the Baltimore and Obio railroad at that point. Early here learned that I had been with Sheridan, and, supposing there was some movement on foot, started back as soon as he got the information. But his forces were separated, and, as I have said, he was very badly defeated. He fell back to Fisher's Hill, Sheridan following.

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
Sheridan, Memoirs, II,

W. R. XLIII (1) 25-28, 46-49, 555-558

Thid, 50

The Valley is narrow at that point, and Early made another stand there, behind works which extended across. But Sheridan turned both his flanks and again sent him speeding up the Valley, following in hot pursuit. The pursuit was continued up the Valley to Mount Jackson and New Market. Sheridan captured about eleven hundred prisoners and sixteen guns. The houses which he passed all along the route were found to be filled with Early's wounded, and the country swarmed with his deserters. Finally, on the 25th, Early turned from the Valley eastward, leaving Sheridan at Harrisonburg in undisputed possession.

Now one of the main objects of the expedition



began to be accomplished. Sheridan went to work chap. XVI with his command, gathering in the crops, cattle, and everything in the upper part of the Valley required by our troops; and especially taking what might be of use to the enemy. What he could not take away he destroyed, so that the enemy would not be invited to come back there. I congratulated Sheridan upon his recent great victory and had a W.R.XLIII salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the guns being aimed at the enemy around Petersburg. I also notified the other commanders throughout the country, who also fired salutes in honor of his victory.

I had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid to have a decisive battle fought at that time, for fear it might go against us and have a bad effect on the November elections. convention which had met and made its nomination of the Democratic candidate for the Presidency had declared the war a failure. Treason was talked as boldly in Chicago at that convention as ever it had been in Charleston. It was a question whether the government would then have had the power to make arrests and punish those who thus talked treason. But this decisive victory was the most effective campaign argument made in the canvass.

Cf. Sheri-dan, Me-moirs, I, 50

Sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they could hear from him in Washington, and the President became very much frightened about him. was afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little like that of General Cass was said to have been, in one of our Indian wars, when he was an officer of the army. Cass was pursuing the Indians so closely that the first thing he knew he found himself in

CHAP. XVI their front and the Indians pursuing him. The President was afraid that Sheridan had got on the other side of Early and that Early was in behind

W. R. XLIII (2) 208

him. He was afraid that Sheridan was getting so far away that reinforcements would be sent out from Richmond to enable Early to beat him. I replied to the President that I had taken steps to prevent Lee from sending reinforcements to Early, by attacking the former where he was.

W. R. XLII (1) 793

On the 28th of September, to retain Lee in his position, I sent Ord with the Eighteenth Corps and Birney with the Tenth Corps to make an advance on Richmond, to threaten it. Ord moved with the left wing up to Chaffin's Bluff; Birney with the Tenth Corps took a road farther north; while Kautz with the cavalry took the Darby road, still farther to the north. They got across the river by the next morning, and made an effort to surprise the enemy. In that, however, they were unsuccessful.

Thid 708

The enemy's lines were very strong and very intricate. Stannard's division of the Eighteenth Corps, with General Burnham's brigade leading, tried an assault against Fort Harrison, and cap-

Hiram Burnham, Col. 6th Me. 1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Apr. 1864

tured it with sixteen guns and a good many prisoners. Burnham was killed in the assault. Colonel Stevens, who succeeded him, was badly wounded; and his successor also fell in the same way. Some

Auron F. Htevens

> works to the right and left were also carried with the guns in them -six in number - and a few more prisoners. Birney's troops to the right captured the enemy's intrenched picket-lines, but were un-

Our troops fortified their new position, bringing Fort Harrison into the new line and extending it

successful in their efforts upon the main line,

to the river. This brought us pretty close to the CHAP. XVI enemy on the north side of the James, and the two opposing lines maintained their relative positions to the close of the siege.

In the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance, but it failed. Ord fell badly wounded, and had to be relieved; the command devolved upon General Heckman, and later General Weitzel was assigned to the command of the Eighteenth Corps. During the night Lee reinforced his troops N.J. Feb. 10, about Fort Gilmer, which was at the right of Fort Harrison, by transferring eight additional brigades from Petersburg, and attempted to retake the works which we had captured by concentrating ten brigades against them. All their efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavy loss. In one of these assaults upon us General Stannard, a gallant officer, who was defending Fort Harrison, lost an arm. Our casualties during these operations amounted to 394 killed, 1554 wounded, and 324 missing.

While this was going on General Meade was instructed to keep up an appearance of moving troops to our extreme left. Parke and Warren were kept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move, leaving their inclosed batteries manned, with a scattering line on the other intrenchments. object of this was to prevent reinforcements from going to the north side of the river. Meade was instructed to watch the enemy closely and, if Lee W. R. XLII weakened his lines, to make an attack.

On the 30th these troops moved out, under Warren, and captured an advanced intrenched camp at Peeble's farm, driving the enemy back to the main.

C. A. Heck-man, Capt. 1st Pa. Apr. 20, 1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Nov. 29, 1862

> G. J. Stan-nard, Lt.-Col. 2d Vt. May, 1861; Brig. Gen. Vols. Mar. 11. 1863

MAP. XVI line. Our troops followed and made an attack in the hope of carrying the enemy's main line; but in this they were unsuccessful and lost a large number of men, mostly captured. The number of killed and wounded was not large. The next day our troops advanced again and established themselves. intrenching a new line about a mile in front of the This advanced Warren's position on the Weldon railroad very considerably.

Sheridan, having driven the enemy out of the Valley, and taken the productions of the Valley, so that instead of going there for supplies the enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if he again entered it, recommended a reduction of his own force, the surplus to be sent where it could be of more use. I approved of his suggestion, and ordered him to send Wright's corps back to the James River. I further directed him to repair the railroad up the Shenandoah Valley toward the advanced position, which we would hold with a small force. The troops were to be sent to Washington by the way of Culpeper, in order to watch the east side of the Blue Ridge, and prevent the enemy from getting into the rear of Sheridan while he was still doing his work of destruction.

The Valley was so very important, however, to the Confederate army that, contrary to our expectations, they determined to make one more strike, and save it, if possible, before the supplies should be all destroyed. Reinforcements were sent, therefore, to Early, and this before any of our troops had been withdrawn. Early prepared to strike Sheridan at Harrisonburg; but the latter had not remained there.

On the 6th of October Sheridan commenced retiring down the Valley, taking or destroying all the food and forage, and driving the cattle before him. Early following. At Fisher's Hill Sheridan turned his cavalry back on that of Early, which, under the lead of Rosser, was pursuing closely, and routed it most completely, capturing eleven guns and a large number of prisoners. Sheridan lost only about sixty men. His cavalry pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles. On the 10th of October the march down the Valley was again resumed, Early again following.

CHAP. XVI W.R. XLIII (1) 30, 50

T.L. Rosser, W.P.1856-61; Brig.-Gen. Cav. Oct. 10, 1863; Maj.-Gen. Nov.

W.R. XLIII (1) 31, 32, 50,

I now ordered Sheridan to halt, and to improve the opportunity, if afforded by the enemy's having been sufficiently weakened, to move back again and cut the James River Canal and Virginia Central railroad. But this order had to go through Wash- W.R. XLIII ington, where it was intercepted; and when Sheridan received what purported to be a statement of what I wanted him to do, it was something entirely different. Halleck informed Sheridan that it was my wish for him to hold a forward position as a base from which to act against Charlottesville and Gordonsville; that he should fortify this position and provision it.

Ibid. 345

Sheridan objected to this most decidedly; and I was impelled to telegraph him, on the 14th, as follows:

> CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, October 14, 1864, 12:30 P.M.

Major-General Sheridan. Cedar Creek, Virginia:

What I want is for you to threaten the Virginia Central railroad and canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding yourself ready to advance if the enemy

Tbid, 363

draw off their forces. If you make the enemy hold a force CHAP, XVI equal to your own for the protection of those thoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruction. If you cannot do this, then the next best thing to do is to send here all the force you can. I deem a good cavalry force necessary for your offensive as well as defensive operations. You need not, therefore, send here more than one division of cavalry.

U. S. Grant. Licutenant-General.

W. R. XLIII

Sheridan, having been summoned to Washington city, started on the 15th, leaving Wright in command. His army was then at Cedar Creek, some twenty miles south of Winchester. The next morning, while at Front Royal, Sheridan received a despatch from Wright, saving that a despatch from Longstreet to Early had been intercepted. It directed the latter to be ready to move and to crush Sheridan as soon as he, Longstreet, arrived. On the receipt of this news Sheridan ordered the eavalry up the Valley to join Wright.

Ibid. 389

W. R. XLIII (1) 52 55, 561 664

On the 18th of October Early was ready to move, and during the night succeeded in getting his troops in the rear of our left flank, which fled precipitately and in great confusion down the Valley, losing eighteen pieces of artillery and a

thousand or more prisoners. The right, under пыл. 193 196 General Getty, maintained a firm and steady front, falling back to Middletown, where it took a position and made a stand. The cavalry went to the rear, seized the roads leading to Winchester, and held them for the use of our troops in falling back, General Wright having ordered a retreat back to

Cf. Sheridan, Mo moirs, 11, 66 et seq.

that place.

Sheridan, having left Washington on the 18th,

reached Winchester that night. The following CHAP, XVI morning he started to join his command. He had searcely got out of town when he met his men returning in panic from the front, and also heard heavy firing to the south. He immediately ordered the cavalry at Winchester to be deployed across the Valley to stop the stragglers. Leaving members of his staff to take care of Winchester and the public property there, he set out with a small escort directly for the scene of battle. As he met the fugitives he ordered them to turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way. His presence soon restored confidence. Finding themselves worse frightened than hurt, the men did halt and turn back. Many of those who had run ten miles got back in time to redeem their reputation as gallant soldiers before night.

When Sheridan got to the front he found Getty and W. R. XLIII Custer still holding their ground firmly between the Confederates and our retreating troops. Everything in the rear was now ordered up. Sheridan at once proceeded to intrench his position; and he awaited an assault from the enemy. This was made with vigor, and was directed principally against Emory's corps, which had sustained the principal loss in the first attack. By one o'clock the attack was repulsed. Early was so badly damaged that he seemed disinclined to make another attack, but went to work to intrench himself with a view to holding the position he had already gained. He thought, no doubt, that Sheridan would be glad enough to leave him unmolested; but in this he was mistaken.

About the middle of the afternoon Sheridan advanced. He sent his cavalry by both flanks, and

Ibid. 284

Thid. 55 .-Sheridan, Memoirs, II,


CHAP. XVI they penetrated to the enemy's rear. The contest was close for a time, but at length the left of the enemy broke, and disintegration along the whole line soon followed. Early tried to rally his men, but they were followed so closely that they had to give way very quickly every time they attempted to make a stand. Our cavalry, having pushed on and got in the rear of the Confederates, captured twenty-four pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had been lost in the morning. This victory pretty much closed the campaigning in the Valley of Virginia. All the Confederate troops were sent back to Richmond, with the exception of one division of infantry and a little cavalry. corps was ordered back to the Army of the Potomac, and two other divisions were withdrawn from the Valley. Early had lost more men in killed, wounded, and captured in the Valley than Sheridan had commanded from first to last.

Gen. Hayes

1877-1880

On more than one occasion in these engagements General R. B. Hayes, who succeeded me as President of the United States, bore a very honorable part. His conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry, as well as the display of qualities of a higher order than that of mere personal daring. This might well have been expected of one who could write at the time he is said to have done so, "Any officer fit for duty who at this crisis would abandon his post to electioneer for a seat in Congress, ought to be scalped." entered the army as a major of volunteers at the beginning of the war, General Hayes attained by meritorious service the rank of brevet major-general before its close.

Maj. 23d Ohio, June7, Lt.-Col. Oct. 24, 1861; Col. Oct. 24, 1862; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Oct. 19, 1864; Byt. Maj.-Gen. Mar. 13,



GENERAL GRANT, MRS. GRANT, AND MASTER JESSE AT HEADQUARTERS AT CITY POINT. (FROM PHOTOGRAPH BY E. AND H. T. ANTHONY.)

he north side of the James River the enemy CHAP. XVI ed Kautz's cavalry on the 7th of October, W. R. XLII rove it back with heavy loss in killed. ed, and prisoners, and the loss of all the y. This was followed up by an attack on renched infantry line, but was repulsed with slaughter. On the 13th a reconnaissance nt out by General Butler, with a view to he enemy from some new works he was conng, which resulted in heavy loss to us.

he 24th I ordered General Meade to attempt W. R. XLII possession of the South Side railroad, and t purpose to advance on the 27th. The atproved a failure, however, the most ad- Told. 35-37 of our troops not getting nearer than six miles of the point aimed for. Seeing possibility of its accomplishment, I ordered ops to withdraw, and they were all back in

ormer positions the next day. er, by my directions, also made a demonstra- Ibid. 331,390, the north side of the James River in order port this move, by detaining there the Cone troops who were on that side. in this, but failed of further results by not ng past the enemy's left before turning in Darby road, and by reason of simply coming inst their lines in place.

closed active operations around Richmond winter. Of course there was frequent skirg between pickets, but no serious battle was near either Petersburg or Richmond. It prolong this work to give a detailed account that took place from day to day around ourg and at other parts of my command,

L. II.—15

Chap. XVI and it would not interest the general region. All these details can be found by the tary student in a series of books published. Scribners; Badeau's history of my campaigneralso in the publications of the War Departmentuding both the National and Confeders ports.

W. R. XLII (3) 713, 728

In the latter part of November General Hs was relieved from the command of the s Corps by the Secretary of War and order Washington, to organize and command a coveteran troops to be designated the First It was expected that this would give him a command to cooperate with in the spring. my expectation, at the time, that in the final tions Hancock should move either up the Val else east of the Blue Ridge to Lynchburg; th being to make the spring campaign the closewar. I expected, with Sherman coming ur the South, Meade south of Petersburg and za Richmond, and Thomas's command in Tenx with depots of supplies established in the es part of that State, to move from the direct Washington or the Valley toward Lynchburg would then have Lee so surrounded that hi plies would be cut off entirely, making it impofor him to support his army.

Ibid. 705, 714

General Humphreys, chief of staff of the of the Potomac, was assigned to the commet the Second Corps, to succeed Hancock.

## CHAPTER XVII

MPAIGN IN GEORGIA—SHERMAN'S MARCH TO SEA—WAR ANECDOTES—THE MARCH ON ANNAH—INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH—CAPTURE SAVANNAH

Is now return to the operations in the CHAP. XVIII litary Division of the Mississippi, and acty Sherman in his march to the sea. Cossession of Atlanta by us narrowed the v of the enemy very materially, and cut off his two remaining lines of roads from east

Palmetto and Macon and made speeches at Palmetto and Macon and made speeches at Ide. He spoke at Palmetto on the 20th of Der, and at Macon on the 22d. Inasmuch and relieved Johnston and appointed Hood, and had immediately taken the initiative, it real to suppose that Mr. Davis was disapwith General Johnston's policy. My own not is that Johnston acted very wisely: he led his men and saved as much of his terrible could, without fighting decisive battles in all might be lost. As Sherman advanced, he shown, his army became spread out, until, had been continued, it would have been

1864

Johnston superseded by Hood

CHAP, XVII easy to destroy it in detail. I know that both Sherman and I were rejoiced when we heard of the change. Hood was unquestionably a brave, gallant soldier, and not destitute of ability; but unfortunately his policy was to fight the enemy wherever he saw him, without thinking much of the consequences of defeat.

Jos. E. Brown, Gov. 1857-64; U. S. Sen. 1880-91

Johnston's policy

In his speeches Mr. Davis denounced Governor Brown, of Georgia, and General Johnston in unmeasured terms, even insinuating that their lovalty to the Southern cause was doubtful. So far as General Johnston is concerned, I think Davis did him a great injustice in this particular. I had known the general before the war, and strongly believed it would be impossible for him to accept a high commission for the purpose of betraying the cause he had espoused. Then, as I have said, I think that his policy was the best one that could have been pursued by the whole South-protract the war, which was all that was necessary to enable them to gain recognition in the end. The North was already growing weary, as the South evidently was also, but with this difference. In the North the people governed, and could stop hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies. The South was a military camp, controlled absolutely by the government with soldiers to back it, and the war could have been protracted, no matter to what extent the discontent reached, up to the point of open mutiny of the soldiers themselves. Mr. Davis's speeches were frank appeals to the people of Georgia and that portion of the South to come to their relief. He tried to assure his frightened hearers that the Yankees were rapidly digging

Davis on the war

their own graves; that measures were already CHAP, XVII being taken to cut them off from supplies from the North: and that, with a force in front and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve in the midst of a hostile people. Papers containing reports of these speeches immediately reached the Northern States, and they were republished. Of course that caused no alarm so long as telegraphic communication was kept up with Sherman.

When Hood was forced to retreat from Atlanta. he moved to the southwest, and was followed by a portion of Sherman's army. He soon appeared upon the railroad in Sherman's rear, and with his whole army began destroying the road. At the same time, also, the work was begun in Tennessee and Kentucky which Mr. Davis had assured his hearers at Palmetto and Macon would take place. He ordered Forrest (about the ablest cavalry general in the South) north for this purpose; and Forrost and Wheeler carried out their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking up a garrison. Forrest, indeed, performed the very remarkable feat of capturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a number of transports, something the accomplishment of which is very hard to account for. Hood's army had been weakened by Governor Brown's withdrawing the Georgia State troops for the purpose of gathering in the season's crops for the use of the people and for the use of the army. This not only depleted Hood's forces. but it served a most excellent purpose in gathering in supplies of food and forage for the use of our army in its subsequent march. Sherman was obliged to push on with his force and go himself

Cf. Hood's Rep. W. R. XXXIX (I)

W. R. XXXIX (1) NON N71

Sherman, Memoira, II. 138, 139

HAP. XVII with portions of it hither and thither, until it was clearly demonstrated to him that with the army he then had it would be impossible to hold the line from Atlanta back and leave him any force whatover with which to take the offensive. Had that plan been adhered to, very large reinforcements would have been necessary; and Mr. Davis's prediction of the destruction of the army would have been realized, or else Sherman would have been obliged to make a successful retreat, which Mr. Davis said in his speeches would prove more disastrous than Napoleon's retreat from Moscow.

These speeches of Mr. Davis were not long in reaching Sherman. He took advantage of the information they gave, and made all the preparation possible for him to make to meet what now became expected—attempts to break his communications. Something else had to be done; and to Sherman's sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long in dawning upon him, not only that something else had to be done, but what that something else should be.

On September 10th I telegraphed Sherman as follows:

> CITY POINT, VIRGINIA. September 10, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN. Atlanta, Georgia:

So soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. We want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war. If we give him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant. Now that we have all of Mobile Bay that is valuable, I do not know but it will be the best move to transfer Canby's troops to act upon Savannah, whilst you move on Augusta. Chap XVII I should like to hear from you, however, in this matter.

U. S. GRANT. Lieutenant-General.

Sherman replied promptly:

If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta or Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and compel Hood to give up Augusta or Macon, and then turn on the other. . . . If you can manage to take the Savannah River as high up as Augusta, or the Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole State of Georgia.

W. R. XXXIX (2) 356

On the 12th I sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with a letter inviting Sherman's views about the next campaign.

Ibid. 364

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, September 12, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,

Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi:

I send Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of my staff, with this. Colonel Porter will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than I can do in the limits of a letter. Although I feel myself strong enough for offensive operations, I am holding on quietly to get advantage of recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. My lines are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom north of the James across the peninsula formed by the Appointtox and the James, and south of the Appomattox to the Weldon road. This line is very strongly fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its great length takes many in the aggregate. I propose, when I do move, to extend my left so as to control what is known as the South Side, or Lynchburg and Petersburg, road, then, if possible, to keep the Danville road cut. At the same time this move is made, I want to

Horace Porter, W. P. 1855-60; 2d Lt.Ord.Apr. Lt. Col. Staff, A.D.C. Apr. 4, 1864

CHAP, XVII send a force of from six to ten thousand men against Wilmington.

The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort Fisher, and hold that point. At the same time a large naval fleet will be assembled there, and the ironelads will run the batteries as they did at Mobile. This will give us the same control of the harbor of Wilmington that we now have of the harbor of Mobile. What you are to do with the forces at your command I do not see. The difficulties of supplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond where you are, I plainly see. If it had not been for Price's movements, Canby would have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile. From your command on the Mississippi an equal number could have been taken. With these forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to Mobile and the other half to Savannah. You could then move as proposed in your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally. Whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new base of supplies. My object now in sending a staff-officer is not so much to suggest operations for you as to get your views and have plans matured by the time everything can be got ready. It will probably be the 5th of October before any of the plans herein indicated will be executed.

If you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward and I will approve them. . . .

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

This reached Sherman on September 20th.

XXIX (2) 464

On the 25th of September Sherman reported to Washington that Hood's troops were in his rear. He had provided against this by sending a division to Chattanooga and a division to Rome, Georgia, which was in the rear of Hood, supposing that Hood would fall back in the direction from which he had come to reach the railroad. At the same

time Sherman and Hood kept up a correspondence CHAP. XVII relative to the exchange of prisoners, the treatment Sherman, Memoirs, II, of citizens, and other matters suitable to be arranged between hostile commanders in the field. On the 27th of September I telegraphed Sherman as follows:

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, September 27, 1864, 10:30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN:

I have directed all recruits and new troops from the W.R. (2) Western States to be sent to Nashville, to receive their further orders from you. . . .

489

U. S. GRANT. Lieutenant-General.

On the 29th Sherman sent Thomas back to Chat-Memoirs, II, tanooga, and afterward to Nashville, with another division (Morgan's) of the advanced army. Sherman then suggested that, when he was prepared, July 17, 1862 his movements should take place against Milledgeville and then to Savannah. His expectation at that time was to make this movement as soon as he could get up his supplies. Hood was moving in his own country, and was moving light, so that he could make two miles to Sherman's one. He depended upon the country to gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays.

As I have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened, Mobile had been looked upon as the objective point of Sherman's army. It had been a favorite move of mine from 1862, when I first suggested to the then commander-in-chief that the troops in Louisiana, instead of frittering away their time in the trans-Mississippi, should move against Mobile. I recommended this from

J. D. Mor-

Ante, I, 484,

CHAP, XVII

Cf. W. R. XXXIX (3) 25,63

time to time until I came into command of the army, the last of March, 1864. Having the power in my own hands, I now ordered the concentration of supplies, stores, and troops in the Department of the Gulf about New Orleans, with a view to a move against Mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the other armies operating in the field. Before I came into command these troops had been scattered over the trans-Mississippi Department in such a way that they could not be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part in the original movement; hence the consideration which had caused Mobile to be selected as the objective point for Sherman's army, to find his next base of supplies after having cut loose from Atlanta, no longer existed.

Sherman, Memoirs, 11, 145

General G. M. Dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer, having been badly wounded, had to leave the army about the 1st of October. He was in command of two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, consolidated into one. Sherman then divided his army into the right and left wings- the right commanded by General O. O. Howard and the left by General Slocum. General Dodge's two divisions were assigned, one to each of these wings. Howard's command embraced the Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps, and Slocum's the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps, commanded by Generals Jeff. C. Davis and A. S. Williams. Generals Logan and Blair commanded the two corps composing the right wing. About this time they left to take part in the Presidential election, which took place that year, leaving their corps to Osterhaus and Ransom. I have no doubt that their leaving was at the ear-

A. S. Williams, Brig.— Gen. Vols. May 17, 1861 nest solicitation of the War Department. General CHAP. XVII Blair got back in time to resume his command and to proceed with it throughout the march to the sea and back to the grand review at Washington. General Logan did not return to his command until after it reached Savannah.

Logan ag-

Logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of General Howard from that portion of the Army of the Potomac which was then with the Western army, to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, with which army General Logan had served from the battle of Belmont to the fall of Atlanta naving passed successively through all grades from colonel commanding a regiment to general comnanding a brigade, division, and army-corps, until, apon the death of McPherson, the command of the entire Army of the Tennessee devolved upon him n the midst of a hotly contested battle. He coneived that he had done his full duty as commander n that engagement; and I can bear testimony, from personal observation, that he had proved nimself fully equal to all the lower positions which ne had occupied as a soldier. I will not pretend to question the motive which actuated Sherman in aking an officer from another army to supersede General Logan. I have no doubt whatever that ne did this for what he considered would be to the good of the service, which was more important than that the personal feelings of any individual should not be aggrieved; though I doubt whether he had in officer with him who could have filled the place s Logan would have done. Differences of opinion nust exist between the best of friends as to policies n war, and of judgment as to men's fitness. The

CHAP, XVII officer who has the command, however, should be allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers under him, unless he is very manifestly wrong.

Sherman, Memoirs.II. 146

Sherman's army, after all the depletions, numbered about sixty thousand effective men. All weak men had been left to hold the rear, and those remaining were not only well men, but strong and hardy, so that he had sixty thousand as good soldiers as ever trod the earth; better than any European soldiers, because they not only worked like a machine, but the machine thought, European armies know very little what they are fighting for, and care less. Included in these sixty thousand troops there were two small divisions of cavalry. numbering altogether about four thousand men. Hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men. independent of Forrest, whose forces were operating in Tennessee and Kentucky, as Mr. Davis had promised they should. This part of Mr. Davis's military plan was admirable, and promised the best results of anything he could have done, according to my judgment. I say this because I have criticized his military judgment in the removal of Johnston, and also in the appointment of Hood. I am aware, however, that there was high feeling existing at that time between Davis and his subordinate, whom I regarded as one of his ablest lieutenants.

Pres. Davis's military genius

W. R. XXXIX (1) 581, 802

On the 5th of October the railroad back from Atlanta was again very badly broken, Hood having got on the track with his army. Sherman saw after night, from a high point, the road burning for miles. The defense of the railroad by our troops was very gallant, but they could not hold points

between their intrenched positions against Hood's CHAP. XVII whole army. In fact, they made no attempt to do so: but generally the intrenched positions were held, as well as important bridges, and stores located at them. Allatoona, for instance, was defended by a small force of men under the command of General Corse, one of the very able and efficient volunteer officers produced by the war. He, with a small force, was cut off from the remainder of the W.R. XXXIX (1) National army, and was attacked with great vigor by many times his own number. Sherman from his high position could see the battle raging, with the Confederate troops between him and his subordinate. He sent men, of course, to raise the Memoirs, II, temporary siege, but the time that would be necessarily consumed in reaching Corse would be so great that all occupying the intrenchments might be dead. Corse was a man who would never surrender. From a high position some of Sherman's signal corps discovered a signal-flag waving from a hole in the block-house at Allatoona. It was from Corse. He had been shot through the face, but he signaled to his chief a message which left no doubt of his determination to hold his post at all hazards. It was at this point, probably, that Sherman first realized that with the forces at his disposal the keeping open of his line of communications with the North would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to operate offensively beyond Atlanta. He proposed, therefore, to destroy the roads back to Chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the latter place garrisoned. Yet, before abandoning the railroad, it was necessary that he should repair

cure xvii damages already done, and hold the road until he could get forward such supplies, ordnance stores, and small rations as he wanted to earry with him on his proposed march, and to return to the north his surplus artillery; his object being to move light, and to have no more artillery than could be used to advantage on the field. Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though

he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the

W. R. XXXIX (3) 694

D. S. Stan-ley, W. P. 1848-52; Capt. 1st Brig. Gen. Vols. Sept. 28, 1861; Maj. Gen.

Cav. Mar. 16. Nov. 29, 1862

Thomas's strength

latter's moving the other way while he was moving south, by making Thomas strong enough to hold Tennessee and Kentucky. I myself was thoroughly satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did. On the 2d of November 1 telegraphed Sherman, authorizing him definitely to move according to the plan he had proposed—that is, cutting loose from his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga. To strengthen Thomas he sent Stanley (Fourth Corps) back, and also ordered Schofield, commanding the Army of the Ohio, twelve thousand strong, to report to him. In addition to this, A. J. Smith, who, with two divisions of Sherman's army, was in Missouri aiding Rosecrans in driving the enemy from that State, was under orders to return to Thomas, and, under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive there long before Hood could reach Nashville. In addition to this the new levies of troops that

were being raised in the Northwest went to Thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped. Thomas, without any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison at Chattanooga - which had been strengthened by one division—and garrisons at Bridgeport, Stevenson, Decatur, Murfreesboro', and Florence. There

were already with him in Nashville ten thousand CHAP. XVII soldiers in round numbers, and many thousands of employees in the quartermaster's and other departments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of Nashville, for its defense. Also, Wilson was there with ten thousand dismounted cavalrymen, who were being equipped for the field. Thomas had at this time about forty-five thousand men without any of the reinforcements here above enumerated. These reinforcements gave him altogether about seventy thousand men, without counting what might be added by the new levies already spoken of.

About this time Beauregard arrived upon the field, not to supersede Hood in command, but to take general charge over the entire district in which Hood and Sherman were, or might be, operating. He made the most frantic appeals to the citizens for assistance to be rendered in every way: by sending reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march of the invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would have to cross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to their front. But it was hard to convince the people of the propriety of destroying supplies which were so much needed by themselves, and each one hoped that his own possessions might escape.

Hood soon started north, and went into camp near Decatur, Alabama, where he remained until the 29th of October, but without making an attack on the garrison of that place.

The Tennessee River was patrolled by gunboats from Muscle Shoals east, and also below the second shoals out to the Ohio River. These, with

W. R. XXXIX (3) 785, 824, 825

W. R. XLIV

CHAP. XVII the troops that might be concentrated from the garrisons along the river at any point where Hood might choose to attempt to cross, made it impos-

sible for him to cross the Tennessee at any place where it was navigable. But Muscle Shoals is not navigable, and below them again is another shoal

W. R. XXXIX (1) 803

which also obstructs navigation. Hood therefore moved down to a point nearly opposite Florence, Alabama, crossed over, and remained there for some time, collecting supplies of food, forage, and ammunition. All of these had to come from a considerable distance south, because the region in which he was then situated was mountainous, with small valleys which produced but little, and what

W. R. XXXIX (3) 576

On the 1st of November I suggested to Shermanand also asked his views thereon—the propriety of destroying Hood before he started on his campaign.

they had produced had long since been exhausted.


Ante, 11, 238

On the 2d of November, as stated, I approved definitely his making his proposed campaign through Georgia, leaving Hood behind to the tender merey of Thomas and the troops in his command. Sherman fixed the 10th of November as the day of starting.

W. R. XXXIX (1) 584; XLIV W. R. XLIV (1) 65, 66

Sherman started on that day to get back to Atlanta, and on the 15th the real march to the sea commenced. The right wing, under Howard, and the envalvy went to Jonesboro'; Milledgeville, then the capital of Georgia, being Sherman's objective or stopping-place on the way to Savannah. The left wing moved to Stone Mountain, along roads much farther east than those taken by the right wing. Slocum was in command, and threatened Augusta as the point to which he was moving; but

Ibid. 157



he was to turn off and meet the right wing at CHAP. XVII Milledgeville.

Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for military purposes before starting, Sherman himself remaining over a day to superintend the work and see that it was well done. Sherman's orders for this campaign were perfect. Before starting he had sent back all sick, disabled, and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy, well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long His artillery was reduced Sherman, Memoirs, II, march in prospect. to sixty-five guns. The ammunition carried with them was two hundred rounds for musket and Small rations were taken in a small wagontrain, which was loaded to its capacity for rapid movement. The army was expected to live on the country, and to always keep the wagons full of forage and provisions against a possible delay of a few days.

The troops, both of the right and left wings. made most of their advance along the line of railroads, which they destroyed. The method adopted to perform this work was to burn and destroy all the bridges and culverts, and for a long distance, at places, to tear up the track and bend the rails. Soldiers, to do this rapidly, would form a line along one side of the road with crowbars and poles. place these under the rails, and, hoisting all at once. turn over many rods of road at one time. The ties would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as they were loosened, would be carried and put across these log-heaps. When a sufficient number of rails were placed upon a pile of ties, it would be set on fire. This would heat the rails very much more in

627, 701, 713

Destroying the railroads

CHAP. XVII the middle—that being over the main part of the fire—than at the ends, so that they would naturally bend of their own weight; but the soldiers, to increase the damage, would take tongs, and, one or two men at each end of the rail, carry it with force against the nearest tree and twist it around, thus leaving rails forming bands to ornament the foresttrees of Georgia. All this work was going on at the same time, there being a sufficient number of men detailed for that purpose. Some piled the logs and built the fire; some put the rails upon the fire; while others would bend those that were sufficiently heated: so that, by the time the last bit of road was torn up that it was designed to destroy at a certain place, the rails previously taken up were already destroyed.

Foraging

The organization for supplying the army was very complete. Each brigade furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the command to which they belonged. Strict injunctions were issued against pillaging, or otherwise unnecessarily annoying the people; but everything in shape of food for man and forage for beast was taken. The supplies were turned over to the brigade commissary and quartermaster, and were issued by them to their respective commands precisely the same as if they had been purchased. The captures consisted largely of cattle, sheep, poultry, some bacon, corn-meal, often molasses, and occasionally coffee or other small rations.

Sherman's "bummers"

The skill of these men, called by themselves and the army "bummers," in collecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands, was marvelous. When they started out in the morning they were always on foot; but scarcely one of them CHAP. XVI returned in the evening without being mounted on a horse or mule. These would be turned in for the general use of the army, and the next day these men would start out afoot and return again in the evening mounted.

Many of the exploits of these men would fall under the head of romance; indeed, I am afraid that in telling some of their experiences the romance got the better of the truth upon which the story was founded, and that, in the way many of these anecdotes are told, very little of the foundation is left. I suspect that most of them consist chiefly of the fiction added to make the stories better. In one instance it was reported that a few men of Sherman's army passed a house where they discovered some chickens under the dwelling. They immediately proceeded to capture them, to add to the army's supplies. The lady of the house, who happened to be at home, made piteous appeals to have these spared, saying they were a few she had put away to save, by permission of other parties who had preceded, and who had taken all the others that she had. The soldiers seemed moved at her appeal; but, looking at the chickens again, they were tempted, and one of them replied, "The rebellion must be suppressed if it takes the last chicken in the Confederacy," and proceeded to appropriate the last one.

Another anecdote characteristic of these times has been told. The South, prior to the rebellion, kept bloodhounds to pursue runaway slaves who took refuge in the neighboring swamps, and also to hunt convicts. Orders were issued to kill all these CHAP. XVII animals as they were met with. On one occasion a soldier picked up a poodle, the favorite pet of its mistress, and was carrying it off to execution when the lady made a strong appeal to him to spare it. The soldier replied, "Madam, our orders are to kill every bloodhound." "But this is not a bloodhound," said the lady. "Well, madam, we cannot tell what it will grow into if we leave it behind," said the soldier as he went off with it.

Notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the necessary hardship they would seem to imply, I do not believe there was much unwarrantable pillaging, considering that we were in the enemy's territory and without any supplies except such as the country afforded.

W.R. XLIV,

Cf. Sherman, Memoirs, 11, 182-184

On the 23d Sherman, with the left wing, reached Milledgeville. The right wing was not far off, but proceeded on its way toward Savannah, destroying the road as it went. The troops at Milledgeville remained over a day, to destroy factories, buildings used for military purposes, etc., before resuming their march.

Gov. J. E. Brown The governor, who had been almost defying Mr. Davis before this, now fled precipitately, as did the Legislature of the State and all the State officers. The governor, Sherman says, was careful to carry away even his garden vegetables, while he left the archives of the State to fall into our hands. The only military force that was opposed to Sherman's forward march was the Georgia militia, a division under the command of General G. W. Smith, and a battalion under Harry Wayne. Neither the quality of the forces nor their number was sufficient to even retard the progress of Sherman's army.

Memoirs, II, 188

(I.W. Smith, W.P.1838-42; Mexico, 1846-48; Maj.-Gen. C.S.A. Sopt.

The people at the South became so frantic at this CHAP. XVII time at the successful invasion of Georgia that they Memoirs, II, took the cadets from the military college and added them to the ranks of the militia. They even liberated the State convicts, under promise from them that they would serve in the army. I have but little doubt that the worst acts that were attributed to Sherman's army were committed by these convicts. and by other Southern people who ought to have been under sentence,—such people as could be found in every community, North and South,-who took advantage of their country being invaded to commit crime. They were in but little danger of detection, or of arrest even if detected.

The Southern papers, in commenting upon Sherman's movements, pictured him as in the most deplorable condition, stating that his men were starving, that they were demoralized and wandering about almost without object, aiming only to reach the sea-coast and get under the protection of our navy. These papers got to the North and had more or less effect upon the minds of the people. causing much distress to all loyal persons—particularly to those who had husbands, sons, or brothers with Sherman. Mr. Lincoln, seeing these accounts, had a letter written asking me if I could give him anything that he could say to the loyal people that would comfort them. I told him there was not the slightest occasion for alarm; that with sixty thousand such men as Sherman had with him, such a commanding officer as he was could not be cut off in the open country. He might possibly be prevented from reaching the point he had started out to reach, but he would get through somewhere and

CHAP. XVII would finally get to his chosen destination; and even if worst came to worst he could return North. I heard afterward of Mr. Lincoln's saying, to those who would inquire of him as to what he thought about the safety of Sherman's army, that Sherman was all right: "Grant says they are safe with such a general, and that if they cannot get out where they want to, they can crawl back by the hole they went in at."

Sherman, Memoirs, 11,

While at Milledgeville the soldiers met at the State House, organized a legislature, and proceeded to business precisely as if they were the legislative body belonging to the State of Georgia. The debates were exciting, and were upon the subject of the situation the South was in at that time. particularly the State of Georgia. They went so far as to repeal, after a spirited and acrimonious debate, the ordinance of secession.

Nov. 1864

The next day (24th) Sherman continued his march, going by the way of Waynesboro' and Louisville, Millen being the next objective, and where the two columns (the right and left wings) were to meet. The left wing moved to the left of the direct road, and the cavalry still farther off, so as to make it look as though Augusta was the point they were aiming for. They moved on all the roads they could find leading in that direction. The cavalry was sent to make a rapid march in hope of surprising Millen before the Union prisoners could be carried away; but they failed in this.

Sherman, Memoirs, II, 191

The distance from Milledgeville to Millen was about one hundred miles. At this point Wheeler, who had been ordered from Tennessee, arrived and swelled the numbers and efficiency of the troops confronting Sherman. Hardee, a native of Georgia, CHAP. XVII also came, but brought no troops with him. It was intended that he should raise as large an army as possible with which to intercept Sherman's march. He did succeed in raising some troops, and, with these and those under the command of Wheeler and Wayne, had an army sufficient to cause some annoyance, but no great detention. Our cavalry and Wheeler's had a pretty severe engagement, in which Wheeler was driven toward Augusta, thus giving the idea that Sherman was probably making for that point.

Henry C

Millen was reached on the 3d of December, and W.R. XLIV, the march was resumed the following day for Savannah, the final objective. Bragg had now been sent to Augusta with some troops. Wade Hampton was there also, trying to raise cavalry sufficient to destroy Sherman's army. If he ever raised a force it was too late to do the work expected of it. Hardee's whole force probably numbered less than ten thousand men.

From Millen to Savannah the country is sandy and poor, and affords but very little forage other than rice-straw, which was then growing. answered a very good purpose as forage, and the rice-grain was an addition to the soldiers' rations. No further resistance worthy of note was met with, until within a few miles of Savannah. This place was found to be intrenched and garrisoned. man proceeded at once on his arrival to invest the place, and found that the enemy had placed torpedoes in the ground, which were to explode when stepped on by man or beast. One of these exploded under an officer's horse, blowing the animal

Sherman, Memoirs, II.

CHAP. XVII to pieces and tearing one of the legs of the officer so badly that it had to be amputated. Sherman at once ordered his prisoners to the front, moving them in a compact body in advance, to either explode the torpedoes or dig them up. No further explosion took place. On the 10th of December the siege of Savannah

Sherman, Memoirs, II, 195 ot sea.

commenced. Sherman then, before proceeding any further with operations for the capture of the place, started with some troops to open communication with our fleet, which he expected to find in the lower harbor or as near by as the forts of the enemy would permit. In marching to the coast he encountered Fort McAllister, which it was necessary to reduce before the supplies he might find on shipboard could be made available. Fort McAllister was soon captured by an assault made by General Hazen's division. Communication was then established with the fleet. The capture of Savannah then only occupied a few days, and involved no great loss of life. The garrison, however, as we shall see, was enabled to escape by crossing the river and moving eastward.

W. R. XLIV 110

Sherman, Memoirs, II, 202

When Sherman had opened communication with the fleet he found there a steamer, which I had forwarded to him, carrying the accumulated mails for his army, also supplies which I supposed he would be in need of. General J. G. Foster, who commanded all the troops south of North Carolina on the Atlantic scaboard, visited General Sherman before he had opened communication with the fleet, with the view of ascertaining what assistance he could be to him. Foster returned immediately to his own headquarters at Hilton Head, for the

se of sending Sherman siege-guns, and also, Char. XVII should find he had them to spare, supplies thing, hard bread, etc., thinking that these s might not be found outside. The mail on eamer which I sent down had been collected lonel A. H. Markland, of the Post-office Deent, who went in charge of it. On this vessel I sent an officer of my staff (Lieu-Dunn) with the following letter to General an:

> CITY POINT, VIRGINIA. December 3, 1864.

GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, mmanding Armies near Savannah, Georgia :

little information gleaned from the Southern press W.R. XLIV ing no great obstacle to your progress, I have d your mails (which had been previously collected imore by Colonel Markland, Special Agent of the fice Department) to be sent as far as the blockading on off Savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as rom on the coast.

liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abom congratulating you and those under your comintil bottom has been struck. I have never had a owever, for the result.

you left Atlanta no very great progress has been ere. The enemy has been closely watched, though, evented from detaching against you. I think not n has gone from here, except some twelve or fifteen d dismounted eavalry. Bragg has gone from Wiln. I am trying to take advantage of his absence to session of that place. Owing to some preparations d Porter and General Butler are making to blow t Fisher (which, while hoping for the best, I do not a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expeoff. I hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, t Bragg will not have started back by that time.

CHAP, XVII

In this letter I do not intend to give you anything like directions for future action, but will state a general idea I have, and will get your views after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. With your veteran army I hope to get control of the only two through routes from east to west possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta. The condition will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by holding any other port to the east of Savannah and Branchville. If Wilmington falls, a force from there can coöperate with you.

Thomas has got back into the defenses of Nashville, with Hood close upon him. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads except the main one leading to Chattanooga. Part of this falling back was undoubtedly necessary, and all of it may have been. It did not look so, however, to me. In my opinion Thomas far outnumbers Hood in infantry. In eavalry Hood has the advantage in morale and numbers. I hope yet that Hood will be badly crippled, if not destroyed. The general news you will learn from the papers better than I could give it.

After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there is likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, I will run down the coast to see you. If you desire it, I will ask Mrs. Sherman to go with me.

> Yours truly, U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General,

I quote this letter because it gives the reader a full knowledge of the events of that period.

Sherman, Memoirs, 11, 207 of seq. Sherman now (the 15th) returned to Savannah to complete its investment and ensure the surrender of the garrison. The country about Savannah is low and marshy, and the city was well intrenched from the river above to the river below, and assaults could not be made except along a comparatively narrow causeway. For this reason assaults must have resulted in serious destruction of life to

the Union troops, with the chance of failing altogether. Sherman therefore decided upon a complete investment of the place. When he believed this investment completed, he summoned the garrison to surrender. General Hardee, who was in command, replied in substance that the condition of affairs was not such as Sherman had described. He said he was in full communication with his department, and was receiving supplies constantly.

> Sherman, Memoirs, II,

Hardee, however, was cut off entirely from all communication with the west side of the river, and by the river itself to the north and south. South Carolina side the country was all rice-fields, through which it would have been impossible to bring supplies—so that Hardee had no possible communication with the outside world except by a dilapidated plank road starting from the west bank Sherman, receiving this reply, proof the river. ceeded in person to a point on the coast where General Foster had troops stationed under General Hatch, for the purpose of making arrangements with the latter officer to go through, by one of the numerous channels running inland along that part of the coast of South Carolina, to the plank road which General Hardee still possessed, and thus to cut him off from the last means he had of getting supplies, if not of communication.

While arranging for this movement, and before the attempt to execute the plan had been commenced, Sherman received information through one of his staff-officers that the enemy had evacuated Savannah the night before. This was the night of the 21st of December. Before evacuating the place Hardee had blown up the navy-yard. Some iron-

W. R. XLIV 771

1864

map. xvu clads had been destroyed, as well as other property that might have been valuable to us; but he left an immense amount of stores untouched, consisting of cotton, railroad cars, workshops, numerous pieces of artillery, and several thousand stands of small arms.

1, 218, 219

A little incident occurred, soon after the fall of Savannah, which Sherman relates in his "Memoirs," and which is worthy of repetition. Savannah was one of the points where blockade-runners entered. Shortly after the city fell into our possession a blockade-runner came sailing up serenely, not doubting but the Confederates were still in possession. It was not molested, and the captain did not find out his mistake until he had tied up and gone to the custom-house, where he found a new occupant of the building, and made a less profitable disposition of his vessel and cargo than he had expected.

As there was some discussion as to the authorship of Sherman's march to the sea, by critics of his book when it appeared before the public, I want to state here that no question upon that subject was ever raised between General Sherman and myself. Circumstances made the plan on which Sherman expected to act impracticable, and as commander of the forces he necessarily had to devise a new one which would give more promise of success; consequently he recommended the destruction of the railroad back to Chattanooga, and that he should be authorized then to move, as he did, from Atlanta forward. His suggestions were finally approved, although they did not immediately find favor in Washington. Even when it came to the time of

nte, 11, 237

starting, the greatest apprehension as to the pro- CHAP. XVII priety of the campaign he was about to commence filled the mind of the President, induced, no doubt, by his advisers. This went so far as to move the President to ask me to suspend Sherman's march for a day or two until I could think the matter over. My recollection is, though I find no record to show it, that out of deference to the President's wish I did send a despatch to Sherman asking him to wait a day or two, or else the connections between us were already cut, so that I could not do However this may be, the question of who devised the plan of march from Atlanta to Savannah is easily answered: it was clearly Sherman, and to him also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution. It was hardly possible that any one else than those on the spot could have devised a new plan of campaign to supersede one that did not promise success.1

Credit for the march to the sea

I was in favor of Sherman's plan from the time it was first submitted to me. My chief of staff, however, was very bitterly opposed to it, and, as I learned subsequently, finding that he could not move me, he appealed to the authorities at Washington to stop it.

Halleck's opposition

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Appendix, letters of October 11th.

## CHAPTER XVIII

THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN-THE BATTLE OF NASH-VILLE

AS we have seen, Hood succeeded in crossing the

Aut., 11, 240 In Tennessee River between Muscle Shoals and the

lower shoals at the end of October, 1864. Thomas sent Schofield with the Fourth and Twenty-third corps, together with three brigades of Wilson's eavalry, to Pulaski to watch him. On the 17th of November Hood started, and moved in such a manner as to avoid Schofield, thereby turning his position. Hood had with him three infantry corps, commanded respectively by Stephen D. Lee, Stewart, and Cheatham. These, with his cavalry, numbered about forty-five thousand men. Schofield had, of all arms, about thirty thousand. Thomas's orders were, therefore, for Schofield to watch the movements of the enemy, but not to fight a battle if he could avoid it; but to fall back in ease of an advance on Nashville, and to fight the enemy, as he fell back, so as to retard the enemy's movements until he could be reinforced by Thomas himself.

8. D. Lee, W. P. 1850 54; Lt. Gen. June 23, 1864

A. P. Stew-art, W. P. 1838-42; Lt. Gen. C. S. A. June 23, 1864

W. R. XLV (1) 841

As soon as Schofield saw this movement of Hood's, he sent his trains to the rear, but did not fall back himself until the 21st, and then only to Columbia. battle. From this place Schofield then retreated to CHAP.XVIII Franklin. He had sent his wagons in advance, and Stanley had gone with them with two divisions to protect them. Cheatham's corps of Hood's army pursued the wagon-train and went into camp at Spring Hill for the night of the 29th.

Schofield, retreating from Columbia on the 29th, passed Spring Hill, where Cheatham was bivouacked, during the night without molestation, though within half a mile of where the Confederates were encamped. On the morning of the 30th he had arrived at Franklin.

B. F. Cheatham, Mexico, 1846-48; Brig.-Gen. C.S.A. Muy, 1861; Maj.-Gen. Sept.

W. R. XLV (1) 113, 341, 652

· Hood followed closely and reached Franklin in time to make an attack the same day. The fight was very desperate and sanguinary. The Confederate generals led their men in the repeated charges, and the loss among them was of unusual proportions. This fighting continued with great severity until long after the night closed in, when the Confederates drew off. General Stanley, who commanded two divisions of the Union troops, and whose troops bore the brunt of the battle, was wounded in the fight, but maintained his position.

The enemy's loss at Franklin, according to Thomas's report, was 1750 buried upon the field by our troops, 3800 in the hospital, and 702 prisoners besides. Schofield's loss, as officially reported, was 189 killed, 1033 wounded, and 1104 captured and missing.

Thomas made no effort to reinforce Schofield at Franklin, as it seemed to me at the time he should have done, and fight out the battle there. He simply ordered Schofield to continue his retreat to

Tbid, 1171

CHAP.XVIII Nashville, which the latter did during that night and the next day.

Thomas, in the mean time, was making his preparations to receive Hood. The road to Chattanooga was still well guarded with strong garrisons at Murfreesboro', Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Chattanooga. Thomas had previously given up Decatur, and had been reinforced by A. J. Smith's two divisions just returned from Missouri. also had Steedman's division and R. S. Granger's, which he had drawn from the front. His quartermaster's men, about ten thousand in number, had been organized and armed under the command of the chief quartermaster, General J. L. Donaldson, and placed in the fortifications under the general supervision of General Z. B. Tower, of the United States Engineers.

Hood was allowed to move upon Nashville, and to invest that place almost without interference. Thomas was strongly fortified in his position, so that he would have been safe against the attack of Hood. He had troops enough even to annihilate him in the open field. To me his delay was unaccountable—sitting there and permitting himself to be invested, so that, in the end, to raise the siege he would have to fight the enemy strongly posted behind fortifications. It is true the weather was very bad. The rain was falling, and freezing as it fell, so that the ground was covered with a sheet of ice, that made it very difficult to move. But I was afraid that the enemy would find means of moving, elude Thomas, and manage to get north of the Cumberland River. If he did this, I apprehended

most serious results from the campaign in the

J. B. Steedman, Col. 4th Ohio, 1861; Maj.-Gen. Vols. Apr. 24, 1864

R. S. Granger, W. P. 1833-38; Brig.-Gen. Vols.Oct. 20, 1862

Z. B. Tower, W.P.1837-41; Mexico, 1846-48; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Nov. 23, 1861 North, and was afraid we might even have to send CHAP.XVIII troops from the East to head him off if he got there, General Thomas's movements being always so deliberate and so slow, though effective in defense.

I consequently urged Thomas, in frequent despatches sent from City Point, to make the attack

W. R. XLV (2) 17, 55, 70, 97, 143, 195

<sup>1</sup> CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 2, 1864.

Major-General Thomas, Nashville, Tennessee:

If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will lose all the road back to Chattanooga, and possibly have to abandon the line of the Tennessee. Should he attack you, it is all well; but if he does not, you should attack him before he fortifies. Arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster employees, citizens, etc.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 2, 1864, 1:30 p.m. MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, Nashville, Tennessee:

With your citizen employees armed, you can move out of Nashville with all your army, and force the enemy to retire or fight upon ground of your own choosing. After the repulse of Hood at Franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to Nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy where he was. At this distance, however, I may err as to the best method of dealing with the enemy. You will now suffer incalculable injury upon your railroads if Hood

is not speedily disposed of. Put forth, therefore, every possible exertion to attain this end. Should you get him to retreating, give him no peace.

> U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 5, 1864.

Major-General Thomas, Nashville, Tennessee:

Is there not danger of Forrest moving down the Cumberland to where he can cross it? It seems to me, whilst you should be getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after Forrest, Hood should be attacked where he is. Time strengthens him, in all possibility, as much as it does you.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,
December 6, 1864, 4 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tennessee:

Attack Hood at once, and wait no longer for a remnant of your cavalry. There is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign back to the Ohio River.

> U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

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W. R. XLV 2) 17, 55, 70, 115, 143

mar.xvin at once. The country was alarmed, the administration was alarmed, and I was alarmed lest the very thing would take place which I have just described -that is, Hood would get North. It was all without avail, further than to elicit despatches from Thomas saving that he was getting ready to move as soon as he could, that he was making prepara-

> CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 8, 1864, 8:30 r.m. Major General Thomas.

Nashville, Tennessee:

Your desputch of yesterday received. It looks to me evident the enemy are trying to cross the Cumberland River, and are seat tered. Why not attack at once? By all means avoid the contingency of a foot-race to see which

you or Hood sean heat to the Ohio. If you think necessary, call on the governors of States to send a force into Louisville to meet the enemy if he should cross the river. You clearly never should cross except in rear of the enemy. Now is one of the finest opportunities ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the enemy. If destroyed he never can replace it. Use the means at your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that will resound from one end of the land to the other.

> U. S. GRANT. Lieutenant General.

CPTV POINT, VINGINIA. December 11, 1864, 4 p.m. MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS. Nashville, Tennessee:

If you delay attack longer, the mortifying spectacle will be wit-

nessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio River, and you will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. Last there be no further delay. Hood cannot even stand a drawn battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. If he retreats and you follow, he must lose his muterial and much of his army. I am in hopes of receiving a desputch from you to day announcing that you have moved. Delay no longer for weather or reinforcements.


> U. S. Graxee Licutenant General.

Washington, D. C., December 15, 1864.

MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS. Nushville, Tennessee:

I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a despatch from Van Duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go no farther. Push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is entirely destroyed. Your army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break up Hood's army and render it useless for future operations. Do not stop for trains or supplies, but take them from the country, as the enemy have done. Much is now expected.

> U. S. GRANT. Lieutenant-General.



tions, etc. At last I had to say to General Thomas CHARXVIII that I should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly. He replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could.

General Logan happening to visit City Point about that time, and knowing him as a prompt, gallant, and efficient officer, I gave him an order to proceed to Nashville to relieve Thomas. I directed him, however, not to deliver the order or publish it until he reached there, and if Thomas had moved. then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with me by telegraph. After Logan started, in thinking over the situation, I became restless, and concluded to go myself. I went as far as Washington city, when a despatch was received from General Thomas announcing his readiness at last to move, and designating the time of his movement. I concluded to wait until that time. He did move, and was successful from the start. This was on the 15th of December. General Logan was at Louisville at the time this movement was made, and telegraphed the fact to Washington, and proceeded no farther himself

Ibid. 230

Thomas's

The battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the Union troops, and continued until night closed in upon the combat. The next day the battle was renewed. After a successful assault upon Hood's men in their intrenchments, the enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken, leaving their dead, their artillery and small arms in great numbers on the field, besides the wounded that were captured. Our cavalry had fought on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them; so that they were not ready to join in the pursuit the

CHARACHI moment the enemy retreated. They sent back. however, for their horses, and endeavored to get to Franklin ahead of Hood's broken army by the Granny White road; but too much time was consumed in getting started. They had got but a few miles beyond the scene of the battle when they found the enemy's cavalry dismounted and behind

intrenchments covering the road on which they

W. R. XLV (1) 39, 552,654

were advancing. Here another battle ensued, our men dismounting and tighting on foot, in which the Confederates were again routed and driven in great disorder. Our cavalry then went into bivouac, 101d, 552, 553 and renewed the pursuit on the following morning.

They were too late. The enemy already had possession of Franklin, and was beyond them. It now became a chase in which the Confederates had the lend.

Ibid. 40, 41, 553, 554, 655

Our troops continued the pursuit to within a few miles of Columbia, where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad-bridge as well as all other bridges over Duck River. The heavy rains of a few days before had swelled the stream into a mad torrent, impassable except on bridges. Unfortunately, either through a mistake in the wording of the order or otherwise, the pontoon-bridge which was to have been sent by rail out to Franklin, to be taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone toward Chattanooga. There was, consequently, a delay of some four days in building bridges out of the remains of the old railroad bridge. Of course Hood got such a start in this time that further pursuit was useless, although it was continued for some

distance, but without coming upon him again.

Ibid. 41, 42

## CHAPTER XIX

PEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER—ATTACK ON THE FORT-FAILURE THE EXPEDITION - SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT-CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER


TP to January, 1865, the enemy occupied Fort CHAP. XIX Fisher, at the mouth of Cape Fear River and low the city of Wilmington. This port was of Importance of Wilmingmense importance to the Confederates, because formed their principal inlet for blockade-runners, means of which they brought in from abroad ch supplies and munitions of war as they could t produce at home. It was equally important to to get possession of it, not only because it was sirable to cut off their supplies so as to ensure a eedy termination of the war, but also because reign governments, particularly the British govnment, were constantly threatening that unless rs could maintain the blockade of that coast they ould cease to recognize any blockade. For these asons I determined, with the concurrence of the avy Department, in December, to send an exdition against Fort Fisher for the purpose of pturing it.

To show the difficulty experienced in maintaining e blockade, I will mention a circumstance that CHAP, XIX Surprised blockaderunners took place at Fort Fisher after its fall. Two English blockade-runners came in at night. Their commanders, not supposing the fort had fallen, worked their way through all our fleet and got into the river unobserved. They then signaled the fort, announcing their arrival. There was a colored man in the fort who had been there before and who understood these signals. He informed General Terry what reply he should make to have them come in, and Terry did as he advised. The vessels came in, their officers entirely unconscious that they were falling into the hands of the Union forces. Even after they were brought into the fort they were entertained in conversation for some little time before suspecting that the Union troops were occupying the fort. They were finally informed that their vessels and cargoes were prizes.

G. Weitzel, W.P.1861-65; 1st Id. Eng. July 1, 1860; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Aug. 29, 1862; Maj.-Gen. Nov. 17, 1864 I selected General Weitzel, of the Army of the James, to go with the expedition, but gave instructions through General Butler. He commanded the department within whose geographical limits Fort Fisher was situated, as well as Beaufort and other points on that coast held by our troops; he was therefore entitled to the right of fitting out the expedition against Fort Fisher.

Gen. Butler's scheme General Butler conceived the idea that if a steamer loaded heavily with powder could be run up near the shore under the fort and exploded, it would create great have and make the capture an easy matter. Admiral Porter, who was to command the naval squadron, seemed to fall in with the idea, and it was not disapproved of in Washington; the navy was therefore given the task of preparing the steamer for this purpose. I had no confidence

Porter, Nav. Hist. p. 692 et seq.



in the success of the scheme, and so expressed my- CHAP. XIX self; but as no serious harm could come of the See W. R. XLII (3) 799 experiment, and the authorities at Washington seemed desirous to have it tried, I permitted it. The steamer was sent to Beaufort, North Carolina, and was there loaded with powder and prepared for the part she was to play in the reduction of Fort Fisher.1

1864

W. R. XLII (1) 964-967

General Butler chose to go in command of the expedition himself, and was all ready to sail by the 9th of December. Very heavy storms prevailed, however, at that time along that part of the seacoast, and prevented him from getting off until the 13th or 14th. His advance arrived off Fort Fisher on the 15th. The naval force had been already assembled, or was assembling, but was obliged to run into Beaufort for munitions, coal, etc.; then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fully prepared. The fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th; but Butler, who had remained outside from the 15th up to that time, now found himself out of coal, fresh water, etc., and had to put into Beaufort to replenish. Another storm overtook him, and several days more were lost before the army and navy were both ready at the same time to coöperate.

On the night of the 23d the powder-boat was Porter, Nav. Hist, p. 695 towed in by a gunboat as near to the fort as it was safe to run. She was then propelled by her own

the mechanism for firing the explosives. Embraced also in the report are accounts of several previous military and accidental explosions of large quantities of powder, and their effects.- F. D. G.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The report of Major T. L. Casey, of the Corps of Engineers, published in the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Vol. XLII, part 1, pp. 988-993, gives a full description of the powder-boat, her stowage, and

CHAP, XIX W. R. XIAI (1) 989

machinery to within about five hundred yards of the shore. There the clockwork, which was to explode her within a certain length of time, was set and she was abandoned. Everybody left, and even the vessels put out to sea to prevent the effect of the explosion upon them. At two o'clock in the morning the explosion took place- and produced no more effect on the fort, or anything else on land, than the bursting of a boiler anywhere on the Atlantic Ocean would have done. Indeed, when the troops in Fort Fisher heard the explosion, they supposed it was the bursting of a boiler in one of the Yankee gunboats.

Fort Fisher

Fort Fisher was situated upon a low, flat peninsula north of Cape Fear River. The soil is sandy. Back a little the peninsula is very heavily wooded, and covered with fresh-water swamps. The fort ran across this peninsula, about five hundred yards in width, and extended along the sea-coast about thirteen hundred yards. The fort had an armament of twenty-one guns and three mortars on the land side, and twenty-four guns on the sea-front. At that time it was only garrisoned by four companies of infantry, one light battery, and the gunners at the heavy guns, less than seven hundred men.with a reserve of less than a thousand men five miles up the peninsula. General Whiting, of the Confederate army, was in command, and General Bragg was in command of the force at Wilmington. Both commenced calling for reinforcements the moment they saw our troops landing. The z. B. Vance Governor of North Carolina called for everybody who could stand behind a parapet and shoot a gun

to join them. In this way they got two or three

W. H. C. whiting, W. P. 1841 45; Brig. Clen. C. B. A. Aug. 27, 1861; Maj. Clen. Peb. 28, 1863

w. r. xlii (8) 1284

hundred additional men into Fort Fisher; and CHAP. XIX Hoke's division, five or six thousand strong, was sent down from Richmond. A few of these troops arrived the very day that Butler was ready to advance.

On the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs Porter, Nav. of concentric circles, their heavy ironclads going in very close range, being nearest the shore, and leaving intervals or spaces so that the outer vessels could fire between them. Porter was thus enabled to throw one hundred and fifteen shells per minute. The damage done to the fort by these shells was very slight, only two or three cannon being disabled in the fort. But the firing silenced all the guns by making it too hot for the men to maintain their positions about them, and compelling them to seek shelter in the bomb-proofs.

On the next day part of Butler's troops, under A. Ames, W. 1856-61; General Adelbert Ames, effected a landing out of Col.20th Me. Aug. 29, 1862; range of the fort without difficulty. This was accomplished under the protection of gunboats sent for the purpose, and under cover of a renewed attack upon the fort by the fleet. They formed a line across the peninsula and advanced, part going north and part toward the fort, covering themselves as they did so. Curtis pushed forward and N.M. Curtis, Capt. 16th N. Y. May 7. came near to Fort Fisher, capturing the small garcame near to Fort Fisher, capturing the small garrison at what was called the Flag Pond Battery. Jan. 15, 1865
Gen. Vols.
Jan. 15, 1865 Weitzel accompanied him to within half a mile of the works. Here he saw that the fort had not been injured, and so reported to Butler, advising against an assault. Ames, who had gone north in his advance, captured two hundred and twentyeight of the reserves. These prisoners reported to

Aug. 29,1862; Brig.-Gen. Vols. May20,

W. R. XLII (1) 981 et seq.

. May 7,

CHAP. XIX Butler that sixteen hundred of Hoke's division of six thousand from Richmond had already arrived,

and the rest would soon be in his rear.

W. R. XLII (1) 968

Upon these reports Butler determined to withdraw his troops from the peninsula and return to the fleet. At that time there had not been a man on our side injured except by one of the shells from the fleet. Curtis had got within a few yards

1bid. 983

of the works. Some of his men had snatched a flag from the parapet of the fort, and others had taken a horse from the inside of the stockade. At night

W. R. XLII

Butler informed Porter of his withdrawal, giving the reasons above stated, and announced his purpose, as soon as his men could embark, to start for

Porter, Nav. Hist. p. 700 pose, as soon as his men could embark, to start for Hampton Roads. Porter represented to him that he had sent to Beaufort for more ammunition. He could fire much faster than he had been doing, and would keep the enemy from showing himself until our men were within twenty yards of the fort; and he begged that Butler would leave some brave fellows like those who had snatched the flag from the parapet and taken the horse from the fort.

parapet and taken the horse from the fort.

Butler was unchangeable. He got all his troops aboard, except Curtis's brigade, and started back.
In doing this Butler made a fearful mistake. My

instructions to him, or to the officer who went in command of the expedition, were explicit in the

command of the expedition, were explicit in the statement that to effect a landing would be of itself

a great victory, and if one should be effected, the foothold must not be relinquished. On the contrary, a regular siege of the fort must be commenced; and

to guard against interference by reason of storms, supplies of provisions must be laid in as soon as they could be got on shore. But General Butler

W. R. XLII (8) 835 seems to have lost sight of this part of his instruc- CHAP. XIX tions, and was back at Fort Monroe on the 28th.

I telegraphed to the President as follows:

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 28, 1864, 8:30 P.M.

The Wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable failure. Many of the troops are back here. Delays and free talk of the object of the expedition enabled the enemy to move troops to Wilmington to defeat After the expedition sailed from Fort Monroe, three days of fine weather were squandered, during which the enemy was without a force to protect himself. Who is to blame will, I hope, be known.

W. R. XLII

U. S. Grant. Lieutenant-General.

Porter sent despatches to the Navy Department in which he complained bitterly of having been abandoned by the army just when the fort was nearly in our possession, and begged that our troops might be sent back again to coöperate, but with a different commander. As soon as I heard this I sent a messenger to Porter with a letter asking him to hold on. I assured him that I fully sympathized with him in his disappointment, and that I would send the same troops back with a different commander, with some reinforcements to offset those which the enemy had received. I told him it would take some little time to get transportation for the additional troops; but as soon as it could be had the men should be on their way to him, and there would be no delay on my part. I selected A. H. Terry to command.

Col. 7th Conn. Sept. Brig.-Gen. Gen. Vols. &

It was the 6th of January before the transports could be got ready and the troops aboard. They

Nav. Hist. pp. 698-706

W. R. XLII (3) 1100

Char XIX sailed from Fort Monroe on that day. The object and destination of the second expedition were at the time kept a secret to all except a few in the Navy Department and in the army to whom it was necessary to impart the information. General Terry

W. R. XLVI (1) 395

had not the slightest idea of where he was going or what he was to do. He simply knew that he was going to sea and that he had his orders with him. which were to be opened when out at sea.

Thid, 43

He was instructed to communicate freely with Porter and have entire harmony between army and navy, because the work before them would require the best efforts of both arms of the service. They arrived off Beaufort on the 8th. A heavy storm. however, prevented a landing at Fort Fisher until the 13th. The navy prepared itself for attack about as before, and at the same time assisted the army in landing, this time five miles away. Only ironclads fired at first, the object being to draw the fire of the enemy's guns so as to ascertain their positions. This object being accomplished, they then let in their shots thick and fast. Very soon the guns were all silenced, and the fort showed evident signs of being much injured.

Porter, Nav. Hist. p. 711 et seq.

W. R. XLI (1) 396, 307

Terry deployed his men across the peninsula as had been done before, and at two o'clock on the following morning was up within two miles of the fort, with a respectable abatis in front of his line. His artillery was all landed on that day, the 14th. Again Curtis's brigade of Ames's division had the lead. By noon they had carried an unfinished work less than a half-mile from the fort, and turned it so as to face the other way.

Terry now saw Porter and arranged for an as-

sault on the following day. The two commanders arranged their signals so that they could communicate with each other from time to time as they might have occasion. At daylight the fleet commenced its firing. The time agreed upon for the assault was the middle of the afternoon, and Ames. who commanded the assaulting column, moved at 3:30. Porter landed a force of sailors and marines to move against the sea-front in coöperation with Ames's assault. They were under Commander Breese, of the navy. These sailors and marines had worked their way up to within a couple of hundred vards of the fort before the assault. signal was given and the assault was made; but the poor sailors and marines were repulsed and very badly handled by the enemy, losing two hundred and eighty killed and wounded out of their number.

Curtis's brigade charged successfully, though met by a heavy fire, some of the men having to wade through the swamp up to their waists to reach the fort. Many were wounded, of course, and some killed; but they soon reached the palisades. These they cut away, and pushed on through. The other troops then came up, Pennypacker's following Curtis, and Bell, who commanded the Third Brigade of Ames's division, following Pennypacker. But the fort was not yet captured, though the parapet was gained.

The works were very extensive. The large parapet around the work would have been but very little protection to those inside except when they were close up under it. Traverses had therefore been run until really the work was a succession of small forts inclosed by a large one. The rebels made a

CHAP. XIX Jan. 15, 1865

Porter, Nav. Hist. pp. 715, 716

W. R. XLV1 (1) 415

K.R.Breese, U.S.N. Nov. 6, 1846; Lt.-Comdr. July 16, 1862

Porter, Nav. Hist. p. 716

W. R. XLVI (1) 398

Thid, 399

desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be

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driven from these traverses one by one. The fight continued till long after night. Our troops gained first one traverse and then another, and by ten o'clock at night the place was carried. During this engagement the sailors, who had been repulsed in their assault on the bastion, rendered the best ser-LVI vice they could by reinforcing Terry's northern line -thus enabling him to send a detachment to the assistance of Ames. The fleet kept up a continuous fire upon that part of the fort which was still occupied by the enemy. By means of signals they could be informed where to direct their shots. During the succeeding nights the enemy blew

up Fort Caswell, on the opposite side of Cape Fear River, and abandoned two extensive works on Smith's Island in the river. Our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, be-

sides small arms, with full supplies of ammunition, and 2083 prisoners. In addition to these, there were about 700 dead and wounded left there. We had lost 110 killed and 536 wounded.

In this assault on Fort Fisher, Bell, one of the brigade commanders, was killed, and two, Curtis and Pennypacker, were badly wounded.

Secretary Stanton, who was on his way back from Savannah, arrived off Fort Fisher soon after it fell. When he heard the good news he promoted all the officers of any considerable rank for their conspicuous gallantry. Terry had been nominated for major-general, but had not been confirmed. This confirmed him; and soon after I recommended him for a brigadier-generalcy in the regular army, and it was given to him for this victory.

## CHAPTER XX

SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH-SHERIDAN ORDERED LYNCHBURG-CANBY ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE -- MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS OF COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA--CAPTURE SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS

THEN news of Sherman being in possession of Savannah reached the North, distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him. Among others who went was the Secretary of War. who seemed much pleased at the result of his campaign. Mr. Draper, the collector of customs of New York, who was with Mr. Stanton's party, was put in charge of the public property that had been abandoned and captured. Savannah was then turned over to General Foster's command to hold, so that Sherman might have his own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the future. sent the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac (General Barnard) with letters to General Sherman. He remained some time with the general, and when Memoirs, II, he returned brought back letters, one of which contained suggestions from Sherman as to what ought to be done in cooperation with him, when he should have started upon his march northward.

I must not neglect to state here the fact that I had

CHAP, XX

Sherman, Memoirs,IL 243 et sea.

> Simeon Draper

CHAP, XX

no idea originally of having Sherman march from Sayannah to Richmond, or even to North Carolina. The season was bad, the roads impassable for anything except such an army as he had, and I should not have thought of ordering such a move. I had therefore made preparations to collect transports to earry Sherman and his army around to the James River by water, and so informed him. On receiving this letter he went to work immediately to prepare for the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to collect the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north through the Carolinas. I was only too happy to approve this; for, if successful, it promised every advantage. His march through Georgia had thoroughly destroyed all lines of transportation in that State, and had completely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west of it. If North and South Carolina were rendered helpless so far as capacity for feeding Lee's army was concerned, the Confederate garrison at Richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw supplies, to very narrow limits in the State of Virginia; and although that section of the country was fertile, it was already well exhausted of both forage and food. I approved Sherman's suggestion, therefore, at once,

W. R. XLIV 636, 727, 728, 742, 743, 798, 799

> Preparing for the march

The work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load the wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long distance. Sherman would now have to march through a country furnishing fewer provisions than that he had previously been operating in during his march to the sea. Besides, he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of the enemy vastly superior to any his troops had en-

countered on their previous march; and the territory through which he had to pass had now become of such vast importance to the very existence of the Confederate army that the most desperate efforts were to be expected in order to save it.

Sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to start with, made arrangements with Admiral Dahlgren, who commanded that part of steel, I. A. Dahlgren, v.s.N. the navy on the South Carolina and Georgia coast, Feb. 1, 1826; Capt. July and General Foster, commanding the troops, to take positions, and hold a few points on the sea-coast. which he (Sherman) designated, in the neighborhood of Charleston.

This provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea-coast in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop his onward progress. He also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to what he would like to have done in support of his movement farther north. This letter was brought to City Point by General Barnard at a time when I happened to be going to Washington City, where I arrived on the 21st of January. I cannot tell the provision I had already made to coöperate with Sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than by giving my reply to this letter.

> HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, Washington, D. C., January 21, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,

Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

GENERAL: Your letters brought by General Barnard were received at City Point, and read with interest. having them with me, however, I cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on all points of recommenda-

Rear-Adm.

Sherman, Memoirs, II.

Ibid. 257

CHAP. XX

tion. As I arrived here at 1 P.M. and must leave at 6 P.M. having in the mean time spent over three hours with the Secretary and General Halleck, I must be brief. Before your last request to have Thomas make a campaign into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis. Maryland, with his corps. The advance (six thousand) will reach the scaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati. The corps numbers over twenty one thousand I was induced to do this because I did not believe Thomas could possibly be got off before spring. His pursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he would never do to conduct one of your campaigns. The command of the advance of the pursuit was left to subordiractes, whilst Thomas followed far behind. When Hood had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit had reached it. Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State, from whence he returned to Nashville to take steamer for Eastport. He is possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness, and honesty, but he is not good on a pursuit. He also reported his troops fagged, and that it was necessary to equip up. This report and a determination to give the enemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere,

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to Selma under an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to to know whether he could go, and if so, which of the several routes he would select. No reply is yet received. Camby has been ordered to act offensively from the sea-coast to the interior, toward Montgomery and Selma. Thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to Canby. Without further reinforcements Canby will have a moving column of twenty thousand men.

Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We have a force there of eight thousand effective. At New Berne about half the number. It is rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also has fallen. I am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemy

ere blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, and that CHAP. XX the 18th Terry moved on Wilmington.

If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there. If t, he will be sent to New Berne. In either event, all the rplus forces at the two points will move to the interior ward Goldsboro' in coöperation with your movements. com either point railroad communications can be run out, ere being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to the uge of those roads.

There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from ee's army south. Of these you will have fourteen thound against you, if Wilmington is not held by the enemy, sualties at Fort Fisher having overtaken about two ousand.

All these troops are subject to your orders, as you come communication with them. They will be so instructed rom about Richmond I will watch Lee closely, and he detaches much more, or attempts to evacuate, will itch in.

In the mean time, should you be brought to a halt anyhere, I can send two corps of thirty thousand effective en to your support, from the troops about Richmond. To resume: Canby is ordered to operate to the interior com the Gulf. A. J. Smith may go from the north, but think it doubtful. A force of twenty-eight or thirty nousand will coöperate with you from New Berne or Vilmington, or both. You can call for reinforcements.

This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my taff, who will return with any message you may have for ne. If there is anything I can do for you in the way of aving supplies on shipboard, at any point on the sea-coast,

eady for you, let me know it.

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

I had written on the 18th of December to General W.R. XLIV Sherman, giving him the news of the battle of Nashville. He was much pleased at the result, al-

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though, like myself, he had been very much disappointed at Thomas for permitting Hood to cross the Tennessee River and nearly the whole State of Tennessee, and come to Nashville to be attacked there. He, however, as I had done, sent Thomas a warm congratulatory letter.

Sherman, Memoirs, II,

On the 10th of January, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to Sherman and his army passed by Congress were approved.

15id, 218, 219

Sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris in Savannah cleared up, commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from the river, and taking up all other obstructions. He had then intrenched the city, so that it could be held by a small garrison. By the middle of January all his work was done, except the accumulation of supplies to commence his movements with.

Ibid. 268 et seq.

He proposed to move in two columns - one from Savannah, going along by the river of the same name, and the other by roads farther east, threatening Charleston. He commenced the advance by moving his right wing to Beamfort, South Carolina, then to Pocotalizo by water. This column, in moving north, threatened Charleston, and, indeed, it was not determined at first that they would not have a force visit Charleston. South Carolina had done so much to prepare the public mind of the South for secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision of the question before the South was fully prepared to meet it, that there was, at that time, a feeling throughout the North, and also largely entertained by people of the South, that the State of South Carolina, and Charleston, the hotbod of secession, in particular, ought to have

Cf. Halleck to Sherman, W. R. XLIV 741



a heavy hand laid upon them. In fact, nothing but the decisive results that followed deterred the radical portion of the people from condemning the movement because Charleston had been left out. To pass into the interior would, however, be to ensure the evacuation of the city, and its possession by the navy and Foster's troops. It is so situated between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold out. Sherman, therefore, passed it by.

Sherman, Memoirs, II, 268 et seq.

By the 1st of February all preparations were completed for the final march, Columbia, South Carolina, being the first objective; Fayetteville, North Carolina, the second; and Goldsboro', or neighborhood, the final one, unless something further should be determined upon. The right wing went from Pocotaligo, and the left from about Hardeeville, on the Savannah River, both columns taking a pretty direct route for Columbia. The cavalry, however, were to threaten Charleston on the right and Augusta on the left.

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On the 15th of January Fort Fisher had fallen, news of which Sherman had received before starting out on his march. We already had New Berne, and had soon Wilmington, whose fall followed that of Fort Fisher; as did other points on the sea-coast, where the National troops were now in readiness to coöperate with Sherman's advance when he had passed Fayetteville.

Movement against Mobile

On the 18th of January I ordered Canby, in command at New Orleans, to move against Mobile, Montgomery, and Selma, Alabama, for the purpose of destroying roads, machine-shops, etc. On the CHAP. XX

8th of February I ordered Sheridan, who was in the Valley of Virginia, to push forward as soon as the weather would permit, and strike the canal west of Richmond at or about Lynchburg; and on the 20th I made the order to go to Lynchburg as soon as the roads would permit, saying:

W. R. XLVI

As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. . . . This additional raid, with one starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering about four or five thousand cavalry; one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry; Canby, from Mobile Bay, with about eighteen thousand mixed troops,—these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of South Carolina,—is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday last.

Urging Canby forward On the 27th of February, more than a month after Canby had received his orders, I again wrote to him, saying that I was extremely anxious to hear of his being in Alabama. I notified him, also, that I had sent Grierson to take command of his cavalry, he being a very efficient officer. I further suggested that Forrest was probably in Mississippi, and if he was there, he would find him an officer of great courage and capacity, whom it would be difficult to get by. I still further informed him that Thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into Mississippi on the 20th of February, or as soon as possible thereafter. This force did not get off, however.

All these movements were designed to be in support of Sherman's march, the object being to keep the Confederate troops in the West from leaving there. But neither Canby nor Thomas could be got off in time. I had some time before depleted Thomas's army to reinforce Canby, for the reason that Thomas had failed to start an expedition which he had been ordered to send out, and to have the troops where they might do something. Canby seemed to be equally deliberate in all of his movements. I ordered him to go in person; but he prepared to send a detachment under another officer. General Granger had got down to New Orleans in some way or other, and I wrote Canby that he must not put him in command of troops. In spite of this he asked the War Department to assign Granger to the command of a corps.

Almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the cause in that quarter, I wrote to Canby:

I am in receipt of a despatch . . . informing me that von have made requisitions for a construction corps and material to build seventy miles of railroad. I have directed that none be sent. Thomas's army has been depleted to send a force to you, that they might be where they could act in winter, and at least detain the force the enemy had in the West. If there had been any idea of repairing railroads, it could have been done much better from the North, where we already had the troops. I expected your movements to be coöperative with Sherman's last. This has now entirely failed. I wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon the country, and destroy railroads, machine-shops, etc., not to build them. Take Mobile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior-to Montgomery and to Selma. Destroy railroads, rolling-stock, and everything useful for carrying on war, and, when you have done this, take such

Chap. XX

W R. XLV (2) 614 CHAP, XX

positions as can be supplied by water. By this means alone you can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the interior can be kept broken.

Most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to render any service in the direction for which they were designed.

The enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of Hardee's troops and Wheeler's eavalry-

Confederate

desperation

W. R. XLV (2) 771

Johnston's Narrative. p. 371

W. R. XLVI (1) 44, 45

perhaps less than fifteen thousand men in all: but frantic efforts were being made in Richmond, as I was sure would be the case, to retard Sherman's movements. Everything possible was being done to raise troops in the South. Lee despatched against Sherman the troops which had been sent to relieve Fort Fisher, which, including those of the other defenses of the harbor and its neighborhood. amounted, after deducting the two thousand killed. wounded, and captured, to fourteen thousand men. After Thomas's victory at Nashville, what remained of Hood's army were gathered together and forwarded as rapidly as possible to the East to cooperate with these forces; and, finally, General Joseph E. Johnston, one of the ablest commanders of the South, though not in favor with the administration (or at least with Mr. Davis), was put in command of all the troops in North and South Carolina.

Schofield arrived at Annapolis in the latter part of January; but before sending his troops to North Carolina I went with him down the coast to see the situation of affairs, as I could give fuller directions after being on the ground than I could very well have given without. We soon returned, and the troops were sent by sea to Cape Fear River. Both New Berne and Wilmington are connected with

Raleigh by railroads which unite at Goldsboro'. CHAP. XX Schofield was to land troops at Smithville, near the mouth of the Cape Fear River on the west side, and move up to secure the Wilmington and Charlotteville railroad. This column took their pontoonbridges with them, to enable them to cross over to the island south of the city of Wilmington. A large body was sent by the north side to coöperate with them. They succeeded in taking the city on the 22d of February. I took the precaution to provide for Sherman's army, in case he should be forced to turn in toward the sea-coast before reaching North Carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he was liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected march. I also sent railroad rolling-stock, of which we had a great abundance, now that we were not operating the roads in Virginia. The gauge of the North Carolina railroads, being the same as the Virginia railroads, had been altered too; these cars and locomotives were ready for use there without any change.

On the 31st of January I countermanded the orders given to Thomas to move south to Alabama and Georgia. (I had previously reduced his force by sending a portion of it to Terry.) I directed, in lieu of this movement, that he should send Stoneman through East Tennessee, and push him well down toward Columbia, South Carolina, in support of Sherman. Thomas did not get Stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when I had supposed he was on his march in support of Sherman, I heard of his being in Louisville, Kentucky. I immediately changed the order, and directed Thomas to Ibid. 385, 386 send him toward Lynchburg. Finally, however, on

1865

Van Horne. Life of Thomas, 381

the 12th of March, he did push down through the northwestern end of South Carolina, creating some consternation. I also ordered Thomas to send the Fourth Corps (Stanley's) to Bull Gap, and to destroy no more roads east of that. I directed him to concentrate supplies at Knoxville, with a view to a probable movement of his army through that way toward Lynchburg.

Goldsboro' is four hundred and twenty-five miles from Savannah. Sherman's march was without much incident until he entered Columbia, on the 17th of February. He was detained in his progress by having to repair and cordurey the roads and rebuild the bridges. There was constant skirmishing and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies, but this did not retard the advance of the infantry. Four days, also, were lost in making complete the destruction of the most important railroads south of Columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water, and the destruction of the bridges on the line of the road. A formidable river had to be crossed near Columbia, and that in the face of a small garrison under General Wade Hampton. There was but little delay, however, further than that caused by high water in the stream. Hampton left as Sherman approached, and the city was found to be on fire.

There has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in discussions of the question as to who set Columbia on fire. Sherman denies it on the part of his troops, and Hampton denies it on the part of the Confederates. One thing is certain: as soon as our troops took possession, they at once proceeded to extinguish the flames to the best of their ability

with the limited means at hand. In any case, the CHAP. XX example set by the Confederates in burning the village of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, a town which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defense of the act of firing the seat of government of the State most responsible for the conflict then raging not imperative.

The Confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor took possession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the National forces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making terms for the protection of property, etc. Sherman paid no attention at all to the overture, but pushed forward and took the town without making any conditions whatever with its citizens. He then, however, cooperated with the mayor in extinguishing the flames and providing for the people who were rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes. When he left there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to be distributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some arrangement could be made for their future supplies. He remained in Sherman, Memoirs, II, Columbia until the roads, public buildings, workshops, and everything that could be useful to the enemy were destroyed. While at Columbia Sherman learned for the first time that what remained of Hood's army was confronting him, under the command of General Beauregard.

Charleston was evacuated on the 18th of February, and Foster garrisoned the place. Wilmington was captured on the 22d. Columbia and Cheraw, farther north, were regarded as so secure from invasion that the wealthy people of Charleston and Augusta had sent much of their valuable property

two points to be stored. Among the at there were valuable carpets, tons of old silverware, and furniture. I am afraid these goods fell into the hands of our There was found at Columbia a large of powder, some artillery, small arms, and munition. These, of course, were among les destroyed. While here Sherman also f Johnston's restoration to command. The s given, as already stated, all troops in d South Carolina. After the completion of uction of public property about Columbia, proceeded on his march, and reached without any special opposition and withlent to relate. The railroads, of course, roughly destroyed on the way. Sherman la day or two at Cheraw, and finally, on f March, crossed his troops over the Pedee need straight for Fayetteville. Hardee and were there, and barely escaped. Sherched Fayetteville on the 11th of March. espatched scouts from Cheraw with letters al Terry, at Wilmington, asking him to eamer with some supplies of bread, clothother articles which he enumerated. The of through successfully, and a boat was sent mail and such articles for which Sherman ed as were in store at Wilmington. Undy, however, those stores did not contain

lays later, on the 15th, Sherman left Fayfor Goldsboro'. The march now had to be th great caution, for he was approaching my and nearing the country that still remained open to the enemy. Besides, he was confronting all that he had had to confront in his previous march up to that point, reinforced by the garrisons along the road and by what remained of Hood's army. Frantic appeals were made to the people to come in voluntarily and swell the ranks of our foe. I presume, however, that Johnston did not have in all over thirty-five or forty thousand The people had grown tired of the war, and confederate desertions from the Confederate army were much more numerous than the voluntary accessions.

weakness

There was some fighting at Averysboro' on the 16th between Johnston's troops and Sherman's. with some loss: and at Bentonville on the 19th and 21st of March, but Johnston withdrew from the contest before the morning of the 22d. Sherman's loss in these last engagements, in killed, wounded, and missing, was about sixteen hundred. Sherman's troops at last reached Goldsboro' on the 23d of the month and went into bivouac: and there his men were destined to have a long rest. Schofield was there to meet him with the troops which had been sent to Wilmington.

Sherman, Memoirs, II,

Ibid. 306

Sherman was no longer in danger. He had Johnston confronting him, but with an army much inferior to his own, both in numbers and in morale. He had Lee to the north of him with a force largely superior; but I was holding Lee with a still greater force, and had he made his escape and gotten down to reinforce Johnston, Sherman, with the reinforce- Sherman, Memoirs, II, ments he now had from Schofield and Terry, would have been able to hold the Confederates at bay for an indefinite period. He was near the sea-shore, with his back to it, and our navy occupied the har-

Johnston's Narrative, pp. 372-374

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bors. He had a railroad to both Wilmington and New Berne, and his flanks were thoroughly protected by streams, which intersect that part of the country and deepen as they approach the sea. Then, too, Sherman knew that if Lee should escape me I would be on his heels, and he and Johnston together would be crushed in one blow if they attempted to make a stand. With the loss of their capital, it is doubtful whether Lee's army would have amounted to much as an army when it reached North Carolina. Johnston's army was demoralized by constant defeat, and would hardly have made an offensive movement, even if they could have been induced to remain on duty. The men of both Lee's and Johnston's armies were, like their brethren of the North, as brave as men can be; but no man is so brave that he may not meet such defeats and disasters as to discourage him and dampen his ardor for any cause, no matter how just he deems it.

## CHAPTER XXI

ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS — LINCOLN AND THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS—AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN-THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG -SHERIDAN DESTROYS THE RAILROAD -GORDON CARRIES THE PICKET-LINE -- PARKE RECAPTURES THE LINE-THE BATTLE OF WHITE OAK ROAD

N the last of January, 1865, peace commission- CHAP. XXI ers from the so-called Confederate States presented themselves on our lines around Petersburg. and were immediately conducted to my headquarters at City Point. They proved to be Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, Judge Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War, and R. M. T. Hunter, formerly United States Senator and then a member of the Confederate Senate.

It was about dark when they reached my headquarters, and I at once conducted them to the steamer Mary Martin, a Hudson River boat which was very comfortably fitted up for the use of passengers. I at once communicated by telegraph with Washington, and informed the Secretary of War and the President of the arrival of these commissioners, and that their object was to negotiate terms of peace between the United States and, as they termed it, the Confederate government.

Nicolay & Hay, Life of Lincoln, X,

J. A. Campbell, Assoc. Just. U.S. Sup. Ct. 1853-

U.S. Sen. (Va.) 1847-61

was instructed to retain them at City Point until the President, or some one whom he would designate, should come to meet them. They remained several days as guests on board the boat. I saw them quite frequently, though I have no recollection of having had any conversation whatever with them on the subject of their mission. It was something I had nothing to do with, and I therefore did not wish to express any views on the subject. For my own part, I never had admitted, and never was ready to admit, that they were the representatives of a government. There had been too great a waste of blood and treasure to concede anything of the kind. As long as they remained there, however, our relations were pleasant, and I found them all very agreeable gentlemen. I directed the captain to furnish them with the best the boat afforded, and to minister to their comfort in every way possible. No guard was placed over them and no restriction was put upon their movements; nor was there any pledge asked that they would not abuse the privileges extended to them. They were permitted to leave the boat when they felt like it, and did so, coming up on the bank and visiting me at my headquarters.

I had never met any of these gentlemen before the war, but knew them well by reputation and through their public services, and I had been a particular admirer of Mr. Stephens. I had always supposed that he was a very small man, but when I saw him in the dusk of the evening I was very much surprised to find so large a man as he seemed to be. When he got down on to the boat I found that he was wearing a coarse gray woolen overcoat,

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9; V. A. a manufacture that had been introduced into the CHAP. XXI South during the rebellion. The cloth was thicker than anything of the kind I had ever seen, even in Canada. The overcoat extended nearly to his feet, and was so large that it gave him the appearance of being an average-sized man. He took this off when he reached the cabin of the boat, and I was struck with the apparent change in size, in the coat and out of it.

After a few days, about the 2d of February, I received a despatch from Washington, directing me to send the commissioners to Hampton Roads to meet the President and a member of the Cabinet. Mr. Lincoln met them there and had an interview of short duration. It was not a great while after they met that the President visited me at City He spoke of his having met the commis-Point. sioners, and said he had told them that there would be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they would recognize, first, that the Union as a whole must be forever preserved; and, second, that slavery must be abolished. If they were willing to concede these two points, then he was ready to enter into negotiations, and was almost willing to hand them a blank sheet of paper with his signature attached, for them to fill in the terms upon which they were willing to live with us in the Union and be one people. He always showed a generous and kindly spirit toward the Southern people, and I never heard him abuse an enemy. Some of the cruel things said about President Lincoln, particularly in the North, used to pierce him to the heart; but never in my presence did he evince a revenge-

ful disposition—and I saw a great deal of him at

Lincoln's State Pa-pers, II, 647

Nicolay & Hay, Life of Lincoln, X,

The President's terms of peace

> Lincoln's character

CHAP. XXI City Point, for he seemed glad to get away from the cares and anxieties of the capital.

Lincoln's characterization of A. II, Stephens

Right here I might relate an anecdote of Mr. Lincoln. It was on the occasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the pence commissioners at Hampton Roads. After a little conversation he asked me if I had seen that overcoat of Stephens's. I replied that I had, "Well," said he, "did you see him take it off?" I said yes. "Well," said he, "didn't you think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest ear that ever you did see?" Long afterward I told this story to the Confederate General J. B. Gordon, at the time a member of the Senate. He repeated it to Stephens, and, as I heard afterward, Stephens laughed immoderately at the simile of Mr. Lincoln.

J. B. Gordon, Lt. Gen. C.S. A., U. S. Sen. (Ga.) 1873-79; 1891 Gov. 1887-90

> The rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace commissioners, passed off quietly and uneventfully, except for two or three little incidents. On one occasion during this period, while I was visiting Washington City for the purpose of conferring with the administration, the enemy's cavalry under General Wade Hampton, passing our extreme left and then going to the south, got in east of us. Before their presence was known they had driven off a large number of beef-cattle that were grazing in that section. It was a fair capture, and they were sufficiently needed by the Confederates. was only retaliating for what we had done, sometimes for many weeks at a time, when out of supplies—taking what the Confederate army otherwise would have goften. As appears in this book, on one single occasion we captured five thousand head of cattle which were crossing the Mississippi River

A Confederate reprisal

Ante, I, 485, 486 near Port Hudson on their way from Texas to sup- CHAP, XXI ply the Confederate army in the East.

burg

One of the most anxious periods of my experi- Anxiety before Petersence during the rebellion was the last few weeks before Petersburg. I felt that the situation of the Confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment. and I was afraid, every morning, that I would awake from my sleep to hear that Lee had gone. and that nothing was left but a picket-line. He had his railroad by the way of Danville south, and I was afraid that he was running off his men and all stores and ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him for his immediate defense. I knew he could move much more lightly and more rapidly than I, and that, if he got the start, he would leave me behind, so that we would have the same army to fight again farther south and the war might be prolonged another year.

I was led to this fear by the fact that I could not see how it was possible for the Confederates to hold out much longer where they were. There is no doubt that Richmond would have been evacuated much sooner than it was if it had not been that it was the capital of the so-called Confederacy, and the fact of evacuating the capital would, of course, have had a very demoralizing effect upon the Confederate army. When it was evacuated (as we shall see further on) the Confederacy at once began to crumble and fade away. Then, too, desertions were taking place not only among those who were with General Lee in the neighborhood of their capital, but throughout the whole Confederacy. remember that, in a conversation with me on one

Importance of Rich-

CHAP. XXI occasion long prior to this, General Butler remarked that the Confederates would find great difficulty in getting more men for their army; possibly adding. though I am not certain as to this, "unless they should arm the slave."

Confederate conscription

The South, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied man between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they had passed a law for the further conscription of boys from fourteen to eighteen, calling them the junior reserves, and men from forty-five to sixty, to be called the senior reserves. The latter were to hold the necessary points not in immediate danger, and especially those in the General Butler, in alluding to this conscription, remarked that they were thus "robbing both the cradle and the grave," an expression which I afterward used in writing a letter to Mr. Washburn.

Confederate desertions

It was my belief that, while the enemy could get no more recruits, they were losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout the entire army, by desertions alone. Then, by casualties of war, sickness, and other natural causes, their losses were much heavier. It was a mere question of arithmetic to calculate how long they could hold out while that rate of depletion was going on. Of course, long before their army would be thus reduced to nothing the army which we had in the field would have been able to capture theirs. Then, too, I knew from the great number of desertions that the men who had fought so bravely, so gallantly, and so long for the cause which they believed in - and as earnestly, I take it, as our men believed in the cause for which they were fighting-had lost hope and become despondent. Many of them were making application to be sent North, where they might get employment CHAP. XXI until the war was over, when they could return to their Southern homes.

For these and other reasons I was naturally very impatient for the time to come when I could commence the spring campaign, which I thoroughly believed would close the war.

There were two considerations I had to observe. however, and which detained me. One was the fact that the winter had been one of heavy rains, and the roads were impassable for artillery and teams. It was necessary to wait until they had dried sufficiently to enable us to move the wagontrains and artillery necessary to the efficiency of an army operating in the enemy's country. The other consideration was that General Sheridan, with the Watting for Sheridan cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, was operating on the north side of the James River, having come down from the Shenandoah. It was necessary that I should have his cavalry with me, and I was therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the James River.

Let us now take account of what he was doing.

On the 5th of March I had heard from Sheridan. He had met Early between Staunton and Charlottesville and defeated him, capturing nearly his entire command. Early and some of his officers escaped by finding refuge in the neighboring houses or in the woods.

W. R. XLVI (1) 476 et seq. Memoirs, II,

On the 12th I heard from him again. He had turned east, to come to White House. He could not go to Lynchburg as ordered, because the rains had been so very heavy and the streams were so very much swollen. He had a pontoon-train with him,

CHAP, XXI

but it would not reach half-way across some of the streams, at their then stage of water, which he would have to get over in going south as first ordered.

I had supplies sent around to White House for him, and kept the depot there open until he arrived. We had intended to abandon it, because the James River had now become our base of supplies.

Shoridan had about ten thousand cavalry with

him, divided into two divisions commanded respectively by Custer and Devin. General Merritt was acting as chief of cavalry. Sheridan moved very light, carrying only four days' provisions with him, with a larger supply of coffee, salt, and other small rations, and very little else besides ammunition.

W. R. XLVI (1) 477

T. C. Devin, Col.6th N.Y.

Cav. Nov.20, 1861; Bvt. Brig.-Gen.

Vols. Aug. 15, 1864

with a larger supply of coffee, salt, and other small rations, and very little else besides ammunition. They stopped at Charlottesville and commenced tearing up the railroad back toward Lynchburg. He also sent a division along the James River Canal to destroy locks, culverts, etc. All mills and factories along the lines of march of his troops were destroyed also.

Sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a march to White House was now somewhat hazardous. He determined, therefore, to fight his way along the railroad and canal till he was as near to Richmond as it was possible to get, or until attacked. He did this, destroying the canal as far as Goochland, and the railroad to a point as near Richmond as he could get. On the 10th he was at Columbia. Negroes had joined his column to the number of two thousand or more, and they assisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads and the canal. His cavalry was in as fine a condition as when he started, because he had been able to find plenty of forage. He

Tbid. 478 et seq.—Sheridan, Memoirs, II,119 et seq. had captured most of Early's horses and picked up chap.xxi a good many others on the road. When he reached Ashland he was assailed by the enemy in force. He resisted their assault with part of his command, moved quickly across the South and North Anna, going north, and reached White House safely on the 19th.

Cf. Sherman, Memoirs, II, 325, 331, 333 et seq.

The time for Sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to the time he could get away from Goldsboro', where he then was. Supplies had to be got up to him which would last him through a long march, as there would probably not be much to be obtained in the country through which he would pass. I had to arrange, therefore, that he should start from where he was, in the neighborhood of Goldsboro', on the 18th of April, the earliest day at which he supposed he could be ready.

Sherman was anxious that I should wait where I was until he could come up and make a sure thing of it; but I had determined to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit of my doing so. I had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting, until Sheridan, who was on his way from the Shenandoah Valley to join me, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to the execution of the plans which I had in mind. However, having arrived at White House on the 19th of March, I was enabled to make my plans.

Prompted by my anxiety lest Lee should get away some night before I was aware of it, and, having the lead of me, push into North Carolina to join with Johnston in attempting to crush out Sherman, I had, as early as the 1st of the month March, given instructions to the troops around stersburg to keep a sharp lookout to see that such movement should not escape their notice, and to ready to strike at once if it was undertaken.

It is now known that early in the month of arch Mr. Davis and General Lee had a consultaon about the situation of affairs in and about 
ichmond and Petersburg, and they both agreed 
at these places were no longer tenable for them, 
ad that they must get away as soon as possible, 
ney, too, were waiting for dry roads, or a condion of the roads which would make it possible to 
ove.

ove. General Lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to cure a wider opening to enable them to reach the inville road with greater security than he would we in the way the two armies were situated, dermined upon an assault upon the right of our ies around Petersburg. The night of the 24th of arch was fixed upon for this assault, and General ordon was assigned to the execution of the plan. ie point between Fort Stedman and Battery 10, where our lines were closest together, was lected as the point of his attack. The attack is to be made at night, and the troops were to get ssession of the higher ground in the rear, where ey supposed we had intrenchments, then sweep the right and left, create a panic in the lines of ir army, and force me to contract my lines. Lee oped this would detain me a few days longer and ve him an opportunity of escape. The plan was all conceived and the execution of it very well one indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion

our line.

Gordon assembled his troops, under the cover of CHAP. XXI night, at the point at which they were to make W.R. XLVI their charge, and got possession of our picket-line, entirely without the knowledge of the troops inside of our main line of intrenchments; this reduced the distance he would have to charge over to not much more than fifty yards. For some time before, the deserters had been coming in with great frequency, often bringing their arms with them; and this the Confederate general knew. Taking advantage of this knowledge, he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping through to ours, as if to desert. they got to our lines they at once took possession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. the main line our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great security. This plan was to have been executed and much damage done before daylight; but the troops that were to reinforce Gordon had to be brought from the north side of the James River, and, by some accident on the railroad on their way over, they were detained for a considerable time; so that it got to be nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge.

The charge, however, was successful and almost 151d. 316,317,315 without loss, the enemy passing through our lines between Fort Stedman and Battery No. 10. Then, turning to the right and left, they captured the fort and the battery, with all the arms and troops in them. Continuing the charge, they also carried Batteries 11 and 12 to our left, which they turned toward City Point.

Meade happened to be at City Point that night, and this break in his line cut him off from all communication with his headquarters. Parke, however,

commanding the Ninth Corps when this breach took

CHAP, XXI

J.C. Tidbull, Cupt. 2d Art. May 14, 1861; Byt. Maj.-Gen. Vols. Apr. 2, 1865 J. F. Hart ranft, Col. 51st. Pn. place, telegraphed the facts to Meade's headquarters, and, learning that the general was away, assumed command himself, and with commendable promptitude made all preparations to drive the enemy back. General Tidball gathered a large number of pieces of artillery, and planted them in rear of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground between the lines very thoroughly. Hartranft was soon out with his division, as also was Willeox. Hartranft to the right of the breach headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly drove them back into Fort Stedman. On the other side they were driven back into the intrenchments which they had captured, and Batteries 11 and 12 were retaken by Willeox early in the morning.

W. R. XLVI (1) 322-324

July 27, 1861;

Brig. Gen. Vols. May 12, 1864; Gov. (Pa.) 1872-78

Ibid. 318

Parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and batteries, and communication was once more established. The artillery fire was kept up so continuously that it was impossible for the Confederates to retreat, and equally impossible for reinforcements to join them. They all, therefore, fell captives into our hands. This effort of Lee's cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in their killing, wounding, and capturing about two thousand of ours.

After the recapture of the batteries taken by the Confederates, our troops made a charge and carried the enemy's intrenched picket-line, which they strengthened and held. This, in turn, gave us but a short distance to charge over when our attack came to be made a few days later.

Ibid, 50, and Appx. post, under date Mar. 24, 1865 The day that Gordon was making dispositions for this attack (24th of March) I issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th. Ord, with three divisions of infantry and Mackenzie's cavalry, was to move in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of the James River, and take his place on our extreme left, thirty miles away. He left Weitzel with the rest of the Army of the James to hold Bermuda Hundred and the north of the James River. The Engineer Brigade was to be left at City Point, and Parke's corps in the lines about Petersburg.

Ord was at his place promptly. Humphreys and Warren were then on our extreme left with the Second and Fifth corps. They were directed, on the arrival of Ord, and on his getting into position in their places, to cross Hatcher's Run and extend out west toward Five Forks, the object being to get into a position from which we could strike the South Side railroad and ultimately the Danville railroad. There was considerable fighting in taking up these new positions for the Second and Fifth corps, in which the Army of the James had also to participate somewhat, and the losses were quite severe.

This was what was known as the battle of White Oak road.

W. R. XI (1) 602, 6

## CHAPTER XXII

INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC -SHERIDAN'S AD-VANCE ON FIVE FORKS - BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS -PARKE AND WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINES -BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG

1865

CHAP.XXII CHERIDAN reached City Point on the 26th of March. His horses, of course, were jaded, and many of them had lost their shoes. A few days of rest were necessary to recuperate the animals and also to have them shod and put in condition for moving. Immediately on General Sheridan's arrival at City Point I prepared his instructions for the move which I had decided upon. The movement was to commence on the 29th of the month.

W. R. XLVI (1) 52. But of Sheridan. Memoirs, II, 127, 134

> After reading the instructions I had given him Sheridan walked out of my tent, and I followed to have some conversation with him by himself-not in the presence of anybody else, even of a member of my staff. In preparing his instructions I contemplated just what took place; that is to say, capturing Five Forks, driving the enemy from Petersburg and Richmond, and terminating the contest before separating from the enemy. But the nation had already become restless and discouraged at the prolongation of the war, and many believed that

it would never terminate except by compromise. CHAP. XXII Knowing that unless my plan proved an entire success it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat. I provided in these instructions that in a certain event he was to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac and his base of supplies, and, living upon the country, proceed south by the way of the Danville railroad, or near it, across the Roanoke, get in the rear of Johnston, who was guarding that road, and cooperate with Sherman in destroying Johnston; then with these combined forces to help carry out the instructions which Sherman already had received, to act in coöperation with the armies around Petersburg and Richmond.

he seemed somewhat disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut loose again from the Army of the Potomac, and place himself between the two main armies of the enemy. I said to him, "General, this portion of your instructions I have put in merely as a blind; " and gave him the reason for doing so, heretofore described. I told him that, as a matter of fact, I intended to close the war right here with this movement, and that he should go no farther. His face at once brightened up, and

Sheridan was not, however, to make his movement against Five Forks until he got further instructions from me.

slapping his hand on his leg he said, "I am glad to

hear it, and we can do it."

One day, after the movement I am about to de- Cf. Ibid. 142scribe had commenced, and when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far to the rear, south, Sheridan rode up to where my headquarters were

Isaw that after Sheridan had read his instructions Memoirs, II,

mar.xxn then established, at Dabney's Mills. He met some of my staff-officers outside, and was highly jubilant over the prospects of success, giving reasons why he believed this would prove the final and successful effort. Although my chief of staff had urged very strongly that we return to our position about City Point and in the lines around Petersburg, he asked Sheridan to come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them. Sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice where it had not been asked; so one of my staff came in and told me that Sheridan had what they considered important news, and suggested that I send for him. I did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he was imbued. Knowing, as I did from experience, of what great value that feeling of confidence by a commander was, I determined to make a movement at once, although, on account of the rains which had fallen after I had started out, the roads were still very heavy. Orders were given accordingly.

tvance on ive Forks

Virginia

Finally the 29th of March came, and fortunately, there having been a few days free from rain, the surface of the ground was dry, giving indications that the time had come when we could move. On that date I moved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about Petersburg. It soon set in raining again, however, and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable for teams, and almost so for cavalry. Sometimes a horse or mule would be standing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot would sink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself, all his feet would sink, and he

vould have to be drawn by hand out of the quick- CHAP. XXII ands so common in that part of Virginia and other Southern States. It became necessary, therefore, to ouild corduroy roads every foot of the way as we dvanced, to move our artillery upon. and become so accustomed to this kind of work, and vere so well prepared for it, that it was done very apidly. The next day (March 30th) we had made sufficient progress to the southwest to warrant me n starting Sheridan with his cavalry over by Dinviddie, with instructions to then come up by the oad leading northwest to Five Forks, thus menacng the right of Lee's line.

ending our lines to the west as far as practicable loward the enemy's extreme right, or Five Forks. The column moving detached from the army still in the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small. The forces in the trenches were themselves extendng to the left flank. Warren was on the extreme left when the extension began, but Humphreys was marched around later and thrown into line between

My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks, get on the enemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their center to protect their right, so that an assault in the center might be successfully made. General Wright's corps had been designated to make this assault, which I intended to order as soon as information reached me of Sheridan's success. He was to move under cover as close to the enemy as he could get.

him and Five Forks.

It is natural to suppose that Lee would understand my design to be to get up to the South Side

This movement was made for the purpose of ex- Advance on Five Forks

CHAP, XXII and ultimately to the Danville railroad, as soon as he had heard of the movement commenced on the 29th. These roads were so important to his very March, 1865 existence while he remained in Richmond and Petersburg, and of such vital importance to him even in case of retreat, that naturally he would

W. R. XLVI (1) 1263


make most strenuous efforts to defend them. did on the 30th send Pickett with five brigades to reinforce Five Forks. He also sent around to the right of his army some two or three other divisions. besides directing that other troops be held in readiness on the north side of the James River to come over on call. He came over himself to superintend in person the defense of his right flank.

1bid, 1102

Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddie Court House on the night of the 30th, and then took a road leading northwest to Five Forks. He had only his cayalry with him. Soon encountering the rebel cavalry, he met with a very stout resistance. He gradually drove them back, however, until in the neighborhood of Five Forks. Here he had to encounter other troops besides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way.

Sheridan, Memoirs, 11, 146, 147

In this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place, and stated that he was falling back toward Dinwiddie gradually and slowly, and asked me to send Wright's corps to his assistance. I replied to him that it was impossible to send Wright's corps, because that corps was already in line close up to the enemy, where we should want to assault when the proper time came, and was, besides, a long distance from him; but the Second (Humphreys's) and Fifth (Warren's) corps were on our extreme left, and a little to the rear of



it, in a position to threaten the left flank of the CHAP. XXII enemy at Five Forks, and that I would send Warren.

Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move W. R. XLVI at once that night (the 31st) to Dinwiddie Court House and put himself in communication with Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him. He was very slow in moving, some of his troops not starting until after five o'clock next morning. When he did move it was done very deliberately, and on arriving at Gravelly Run he found the stream swollen from the recent rains, so that he regarded it as not fordable. Sheridan, of course, knew of his coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as possible, sent orders to him to hasten. Sheridan, Memoirs, II, He was also hastened, or at least ordered to move up rapidly, by General Meade. He now felt that he could not cross that creek without bridges, and his orders were changed to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank or get in their rear; but he was so late in getting up that Sheridan determined to move forward without him. However, Ayres's division of Warren's corps reached him in time to be in the fight all day, most of the time separated from the remainder of the Fifth Corps and fighting directly under Sheridan.

Warren reported to Sheridan about eleven o'clock on the 1st, but the whole of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in the afternoon. Griffin's division, in backing to get out of the way of a severe cross-fire of the enemy, was found marching away from the fighting. This did not continue long, however; the division was brought back, and with Ayres's division did most excellent IDIG. 838, 869 service during the day. Crawford's division of the

Cf. W. R. XLVI (1)

CHAR, XXII same corps had backed still farther off, and although orders were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was late before it finally got to where it could be of material assistance. Once there it did very excellont service.

Sheridan's imputience

Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon, or a little later, in advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon Five Forks itself. He was very impatient to make the assault and have it all over before night, because the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in biyonac during the night. Unless the assault was made and was successful he would be obliged to return to Dinwiddie Court House, or even farther than that, for the night. It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan

wanted to get Crawford's division in hand, and he also wanted Warren. He sent staff-officer after staff-officer in search of Warren, directing that general to report to him, but they were unable to find him. At all events, Sheridan was unable to get that officer to him. Finally he went himself. He issued an order relieving Warren and assigning Griffin to the command of the Fifth Corps. The troops were then brought up and the assault suc-

Sheridan, Memoirs, II,

> Warren's distant

cessfully made. I was so much dissatisfied with Warren's dilatory movements in the battle of White Oak road, and in his failure to reach Sheridan in time, that I was very much afraid that at the last moment he would fail Sheridan. He was a man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quick perception, and could make his dispositions as quickly as any officer, under difficulties where he was forced to act. But I had

before discovered a defect which was beyond his CHAP. XXII control, that was very prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just before us. could see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it. He would not only make preparations to meet the danger which might occur, but he would inform his commanding officer what others should do while he was executing his move.

I had sent a staff-officer to General Sheridan to Sheridan, Memoirs, II, call his attention to these defects, and to say that, as much as I liked General Warren, now was not a time when we could let our personal feelings for any one stand in the way of success; and if his removal was necessary to success, not to hesitate. It was upon that authorization that Sheridan removed Warren. I was very sorry that it had been done, and regretted still more that I had not long before taken occasion to assign him to another field of duty.

Tbid. 165

It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went W.R. XLVI over the parapets of the enemy. The two armies were mingled together there for a time in such manner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand the surrender of the other. Soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in every direction, some six thousand prisoners, besides artillery and small arms in large quantities, falling into our hands. The flying troops were pursued in different directions, the cavalry and Fifth Corps under Sheridan pursuing the larger body, which moved northwest.

This pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at night, when Sheridan halted his troops, and, knowing the importance to him of the part of the

HAR.XXII enemy's line which had been captured, returned. sending the Fifth Corps across Hatcher's Run to just southwest of Petersburg, and facing them toward it. Merritt, with the cavalry, stopped and bivouncked west of Five Forks.

> This was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the 1st of April. I then issued orders for an assault by Wright and Parke at four o'clock on the morning of the 2d. I also ordered the Second Corps, General Humphreys, and General Ord with the Army of the James, on the left, to hold themselves in readiness to take any advantage that could be taken from weakening in their front.

ndenu, Mil. Iist. III, 501

I notified Mr. Lincoln at City Point of the success of the day; in fact, I had reported to him during the day and evening as I got news, because he was so much interested in the movements taking place that I wanted to relieve his mind as much as Leould. I notified Weitzel on the north side of the James River, directing him, also, to keep close up to the enemy, and take advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there to promptly enter the city of Richmond.

I was afraid that Lee would regard the possession of Five Forks as of so much importance that he would make a last desperate effort to retake it, risking everything upon the east of a single die. It was for this reason that I had ordered the assault to take place at once, as soon as I had received the news of the capture of Five Forks. The corps commanders, however, reported that it was so dark that the men could not see to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then.

But we kept up a continuous artillery fire upon the CHAP. XXII enemy around the whole line, including that north of the James River, until it was light enough to move, which was about a quarter to five in the Apr. 2, 1865 morning.

At that hour Parke's and Wright's corps moved W. R. XLVI out as directed, brushed the abatis from their front as they advanced under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and went without flinching directly on till they mounted the parapets and threw themselves inside of the enemy's line. Parke, who was on the right, swept down to the right and captured a very considerable length of line in that direction; but at that point the outer was so near the inner line which closely enveloped the city of Petersburg that he could make no advance forward, and, in fact, had a very serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the defense of his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in this.

Ibid. 904

Wright swung around to his left and moved to Hatcher's Run, sweeping everything before him. The enemy had traverses in rear of his captured line, under cover of which he made something of a stand, from one to another, as Wright moved on; but the latter met no serious obstacle. proceed to the left the outer line becomes gradually much farther from the inner one, and along about Hatcher's Run they must be nearly two miles apart. Both Parke and Wright captured a considerable amount of artillery and some prisoners—Wright about three thousand of them.

In the mean time Ord and Humphreys, in obedi- 101d.679,1161 ence to the instructions they had received, had succeeded by daylight, or very early in the morning,

on in capturing the intrenched picket-lines in their front; and before Wright got up to that point, Ord had also succeeded in getting inside of the enemy's intrenchments. The Second Corps soon followed; and the outer works of Petersburg were in the hands of the National troops, never to be wrenched from them again. When Wright reached Hatcher's Run, he sent a regiment to destroy the South Side railroad just outside of the city.

My headquarters were still at Dabney's saw-mills. As soon as I received the news of Wright's success I sent despatches announcing the fact to all points around the line, including the troops at Bermuda Hundred and those on the north side of the James, and to the President at City Point. Further despatches kept coming in, and as they did I sent the additional news to these points. Finding at length that they were all in, I mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works. When I arrived there I rode my horse over the parapet just as Wright's three thousand prisoners were coming out. I was soon joined inside by General Meade and his staff.

Lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost ground. Parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but repulsed every effort. Before noon Longstreet was ordered up from the north side of the James River, thus bringing the bulk of Lee's army around to the support of his extreme right. As soon as I learned this I notified Weitzel and directed him to keep up close to the enemy, and to have Hartsuff, commanding the Bermuda Hundred dred front, to do the same thing, and if they found any break to go in; Hartsuff especially

should do so, for this would separate Richmond CHAP. XXII and Petersburg.

Sheridan, after he had returned to Five Forks. swept down to Petersburg, coming in on our left. This gave us a continuous line from the Appomattox River below the city to the same river above. At eleven o'clock, not having heard from Sheridan. I reinforced Parke with two brigades from City W.R.XLVI Point. With this additional force he completed his captured works for better defense, and built back from his right, so as to protect his flank. He also carried in and made an abatis between himself and the enemy. Lee brought additional troops and artillery against Parke even after this was done, and made several assaults with very heavy losses.

The enemy had, in addition to their intrenched line close up to Petersburg, two inclosed works outside of it, Fort Gregg and Fort Whitworth. We thought it had now become necessary to carry them by assault. About one o'clock in the day, Fort Gregg was assaulted by Foster's division of the Twenty-fourth Corps (Gibbon's), supported by two brigades from Ord's command. The battle was desperate, and the National troops were repulsed several times; but it was finally carried, and immediately the troops in Fort Whitworth evacuated the place. The guns of Fort Gregg were turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commanding officer, with some sixty of the men of Fort Whitworth. surrendered.

Ibid, 1179

I had ordered Miles in the morning to report to Sheridan. In moving to execute this order he came upon the enemy at the intersection of the White out 21, 1865

N. A. Miles, 1st Lt. 22d Mass. Sept. 9, 1861; Col. 61st N. Y. 1862; Brig. Gen. Vols. May 12, 1864; Maj.-Gen.

W. R. XLVI (1) 1106. Sheridan, Memoirs, II,

Char.xxii Oak road and the Claiborne road. The enemy fell back to Sutherland's station on the South Side road and were followed by Miles. This position, natnrally a strong and defensible one, was also strongly intrenched. Sheridan now came up, and Miles asked permission from him to make the assault, which Sheridan gave. By this time Humphreys had got through the outer works in his front, and came up also and assumed command over Miles, who commanded a division in his corps. I had sent an order to Humphreys to turn to his right and move toward Petersburg. This order he now got, and started off, thus leaving Miles alone. The latter made two assaults, both of which failed, and he had to fall back a few hundred yards.

> Hearing that Miles had been left in this position, I directed Humphreys to send a division back to his relief. He went himself.

Bheridan. Memoirs, 11,

Sheridan, before starting to sweep down to Petersburg, had sent Merritt with his cavalry to the west to attack some Confederate cavalry that had assembled there. Merritt drove them north to the Appomattex River. Sheridan then took the enemy at Sutherland's station on the reverse side from where Miles was, and the two together captured the place, with a large number of prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put the remainder, portions of three Confederate corps, to flight. Sheridan followed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was stopped. Miles bivouncked for the night on the ground which he, with Sheridan, had carried so handsomely by assault. I cannot explain the situation here better than by giving my despatch to City Point

W. R. XVLI (1) 712

that evening:

BOYDTON ROAD, NEAR PETERSBURG, April 2, 1865, 4:40 p.m.

CHAP. XXII

Colonel T. S. Bowers, City Point:

We are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few hours will be intrenched from the Appointtox below Petersburg to the river above. Heth's and Wilcox's divisions—such part of them as were not captured—were cut off from town, either designedly on their part or because they could not help it. Sheridan with the cavalry and Fifth Corps is above them. Miles's division, Second Corps, was sent from the White Oak road to Sutherland's station on the South Side railroad, where he met them, and at last accounts was engaged with them. Not knowing whether Sheridan would get up in time, General Humphreys was sent with another division from here. The whole captures since the army started out gunning will amount to not less than twelve thousand men and probably fifty pieces of artillery. I do not know the number of men and guns accurately, however. . . . I think the President might come out and pay us a visit to-morrow.

> U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

During the night of April 2d our line was intrenched from the river above to the river below. I ordered a bombardment to be commenced the next morning at 5 A.M., to be followed by an assault at six o'clock; but the enemy evacuated Petersburg early in the morning.

Henry Heth, W.P.1843-47; Maj.-Gen.C. S. A. May,

C. M. Wilcox, W. P. 1842-46; Maj.-Gen. C. S. A. Aug. 9,

## CHAPTER XXIII

THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG—MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN PETERSBURG—THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND—PURSUING THE ENEMY—VISIT TO SHERIDAN AND MEADE

AP.XXIII Entering GENERAL MEADE and I entered Petersburg on the morning of the 3d and took a position under cover of a house which protected us from the enemy's musketry, which was flying thick and fast there. As we would occasionally look around the corner we could see the streets and the Appomattox bottom, presumably near the bridge, packed with the Confederate army. I did not have artillery brought up, because I was sure Lee was trying to make his escape, and I wanted to push immediately in pursuit. At all events, I had not the heart to turn the artillery upon such a mass of defeated and fleeing men, and I hoped to capture them soon.

military ruse Soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated Petersburg, a man came in who represented himself to be an engineer of the Army of Northern Virginia. He said that Lee had for some time been at work preparing a strong inclosed intrenchment, into which he would throw himself when forced out of Petersburg, and fight his final battle there; that he was actually at that time drawing his troops

from Richmond, and falling back into this prepared CHAP.XXIII work. This statement was made to General Meade and myself when we were together. I had already given orders for the movement up the south side of the Appointtox for the purpose of heading off Lee; but Meade was so much impressed by this man's story that he thought we ought to cross the Appomattox there at once and move against Lee in his new position. I knew that Lee was no fool, as he would have been to have put himself and his army between two formidable streams like the James and Appomattox rivers, and between two such armies as those of the Potomac and the James. Then these streams coming together as they did to the east of him, it would be only necessary to close up in the west to have him thoroughly cut off from all supplies or possibility of reinforcement. It would only have been a question of days,—and not many of them,—if he had taken the position assigned to him by the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to surrender his army. Such is one of the ruses resorted to in war to deceive your antagonist. My judgment was that Lee would necessarily have to evacuate Richmond, and that the only course for him to pursue would be to follow the Danville road. Accordingly my object was to secure a point on that road south of Lee, and I told Meade this. He suggested that if Lee was going that way we should follow him. My reply was that we did not want to follow him; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut him off, and if he would only stay in the position he (Meade) believed him to be in at that time, I wanted nothing better; that when we got in possession of the Danville railroad, at its

Plan to cut

CHAP.XXIII crossing of the Appointatox River, if we still found him between the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward and close him up; that we would then have all the advantage we could possibly have by moving directly against him from Petersburg. even if he remained in the position assigned him by the engineer officer.


I had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so as to start them out on the Danville road early in the morning, supposing that Lee would be gone during the night. During the night I strengthened Sheridan by sending him Humphreys's corps.

"Jefferson Davis," II, 582

Lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities at Richmond, during the day, of the condition of affairs, and told them it would be impossible for him to hold out longer than night, if he could hold out that long. Davis was at church when he received Lee's despatch. The congregation was dismissed with the notice that there would be no evening service. The rebel government left Richmond about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d.

Lee's desperate plan

At night Lee ordered his troops to assemble at Amelia Court House, his object being to get away, join Johnston, if possible, and try to crush Sherman before I could get there. As soon as I was sure of this I notified Sheridan, and directed him to move out on the Danville railroad to the south side of the Appointtox River as speedily as possible. He replied that he already had some of his command nine miles out. I then ordered the rest of the Army of the Potomac under Meade to follow the same road in the morning. Parke's corps followed by the same road, and the Army of the James was directed to follow the road which ran alongside of CHAP.XXIII the South Side railroad to Burke's Station, and to repair the railroad and telegraph as they proceeded. That road was a 5-feet gauge, while our rolling-



MAP OF THE PETERSBURG AND APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGNS.

stock was all of the 4 feet 8½ inches gauge; consequently the rail on one side of the track had to be taken up throughout the whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge of our cars and locomotives.

Mr. Lincoln was at City Point at the time, and had been for some days. I would have let him know what I contemplated doing, only, while I felt

CHARLEST A strong conviction that the move was going to be successful, yet it might not prove so; and then I would have only added another to the many disappointments he had been suffering for the past three years. But when we started out he saw that we were moving for a purpose, and bidding us Godspeed, remained there to hear the result.

The Presi dent's visit to Peters burg

The next morning after the capture of Petersburg I telegraphed Mr. Lincoln, asking him to ride out there and see me, while I would await his arrival. I had started all the troops out early in the morning, so that after the National army left Petersburg there was not a soul to be seen, not even an animal in the streets. There was absolutely no one there except my staff-officers and, possibly, a small escort of cavalry. We had selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until the President arrived.

About the first thing that Mr. Lincoln said to me, after warm congratulations for the victory and thanks both to myself and to the army which had accomplished it, was, "Do you know, general, that I have had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days that you intended to do something like this?" Our movements having been successful up to this point, I no longer had any object in concealing from the President all my movements, and the objects I had in view. He remained for some days near City Point, and I communicated with him frequently and fully by telegraph.

Possible rivalry be-tween the Enstand the West

Mr. Lincoln knew that it had been arranged for Sherman to join me at a fixed time, to cooperate in the destruction of Lee's army. I told him that I had been very anxious to have the Eastern armies

vanguish their old enemy, who had so long resisted CHAP.XX all their repeated and gallant attempts to subdue them or drive them from their capital. The Western armies had been in the main successful until they had conquered all the territory from the Mississippi River to the State of North Carolina, and were now almost ready to knock at the back door of Richmond, asking admittance. I said to him that if the Western armies should be even upon the field, operating against Richmond and Lee, the credit would be given to them for the capture, by politicians and non-combatants from the section of country which those troops hailed from. It might lead to disagreeable bickerings between members of Congress of the East and those of the West in some of their debates. Western members might be throwing it up to the members of the East that in the suppression of the rebellion they were not able

Mr. Lincoln said he saw that now, but had never thought of it before, because his anxiety was so great that he did not care where the aid came from so the work was done.

engaged with.

to capture an army, or to accomplish much in the way of contributing toward that end, but had to wait until the Western armies had conquered all the territory south and west of them, and then come on to help them capture the only army they had been

The Army of the Potomac has every reason to be proud of its four years' record in the suppression of the rebellion. The army it had to fight was the protection to the capital of a people which was attempting to found a nation upon the territory of the United States. Its loss would be the loss of the

The Army

CHAP.XXIII CHUSO.

cause. Every energy, therefore, was put forth by the Confederacy to protect and maintain their capital. Everything else would go if it went. Lee's army had to be strengthened to enable it to maintain its position, no matter what territory was wrested from the South in another quarter.

I never expected any such bickering as I have indicated between the soldiers of the two sections; and fortunately there has been none between the politicians. Possibly I am the only one who thought of the liability of such a state of things in advance.

When our conversation was at an end Mr. Lincoln mounted his horse and started on his return to City Point, while I and my staff started to join the army, now a good many miles in advance. Up to this time I had not received the report of the capture of Richmond.

Fall of Rich-

April, 1865

Soon after I left President Lincoln I received a despatch from General Weitzel which notified me that he had taken possession of Richmond at about 8:15 o'clock in the morning of that day (the 3d), and that he had found the city on fire in two places. The city was in the most utter confusion. The authorities had taken the precaution to empty all the liquor into the gutter, and to throw out the provisions which the Confederate government had left, for the people to gather up. The city had been deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without any notice whatever that they were about In fact, up to the very hour of the evacuation the people had been led to believe that Lee had gained an important victory somewhere around Petersburg.

Weitzel's command found evidence of great de-

moralization in Lee's army, there being still a great CHAP.XXIII many men and even officers in the town. The city The burning of the city was on fire. Our troops were directed to extinguish the flames, which they finally succeeded in doing. The fire had been started by some one connected with the retreating army. All authorities deny that it was authorized, and I presume it was the work of excited men who were leaving what they regarded as their capital, and may have felt that it was better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of their enemy. Be that as it may, the National troops found the city in flames, and used every effort to extinguish them.

The troops that had formed Lee's right, a great Flight of Lee's army many of them, were cut off from getting back into Petersburg, and were pursued by our cavalry so hotly and closely that they threw away caissons, ammunition, clothing, and almost everything to lighten their loads, and pushed along up the Appomattox River until finally they took water and crossed over.

I left Mr. Lincoln and started, as I have already said, to join the command, which halted at Sutherland's station, about nine miles out. We had still time to march as much farther, and time was an object; but the roads were bad, and the trains belonging to the advance corps had blocked up the road so that it was impossible to get on. Then, again, our cavalry had struck some of the enemy and were pursuing them; and the orders were that the roads should be given up to the cavalry whenever they appeared. This caused further delay.

General Wright, who was in command of one of the corps which were left back, thought to gain

Vor. II.—21

Char.xxm time by letting his men go into bivouae and trying to get up some rations for them, and clearing out the road, so that when they did start they would be uninterrupted. Humphreys, who was far ahead. was also out of rations. They did not succeed in getting them up through the night; but the Army of the Potomac, officers and men, were so elated by the reflection that at last they were following up a victory to its end that they preferred marching without rations to running a possible risk of letting the enemy clude them. So the march was resumed at three o'clock in the morning.

W. R. XLVI (1) 1119

Elation of the troops

> Merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at Deep Creek, and driven them north to the Appomattox, where, I presume, most of them were forced to cross.

On the morning of the 4th I learned that Lee had ordered rations up from Danville for his famishing army, and that they were to meet him at Farmville. This showed that Lee had already abandoned the idea of following the railroad down to Danville, but had determined to go farther west, by the way of Farmville. I notified Sheridan of this and directed him to get possession of the road before the supplies could reach Lee. He responded that he had already sent Crook's division to get upon the road between Burkesville and Jetersville, then to face north and march along the road upon the latter place; and he thought Crook must be there now. The bulk of the army moved directly for Jetersville by two roads.

After I had received the despatch from Sheridan saying that Crook was on the Danville road, I immediately ordered Meade to make a forced march with the Army of the Potomae, and to send Parke's

Sheridan, Memoirs, II, 175

corps across from the road they were on to the CHAP.XXIII South Side railroad, to fall in the rear of the Army of the James and to protect the railroad which that army was repairing as it went along.

Our troops took possession of Jetersville, and in the telegraph-office they found a despatch from Lee, Lee's desperate plight ordering two hundred thousand rations from Dan-The despatch had not been sent, but Sheriville. dan sent a special messenger with it to Burkesville and had it forwarded from there. In the mean time, however, despatches from other sources had reached Danville, and they knew there that our army was on the line of the road; so that they sent no further supplies from that quarter.

At this time Merritt and Mackenzie, with the cave W. R. XLVI alry, were off between the road which the Army of the Potomac was marching on and the Appomattox River, and were attacking the enemy in flank. They picked up a great many prisoners and forced the abandonment of some property.

Lee intrenched himself at Amelia Court House, and also his advance north of Jetersville, and sent his troops out to collect forage. The country was very poor and afforded but very little. His foragers scattered a great deal; many of them were picked up by our men, and many others never returned to the Army of Northern Virginia.

Griffin's corps was intrenched across the railroad south of Jetersville, and Sheridan notified me of the situation. I again ordered Meade up with all despatch, Sheridan having but the one corps of infantry, with a little cavalry, confronting Lee's entire army. Meade, always prompt in obeying orders, now pushed forward with great energy, although he

Ibid, 604

CHAP.XXIII W. R. XLVI (1) 681, 905 was himself sick and hardly able to be out of bed. Humphreys moved at two, and Wright at three o'clock in the morning, without rations, as I have said, the wagons being far in the rear.

I stayed that night at Wilson's Station on the South Side railroad. On the morning of the 5th I sent word to Sheridan of the progress Meade was making, and suggested that he might now attack Lee. We had now no other objective than the Confederate armies, and I was anxious to close the thing up at once.

Sheridan, Memoirs, II, 178 On the 5th I marched again with Ord's command until within about ten miles of Burkesville, where I stopped to let his army pass. I then received from Sheridan the following despatch:

H. P.
Davies, Jr.,
Capt. 5th N.
Y. Apr. 1861;
Brig. Gen.
Vols. Sept.
19, 1863;
Maj. Gen.
Muy 4, 1865

The whole of Lee's army is at or near Amelia Court House, and on this side of it. General Davies, whom I sent out to Painesville on their right flank, has just captured six pieces of artillery and some wagons. We can capture the Army of Northern Virginia if force enough can be thrown to this point, and then advance upon it. My cavalry was at Burkesville yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the Danville road, last night. General Lee is at Amelia Court House in person. They are out of rations, or nearly so. They were advancing up the railroad toward Burkesville yesterday, when we intercepted them at this point.

It now became a life-and-death struggle with Lee to get south to his provisions.

W. R. X1,VI (1) 1107

Ibid. 1145

Sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately toward Farmville, moved Davies's brigade of eavalry out to watch him. Davies found the movement had already commenced. He attacked and drove away their eavalry, which was escorting wagons to the west, capturing and burning one

hundred and eighty wagons. He also captured CHAP.XXIII five pieces of artillery. The Confederate infantry then moved against him, and probably would have handled him very roughly, but Sheridan had sent two more brigades of cavalry to follow Davies, and they came to his relief in time. A sharp engagement took place between these three brigades of cavalry and the enemy's infantry, but the latter was repulsed.

W. R. XLVI

Thid, 1107

Meade himself reached Jetersville about two o'clock in the afternoon, but in advance of all his troops. The head of Humphreys's corps followed in about an hour afterward. Sheridan stationed the troops as they came up, at Meade's request, the latter still being very sick. He extended two divisions of this corps off to the west of the road to the left of Griffin's corps, and one division to the right. The cavalry by this time had also come up, and they were put still farther off to the left, Sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which the enemy intended to escape. He wanted to attack. feeling that, if time was given, the enemy would get away; but Meade prevented this, preferring to wait till his troops were all up.

At this juncture Sheridan sent me a letter which Sheridan, Memoirs, II, had been handed to him by a colored man, with a note from himself saying that he wished I was there myself. The letter was dated Amelia Court House, April 5th, and signed by Colonel Taylor. It was to his mother, and showed the demoralization of the Confederate army. Sheridan's note also gave me the information, as here related, of the movements of that day. I received a second message from Sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged more em-

A scout's precaution

W. R. XLVI (1) 1161

Char.xxiii phatically the importance of my presence. This was brought to me by a scout in gray uniform. It was written on tissue-paper and wrapped up in tin-foil such as chewing tobacco is folded in. This was a precaution taken so that if the scout should be captured be could take this tin-foil out of his pocket and, putting it into his mouth, chew it. It would cause no surprise at all to see a Confederate soldier chewing tobacco. It was nearly night when this letter was received. I gave Ord directions to continue his march to Burkesville and there intrench himself for the night, and in the morning to move west to cut off all the roads between there and Karmville.

> I then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort of eavalry, going directly through the

woods, to join Meade's army. The distance was about sixteen miles; but the night being dark, our progress was slow through the woods in the absence of direct roads. However, we got to the outposts about ten o'clock in the evening, and after some little parley convinced the sentinels of our identity and were conducted in to where Sheridan was biyouacked. We talked over the situation for some little time, Sheridan explaining to me what he thought Lee was trying to do, and that Meade's orders, if carried out, moving to the right flank,

ing us and putting us in rear of him. We then together visited Meade, reaching his headquarters about midnight. I explained to Meade that we did not want to follow the enemy-we wanted to get ahead of him; and that his orders would allow the enemy to escape; and besides that,

would give him the coveted opportunity of escap-

Bheridan, Memoirs, II, 17H

I had no doubt that Lee was moving right then. CHAP.XXII Meade changed his orders at once. They were W.R.XLV now given for an advance on Amelia Court House, at an early hour in the morning, as the army then lay; that is, the infantry being across the railroad, most of it to the west of the road, with the cavalry swung out still farther to the left.

#### CHAPTER XXIV


BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK—ENGAGEMENT AT FARM-VILLE—CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL LEE— SHERDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY

... \*\*\*\*

attleffeld f Hallor's Crook

TIME Appointatox, going westward, takes a long sweep to the southwest from the neighborhood of the Richmond and Danville railroad bridge. and then trends northwesterly. Sailor's Creek, an insignificant stream, running northward, empties into the Appointatox between the High Bridge and Jetersville. Near the High Bridge the stage-road from Petersburg to Lynchburg crosses the Appomattex River, also on a bridge. The railroad runs on the north side of the river to Farmville, a few miles west, and from there, recrossing, continues on the south side of it. The roads coming up from the southeast to Farmville cross the Appointatox River there on a bridge and run on the north side, leaving the Lynchburg and Petersburg railroad well to the left.

Lee, in pushing out from Amelia Court House, availed himself of all the roads between the Danville road and Appointation River to move upon, and never permitted the head of his columns to stop because of any fighting that might be going on in his rear. In this way he came very near suc-



ceeding in getting to his provision-trains and elud- CHAP.XXIV ing us with at least part of his army.

As expected, Lee's troops had moved during the Memoirs, II, night before, and our army in moving upon Amelia Court House soon encountered them. There was a good deal of fighting before Sailor's Creek was reached. Our cavalry charged in upon a body of theirs which was escorting a wagon-train in order to get it past our left. A severe engagement ensued, in which we captured many prisoners, and many men also were killed and wounded. There was as much gallantry displayed by some of the Confederates in these little engagements as was displayed at any time during the war, notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week.

The armies finally met on Sailor's Creek, when a Battles & Leaders, IV. heavy engagement took place, in which infantry, artillery, and cavalry were all brought into action. Our men on the right, as they were brought in against the enemy, came in on higher ground, and upon his flank, giving us every advantage to be derived from the lay of the country. Our firing was also very much more rapid, because the enemy commenced his retreat westward, and in firing as he retreated had to turn around every time he fired. The enemy's loss was very heavy, as well in killed and wounded as in captures. Some six general officers fell into our hands in this engagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners. engagement was commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the 6th, and the retreat and pursuit were continued until nightfall, when the armies bivouacked upon the ground where the night had overtaken them.

CHAP, X X I V W. R. X L V I When the move toward Amelia Court House had commenced that morning, I ordered Wright's corps, which was on the extreme right, to be moved to the left past the whole army, to take the place of Griffin's, and ordered the latter at the same time to move by and place itself on the right. The object of this movement was to get the Sixth Corps (Wright's) next to the cavalry, with which they had formerly served so harmoniously and so efficiently in the Valley of Virginia.

The Sixth Corps now remained with the eavalry and under Sheridan's direct command until after the surrender.

Ibid. 1161

Francis Washburn, Col. 5th Mass, Cav.

Theo. Rend, Capt. A. A. G. Oct. 24, 1861; Maj. July 25, 1864

W. R. XLVI

Ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads southward between Burkesville and the High Bridge. On the morning of the 6th he sent Colonel Washburn, with two infantry regiments, with instructions to destroy High Bridge and to return rapidly to Burkesville Station; and he prepared himself to resist the enemy there. Soon after Washburn had started Ord became a little alarmed as to his safety, and sent Colonel Read, of his staff, with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him and bring him back. Very shortly after this he heard that the head of Lee's column had got up to the road between him and where Washburn now was, and attempted to send reinforcements, but the reinforcements could not get through. Read, however, had got through ahead of the enemy. He rode on to Farmville, and was on his way back again when he found his return ent off, and Washburn confronting apparently the advance of Lee's army. Read drew his men up into line of battle, his force now consisting of less than six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, and rode along their front, CHAP.XXIV making a speech to his men to inspire them with the same enthusiasm that he himself felt. He then gave the order to charge. This little band made several charges, of course unsuccessful ones, but inflicted a loss upon the enemy more than equal to their own entire number. Colonel Read fell mortally wounded, and then Washburn; and at the close of the conflict nearly every officer of the command and most of the rank and file had been either killed or wounded. The remainder then surrendered. The Confederates took this to be only the W.R. XLVI advance of a larger column which had headed them off, and so stopped to intrench; so that this gallant band of six hundred had checked the progress of a strong detachment of the Confederate army.

This stoppage of Lee's column no doubt saved to us the trains following. Lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon-road bridge near the High Bridge, and attempted to destroy it. He did set fire to it, but the flames had made but little headway when Humphreys came up with his corps and 151d. 682, 683 drove away the rear-guard which had been left to protect it while it was being burned up. Humphreys forced his way across with some loss, and followed Lee to the intersection of the road crossing at Farmville with the one from Petersburg. Here Lee held a position which was very strong naturally, besides being intrenched. Humphreys was alone, confronting him all through the day, and in a very hazardous position. He put on a bold face, however, and assaulted with some loss, but was not assaulted in return.

Our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of

CHAP.XXIV Prince Edward's Court House, along with the Fifth


W. R. XLVI (1) 907, 1142

Ibid, 907

Corps (Griffin's), Ord falling in between Griffin and the Appointtox. Crook's division of cavalry and Wright's corps pushed on west of Farmville. When the cavalry reached Farmville they found that some of the Confederates were in ahead of them, and had already got their trains of provisions back to that point; but our troops were in time to prevent them from securing anything to eat, although they succeeded in again running the trains off, so that we did not get them for some time. These troops retreated to the north side of the Appointatox to join Lee, and succeeded in destroying the bridge after them. Considerable fighting ensued there between Wright's corps and a portion of our cavalry and the Confederates, but finally the cavalry forded the stream and drove them away. Wright built a footbridge for his men to march over on, and then marched out to the junction of the roads to relieve Humphreys, arriving there that night. I had stopped the night before at Burkesville Junction. Our troops were then pretty much all out of the place. but we had a field-hospital there, and Ord's command was extended from that point toward Farmville.

Ewell's

Here I met Dr. Smith, a Virginian and an officer of the regular army, who told me that in a conversation with General Ewell, one of the prisoners and a relative of his, Ewell had said that when we had got across the James River he knew their cause was lost, and it was the duty of their authorities to make the best terms they could while they still had a right to claim concessions. The authorities thought differently, however. Now the cause was lost and they had no right to claim anything. He



said, further, that for every man that was killed CHAP.XXIV after this in the war somebody was responsible, and it would be but very little better than murder. He was not sure that Lee would consent to surrender his army without being able to consult with the President, but he hoped he would.

I rode in to Farmville on the 7th, arriving there early in the day. Sheridan and Ord were pushing through, away to the south. Meade was back toward the High Bridge, and Humphreys confronting Lee as before stated. After having gone into bivouac at Prince Edward's Court House, Sheridan W. R. XLVI (1) 1109.—
Sheridan, Sheri learned that seven trains of provisions and forage Sheridan, Memoirs, II. were at Appointtox, and determined to start at once and capture them; and a forced march was necessary in order to get there before Lee's army could secure them. He wrote me a note telling me this. This fact, together with the incident related the night before by Dr. Smith, gave me the idea of opening correspondence with General Lee on the subject of the surrender of his army. I therefore wrote to him on this day as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., 5 P.M., April 7, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE,

Commanding Confederate States Armies:

The result of the last week must convince you of the W. R. XLVI hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

> U. S. GRANT. Lieutenant-General

During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the James River, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base. by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge vessels. Too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. Under the general supervision of the chief quartermaster, Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, and but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.

The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under General Sigel, commenced on the 1st of May. General Crook, who had the immediate command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to General Averell. They crossed the mountains by separate routes. Averell struck the Tennessee and Virginia railroad, near Wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to New River and Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and depots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with Crook at Union on the 15th. General Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy at New Market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind Cedar Creek. Not regarding the operations of General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal from command, and Major-General Hunter was appointed to supersede His instructions were embraced in the following despatches to Major-General H. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, VIRGINIA, May 20, 1864.

The enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the branch road running through Staunton. On the whole, therefore, I think it would be better for General Hunter to move in that direction; reach Staunton and Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet too much opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he will be doing good service. . . .

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.

Jericho Ford, Virginia, May 25, 1864.

If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should do so, living on the country. The railroads and canal should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. Completing this, he could find his way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville join this army.

U. S. Grant,

Lieutenant-General.

410 APPENDIX

structions to Hunter—whom I hoped he would meet near Charlottes, ville—to join his forces to Sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the Army of the Potomae by the route had down in Sheridan's instructions.

On the 10th of June General Butler sent a force of infantry under General Gillmore, and of eavairy under General Kautz to capture Petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railread and common bridges across the Appendates. The cavalry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well in toward the town, but were forced to retire. General Gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Berminda Hundred without attempting one

Attaching great importance to the pessession of Petersburg, I sent back to Bermida Hundred and City Point General Smith's command by water vin the White House, to reach there in advance of the Army of the Potomae. This was for the express purpose of securing Petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reinforce the place.

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the 12th. One division of cavalry, under General Wilson, and the Pifth Corps, crossed the Chickahoumy at Long Birdge, and moved out to White Oak Swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps. The advance corps reached James River, at Wilson's Landing and Charles City Court House, on the night of the 13th

During three long years the Armies of the Potomas and Northern Virginia had been confronting each other. In that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing the van tage-ground of either. The Southern press and people, with more shrewdress than was displayed in the North, finding that they had failed to employe Washington and march on to New York as they had bursted they would do assumed that they only defended their capital and Southern territory - Hence Autotain, Getty sharing and all the other buttles that had been fought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for them. Their army behaved this. It produced a morale which could only be exceeding by deaperate and continuous hard fighting. The battles of the Wibberness, Spottsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so erippled him as to make him wars ever after of taking the offensive. His losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the attack ing party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field talls of these battles, which for endurance and bravers on the part of the soldiery have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of Major-General Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it.

## CHAPTER XXV

NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX—INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT McLEAN'S HOUSE-THE TERMS OF SURRENDER -LEE'S SURRENDER - INTERVIEW WITH LEE AFTER THE SURRENDER

N the 8th I had followed the Army of the CHAP. XXV Potomac in rear of Lee. I was suffering Battles & Leaders, IV, very severely with a sick-headache, and stopped at a farm-house on the road some distance in rear of the main body of the army. I spent the night in bathing my feet in hot water and mustard, and putting mustard-plasters on my wrists and the back part of my neck, hoping to be cured by morning. During the night I received Lee's answer to my letter of the 8th, inviting an interview between post, Appx. the lines on the following morning. But it was for a different purpose from that of surrendering his army, and I answered him as follows:

W. R. XLVI (1) 57, and

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., April 9, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding Confederate States Armies:

Your note of yesterday is received. I have no au- w. R. XLVI thority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for 10 A.M. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equally anxious for

(1)57

CHAP. XXV

peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, etc.,

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General,

Battles & Leaders, IV, 732-734 I proceeded at an early hour in the morning, still suffering with the headache, to get to the head of the column. I was not more than two or three miles from Appointox Court House at the time, but to go direct I would have to pass through Lee's army, or a portion of it. I had therefore to move south in order to get upon a road coming up from another direction.

When the white flag was put out by Lee, as already described, I was in this way moving toward Appointtox Court House, and consequently could not be communicated with immediately, and be informed of what Lee had done. Lee, therefore, sent a flag to the rear to advise Meade, and one to the front to Sheridan, saying that he had sent a message to me for the purpose of having a meeting to consult about the surrender of his army, and asked for a suspension of hostilities until I could be communicated with. As they had heard nothing of this until the fighting had got to be severe and all going against Lee, both of these commanders hesitated very considerably about suspending hostilities at all. They were afraid it was not in good faith, and we had the Army of Northern Virginia where it

W. R. XLVI (1) 605

Hheridan, Memoirs, II, 193 et seq.

could not escape except by some deception. They, CHAP. XXV however, finally consented to a suspension of hostilities for two hours, to give an opportunity of communicating with me in that time, if possible. It was found that, from the route I had taken, they would probably not be able to communicate with me and get an answer back within the time fixed unless the messenger should pass through the rebel lines.

Lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this message through his lines to me:

April 9, 1865.

GENERAL: I received your note of this morning on the W. R. XLV picket-line, whither I had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose.

R. E. Lee

General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commanding U. S. Armies.

When the officer reached me I was still suffering Leaders, IV, with the sick-headache; but the instant I saw the contents of the note I was cured. I wrote the following note in reply and hastened on:

April 9, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE,

Commanding Confederate States Armies:

Your note of this date is but this moment (11:50 A.M.) received, in consequence of my having passed from the Richmond and Lynchburg road to the Farmville and Lynchburg road. I am at this writing about four miles west of Walker's Church, and will push forward to the

Ibid. 733

CHAP, XXV front for the purpose of meeting you. Notice sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take place will meet me.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

Sheridan, Memoirs, II, 200

I was conducted at once to where Sheridan was located, with his troops drawn up in line of battle facing the Confederate army near by. They were very much excited, and expressed their view that this was all a ruse employed to enable the Confederates to get away. They said they believed that Johnston was marching up from North Carolina now, and Lee was moving to join him; and they would whip the rebels where they now were in five minutes if I would only let them go in. But I had no doubt about the good faith of Lee, and pretty soon was conducted to where he was. I found him at the house of a Mr. McLean, at Appointatox Court House, with Colonel Marshall, one of his staff-officers, awaiting my arrival. The head of his column was occupying a hill, on a portion of which was an apple-orchard, beyond a little valley which separated it from that on the crest of which Sheridan's forces were drawn up in line of battle to the south.

Wilmer Me Lean Chas, Mar shall, A. A. G. & Insp.

Gen.

Before stating what took place between General Lee and myself I will give all there is of the story of the famous apple-tree.


Facts about the apple tree Wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told until they are believed to be true. The war of the rebellion was no exception to this rule, and the story of the apple-tree is one of those fictions based on a slight foundation of fact. As I have said, there was an apple-orchard on the side


# APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE.

under the direction of Bvt. Brig. Gen. N. Michler, Maj. of Engineers,

By Command of

Bvt. Maj. Gen'l A. A HUMPHREYS, Brig. Gen'l & Chief of Engineers.





of the hill occupied by the Confederate forces. CHAP. XXV Running diagonally up the hill was a wagon-road, which at one point ran very near one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had on that side cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little embank-General Babcock, of my staff, reported to me that when he first met General Lee he was sitting upon this embankment with his feet in the road below and his back resting against the tree. The story had no other foundation than that. Like many other stories, it would be very good if it were only true.

O. E. Bab-cock, W. P. 1856-61; Lt.-

I had known General Lee in the old army, and had served with him in the Mexican war; but did not suppose, owing to the difference in our age and rank, that he would remember me; while I would more naturally remember him distinctly, because he was the chief of staff of General Scott in the Mexican war.

When I had left camp that morning I had not Leaders, IV, expected so soon the result that was then taking place, and consequently was in rough garb. without a sword, as I usually was when on horseback in the field, and wore a soldier's blouse for a coat, with the shoulder-straps of my rank to indicate to the army who I was. When I went into the house I found General Lee. We greeted each other, and after shaking hands took our seats. had my staff with me, a good portion of whom were in the room during the whole of the interview.

What General Lee's feelings were I do not know. As he was a man of much dignity, with an impassible face, it was impossible to say whether he felt inwardly glad that the end had finally come, or felt

HAP, XXV sad over the result and was too manly to show it. Whatever his feelings, they were entirely concealed from my observation; but my own feelings, which had been quite jubilant on the receipt of his letter. were sad and depressed. I felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least excuse. I do not question, however, the sincerity of the great mass of those who were opposed to us.

General Lee was dressed in a full uniform which was entirely new, and was wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely the sword which had been presented by the State of Virginia; at all events, it was an entirely different sword from the one that would ordinarily be worn in the field. my rough traveling-suit, the uniform of a private with the straps of a lieutenant-general, I must have contrasted very strangely with a man so handsomely dressed, six feet high, and of faultless form. But this was not a matter that I thought of until afterward.

We soon fell into a conversation about old army times. He remarked that he remembered me very well in the old army; and I told him that as a matter of course I remembered him perfectly, but from the difference in our rank and years (there being about sixteen years' difference in our ages) I had thought it very likely that I had not attracted his attention sufficiently to be remembered by him after such a long interval. Our conversation grew so pleasant that I almost forgot the object of our

meeting. After the conversation had run on in this CHAP, XXV style for some time, General Lee called my attention to the object of our meeting, and said that he had asked for this interview for the purpose of getting from me the terms I proposed to give his army. said that I meant merely that his army should lav down their arms, not to take them up again during the continuance of the war unless duly and properly exchanged. He said that he had so understood my letter.

Battles & Leaders, IV,

Then we gradually fell off again into conversation about matters foreign to the subject which had brought us together. This continued for some little time, when General Lee again interrupted the course of the conversation by suggesting that the terms I proposed to give his army ought to be written out. I called to General Parker, secretary of my staff, for writing-materials, and commenced writing out the following terms:

APPOMATTOX C. H., VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE.

Commanding Confederate States Armies:

GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my let- W. R. XLVI ter to you of the 8th inst., I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit:

Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged, and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands.

The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officer appointed by

CHAP, XXV me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their parole and the laws in force where they may reside.

> Very respectfully, U. S. GRANT. Lieutenant-General


Drawing up the terms

When I put my pen to the paper I did not know the first word that I should make use of in writing the terms. I only knew what was in my mind, and I wished to express it clearly, so that there could be no mistaking it. As I wrote on, the thought occurred to me that the officers had their own private horses and effects, which were important to them, but of no value to us; also that it would be an unnecessary humiliation to call upon them to deliver their side-arms.

No conversation—not one word—passed between General Lee and myself, either about private property, side-arms, or kindred subjects. He appeared to have no objections to the terms first proposed; or, if he had a point to make against them, he wished to wait until they were in writing to make it. When he read over that part of the terms about side-arms, horses, and private property of the officers, he remarked, with some feeling, I thought, that this would have a happy effect upon his army.

Buttles & Lenders, IV.

Then, after a little further conversation, General Lee remarked to me again that their army was organized a little differently from the army of the United States (still maintaining by implication that we were two countries); that in their army the cav-



General Robert E. Lee. 1. Colonel Charles Marshall, of General Lee's Staff. 8. Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant. 15. Major-General Philip H. Sheridan. 7. Major-General Edward O. C. Ord. 14. Brevet Major-General Rufus Ingalls. 10. Brigadier-General John A. Rawlins, Chief Staff; other members of General Grant's Staff. 4. Major-General Seth Williams. 12. Brevet Major-General John G. Barnard. 9. Colonel Horace Porter. 5. Colonel Orville E. Babcock. 5. Colonel Ely S. Parker. 6. Colonel Theodore S. Bowers. 11. Colonel Frederick T. Dent. 12. Colonel Adam Badeau.

alrymen and artillerists owned their own horses; CHAP. XXV and he asked if he was to understand that the men who so owned their horses were to be permitted to retain them. I told him that as the terms were written they would not; that only the officers were permitted to take their private property. He then, after reading over the terms a second time, remarked that that was clear.

I then said to him that I thought this would be Leaders, IV, about the last battle of the war—I sincerely hoped so; and I said, further, I took it that most of the men in the ranks were small farmers. The whole country had been so raided by the two armies that it was doubtful whether they would be able to put in a crop to carry themselves and their families through the next winter without the aid of the horses they were then riding. The United States did not want them, and I would therefore instruct the officers I left behind to receive the paroles of his troops to let every man of the Confederate army who claimed to own a horse or mule take the animal to his home. Lee remarked again that this would have a happy effect.1

He then sat down and wrote out the following letter:

> HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

GENERAL: I have received your letter of this date con- W. R. XLVI taining the terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern

<sup>1</sup> There is a popular error to the effect that Generals Grant and Lee each signed the articles of surrender. The document in the form of a letter was signed only by General Grant, in the

parlor of McLean's house, while General Lee was sitting in the room; and General Lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms, and handed it to General Grant.-F. D. G.

(AF, XXV) Virginia as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to enrry the stipulations into effect.

R. E. Lee.

General.

LITTENANT GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

While duplicates of the two letters were being made, the Union generals present were severally presented to General Lee.

re fable of he sword The much-talked-of surrendering of Lee's sword and my handing it back, this and much more that has been said about it is the purest romance. The word "sword" or "side-arms" was not mentioned by either of us until I wrote it in the terms. There was no premeditation, and it did not occur to me until the moment I wrote it down. If I had happened to omit it, and General Lee had called my attention to it, I should have put it in the terms precisely as I acceded to the provision about the soldiers retaining their horses.

Hattles & ouders, IV, 743 General Lee, after all was completed and before taking his leave, remarked-that his army was in a very bad condition for want of food, and that they were without forage; that his men had been living for some days on parched corn exclusively, and that he would have to ask me for rations and forage. I told him "Certainly," and asked for how many men he wanted rations. His answer was "About twenty-five thousand;" and I authorized him to send his own commissary and quartermaster to Appomattox Station, two or three miles away, where he could have, out of the trains we had stopped, all the provisions wanted. As for forage, we had ourselves

depended almost entirely upon the country for CHAP. XXV that.

Generals Gibbon, Griffin, and Merritt were designated by me to carry into effect the paroling of Lee's troops before they should start for their homes—General Lee leaving Generals Longstreet, Gordon, and Pendleton for them to confer with in order to facilitate this work. Lee and I then separated as cordially as we had met, he returning to his own lines; and all went into bivouac for the night at Appomattox.

W. N. Pendleton, W. P. 1826-30; Col. Art. C. S. A. 1861; Brig.-Gen. Mar. 1862

Soon after Lee's departure I telegraphed to Washington as follows:

Headquarters,
Appomattox Court House, Virginia,
April 9, 1865, 4:30 p.m.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War,

Washington:

General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia this afternoon on terms proposed by myself. The accompanying additional correspondence will show the conditions fully.

> U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

When news of the surrender first reached our lines our men commenced firing a salute of a hundred guns in honor of the victory. I at once sent word, however, to have it stopped. The Confederates were now our prisoners, and we did not want to exult over their downfall.

Battles & Leaders, IV, 743

I determined to return to Washington at once, with a view to putting a stop to the purchase of supplies, and what I now deemed other useless outlay of money. Before leaving, however, I thought

HAP, XXV Buttles & saders, IV, 745 I would like to see General Lee again; so next morning I rode out beyond our lines toward his head-quarters, preceded by a bugler and a staff-officer carrying a white flag.

Lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, and met me. We had there between the lines, sitting on horseback, a very pleasant conversation of over half an hour, in the course of which Lee said to me that the South was a big country, and that we might have to march over it three or four times before the war entirely ended, but that we would now be able to do it, as they could no longer resist He expressed it as his earnest hope, however, that we would not be called upon to cause more loss and sacrifice of life; but he could not foretell the result. I then suggested to General Lee that there was not a man in the Confederacy whose influence with the soldiery and the whole people was as great as his, and that if he would now advise the surrender of all the armies I had no doubt his advice would be followed with alacrity. But Lee said that he could not do that without consulting the President first. I knew there was no use to urge him to do anything against his ideas of what was right.

I was accompanied by my staff and other officers, some of whom seemed to have a great desire to go inside the Confederate lines. They finally asked permission of Lee to do so for the purpose of seeing some of their old army friends, and the permission was granted. They went over, had a very pleasant time with their old friends, and brought some of them back with them when they returned.

When Lee and I separated he went back to his lines and I returned to the house of Mr. McLean.

Ibid. 746

Jean-Quarters, Aphromathy G. H. Par April 9 1865, 4,30 o'clock, P M.

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FAC-SIMILE OF GENERAL GRANT'S DESPATCH ANNOUNCING THE SURRENDER OF GENERAL LEW.

At the request of the Editor, General Badeau has given the history of the despatch in the following letter:

"On Sunday afternoon, the 9th of April, 1865, as General Grant was riding to his headquarters from the farm-house in which he had received the surrender of Lee, it occurred to him that he had made no report of the event to the government. He halted at once and dismounted, with his staff, in a rough field, within the National lines. Sitting on a stone, he asked for paper. I happened to be

near, and offered him my memorandum-book, such as staff-officers often carry for orders or reports in the field. He laid the book on his knee and wrote the above despatch in pencil; he handed it to me and told me to send it to the telegraph operator. I asked him if I might copy the despatch for the operator and retain the original. He assented and I rewrote the paper, the original of which is in the keeping of The Century magazine.

" Adam Badeau.

"TANNERSVILLE, N. Y., July 10, 1885."

Here the officers of both armies came in great numbers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as much as though they had been friends separated for a long time while fighting battles under the same flag. For the time being it looked very much as if all thought of the war had escaped their minds. After an hour pleasantly passed in this way I set out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort, for Burkesville Junction, up to which point the railroad had by this time been repaired.

### CHAPTER XXVI

MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES —RELATIVE CONDITIONS
OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH — PRESIDENT LINCOLN
VISITS RICHMOND—ARRIVAL AT WASHINGTON—
PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION—PRESIDENT
JOHNSON'S POLICY

CHAP, X X VI Morale of the two ar-

AFTER the fall of Petersburg, and when the Armies of the Potomac and the James were in motion to head off Lee's army, the morale of the National troops had greatly improved. There was no more straggling, no more rear-guards. The men who in former times had been falling back were now, as I have already stated, striving to get to the front. For the first time in four weary years they felt that they were now nearing the time when they could return to their homes with their country saved. On the other hand, the Confederates were more than correspondingly depressed. Their despondency increased with each returning day, and especially after the battle of Sailor's Creek. They threw away their arms in constantly increasing numbers, dropping out of the ranks and betaking themselves to the woods in the hope of reaching their homes. I have already instanced the case of the entire disintegration of a regiment whose colonel I met at Farmville. As a result of these

Ante, II, 335

and other influences, when Lee finally surrendered CHAP.XXVI at Appointtox there were only 28,356 officers and men left to be paroled, and many of these were without arms. It was probably this latter fact which gave rise to the statement sometimes made. North and South, that Lee surrendered a smaller number of men than what the official figures show. As a matter of official record, and in addition to Lee's losses the number paroled as given above, we captured between March 29th and the date of surrender 19,132 Confederates, to say nothing of Lee's other losses, killed, wounded, and missing, during the series of desperate conflicts which marked his headlong and determined flight. The same record shows the number of cannon, including those at Appomattox, to have been 689 between the dates named.

There has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the number of troops engaged in every battle, or all important battles, fought between the sections, the South magnifying the number of Union troops engaged and belittling their own. Northern writers have fallen, in many instances, into the same error. I have often heard gentlemen who were thoroughly loyal to the Union speak of what a splendid fight the South had made and successfully continued for four years before yielding, with their twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the twelve four being colored slaves, noncombatants. I will add to their argument. We had many regiments of brave and loyal men who volunteered under great difficulty from the twelve million belonging to the South.

But the South had rebelled against the National government. It was not bound by any constitu-

he Confed-atenrales

MEXXVI tional restrictions. The whole South was a military camp. The occupation of the colored people was to furnish supplies for the army. Conscription was resorted to early, and embraced every male from the age of eighteen to forty-five, excluding only those physically unfit to serve in the field, and the necessary number of civil officers of State and intended National government. The old and physically disabled furnished a good portion of these. The slaves, the non-combatants, one third of the whole, were required to work in the field without regard to sex, and almost without regard to age. Children from the age of eight years could and did handle the hoe; they were not much older when they began to hold the plow. The four million of colored non-combatants were equal to more than three times their number in the North, age for age and sex for sex, in supplying food from the soil to support armies. Women did not work in the fields in the North, and children attended school.

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The arts of peace were carried on in the North. Towns and cities grew during the war. Inventions were made in all kinds of machinery to increase the products of a day's labor in the shop and in the In the South no opposition was allowed to field. the government which had been set up, and which would have become real and respected if the rebellion had been successful. No rear had to be proteeted. All the troops in service could be brought to the front to contest every inch of ground threatened with invasion. The press of the South, like the people who remained at home, was loyal to the Southern cause.

In the North, the country, the towns, and the

cities presented about the same appearance they CHAP.XXVI do in time of peace. The furnaces were in blast, the shops were filled with workmen, the fields were cultivated, not only to supply the population of the North and the troops invading the South, but to ship abroad to pay a part of the expense of the war. In the North the press was free up to the point of open treason. The citizen could entertain his views and express them. Troops were necessary in the Northern States to prevent prisoners from the Southern army being released by outside force, armed, and set at large to destroy by fire our Northern cities. Plans were formed by Northern and Southern citizens to burn our cities, to poison the water supplying them, to spread infection by importing clothing from infected regions, to blow up our river and lake steamers—regardless of the destruction of innocent lives. The copperhead dis- The copperhead dis- The copperhead press reputable portion of the press magnified rebel successes and belittled those of the Union army. It was, with a large following, an auxiliary to the Confederate army. The North would have been much stronger with a hundred thousand of these men in the Confederate ranks and the rest of their kind thoroughly subdued, as the Union sentiment was in the South, than we were as the battle was fought.

As I have said, the whole South was a military Ante, II, 202, camp. The colored people, four million in number, were submissive, and worked in the field and took care of the families while the able-bodied white men were at the front fighting for a cause destined to defeat. The cause was popular, and was enthusiastically supported by the young men. The conscription took all of them. Before the war was

Plots against the North

CHAP.XXVI over, further conscriptions took those between fourteen and eighteen years of age as junior reserves, and those between forty-five and sixty as senior reserves. It would have been an offense directly after the war, and perhaps it would be now, to ask any able-bodied man in the South. who was between the ages of fourteen and sixty at any time during the war, whether he had been in the Confederate army. He would assert that he had, or account for his absence from the ranks. Under such circumstances it is hard to conceive how the North showed such a superiority of force in every battle fought. I know they did not. During 1862 and 1863, John H. Morgan, a parti-

J. H. Mor-gan, Mex-ico, 1846-48; Maj. Gen. C B. A. Dec.,

zan officer, of no military education, but possessed of courage and endurance, operated in the rear of the Army of the Ohio in Kentucky and Tennessee. He had no base of supplies to protect, but was at home wherever he went. The army operating against the South, on the contrary, had to protect its lines of communication with the North, from which all supplies had to come to the front. Every foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed at convenient distances apart. These guards could not render assistance beyond the points where stationed. Morgan was foot-loose, and could operate where his information-always correct-led him to believe he could do the greatest damage. ing the time he was operating in this way he killed, wounded, and captured several times the number he ever had under his command at any one time. He destroyed many millions of property in addi-Places he did not attack had to be guarded as if threatened by him. Forrest, an abler soldier,

Morgan'a

Operated farther west, and held from the National CHAP.XXVI front quite as many men as could be spared for offensive operations. It is safe to say that more than half the National army were engaged in guarding lines of supplies, or were on leave, sick in hospital, or on detail which prevented their bearing arms. Then, again, large forces were employed where no Confederate army confronted them. I deem it safe to say that there were no large engagements where the National numbers compensated for the advantage of position and intrenchment occupied by the enemy.

While I was in pursuit of General Lee, the President went to Richmond in company with Admiral Porter, and on board his flag-ship. He found the people of that city in great consternation. The leading citizens among the people who had remained at home surrounded him, anxious that something should be done to relieve them from suspense. General Weitzel was not then in the city, having taken offices in one of the neighboring villages after his troops had succeeded in subduing the conflagration which they had found in progress on entering the Confederate capital. The President sent for him, and on his arrival a short interview was had on board the vessel, Admiral Porter and a leading citizen of Virginia being also present. After this interview the President wrote an order in about these words, which I quote from memory: "General Weitzel is authorized to permit the body calling itself the Legislature of Virginia to meet for the purpose of recalling the Virginia troops from the Confederate armies."

Immediately some of the gentlemen composing

Cf. Ibid. 219

caxexxvi that body wrote out a call for a meeting and had it published in their papers. This call, however, went very much further than Mr. Lincoln had contemplated, as he did not say the "Legislature of Virginia," but "the body calling itself the Legislature of Virginia." Mr. Stanton saw the call as published in the Northern papers the very next issue. and took the liberty of countermanding the order authorizing any meeting of the Legislature, or any other body, and this notwithstanding the fact that the President was nearer the spot than he was.

Sec. Stan ton's char acteristics

The Consti tution and the rebel lion

This was characteristic of Mr. Stanton. He was a man who never questioned his own authority. and who always did in war-time what he wanted to do. He was an able constitutional lawyer and jurist; but the Constitution was not an impediment to him while the war lasted. In this latter partieular I entirely agree with the view he evidently held. The Constitution was not framed with a view to any such rebellion as that of 1861-65. While it did not authorize rebellion, it made no provision against it. Yet the right to resist or suppress rebellion is as inherent as the right of self-defense, and as natural as the right of an individual to preserve his life when in jeopardy. The Constitution was therefore in abeyance for the time being, so far as it in any way affected the progress and termination of the war

Those in rebellion against the government of the United States were not restricted by constitutional provisions, or any other, except the acts of their Congress, which was loyal and devoted to the cause for which the South was then fighting. It would be a hard case, when one third of a nation, united in rebellion against the national authority, is entirely CHAP.XXVII untrammeled, that the other two thirds, in their efforts to maintain the Union intact, should be restrained by a Constitution prepared by our ancestors for the express purpose of ensuring the permanency of the confederation of the States.

After I left General Lee at Appomattox Station, I went with my staff and a few others directly to Burkesville Station on my way to Washington. The road from Burkesville back having been newly repaired, and the ground being soft, the train got off the track frequently, and, as a result, it was after midnight of the second day when I reached City Point. As soon as possible I took a despatch-boat thence to Washington city.

While in Washington I was very busy for a time in preparing the necessary orders for the new state of affairs; communicating with my different commanders of separate departments, bodies of troops, But by the 14th I was pretty well through with this work, so as to be able to visit my children, who were then in Burlington, New Jersey, attending school. Mrs. Grant was with me in Washington at the time, and we were invited by President and Mrs. Lincoln to accompany them to the theater on the evening of that day. I replied to the President's verbal invitation to the effect that if we were in the city we would take great pleasure in accompanying them; but that I was very anxious to get away and visit my children, and if I could get through my work during the day I should do so. I did get through and started by the evening train on the 14th, sending Mr. Lincoln word, of course, that I would not be at the theater.

Nicolay & Hay, Life of Lincoln, X, At that time the railroad to New York entered

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Philadelphia on Broad Street; passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the Delaware River, and then ferried to Camden, at which point they took the cars again. When I reached the ferry, on the east side of the city of Philadelphia, I found people awaiting my arrival there; and also despatches informing me of the assassination of the President and Mr. Seward, and of the probable assassination of the Vice-President, Mr. Johnson, and requesting my immediate return.

ows of the essential tion

> It would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that overcame me at the news of these assassinations, more especially the assassination of the President. I knew his goodness of heart, his generosity, his yielding disposition, his desire to have everybody happy, and, above all, his desire to see all the people of the United States enter again upon the full privileges of citizenship with equality among all. I knew, also, the feeling that Mr. Johnson had expressed in speeches and conversation against the Southern people, and I feared that his course toward them would be such as to repel, and make them unwilling citizens; and if they became such they would remain so for a long while. I felt that reconstruction had been set back, no telling how far.

thlow to construction

> I immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to Washington City; but Mrs. Grant was with me, it was after midnight, and Burlington was but an hour away. Finding that I could accompany her to our house and return about as soon as they would be ready to take me from the Philadelphia station, I went up with her and re

turned immediately by the same special train. The CHAP.XXVI joy that I had witnessed among the people in the street and in public places in Washington when I left there had been turned to grief; the city was in reality a city of mourning. I have stated what I believed then the effect of this would be, and my judgment now is that I was right. I believe the South would have been saved from very much of the hardness of feeling that was engendered by Mr. Johnson's course toward them during the first few months of his administration. Be this as it may, Mr. Lincoln's assassination was particularly unfortunate for the entire nation.

President Johnson's harshness

Mr. Johnson's course toward the South did engender bitterness of feeling. His denunciations of treason, and his ever-ready remark, "Treason is a crime and must be made odious," were repeated to all those men of the South who came to him to get some assurances of safety so that they might go to work at something with the feeling that what they obtained would be secure to them. He uttered his denunciations with great vehemence, and as they were accompanied with no assurances of safety, many Southerners were driven to a point almost beyond endurance.

The President of the United States is, in a large degree, or ought to be, a representative of the feeling, wishes, and judgment of those over whom he presides; and the Southerners who read the denunciations of themselves and their people must have come to the conclusion that he uttered the sentiments of the Northern people; whereas, as a matter of fact, but for the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, I believe the great majority of the Northern peo-

Folly of the assassination

CHAP.XXVI ple, and the soldiers unanimously, would have been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that would be the least humiliating to the people who had rebelled against their government. They believed, I have no doubt, as I did, that besides being the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy.

Reconstruc

The people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back into the Union, and be incorporated as an integral part of the nation. Naturally the nearer they were placed to an equality with the people who had not rebelled, the more reconciled they would feel with their old antagonists. and the better citizens they would be from the beginning. They surely would not make good citizens if they felt that they had a yoke around their necks.

Negro suf-

Pres, John son'srevolution of sentiment

I do not believe that the majority of the Northern people at that time were in favor of negro suffrage. They supposed that it would naturally follow the freedom of the negro, but that there would be a time of probation, in which the ex-slaves could prepare themselves for the privileges of citizenship before the full right would be conferred; but Mr. Johnson, after a complete revolution of sentiment. seemed to regard the South not only as an oppressed people, but as the people best entitled to consideration of any of our citizens. This was more than the people who had secured to us the perpetuation of the Union were prepared for, and they became more radical in their views. The Southerners had the most power in the executive branch, Mr. Johnson having gone to their side; and with a compact South, and such sympathy and support as they could get from the North, they felt that they would

be able to control the nation at once, and already CHAP.XXVI many of them acted as if they thought they were entitled to do so.

Thus Mr. Johnson, fighting Congress on the one tween Control hand, and receiving the support of the South on the other, drove Congress, which was overwhelmingly Republican, to the passing of first one measure and then another to restrict his power. There being a solid South on one side that was in accord with the political party in the North which had sympathized with the rebellion, it finally, in the judgment of Congress and of the majority of the legislatures of the States, became necessary to enfranchise the negro, in all his ignorance. In this work I shall not discuss the question of how far the policy of Congress in this particular proved a wise one. It became an absolute necessity, however, because of the foolhardiness of the President and the blindness of the Southern people to their own interest. As to myself, while strongly favoring the course that would be the least humiliating to the people who had been in rebellion. I had gradually worked up to the point where, with the majority of the people, I favored immediate enfranchisement.

## CHAPTER XXVI

SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON - JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN - CAPTURE OF MOBILE - WILSON'S EXPEDITION - CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS - GENERAL THOMAS'S QUALITIES - ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANRY

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nte, 11, 280, 14, 295, 316

WHEN I left Appointation I ordered General Meade to proceed leisurely back to Burkesville Station with the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James, and to go into camp there until further orders from me. General Johnston. as has been stated before, was in North Carolina confronting General Sherman. It could not be known positively, of course, whether Johnston would surrender on the news of Lee's surrender. though I supposed he would; and if he did not, Burkesville Station was the natural point from which to move to attack him. The army which I could have sent against him was superior to his, and that with which Sherman confronted him was also superior; and between the two he would necessarily have been crushed or driven away. the loss of their capital and the Army of Northern Virginia it was doubtful whether Johnston's men would have had the spirit to stand. My belief was that he would make no such attempt; but I adopted

this course as a precaution against what might CH. XXVII happen, however improbable.

Simultaneously with my starting from City Point. I sent a messenger to North Carolina by boat with despatches to General Sherman, informing him of the surrender of Lee and his army; also of the terms which I had given him; and I authorized Sherman to give the same terms to Johnston if the latter chose to accept them. The country is familiar with the terms that Sherman agreed to conditionally, because they embraced a political question as well as a military one, and he would therefore have to confer with the government before agreeing to them definitely.

Sherman's terms to

General Sherman had met Mr. Lincoln at City Point while visiting there to confer with me about our final movement, and knew what Mr. Lincoln Ante, II, 289 had said to the peace commissioners when he met them at Hampton Roads, viz., that before he could enter into negotiations with them they would have to agree to two points—one being that the Union should be preserved, and the other that slavery should be abolished; and if they were ready to concede these two points he was almost ready to sign his name to a blank piece of paper and permit them to fill out the balance of the terms upon which we would live together. He had also seen notices in the newspapers of Mr. Lincoln's visit to Richmond, and had read in the same papers that while there he had authorized the convening of the Legislature of Virginia.

Sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the terms that I had made with General Lee, that he was but carrying out the wishes of the President of

Cu. XXVII
Sherman,
Memoirs, II,
316 et seq.
Johnston's
Narrative,
p, 401 et seu.

the United States. But seeing that he was going beyond his authority, he made it a point that the terms were only conditional. They signed them with this understanding, and agreed to a truce until the terms could be sent to Washington for approval; if approved by the proper authorities there, they would then be final; if not approved. then he would give due notice before resuming hostilities. As the world knows, Sherman, from being one of the most popular generals of the land (Congress having even gone so far as to propose a bill providing for a second lieutenant-general for the purpose of advancing him to that grade), was denounced by the President and Secretary of War in very bitter terms. Some people went so far as to denonnee him as a traitor—a most preposterous term to apply to a man who had rendered so much service as he had, even supposing he had made a mistake in granting such terms as he did to Johnston and his army. If Sherman had taken authority to send Johnston with his army home, with their arms to be put in the arsenals of their own States, without submitting the question to the authorities at Washington, the suspicions against him might have some foundation. But the feeling against Sherman died out very rapidly, and it was not many weeks before he was restored to the fullest

Harman, Memoirs, II, 158 of seq., 185

confidence of the American people.

When, some days after my return to Washington, President Johnson and the Secretary of War received the terms which General Sherman had forwarded for approval, a Cabinet meeting was immediately called and I was sent for. There seemed to be the greatest consternation lest Sherman would

commit the government to terms which they were CH. XXVII not willing to accede to and which he had no right to grant. A message went out directing the troops in the South not to obey General Sherman. ordered to proceed at once to North Carolina and take charge of matters there myself. Of course I started without delay, and reached there as soon as possible. I repaired to Raleigh, where Sherman was, as quietly as possible, hoping to see him without even his army learning of my presence.

When I arrived I went to Sherman's headquarters, Memoirs, I and we were at once closeted together. I showed him the instructions and orders under which I visited him. I told him that I wanted him to notify General Johnston that the terms which they had conditionally agreed upon had not been approved in Washington, and that he was authorized to offer the same terms I had given General Lee. I sent Sherman to do this himself. I did not wish the knowledge of my presence to be known to the army generally; so I left it to Sherman to negotiate the terms of the surrender solely by himself, and without the enemy knowing that I was anywhere near the field. As soon as possible I started to get away, to leave Sherman quite free and untrammeled.

At Goldsboro', on my way back, I met a mail, containing the last newspapers, and I found in them indications of great excitement in the North over the terms Sherman had given Johnston; and harsh orders that had been promulgated by the President and Secretary of War. I knew that Sherman must see these papers, and I fully realized what great indignation they would cause him, though I do not think his feelings could have been CH. XXVII Sherman's loyalty more excited than were my own. But like the true and loyal soldier that he was, he carried out the instructions I had given him, obtained the surrender of Johnston's army, and settled down in his camp about Raleigh, to await final orders.

There were still a few expeditions out in the South that could not be communicated with, and had to be left to act according to the judgment of their respective commanders. With these it was impossible to tell how the news of the surrender of Lee and Johnston, of which they must have heard, might affect their judgment as to what was best to do.

liciated ex peditions

The three expeditions which I had tried so hard to get off from the commands of Thomas and Canby did finally get off; one under Canby himself, against Mobile, late in March; that under Stoneman, from East Tennessee, on the 20th; and the one under Wilson, starting from Eastport, Mississippi, on the 22d of March. They were all eminently successful, but without any good result. Indeed, much valuable property was destroyed and many lives lost at a time when we would have liked to spare them. The war was practically over before their victories were gained. They were so late in commencing operations that they did not hold any troops away that otherwise would have been operating against the armies which were gradually forcing the Confederate armies to a surrender. The only possible good that we may have experienced from these raids was by Stoneman's getting near Lynchburg about the time the Armies of the Potomac and the James were closing in on Lee at Appointtox.

Htoneman'a final campaign

Stoneman entered North Carolina and then

pushed north to strike the Virginia and Tennessee CH. XXVII railroad. He got upon that road, destroyed its bridges at different places, and rendered the road useless to the enemy up to within a few miles of Lynchburg. His approach caused the evacuation of that city about the time we were at Appomattox, and was the cause of a commotion we heard of there. He then pushed south, and was operating in the rear of Johnston's army about the time the negotiations were going on between Sherman and Johnston for the latter's surrender. In this raid Stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount of stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thousand prisoners were the trophies of his success.

Canby appeared before Mobile on the 27th of Battles & Leaders, IV, March. The city of Mobile was protected by two forts, besides other intrenchments—Spanish Fort. on the east side of the bay, and Fort Blakely, north of the city. These forts were invested. On the night of the 8th of April, the National troops having carried the enemy's works at one point, Spanish Fort was evacuated; and on the 9th, the very day of Lee's surrender, Blakely was carried by assault. with a considerable loss to us. On the 11th the city was evacuated.

Ante, I, 484, 485; II, 33, 49, 58, 61, 232-234

I had tried for more than two years to have an expedition sent against Mobile when its possession by us would have been of great advantage. finally cost lives to take it when its possession was of no importance, and when, if left alone, it would within a few days have fallen into our hands without any bloodshed whatever.

Wilson moved out with full twelve thousand men, Leaders, IV, well equipped and well armed. He was an energetic

cu.xxvn officer and accomplished his work rapidly. Forrest was in his front, but with neither his old-time army nor his old-time prestige. He now had principally conscripts. His conscripts were generally old men and boys. He had a few thousand regular cavalry left, but not enough to even retard materially the progress of Wilson's cavalry. Selma fell on the 2d of April, with a large number of prisoners and a large quantity of war-material, machine-shops, etc., to be disposed of by the victors. Tuscaloosa, Montgomery, and West Point fell in quick succession. These were all important points to the enemy by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies, and because of their manufactories of warmaterial. They were fortified or intrenched, and there was considerable fighting before they were captured. Macon surrendered on the 21st of April. Here news was received of the negotiations for the surrender of Johnston's army. Wilson belonged to the military division commanded by Sherman, and of course was bound by his terms. This stopped all fighting.

Burrender of Taylor and Kirby Smith

General Richard Taylor had now become the senior Confederate officer still at liberty east of the Mississippi River, and on the 4th of May he surrendered everything within the limits of this extensive command. General E. Kirby Smith surrendered the trans-Mississippi department on the 26th of May, leaving no other Confederate army at liberty to continue the war

Wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive President of the defunct Confederacy before he got out of the country. This occurred at Irwinsville, Georgia, on the 11th of May. For myself-



RIGHT PROFILE OF GENERAL GRANT. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN BY WALKER IN 1875, AND LENT BY MAJOR C. C. SNIFFIN.)

and I believe Mr. Lincoln shared the feeling-I CH. XXVII would have been very glad to have seen Mr. Davis succeed in escaping, but for one reason: I feared that if not captured he might get into the trans-Mississippi region and there set up a more contracted Confederacy. The young men now out of homes and out of employment might have rallied under his standard and protracted the war yet another The Northern people were tired of the war: they were tired of piling up a debt which would be a further mortgage upon their homes.

Cf. Sherman, Memoirs, II, 326, 327

Mr. Lincoln, I believe, wanted Mr. Davis to escape. because he did not wish to deal with the matter of his punishment. He knew there would be people clamoring for the punishment of the ex-Confederate President, for high treason. He thought blood enough had already been spilled to atone for our wickedness as a nation. At all events, he did not wish to be the judge to decide whether more should be shed or not. But his own life was sacrificed at the hands of an assassin before the ex-President of the Confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the government which he had lent all his talent and all his energies to destroy.

All things are said to be wisely directed, and for the best interest of all concerned. This reflection does not, however, abate in the slightest our sense of bereavement in the untimely loss of so good and great a man as Abraham Lincoln.

He would have proven the best friend the South could have had, and saved much of the wrangling and bitterness of feeling brought out by reconstruction under a President who at first wished to revenge himself upon Southern men of better social

Lincoln and Johnson contrasted

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standing than himself, but who still sought their recognition, and in a short time conceived the idea and advanced the proposition to become their Moses to lead them triumphantly out of all their difficulties.

Reconstruc-

The story of the legislation enacted during the reconstruction period to stay the hands of the President is too fresh in the minds of the people to be told now. Much of it, no doubt, was unconstitutional; but it was hoped that the laws enacted would serve their purpose before the question of constitutionality could be submitted to the judiciary and a decision obtained. These laws did serve their purpose, and now remain "a dead letter" upon the statute-books of the United States, no one taking interest enough in them to give them a passing thought.

Cf. Davis, 'Rise and Fall,"11,701, 702

Much was said at the time about the garb Mr. Davis was wearing when he was captured. I cannot settle this question from personal knowledge of the facts; but I have been under the belief from information given to me by General Wilson shortly after the event, that when Mr. Davis learned that he was surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed in a gentleman's dressing-gown. Naturally enough, Mr. Davis wanted to escape, and would not reflect much how this should be accomplished provided it might be done specessfully. If captured, he would be no ordinary prisoner. He represented all there was of that hostility to the government which had caused four years of the bloodiest war -and the most costly in other respects of which history makes any record. Every one supposed he would be tried for treason if captured, and that he would be executed. Had he succeeded in making escape in any disguise it would have been ad- CH. XXVII ged a good thing afterward by his admirers.

as my official letters on file in the War Departnt, as well as my remarks in this book, reflect on General Thomas by dwelling somewhat upon tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to him, t I give my estimate of him as a soldier. ne remark will apply also in the case of General by. I had been at West Point with Thomas year, and had known him later in the old y. He was a man of commanding appearance, v and deliberate in speech and action; sensible, est, and brave. He possessed valuable soldierly lities in an eminent degree. He gained the fidence of all who served under him, and almost r love. This implies a very valuable quality. s a quality which calls out the most efficient rices of the troops serving under the commander sessing it.

homas's dispositions were deliberately made, always good. He could not be driven from a nt he was given to hold. He was not as good, rever, in pursuit as he was in action. I do not eve that he could ever have conducted Shera's army from Chattanooga to Atlanta against. defenses and the commander guarding that line 864. On the other hand, if it had been given to hold the line which Johnston tried to hold, her that general nor Sherman, nor any other er, could have done it better. homas was a valuable officer, who richly de-

ed, as he has received, the plaudits of his counnen for the part he played in the great tragedy

861-65.

He was naturally studious and inclined to the law. There have been in the army but very few, if any,

General Camby was an officer of great merit.

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officers who took as much interest in reading and digesting every act of Congress and every regulation for the government of the army as he. knowledge gained in this way made him a most valuable staff-officer, a capacity in which almost all his army services were rendered up to the time of his being assigned to the Military Division of the Gulf. He was an exceedingly modest officer, though of great talent and learning. I presume his feelings when first called upon to command a large army against a fortified city were somewhat like my own when marching a regiment against General Thomas Harris in Missouri in 1861. Neither of us would have felt the slightest trepidation in going into battle with some one else commanding. Had Canby been in other engagements afterward, he would, I have no doubt, have advanced without any fear arising from a sense of the responsibility. He was afterward killed in the lava-beds of south-

ern Oregon, while in pursuit of the hostile Modoe Indians. His character was as pure as his talent and learning were great. His services were valuable during the war, but principally as a bureau officer. I have no idea that it was from choice that his services were rendered in an office, but because of his

superior efficiency there.

nte, I, 200, 201

## CHAPTER XXVIII

THE END OF THE WAR—THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON ONE OF LINCOLN'S ANCEDOTES --- GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON—CHARACTERISTICS OF LINCOLN STANTON - ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS

THINGS began to quiet down, and as the cer- CH. XXVIII tainty that there would be no more armed resistance became clearer, the troops in North Carolina and Virginia were ordered to march immediately to the capital, and go into camp there until mustered Suitable garrisons were left at the prominent places throughout the South to ensure obedience to the laws that might be enacted for the government of the several States, and to ensure security to the lives and property of all classes. I do not know how far this was necessary, but I deemed it necessary, at that time, that such a course should be pur-I think now that these garrisons were continued after they ceased to be absolutely required; but it is not to be expected that such a rebellion as was fought between the sections from 1861 to 1865 could terminate without leaving many serious apprehensions in the mind of the people as to what should be done.

Sherman marched his troops from Goldsboro' up

Sherman, Memoirs,II.

CH. XXVIII to Manchester, on the south side of the James River, opposite Richmond, and there put them in camp, while he went back to Savannah to see what the situation was there.

Sherman, Memoirs, II, 371-374

It was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon him. Halleck had been sent to Richmond to command Virginia, and had issued orders prohibiting even Sherman's own troops from obeying his, Sherman's, orders. Sherman met the papers on his return, containing this order of Halleck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage. On his arrival at Fortress Monroe returning from Savannah, Sherman received an invitation from Halleck to come to Richmond and be his guest. This he indignantly refused, and informed Halleck, furthermore, that he had seen his order. He also stated that he was coming up to take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would probably be as well for Halleck not to show himself, because he (Sherman) would not be responsible for what some rash person might do through indignation for the treatment he had received. Very soon after that Sherman received orders from me to proceed to Washington city, and to go into camp on the south side of the city pending the mustering out of the troops.

Thid, 375

There was no incident worth noting in the march northward from Goldsboro' to Richmond, or in that from Richmond to Washington city. The army, however, commanded by Sherman, which had been engaged in all the battles of the West and had marched from the Mississippi through the Southern States to the sea, from there to Goldsboro', and thence to Washington city, had passed over

many of the battle-fields of the Army of the Po- CH. XXVIII tomac, thus having seen, to a greater extent than any other body of troops, the entire theater of the four years' war for the preservation of the Union.

Sherman's great cam-paigns

The march of Sherman's army from Atlanta to the sea and north to Goldsboro', while it was not accompanied with the danger that was anticipated. vet was magnificent in its results, and equally magnificent in the way it was conducted. It had an important bearing, in various ways, upon the great object we had in view, that of closing the war. All the States east of the Mississippi River up to the State of Georgia had felt the hardships of the war. Georgia and South Carolina, and almost all of North Carolina, up to this time, had been exempt from invasion by the Northern armies, except upon their immediate sea-coasts. Their newspapers had given such an account of Confederate success that the people who remained at home had been convinced that the Yankees had been whipped from first to last, and driven from pillar to post, and that now they could hardly be holding out for any other purpose than to find a way out of the war with honor to themselves.

Even during this march of Sherman's the newspapers in his front were proclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a mob of men who were frightened out of their wits and hastening, panic-stricken, to try to get under the cover of our navy for protection against the Southern people. As the army was seen marching on triumphantly, however, the minds of the people became disabused, and they saw the true state of affairs. In turn they ca.xxviii became disheartened, and would have been glad to submit without compromise.

Another great advantage resulting from this march, and which was calculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great storehouse of Georgia was entirely cut off from the Confederate armies. As the troops advanced north from Savannah, the destruction of the railroads in South Carolina and the southern part of North Carolina further cut off their resources, and left the armies still in Virginia and North Carolina dependent for supplies upon a very small area of country, already very much exhausted of food and forage.

In due time the two armies, one from Burkesville Junction and the other from the neighborhood of Raleigh, North Carolina, arrived and went into camp near the enpital, as directed. The troops were hardy, being inured to fatigue, and they appeared in their respective camps as ready and fit for duty as they had ever been in their lives. I doubt whether an equal body of men of any nation, take them man for man, officer for officer, was ever gotten together that would have proved their equal in a great battle.

American and European armics contrasted The armies of Europe are machines: the men are brave and the officers capable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of the nations of Europe are taken from a class of people who are not very intelligent and who have very little interest in the contest in which they are called upon to take part. Our armies were composed of men who were able to read, men who knew what they were fighting for, and could not be induced to serve as soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of the

nation was involved, and so necessarily must have CR. XXVIII been more than equal to men who fought merely because they were brave and because they were thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships.

Nothing of particular importance occurred during the time these troops were in camp before starting North.

I remember one little incident which I will relate as an anecdote characteristic of Mr. Lincoln. occurred a day after I reached Washington, and about the time General Meade reached Burkesville with the army. Governor Smith of Virginia had left Richmond with the Confederate States governsmith, Gov.
1846-48, 1863ment, and had gone to Danville. Supposing I was necessarily with the army at Burkesville, he addressed a letter to me there, informing me that, as governor of the Commonwealth of the State of Virginia, he had temporarily removed the State capital from Richmond to Danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform the functions of his office there without molestation by the Federal authorities. I give this letter only in substance. He also inquired of me whether, in case he was not allowed to perform the duties of his office, he with a few others might not be permitted to leave the country and go abroad without interference. General Meade, being informed that a flag of truce was outside his pickets with a letter to me, at once sent out and had the letter brought in without informing the officer who brought it that I was not pres-He read the letter and telegraphed me its contents. Meeting Mr. Lincoln shortly after receiving this despatch, I repeated its contents to him. Mr. Lincoln, supposing I was asking for instruc-

axxvm tions, said, in reply to that part of Governor Smith's letter which inquired whether he with a few friends would be permitted to leave the country unmolested, that his position was like that of a certain Irishman (giving the name) he knew in Springfield, who was very popular with the people, a man of considerable promise, and very much liked. Unfortunately he had acquired the habit of drinking, and his friends could see that the habit was growing on him. These friends determined to make an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up a pledge to abstain from all alcoholie drinks. They asked Pat to join them in signing the pledge, and he consented. He had been so long out of the habit of using plain water as a beverage that he resorted to soda-water as a substitute. After a few days this began to grow distasteful to him. So holding the glass behind him, he said, "Doctor, could n't you drop a bit of brandy in that unbeknownst to myself?"

> I do not remember what the instructions were the President gave me, but I know that Governor Smith was not permitted to perform the duties of his office. I also know that if Mr. Lincoln had been spared, there would have been no efforts made to prevent any one from leaving the country who desired to do so. He would have been equally willing to permit the return of the same expatriated citizens after they had time to repent of their choice.

he grand review

On the 18th of May orders were issued by the adjutant-general for a grand review by the President and his Cabinet of Sherman's and Meade's armies. The review commenced on the 23d and lasted two

days. Meade's army occupied over six hours of the CHXXVIII first day in passing the grand stand which had been erected in front of the President's house. Sherman witnessed this review from the grand stand which was occupied by the President and his Cabinet. Here he showed his resentment for the cruel and Memoirs, II, harsh treatment that had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by the Secretary of War, by refusing to take his extended hand.

Sherman's troops had been in camp on the south side of the Potomac. During the night of the 23d he crossed over and bivouacked not far from the Capitol. Promptly at ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th his troops commenced to pass in review. Sherman's army made a different appearance from that of the Army of the Potomac. The latter had been operating where they received directly from the North full supplies of food and clothing regularly; the review of this army, therefore, was the review of a body of sixty-five thousand well-drilled, well-disciplined, and orderly soldiers, inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but without the experience of gathering their own food and supplies in an enemy's country, and of being ever on the watch. Sherman's army was not so well dressed as the Army of the Potomac, but their marching could not be excelled; they gave the appearance of men who had been thoroughly drilled to endure hardships, either by long and continuous marches or through exposure to any climate without the ordinary shelter of a camp. They exhibited also some of the order of march through Georgia, where the "sweet potatoes sprang up from the ground" as Sherman's army went marching through. In the

exxviii rear of a company there would be a captured horse or mule loaded with small cooking mensils, caretured chickens, and other food picked up for the use of the men. Negro families who had followed the army would sometimes come along in the rear of a company, with three or four children packed unon a single male, and the mother leading it.

The sight was varied and grand; nearly all day for two successive days, from the Capitol to the Treasury Building, could be seen a mass of orderly soldiers marching in columny of companies. The National flag was flying from almost every house and store; the windows were filled with spectators; the doorsters and sidewalks were crowded with colored people and poor whites who did not succoul in securing better quarters from which to get a view of the grand armies. The city was about as full of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually is on inauguration day when a new President takes his sent.

otel randral

It may not be out of place to again allude to President Lincoln and the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, who were the great conspicuous figures in the executive branch of the government. There is no great difference of opinion now, in the public mind, as to the characteristics of the President. With Mr. Stanton the case is different. They were the very opposite of each other in almost every particular, except that each possessed great ability. Mr. Lincoln gained influence over men by making them feel that it was a pleasure to serve him. preferred yielding his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist upon having his own way. It distressed him to disappoint others. In matters of public duty, however, he had what he wished, but CH.XXVI in the least offensive way. Mr. Stanton never questioned his own authority to command, unless resisted. He cared nothing for the feeling of others. In fact, it seemed to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify. He felt no hesitation in assuming the functions of the Executive, or in acting without advising with him. If his act was not sustained he would change it,—if he saw the matter would be followed up until he did so.

It was generally supposed that these two officials formed the complement of each other. The Secretary was required to prevent the President's being imposed upon. The President was required in the more responsible place of seeing that injustice was not done to others. I do not know that this view of these two men is still entertained by the majority of the people. It is not a correct view, however, in my estimation. Mr. Lincoln did not require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of a public trust.

Mr. Lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his generals in making and executing their plans. The Secretary was very timid, and it was impossible for him to avoid interfering with the armies covering the capital when it was sought to defend it by an offensive movement against the army guarding the Confederate capital. He could see our weakness, but he could not see that the enemy was in danger. The enemy would not have been in danger if Mr. Stanton had been in the field. These characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly after Early came so near getting into the capital.

t. XXVIII The gene alsof the war Among the army and corps commanders who served with me during the war between the States, and who attracted much public attention, but of whose ability as roldiers I have not yet given any estimate, are Meade, Hancock, Sedgwick, Burnside, Terry, and Hooker. There were others of great merit, such as Griffin, Humphreys, Wright, and Macketzic. Of those first named, Burnside at one time had command of the Army of the Potomac, and later of the Army of the Obio. Hooker also commanded the Army of the Potomac for a short time.

en, Mende

General Membewas an officer of great ment, with drawbacks to his medalness that were beyond his control. He had been an officer of the Engineer Corps before the war, and correspondly had never served with troops until he was cover forty has years of age. He never had, I believe, a command of less than a brigade. He saw clearly and distinctly the position of the enemy, and the begoggraphy of the country in front of his own position. His first pleawas to take advantage of the lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we wanted to move afterward. He was subsedinate to his superiors in rank to the extent that he could execute an order which changed his own plans with the same zeal he would have displayed if the plan had been his own. He was brave and conscientions, and commanded the respect of all who knew him. He was, unfortunately, of a temper that would get beyond his control at times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the most officers to manner. No one saw this fault more placely than he himself, and no one regretted it more. This made

it unpleasant at times, even in battle, for those CH.XXVIII around him to approach him even with information. In spite of this defect he was a most valuable officer, and deserves a high place in the annals of his country.

Gen. Burn-

General Burnside was an officer who was generally liked and respected. He was not, however, fitted to command an army. No one knew this better than himself. He always admitted his blunders, and extenuated those of officers under him beyond what they were entitled to. It was hardly his fault that he was ever assigned to a separate command.

Of Hooker I saw but little during the war. I Gen. Hooker had known him very well before, however. Where I did see him, at Chattanooga, his achievement in bringing his command around the point of Lookout Mountain and into Chattanooga Valley was brilliant. I nevertheless regarded him as a dangerous man. He was not subordinate to his superiors. He was ambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the rights of others. His disposition was, when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main body of the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to his standard all he could of his juniors.

Hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general officers who did not exercise a separate command. He commanded a corps longer than any other one, and his name was never mentioned as having committed in battle a blunder for which Nov.29,1862; he was responsible. He was a man of very conspicuous personal appearance. Tall, well formed, and, at the time of which I now write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearance that

W. S. Han-cock, W. P. ols. Sept. 23, 1861; Brig.-Gen. U.S. A. Aug. 12, 1864

axxviii would attract the attention of an army as he passed. His genial disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his presence with his command in the thickest of the fight won for him the confidence of troops serving under him. No matter how hard the fight, the Second Corps always felt that their commander was looking after them.

Sedgwick was killed at Spottsylvania before I had an opportunity of forming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from personal observation. I had known him in Mexico when both of us were lieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that either of us would ever be equal to the command of a brigade. He stood very high in the army, however, as an officer and a man. He was brave and conscientious. His ambition was not great, and he seemed to dread responsibility. He was willing to do any amount of battling, but always wanted some one else to direct. He declined the command of the Army of the Potomac once, if not oftener.

ch. Terry

General Alfred H. Terry came into the army as a volunteer without a military education. His way was won without political influence up to an important separate command - the expedition against Fort Fisher, in January, 1865. His success there was most brilliant, and won for him the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army and of majorgeneral of volunteers. He is a man who makes friends of those under him by his consideration of their wants and their dues. As a commander he won their confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness of perception in taking in the situation under which he was placed at any given time.



LEFT PROFILE OF GENERAL GRANT. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN BY WALKER IN 1875, AND LENT BY MAJOR C. C. SNIFFIN.)

Griffin, Humphreys, and Mackenzie were good CH. XXVIII corps commanders, but came into that position so near to the close of the war as not to attract public attention. All three served as such in the last capt.2dArt. campaign of the Armies of the Potomac and the James, which culminated at Appomattox Court gen App. 2, 1862; Maj-House, on the 9th of April, 1865. The sudden collapse of the rebellion monopolized attention to the exclusion of almost everything else. I regarded Mackenzie as the most promising young officer in the army. Graduating at West Point, as he did. during the second year of the war, he had won 1862; Brig. his way up to the command of a corps before its Oct. 19, 1864 This he did upon his own merit and without close. influence.

Chas. Grif-1843-47: Mexico, Apr. 25, 1861; Brig.-Gen.

R. S. Mackenzie, W. P. 1858-62; 2d Lt. Eng. Gen. Vols.

## CONCLUSION

ecamount

THE cause of the great war of the rebellion against the United States will have to be attributed to slavery. For some years before the war began it was a trite saying among some politicians that "a state half slave and half free cannot exist." All must become slave or all free, or the state will go down. I took no part myself in any such view of the case at the time, but since the war is over, reviewing the whole question, I have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true.

Slavery

Slavery was an institution that required unusual guaranties for its security wherever it existed; and in a country like ours, where the larger portion of it was free territory inhabited by an intelligent and well-to-do population, the people would naturally have but little sympathy with demands upon them for its protection. Hence the people of the South were dependent upon keeping control of the general government to seeme the perpetuation of their favorite institution. They were enabled to maintain this control long after the States where slavery existed had ceased to have the controlling power, through the assistance they received from odd men here and there throughout the Northern States. They saw their power waning, and this led them to encroach upon the prerogatives and independence of the Northern States by enacting such laws as the Fugitive Slave Law. By this law every Northern man was obliged, when properly summoned, to turn out and help apprehend the runaway slave of a Southern man. Northern marshals became slavecatchers, and Northern courts had to contribute to the support and protection of the institution.

This was a degradation which the North would not permit any longer than until they could get the power to expunge such laws from the statute-books. Prior to the time of these encroachments the great majority of the people of the North had no particular quarrel with slavery, so long as they were not forced to have it themselves. But they were not willing to play the rôle of police for the South in the protection of this particular institution.

In the early days of the country, before we had railroads, telegraphs, and steamboats,—in a word, rapid transit of any sort,—the States were each almost a separate nationality. At that time the subject of slavery caused but little or no disturbance to the public mind. But the country grew, rapid transit was established, and trade and commerce between the States got to be so much greater than before, that the power of the National government became more felt and recognized, and therefore had to be enlisted in the cause of this institution.

It is probably well that we had the war when we did. We are better off now than we would have been without it, and have made more rapid progress than we otherwise should have made. The civilized nations of Europe have been stimulated into unusual activity, so that commerce, trade, travel, and thorough acquaintance among people

The war

of different nationalities have become common; whereas before it was but the few who had ever had the privilege of going beyond the limits of their own country, or who knew anything about other people. Then, too, our republican institutions were regarded as experiments up to the breaking out of the rebellion, and monarchical Europe generally believed that our republic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the slightest strain was brought upon it. Now it has shown itself capable of dealing with one of the greatest wars that was ever made, and our people have proven themselves to be the most formidable in war of any nationality.

But this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the necessity of avoiding wars in the future.

Attitude of Europe

The conduct of some of the European states during our troubles shows the lack of conscience of communities where the responsibility does not come upon a single individual. Seeing a nation that extended from ocean to ocean, embracing the better part of a continent, growing as we were growing in population, wealth, and intelligence, the European nations thought it would be well to give us a check. We might possibly, after a while, threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of their institutions. Hence England was constantly finding fault with the administration at Washington because we were not able to keep up an effective blockade. She also joined, at first, with France and Spain in setting up an Austrian prince upon the throne in Mexico, totally disregarding any rights or claims that Mexico had of being treated

The attempted Mexicar as an independent power. It is true they trumped up grievances as a pretext, but they were only pretexts which can always be found when wanted.

Mexico, in her various revolutions, had been unable to give that protection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would have liked to give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had forced loans from them. Under pretense of protecting their citizens, these nations seized upon Mexico as a foothold for establishing a European monarchy upon our continent, thus threatening our peace at home. I myself regarded this as a direct act of war against the United States by the powers engaged, and supposed as a matter of course that the United States would treat it as such when their hands were free to strike. I often spoke of the matter to Mr. Lincoln and the Secretary of War, but never heard any special views from them to enable me to judge what they thought or felt about it. I inferred that they felt a good deal as I did, but were unwilling to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon our hands.

All of the powers except France very soon withdrew from the armed intervention for the establishment of an Austrian prince upon the throne of Mexico; but the governing people of these countries continued to the close of the war to throw obstacles in our way. After the surrender of Lee, therefore, entertaining the opinion here expressed, I sent Sheridan with a corps to the Rio Grande to have him where he might aid Juarez in expelling the French from Mexico. These troops got off before they could be stopped, and went to the Rio Grande, where Sheridan distributed them up and

Sheridan sent to the Rio Grande French troops thdrawn om Mexdown the river, much to the consternation of the troops in the quarter of Mexico bordering on that stream. This soon led to a request from France that we should withdraw our troops from the Rio Grande, and to negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs. Finally Bazaine was withdrawn from Mexico by order of the French government. From that day the empire began to totter. Mexico was then able to maintain her independence without aid from us.

France is the traditional ally and friend of the United States. I did not blame France for her part in the scheme to creet a monarchy upon the ruins of the Mexican republic. That was the scheme of one man, an imitator without genius or merit. He had succeeded in stealing the government of his country, and made a change in its form against the wishes and instincts of his people. He tried to play the part of the first Napoleon, without the ability to sustain that rôle. He sought by new conquests to add to his empire and his glory; but the signal failure of his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own overthrow.

Like our own war between the States, the Franco-Prussian war was an expensive one; but it was worth to France all it cost her people. It was the completion of the downfall of Napoleon III. The beginning was when he landed troops on this continent. Failing here, the prestige of his name—all the prestige he ever had—was gone. He must achieve a success or fall. He tried to strike down his neighbor, Prussia—and fell.

I never admired the character of the first Napoleon; but I recognize his great genius. His work,

ownfall of Napoleon 111 too, has left its impress for good on the face of Europe. The third Napoleon could have no claim to having done a good or just act.

To maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war. There can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict, such as the last one, occurring among our own people again; but, growing as we are in population, wealth, and military power, we may become the envy of nations which led us in all these particulars only a few years ago; and unless we are prepared for it we may be in danger of a combined movement being some day made to crush us out. Now, scarcely twenty years after the war, we seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going on as if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an invasion by the fleets of fourth-rate European powers for a time until we could prepare for them.

We should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defenses should be put in the finest possible condition. Neither of these cost much when it is considered where the money goes, and what we get in return. Money expended in a fine navy not only adds to our security and tends to prevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our commerce with foreign nations in the mean time. Money spent upon sea-coast defenses is spent among our own people, and all goes back again among the people. The work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a feeling of security.

England's course toward the United States during the rebellion exasperated the people of this country very much against the mother-country. I regretted it. England and the United States are

The art of maintaining peace

Naval and coast defenses

Attitude of England natural allies, and should be the best of friends. They speak one language and are related by blood and other ties. We together, or even either separately, are better qualified than any other people to establish commerce between all the nationalities of the world.

England governs her own colonies, and particularly those embracing the people of different races from her own, better than any other nation. She is just to the conquered, but rigid. She makes them self-supporting, but gives the benefit of labor to the laborer. She does not seem to look upon the colonies as outside possessions which she is at liberty to work for the support and aggrandizement of the home government.

The hostility of England to the United States during our rebellion was not so much real as it was apparent. It was the hostility of the leaders of one political party. I am told that there was no time during the civil war when they were able to get up in England a demonstration in favor of secession, while these were constantly being gotten up in favor of the Union, or, as they called it, in favor of the North. Even in Manchester, which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut off from her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the North at the very time when their workmen were almost famishing.

The cotton famine

The negro

It is possible that the question of a conflict between races may come up in the future, as did that between freedom and slavery before. The condition of the colored man within our borders may become a source of anxiety, to say the least. But he was brought to our shores by compulsion, and he now should be considered as having as good a right to remain here as any other class of our citizens was looking to a settlement of this question that led me to urge the annexation of Santo Domingo during the time I was President of the United States.

annexation of Santo Do-

Santo Domingo was freely offered to us not only by the administration, but by all the people, almost without price. The island is upon our shores, is very fertile, and is capable of supporting fifteen millions of people. The products of the soil are so valuable that labor in her fields would be so compensated as to enable those who wished to go there to quickly repay the cost of their passage. it that the colored people would go there in great numbers, so as to have independent States governed by their own race. They would still be States of the Union, and under the protection of the gen eral government; but the citizens would be almost wholly colored.

By the war with Mexico we had acquired, as we opening up the West have seen, territory almost equal in extent to that we already possessed. It was seen that the volunteers of the Mexican war largely composed the pioneers to settle up the Pacific coast country. Their numbers, however, were scarcely sufficient to be a nucleus for the population of the important points of the territory acquired by that war. After our rebellion, when so many young men were at liberty to return to their homes, they found they were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the workshop of the villages, but wanted larger fields. The mines of the mountains first attracted them; but afterward they found that rich valleys and productive grazing and farming lands were there.

This territory, the geography of which was not known to us at the close of the rebellion, is now as well mapped as any portion of our country. Railroads traverse it in every direction—north, south, east, and west. The mines are worked. The high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich agricultural lands are found in many of the valleys. This is the work of the volunteer. It is probable that the Indians would have had control of these lands for a century yet but for the war. We must conclude, therefore, that wars are not always evils unmixed with some good.

Prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were satisfied to remain near the scenes of their In fact, an immense majority of the whole people did not feel secure against coming to want should they move among entire strangers. So much was the country divided into small communities that localized idioms had grown up, so that you could almost tell what section a person was from by hearing him speak. Before, new territories were settled by a "class" people who shunned contact with others; people who, when the country began to settle up around them, would push out farther from civilization. Their guns furnished meat, and the cultivation of a very limited amount of the soil their bread and vegetables. All the streams abounded with fish. Trapping would furnish pelts to be brought into the States once a year, to pay for necessary articles which they could not raisepowder, lead, whisky, tobacco, and some store goods. Occasionally some little articles of luxury would enter into these purchases—a quarter of a pound of tea, two or three pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing-cards, and, if anything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whisky.

Little was known of the topography of the country beyond the settlements of these frontiersmen. This is all changed now. The war begot a spirit of independence and enterprise. The feeling now is that a youth must cut loose from his old surroundings to enable him to get up in the world. There is now such a commingling of the people that particular idioms and pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent; the country has filled up "from the center all around to the sea"; railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior; maps, nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now furnished the student of geography.

The war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. We have but little to do to preserve peace, happiness, and prosperity at home, and the respect of other nations. Our experience ought to teach us the necessity of the first; our power secures the latter.

I feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when The new there is to be great harmony between the Federal and Confederate. I cannot stay to be a living witness to the correctness of this prophecy; but I feel it within me that it is to be so. The universally kind feeling expressed for me at a time when it was supposed that each day would prove my last seemed to me the beginning of the answer to "Let us have peace."

The expressions of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a section of the country nor to a division of the people. They came from individual citizens of all nationalities; from all denominations

—the Protestant, the Catholic, and the Jew; and from the various societies of the land—scientific, educational, religious or otherwise.—Polities did not enter into the matter at all.

I am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should be given because I was the object of it. But the war between the States was a very bloody and a very costly war. One side or the other had to yield principles they deemed dearer than life before it could be brought to an end. I commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged on the victorious side. I was, no matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative of that side of the controversy. It is a significant and gratifying fact that Confederates should have joined heartily in this spontaneous move. I hope the good feeling inaugurated may continue to the end.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U.S. GRANT, OF THE UNITED STATES ARMIES (1864-65)

Headquarters, Armies of the United States, Washington, D. C., July 22, 1865.

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Armies of the United States from the date of my appoint-

ment to command the same.

From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. The resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from East to West, reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of producing for the support of their armies. It was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced

by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.

From the first I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both North and South, until the military power of the rebellion

was entirely broken.

I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy, preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting

and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land.

These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. All I can say is that what I have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what I conceived to be for

the best interests of the whole country.

At the date when this report begins, the situation of the contending forces was about as follows: The Mississippi River was strongly garrisoned by Federal troops, from St. Louis, Missouri, to its mouth. The line of the Arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possession of all west of the Mississippi, north of that stream. A few points in southern Louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, together with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande. All the balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably not less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have been brought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to have brought them out. The letatione policy had demoralized this force so that probably but little more than one half of it was ever present in garrison at any one time. half, or forty thousand men, with the bands of guerrillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas, and along the Mississippi River, and the disloyal character of much of the population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the west of it. To the east of the Mississippi we held substantially with the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the State of Tennessee. South of Chattanooga a small foothold had been obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect East Tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia. West Virginia was substantially within our lines. Virginia, with the exception of the northern border, the Potomae River, a small area about the mouth of James River, covered by the troops at Norfolk and Fort Monroe, and the territory covered by the Army of the Potomae lying along the Rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. Along the sea-coast footholds had been obtained at Plymouth, Washington, and New Berne, in North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Fort Pulaski, and Port Royal, in South Carolina: Fernandina and St. Augustine, in Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in our possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy.

The accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to General Sherman and other commanders in March, 1864, shows by red lines the territory occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and at the opening of the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was proposed to occupy.

Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerrillas and a large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies. In the South a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier, and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them. This enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the field.

The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E. Johnston, his ablest and best generals. The army commanded by Lee occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine Run westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending Richmond, the rebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac. The army under Johnston occupied a strongly intrenched position at Dalton, Georgia, covering and defending Atlanta, Georgia,—a place of great importance as a railroad center,—against the armies under Major-General W. T. Sherman. In addition to these armies he had a large cavalry force, under Forrest, in northeast Mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the Shenandoah Valley and in the western part of Virginia and extreme eastern part of Tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports where

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them,

were the main objective points of the campaign.

Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing all the armies and territory east of the Mississippi River to the Alleghanies, and the Department of Arkansas, west of the Mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating against Johnston.

Major-General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the Army of the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision of

the movements of all our armies.

we had no foothold upon land.

General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. If the enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his ability, while I would prevent the concentration of Lee upon him, if it was in the power of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This allusion is to a map which is fully described in the "Official Records of the War of the Rebellion," vol. xxxii, part 3, p. 261.—F. D. G.

Army of the Potonne to do so. More specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was satisfied that be understood them

and would execute them to the fullest extent possible.

Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red River nominst Shreveport, Long-sing which had been organized previous to my appointment to command, was notified by me on the lath of March of the importance it was that Sinesepart should be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he tound that the taking of it would occupy from ten to hifteen days more time than General Sher man had given his troops to be also at from their command, he would send them back at the time position by General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main object of the Red River expedition for this force was neces are to movements east of the Missis sippi; that should his expedition prove successful he would hold Shreveport and the Red River with such force us be might deem necessary, and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that then lable by him more ensily held: that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against Mobile: that it certainly would be, if troop, enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition, also, that I and directed General Steele to make a real move from Arkansas, as suggested by him General Panks), instead of a demonstration, as Steele thought advisable

On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification and directions, he was instructed as follows:

1st. If puccessful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you turn

over the defense of the Red River to General Steele and the navy.

2d. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold upon the Rio Grande. This can be hold with four thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. At least one half of the force required for this service might be taken from the col-

ored troops.

3d. By properly fortifying on the Missi sippa River, the force to guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number. Six thou and more would then held all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until netive operations can again be resumed west of the river. According to your last return, this would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against Mobile. To this I expect to add five thousand men from Missioni. If, however, you think the force here stated to comail to hold the tenitory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would say concentrate at least twenty five thousand men of your present command for operations against Mobile. With these and such additions as I can give you from classwhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or more ironelads will be ordered to report to Admiral Farragut.

This gives him a strong naval fleet with which to coöperate. You can make your own arrangements with the admiral for his coöperation, and select your own line of approach. My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base; but, from your long service in the Gulf Department, you will know best about the matter. It is intended that your movements shall be coöperative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All I would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at once. Preserve a profound secreey of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible moment.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS.

Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be his objective point; that wherever Lee went he would go also. For his movement two plans presented themselves: one to cross the Rapidan below Lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left. Each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond or going north on a raid. But if we took this route, all we did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out; besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed how to coöperate. If we took the other route, Brandy Station could be used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the York or James rivers. Of these, however, it was decided to take the lower route.

The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major-General

B. F. Butler:

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FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, April 2, 1864.

GENERAL: In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished.

It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the enemy. But, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. By such movement they interpose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's army and Richmond being the greater objects toward which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we can against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the Army of the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable: The Army of the Potomac will act from its present base, Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect all the forces from your command that can be spared from garrison duty—I should

say not less than twenty thousand effective ment to operate on the south side of James River, Richmond because your objective point. To the force you already have will be added about the thore and ment from South Carolina, under Major tieneral trillmore, who will consisted them in person. Major-tieneral W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into the field from your man department.

tieneral Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Featre? Monroe, with all the troops on transporte, by the 48th matient, or as soon thereafter as practicable. Should you not receive potice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of them and soon other house, as you may deem best calculated to decrease the enemy restorters of move to be made.

When you are notified to move, take this Point with as much force no possible. Fortify, or rather introdes, at once, and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapions as you can. From this Point directions

cannot be given at this time be your fatther movements.

The fact that has already been stated—that is, that Richmond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be recept ration between your force and the Army of the Potenne—must be your goide. This indicates the meresity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River mayou advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into be nationally in Richmond, the Army of the Potenne would follow, and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit.

All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry south of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford, about the time of the general advance.

it would be of immense advantage.

You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the execution of this order.

1', S. GRANT, Lieutenant General,

MARGING GENERAL B. P. BUTTER.

On the 16th these instructions were substantially resterated. On the 19th, in order to secure full cooperation between his army and that of General Meads, he was informed that I expected him to move from Fort Monroe the same day that General Meads moved from Culpeper. The exact time I was to telegraph lam as soon as it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the 27th of April; that it was my intention to fight Lee between Culpoper and Richmond, if he would stand. Should be, however, full back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction with his (General Patter's army on the James River; that, could I be certain be would be able to invest Richmond on the south side, so as to have his left resting on the James, above the city, I would form the junction there, that execumstances might make this course advisable anyhow, that he should use every exertion to seeme footing as far up the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not energy the city, he should at heast detain as large a force there as possible.

In coöperation with the main movements against Lee and Johnston, I was desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in the background for the protection of our extended lines between the loyal States and the armies operating against them.

A very considerable force, under command of Major-General Sigel, was so held for the protection of West Virginia and the frontiers of Maryland and Pennsylvania. Whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the North to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front, and give better protection than if lying idle in garrison. By such a movement they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection of his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them. General Sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force into two expeditions, to move from Beverly and Charleston, under command of Generals Ord and Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad. Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own request, General Sigel was instructed, at his own suggestion, to give up the expedition by Beverly, and to form two columns, one under General Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the Shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men. The one on the Shenandoah to assemble between Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery advanced to Cedar Creek with such cavalry as could be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the Shenandoah Valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crook would take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down the Tennessee railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the New River Bridge and the saltworks at Saltville, Virginia.

Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were delayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being in readiness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a general move-

ment of all the armies not later than the 4th of May.

My first object, being to break the military power of the rebellion and capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that General Butler should succeed in his movement against Richmond, as that would tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of Lee's army, to accomplish this desired result in the East. If he failed, it was my determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to retreat, or to so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north, and still retain enough for the defense of Richmond. It was well understood by both Generals Butler and Meade before starting on the campaign that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the James River, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it.

APPLANTA

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Before giving General Bottom to the reserved by solid Forcer Place Montroe, and in convertation per research to state out on post message offing presentation Peterships, and a stream of virtual assumption ution as far south as persons. The control of the control of the property of the optimizer Received States of the control of the objective point of the open week. As really as a set of the Petrol of the to move smart are as a sure less than the soul on the will be easily rmy with sup 18, and the energy of a contract contract graps he the afolian sout the sells in the color of a second second PERREE Place granged to and about a confidence

I may be restate that, core mandoner with the service and ever I treat a furnish peculide to leave to near a Mendoner of the results of the Petrone My as the results of the service of the results. If through him, and were recorded in the easy me to your militaria. arly and the execution to home. The superposition that the exect agreement and to be the right man in the middighter. He is a consequent should a the presence of an officer engage or to only related his dream from in united at that public attended for a trace of a real good at the agent is im to, and which he would athern a collection.

The movement of the Army of the Post me according to the second

he morning of the 4th of Max, ander the reason of second on and rders of Mapor General Meade, pass asset his restaurance of ight the whole arms was across the Barely . To Indian a sugar orpherocome at Cormanna Ford, and the November 1996. A Fig. 1 lie envilve, maler Major them end betwonlight of the engine and the services he greater part of its team , team & tog above a secretion and was no noting with but slight approximate. The account of a region of a second of v the troops that day was about twelve which is here becaused as great survey, and it is most of from its exact the new tenance parelienchous I had entertained that if it consists and in the mer of an active, large, well appearated, acres and a reconstrated arms. nd how no large a train was to be a grand discount of hostile equation, id protected. Early on the oth the advance compacts. Party Masses lement G. K. Where h combinatalings and axid a recovered floorers has soil ide libs intremeliments mean Maney Rome. The Statistic pagest Separately Il day, the whole army being brought not all a part we tast as the urps could be got upon the field, which convolves ag 3) and a new of he forest and narrowness of the newly, was about with second and deround ness.

General Burnside, with the Night Corps, was, at the terry the Army I the Potomic moved, left with the boils of his respect to the core I the Rappulanuock River and Alexanders increase bolding the and buck to Bull Run, with instructions and to move exist he secived notice that a crossing of the Rapalus was accessed but to nove promptly as seen as such before was received. This crossing ie was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th. By any o'clock of

the morning of the 6th he was leading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some of his troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers. Considering that a large proportion—probably two thirds—of his command was composed of new troops unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accourtements of a soldier, this was a remarkable march.

The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on the evening of the 5th. After dark the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable confusion. But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored order. morning of the 7th reconnaissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field. From this it was evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind his works. therefore determined to push on and put my whole force between him and Richmond, and orders were at once issued for a movement by his right flank. On the night of the 7th the march was commenced toward Spottsylvania Court House, the Fifth Corps moving on the most direct road. But the enemy, having become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there On the 8th General Warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line taken up at Spottsylvania. This force was steadily driven back on the main force within the recently constructed works, after considerable fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. On the morning of the 9th General Sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of communication with Richmond. The 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent in manœuvering and fighting, without decisive results. Among the killed on the 9th was that able and distinguished soldier, Major-General John Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Armycorps. Major-General H. G. Wright succeeded him in command. Early on the morning of the 12th a general attack was made on the enemy in position. The Second Corps, Major-General Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line, capturing most of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps and twenty pieces of artillery. But the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage gained did not prove The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th were consumed in manœuvering and awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from Washington. Deeming it impracticable to make any further attack men the enemy of Spott along the collection determined and are the 18th with a great few menons of heart. So oth At his to contain a nor at two land of the house of the 1905 have a transfer town in a the 19th, East We cooperate event of the western to one extreme times thanks but the which was promptly reprinted with heavy him. delived the maneric rate of a Nobel Arica at the residence of the when it was commoned. The forester words have the ready line, and former responses the sold the remain tends of war as of leaf to be used. the North Arma members of the most own, per constructed of Fifth Corps resulted the New W. Anna case the soften over all the closely tollowed by the South Congress The Second and Ninet compa put up about the parts type, the Proceed bearing the real cool bridge. and the Ninth lyner to tween Out and Service Food - Giveral Warren efficient a consisting the season aforeseen, and need a paration without much appointment. Second after gradient rate position for man and entitle uttucked, but repulsed the course watt great a greature of the the chief. General Sheridan repaired the Arms of the Potential teach the send on which he started from Equation is zone, has not die trained the depute nt Benger Dam and Additional attachment from those and come large emp plies of rations, and many male of called at the all trees, recognized wheat Pour hundred of our nich on the rower to heldered as join here of war; not and defeated the empty bear also at Yellow Taxern, earned the first line of works around Riche, and Just Bodong the series of lose time strong to be curred by assess to reversed to the parth bank of the Chrishbourns at Mendon Bridge ander to any the part moved by a detour to Haxall's Landings on the Jane of River, where I closes minimizated with the noral Parties - There exist lead to earliest of drawing off the whole of the enemis coasiles here, making it is deponentially erkov tee kriminel edin tradici

General Butler there of his many force apiths James River, is pursuance of instructions, on the 4th of Max. Conversity homes Jaxonz joined him with the Tenth Corps. At the cance tone he set it a force of eighteen hundred cavalry, he way of West Point, to have a possition with him wherever he might get a feethed hand a force of three thousand cavalry, under General Bantz from Suffells, to equal against the rend south of Peterstong and Redmond. On the 4th Jocenneid without opposition, both this Point and Bernarda Harries his movement being a complete surprise. On the 6th Jets is a his movement being a complete surprise. On the 6th Jets is the made a recommissioner against the Peterstonic and Redmond rate from the made a recommissioner against the Peterstonic and Redmond with he made a recommissioner against the Peterstonic and Redmond with the follows:

Hearquairmen was limbered Leberary, May b, 1964.

Hon, E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With accentacen hundred eavalry we have advanced up the Penansia, forced the Chicka-

hominy, and have safely brought them to their present position. were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets toward Richmond.

General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the same day with our movement up James River, forced the Black Water, burned the railroad-bridge at Stony Creek, below Petersburg, cutting into Beauregard's force at that point.

We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold out

against the whole of Lee's army. I have ordered up the supplies.

Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the cutting of the railroads by Kautz. That portion which reached Petersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight.

General Grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to

Lee from Beauregard's force.

BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General.

On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of the enemy's first line of defenses at Drury's Bluff, or Fort Darling, with small loss. The time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his loose forces in North and South Carolina, and bring them to the defense of those places. On the 16th the enemy attacked General Butler in his position in front of Drury's Bluff. He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments between the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers, the enemy intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the city, and all that was valuable to him. His army, therefore, though in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. It required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold it there.

On the 12th, General Kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a raid

against the Danville railroad, which he struck at Coalfield, Powhatan, and Chula stations, destroying them, the railroad track, two freighttrains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary and other stores; thence, crossing to the South Side road, struck it at Wilson's, Wellsville, and Black's and White's stations, destroying the road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to City Point,

which he reached on the 18th.

On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General Butler, the enemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an ironclad ram, attacked Plymouth, North Carolina, commanded by General H. W. Wessells, and our gunboats there; and after severe fighting the place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and armament captured. The gunboat Smithfield was sunk and the Miami disabled.

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loss in every instance. That night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, but failed. The 2d was spent in getting troops into position for an attack on the 3d. On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy's works, in the hope of driving him from his position. In this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe, was comparatively light. It was the only general attack made from the Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own losses. I would not be understood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy severe losses, which tended in the end to the complete overthrow of the rebellion.

From the proximity of the enemy to his defenses around Richmond. it was impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and the city. I was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, and invest Richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the James. While the former might have been better as a covering for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg railroad—a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My idea from the start had been to beat Lee's army north of Richmond, if possible; then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the James River, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. the battle of the Wilderness it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of life than I was willing to make, all could not be accomplished that I had designed north of Richmond. I therefore determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville and Gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg; and when the cavalry got well off, to move the army to the south side of the James River, by the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources of supply, except by the canal.

On the 7th two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, got off on the expedition against the Virginia Central railroad, with in-

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealed itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south by Beauregard against the Army of the Potomac. In addition to this reinforcement a very considerable one—probably not less than fifteen thousand men—was obtained by calling in the scattered troops under Breekinridge from the western part of Virginia.

The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was difficult to operate from against the enemy. I determined, therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, I directed that they be sent forward under command of Major-General W. F. Smith,

to join the Army of the Potomac.

On the 24th of May the Ninth Army-corps, commanded by Major-General A. E. Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the Potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of Major-General Meade's command.

Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than either of his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bank of the North Anna, and moved via Hanover Town to turn

the enemy's position by his right.

Generals Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under Sheridan, and the Sixth Corps, led the advance, crossed the Pamunkey River at Hanover Town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe but successful engagement with the enemy at Hawes's Shop. On the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the Hanover Court House and Cold Harbor road, and developed the enemy's position north of the Chickahominy. Late on the evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was repulsed with very considerable loss. An attack was immediately ordered by General Meade along his whole line, which resulted in driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish-line.

On the 31st General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad-bridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the enemy's cavalry. General Sheridan on the same day reached Cold Harbor, and held it until relieved by the Sixth Corps and General Smith's command, which had just arrived, via White House, from General

Butler's army.

On the first day of June an attack was made at 5 p.m. by the Sixth Corps and the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the right of the Sixth Corps, and in front of General Smith. During the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy

During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the James River, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base. by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge vessels. Too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. Under the general supervision of the chief quartermaster, Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, and but little difficulty roads between the army and our water-base,

and but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.

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U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

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structions to Hunter—whom I hoped be would meet near Charlottes, ville—to join his forces to Sheridan's, and after the work laid out for their was thoroughly done, to join the Army of the Potomae by the route haid down in Sheridan's instructions

On the 10th of June General Butler sent a force of infantry under General Gillmore, and of eavalry under General Kautz, to capture Petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges across the Appointtox. The eavalry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well in toward the town, but were forced to retire. General Gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Berminda Hundred without attempting one

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I sent back to Bermuda Hundred and City Point General Smith's command by water via the White House, to reach there in advance of the Army of the Potomae. This was for the express purpose of securing Petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our intention, rould reinforce the place.

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the 12th. One division of cavalry, under General Wilson, and the Fifth Corps, crossed the Chickahoniny at Long Bridge, and moved out to White Oak Swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps. The advance corps reached James River, at Wilcox's Landing and Charles City Court House, on the night of the 13th

During three long years the Armies of the Potomas and Northern Virginia had been confronting each other. In that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing the van tage-ground of either. The Southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was displayed in the Sorth, finding that they had failed to capture Washington and march on to New York, as they had bousted they would do, assumed that they only defended their enpital and Southern territory. Hence Antictam, Gettysburg, and all the other buttles that had been fought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for them. Their army believed this. It produced a morale which could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. The battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive. His losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the attacking party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. The details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of the soldiery have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of Major-General Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it.

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General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the field of battle fifteen hundred men, three pieces of artillery, and three hundred stand of small arms. On the 8th of the same month he formed a junction with Crook and Averell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct on Lynchburg via Lexington, which place he reached and invested on the sixteenth day of June. Up to this time he was very successful, and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march through a hostile country, he would no doubt have captured that, to the enemy important, point. The destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was very great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg a short time before Hunter. After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of Kanawha. This lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from the defense of the North.

Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville instead of Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it. If it did not he would have been within easy distance of the James River Canal, on the main line of communication between Lynchburg and the force sent for its defense. I have never taken exception to the operations of General Hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for I have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions and the interests of the service. The promptitude of his movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the com-

mendation of his country.

To return to the Army of the Potomac. The Second Corps commenced crossing the James River on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at Wilcox's Landing. The laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward by both bridge and ferry.

After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to Bermuda Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate

capture of Petersburg.

The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to send General Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he then held. I told him that I would return at once to the Army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing, and throw it forward to Petersburg by divisions

as rapidly as it could be done; that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring troops against us. General Smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight next morning, but, for some reason that I have never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines until near sundown. Then, with a part of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines northeast of Petersburg from the Appomattox River for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was about 7 P.M. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The night was clear—the moon shining brightly—and favorable to further operations. General Hancock, with two divisions of the Second Corps, reached General Smith just after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (Smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. But instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into Petersburg, he requested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight.

By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. An attack was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops under Smith and the Second and Ninth corps. It required until that time for the Ninth Corps to get up and into position. The attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clock the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously captured by General Smith,

several pieces of artillery, and over four hundred prisoners.

The Fifth Corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. The advantages of position gained by us were very great. The army then proceeded to envelop Petersburg toward the South Side railroad, as far as possible without attacking fortifications.

On the 16th the enemy, to reinforce Petersburg, withdrew from a part of his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting, no doubt, to get troops from north of the James to take the place of those withdrawn before we could discover it. General Butler, taking advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond. As soon as I was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it I ordered two divisions of the Sixth Corps, General Wright commanding, that were embarking at Wilcox's Landing, under orders for City Point, to report to General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler was notified, and the

importance of holding a position in advance of his present line urged

upon him.

About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced back to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. General Wright, with his two divisions, joined General Butler on the forenoon of the 17th, the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works. But instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his own line. Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy attacked and drove in his pickets and reoccupied his old line.

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge

with Bermuda Hundred.

On the 19th General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition against the Virginia Central railroad, arrived at the White House just as the enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. The result of this expedition was that General Sheridan met the enemy's cavalry near Trevillian Station, on the morning of the 11th of June, whom he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in complete rout. He left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. On the 12th he destroyed the railroad from Trevillian Station to Louisa Court House. This occupied until 3 P.M., when he advanced in the direction of Gordonsville. He found the enemy reinforced by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the latter place, and too strong to successfully assault. On the extreme right, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by infantry. Night closed the contest. Not having sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals being without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and hearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdrew his command to the north side of the North Anna, and commenced his return march, reaching White House at the time before stated. After breaking up the depot at that place, he moved to the James River, which he reached safely after heavy fighting. He commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort Powhatan, without further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac. On the 22d General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of

On the 22d General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry of the Army of the James, moved against the enemy's railroads south of Richmond. Striking the Weldon railroad at Reams's Station, destroying the depot and several miles of the road, and the South Side road about fifteen miles from Petersburg to near Nottoway Station, where he met and defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry. He

reached Burkesville Station on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville railroad to Roanoke Bridge,—a distance of twenty-five miles,—where he found the enemy in force and in a position from which he could not dislodge him. He then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon railroad crossing of Stony Creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. Thence he made a detour from his left with a view of reaching Reams's Station (supposing it to be in our possession). At this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of his artillery and trains. In this last encounter General Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way into our lines. General Wilson, with the remainder of his force, succeeded in crossing the Nottoway River and coming in safely on our left and rear. The damage to the enemy in this expedition more than compensated for the losses we sustained. It severed all connection by railroad with Richmond for several weeks.

With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond to the Anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in the Shenandoah; and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared in front of the Ninth Corps and assault the enemy's lines at that place, on the night of the 26th of July the Second Corps and two divisions of the cavalry corps and Kautz's cavalry were crossed to the north bank of the James River, and joined the force General Butler had there. On the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. On the 28th our lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market road, but in getting this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. The fighting lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides. The first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown there by the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the diversion made, by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force back there. One division of the Second Corps was withdrawn on the night of the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the Eighteenth Corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the assault to be made. The other two divisions of the Second Corps and Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and moved in front of Petersburg. On the morning of the 30th, between four and five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a regiment; and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the Ninth Corps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion, and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance promptly to the ridge beyond.

Had they done this I have every reason to believe that Petersburg would have fallen. Other troops were immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete) and get forces to this point for its defense. The captured line thus held being untenable and of no advantage to us, the troops were withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. Thus terminated in disaster what promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign.

Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter was retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River, thus laying the Shenandonh Valley open for raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania, he returned northward and moved down that valley. As soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained, General Hunter, who had reached the Kanawha River, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to Harper's Ferry; but owing to the difficulty of navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was experienced in getting there. It became necessary, therefore, to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. For this purpose the Sixth Corps was taken from the armies operating against Richmond, to which was added the Nineteenth Corps, then fortunately beginning to arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf Department, under orders issued immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the Red River expedition. The garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time made up of heavy artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments from the invalid corps. One division, under command of General Ricketts, of the Sixth Corps was sent to Baltimore, and the remaining two divisions of the Sixth Corps, under General Wright, were subsequently sent to Washington. On the 3d of July the enemy approached Martinsburg. General Sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across the Potomac at Shepherdstown, and General Weber, commanding at Harper's Ferry, crossed the river and occupied Maryland Heights. On the 6th the enemy occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column toward Frederick City. General Wallace, with Ricketts's division and his own command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from Baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the Monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad-bridge. His force was not sufficient to ensure success; but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy, and thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with two divisions of the Sixth Corps, and the advance of the Nineteenth Corps before him. From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington, his cavalry advance reaching Rockville on the evening of the 10th. On the 12th a reconnaissance was thrown out in front of Fort Stevens, to ascertain the enemy's position and force. A severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost about two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded. The enemy's loss was probably greater. He commenced retreating during the night. Learning the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested by telegraph, at forty-five minutes past 11 P.M., on the 12th, the assignment of Major-General H. G. Wright to the command of all the troops that could be made available to operate in the field against the enemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all the force he could, and push Early to the last moment. General Wright commenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken at Snicker's ferry, on the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred; and on the 20th General Averell encountered and defeated a portion of the rebel army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners.

Learning that Early was retreating south toward Lynchburg or Richmond, I directed that the Sixth and Nineteenth corps be got back to the armies operating against Richmond, so that they might be used in a movement against Lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the Valley; and that Hunter should remain in the Shenandoah Valley, keeping between any force of the enemy and Washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible. I felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the fact would be developed before the Sixth and Nineteenth corps could leave Washington. Subsequently the Nineteenth Corps was excepted from the

order to return to the James.

About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the Sixth Corps, then at Washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. The rebel force moved down the Valley, and sent a raiding party into Pennsylvania, which on the 30th burned Chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, toward Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelley, and with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West Virginia. From the time of the first raid the telegraph-wires were frequently down between Washington and City Point, making it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat. It took from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get despatches through and return answers back; so that often orders would be given, and then information would be received showing a different state of facts from those on which they were based, causing a confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise would have been. To remedy this evil it was evident to my mind that some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the Departments of West Virginia, Washington, Susquenanna, and the Middle Department, and I so recommended.

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On the 2d of August I ordered General Sheridan to report in person to Major-General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington, with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces against Early. At this time the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of Winchester, while our forces, under General Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the crossing of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, leaving open to the enemy western Maryland and southern Pennsylvania. From where I was I hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington. Therefore on the 4th I left City Point to visit Hunter's command and determine for myself what was best to be done. On arrival there, and after consultation with General Hunter, I issued to him the following instructions:

MONOCACY BRIDGE, MARYLAND, August 5, 1864, 8 p.m.

GENERAL: Concentrate all your available force without delay in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary. Use, in this concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the Potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him wherever found; follow him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a competent commander a sufficient force to look after the raiders and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a force, the brigade of cavalry now en route from Washington via Rockville may be taken into account.

There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south side of the Potomae. One brigade will probably start to-morrow. In pushing up the Shenandonh Valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed—they should rather be protected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards.

Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this, you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the course he takes.

Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country through which you march.

MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached Halltown that night.

General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have General Sheridan, then at Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry, by the morning train, with orders to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on General Hunter at Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of instructions. I remained at Monocacy until General Sheridan arrived, on the morning of the 6th; and after a conference with him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, I returned to City Point by way of Washington.

On the 7th of August the Middle Department and the Departments of West Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna were constituted into the "Middle Military Division," and Major-General Sheridan

was assigned to temporary command of the same.

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson, were sent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The first reached him at Harper's Ferry about the 11th of August.

His operations during the month of August and the fore part of September were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were generally successful; but no general engagement took place. The two armies lay in such a position—the enemy on the west bank of the Opequan Creek covering Winchester, and our forces in front of Berryville—that either could bring on a battle at any time. Defeat to us would lay open to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be interposed to check him. Under these circumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. Finally the use of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving Pennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened invasion so great, that I determined the risk should be taken. But fearing to telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than I did of General Sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, I left City Point on the 15th of September to visit him at his headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done. I met him at Charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army lay, what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of success, that I saw there were but two words of instruction necessary—Go in! For the convenience of forage the teams for supplying the army were kept at Harper's Ferry. I asked him if he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing Tuesday morning. His reply was that he could before daylight on Monday. He was off promptly to time, and I may here add that the result was such that I have never since deemed it necessary to visit General Sheridan before giving him orders.

Early on the morning of the 19th General Sheridan attacked General Early at the crossing on the Opequan Creek, and after a most sanguinary and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the evening, defeated him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from Opequan Creek to Winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces of artillery. The enemy rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at Fisher's Hill, where he was attacked and again defeated with heavy loss on the 20th [22d]. Sheridan pursued him with great energy through Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge. After stripping the upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel army, he returned to Strasburg.

and took position on the north side of Cedar Creek.

Having received considerable reinforcements, General Early again returned to the Valley, and on the 9th of October his cavalry encountered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, with the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and fifty prison-On the night of the 18th the enemy crossed the mountains which separate the branches of the Shenandoah, forded the North Fork, and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the darkness and the fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteries which enfladed our whole line. Our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much confusion, but were finally rallied between Middletown and Newtown. At this juneture General Sheridan, who was at Winchester when the battle commenced, arrived on the field, arranged his lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor. The enemy was defeated with great slaughter and the loss of most of his artillery and trains, and the trophies he had captured in the morning. The wreck of his army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of Staunton and Lynchburg. Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus ended this the enemy's last attempt to invade the North via the Shenandoah Valley. I was now enabled to return the Sixth Corps to the Army of the Potomae, and to send one division from Sheridan's army to the Army of the James, and another to Savannah, Georgia, to hold Sherman's new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and thus enable him to move without detaching from his force for that purpose.

Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had detached three divisions from Petersburg to reinforce Early in the Shenandoah Valley. I therefore sent the Second Corps and Gregg's division of cavalry, of the Army of the Potomae, and a force of General Butler's army, on the night of the 13th of August, to threaten Richmond from the north side of the James, to prevent him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw back those sent. In this move we captured six pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that were under marching orders, and as-

certained that but one division (Kershaw's) of the three reputed de-

tached had gone.

The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist this movement, the Fifth Corps, General Warren commanding, was moved out on the 18th, and took possession of the Weldon railroad. During the day he had considerable fighting. To regain possession of the road the enemy made repeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great loss. On the night of the 20th the troops on the north side of the James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the front at Petersburg. On the 25th the Second Corps and Gregg's division of cavalry, while at Reams's Station destroying the railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fighting a part of our line gave way, and five pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy.

By the 12th of September a branch railroad was completed from the City Point and Petersburg railroad to the Weldon railroad, enabling us to supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in

front of Petersburg.

The extension of our lines across the Weldon railroad compelled the enemy to so extend his that it seemed he could have but few troops north of the James for the defense of Richmond. night of the 28th the Tenth Corps, Major-General Birney, and the Eighteenth Corps, Major-General Ord commanding, of General Butler's army, were crossed to the north side of the James, and advanced on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments below Chaffin's Farm, known as Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and the New Market road and This success was followed up by a gallant assault intrenchments. upon Fort Gilmer, immediately in front of the Chaffin Farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy loss. Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of this, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but was unable to get The position captured from the enemy was so threatening to Richmond that I determined to hold it. The enemy made several desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly. On the morning of the 30th General Meade sent out a reconnaissance, with a view to attacking the enemy's line if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of troops to the north side. In this reconnaissance we captured and held the enemy's works near Poplar Spring Church. In the afternoon troops moving to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces holding the captured works. Our cavalry under Gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great loss.

On the 7th of October the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north

of the James, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery—eight or nine pieces. This he followed up by an attack on our intrenehed infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. On the 13th a reconnaissance was sent out by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us.

On the 27th the Army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. The Second Corps, followed by two divisions of the Fifth Corps, with the cavalry in advance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of Hatcher's Run, and moved up the south side of it toward the South Side railroad, until the Second Corps and part of the cavalry reached the Boydton plank road where it crosses Hatcher's Run. At this point we were six miles distant from the South Side railroad, which I had hoped by this movement to reach and hold. But finding that we had not reached the end of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful assault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, I determined to withdraw to within our fortified Orders were given accordingly. Immediately upon receiving a report that General Warren had connected with General Hancock. I returned to my headquarters. Soon after I left, the enemy moved out across Hatcher's Run, in the gap between Generals Hancock and Warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a desperate attack on General Hancock's right and rear. General Hancock immediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position.

In support of this movement General Butler made a demonstration on the north side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the Williamsburg road, and also on the York River railroad. In the former he was unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work, which was afterward abandoned and his forces withdrawn to their former positions.

From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the defense and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent his detaching any considerable force to send south. By the 7th of February our lines were extended to Hatcher's Run, and the Weldon railroad had been destroyed to Hicksford.

General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the 6th of May, with the Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded respectively by Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, upon Johnston's army at Dalton; but finding the enemy's position at Buzzard's Roost, covering Dalton, too strong to be assaulted, General McPher-

son was sent through Snake Gap to turn it, while Generals Thomas and Schofield threatened it in front and on the north. This movement was successful. Johnston, finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of May 15th. A heavy battle ensued. During the night the enemy retreated south. Late on the 17th his rear-guard was overtaken near Adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed. The next morning, however, he had again disappeared. He was vigorously pursued, and was overtaken at Cassville on the 19th, but during the ensuing night retreated across the Etowah. While these operations were going on, General Jefferson C. Davis's division of Thomas's army was sent to Rome, capturing it, with its forts and artillery and its valuable mills and foundries. General Sherman. having given his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it in motion on the 23d for Dallas, with a view of turning the difficult pass at Allatoona. On the afternoon of the 25th the advance, under General Hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to New Hope Church, near Dallas. Several sharp encounters occurred at this point. The most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted General McPherson at Dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse.

On the 4th of June Johnston abandoned his intrenched position at New Hope Church, and retreated to the strong positions of Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost mountains. He was forced to yield the two last-named places and concentrate his army on Kenesaw, where, on the 27th, Generals Thomas and McPherson made a determined but unsuccessful assault. On the night of the 2d of July Sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank, and on the morning of the 3d found that the enemy, in consequence of this movement, had abandoned Kene-

saw and retreated across the Chattahoochee.

General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochee, to give his men rest and get up stores, until the 17th of July, when he resumed his operations, crossed the Chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of the railroad to Augusta, and drove the enemy back to Atlanta. At this place General Hood succeeded General Johnston in command of the rebel army, and assuming the offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon Sherman in the vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which was on the 22d of July. About 1 P.M. of this day the brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson was killed. General Logan succeeded him, and commanded the Army of the Tennessee, through this desperate battle and until he was superseded by Major-General Howard, on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had characterized him in the command of a corps or division.

In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. Finding it impossible to entirely invest the place, General Sherman, after

securing his line of communications across the Chattahoochee, moved his main force round by the enemy's left flank upon the Montgomery and Macon roads, to draw the enemy from his fortifications. In this he succeeded, and after defeating the enemy near Rough-and Ready, Jonesboro', and Lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of September occupied Atlanta, the objective point of his campaign.

About the time of this move the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler, attempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at Dalton, and driven into East Tennessee, whence it proceeded west to McMinnville, Murfreesboro', and Franklin, and was finally driven south of the Tennessee. The damage done by this raid was repaired

in a few days.

During the partial investment of Atlanta General Rousseau joined General Sherman with a force of envalry from Decatur, having made a successful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery railroad, and its branches near Opelika. Cavalry raids were also made by Generals McCook, Garrard, and Stoneman, to cut the remaining railroad communication with Atlanta. The first two were successful, the latter disastrous.

General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was prompt, skilful, and brilliant. The history of his flank movements and battles during that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest unsurpassed by anything in history.

His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders accom-

panying it, give the details of that most successful campaign.

He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track railroad from Nashville to the point where he was operating. This passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot of it had to be protected by troops. The cavalry force of the enemy under Forrest, in northern Mississippi, was evidently waiting for Sherman to advance far enough into the mountains of Georgia to make a retreat disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the possibility of further use. To guard against this danger, Sherman left what he supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against Forrest in West Tonnessee, He directed General Washburn, who commanded there, to send Brigadier-General S. D. Sturgis in command of this force to attack him. On the morning of the 10th of June General Sturgis met the enemy near Guntown, Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and confusion to Memphis,—a distance of about one hundred miles,—hotly pursued by the enemy. By this, however, the enemy was defeated in his designs upon Sherman's line of communications. The persistency with which he followed up this success exhausted him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary. In the mean time Major-General A. J. Smith, with the troops of the Army of the Tennessee that had been

sent by General Sherman to General Banks, arrived at Memphis on their return from Red River, where they had done most excellent service. He was directed by General Sherman to immediately take the offensive against Forrest. This he did with the promptness and effect which has characterized his whole military career. On the 14th of July he met the enemy at Tupelo, Mississippi, and whipped him badly. The fighting continued through three days. Our loss was small compared with that of the enemy. Having accomplished the object of his expedition, General Smith returned to Memphis.

During the months of March and April this same force under Forrest annoyed us considerably. On the 24th of March it captured Union City, Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked Paducah, commanded by Colonel S. G. Hicks, Fortieth Illinois Volunteers. Colonel Hicks, having but a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy and drove

him from the place.

On the 13th of April part of this force, under the rebel General Buford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to surrender, but received for reply from Colonel Lawrence, Thirty-fourth New Jersey Volunteers, that, being placed there by his government with adequate force to hold his post and repel all enemies from it, sur-

render was out of the question.

On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow, Tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry and the First Regiment Alabama colored troops, commanded by Major Booth. The garrison fought bravely until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy carried the works by assault, and, after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison.

On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared

before Paducah, but was again driven off.

Guerrillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's operations, were also very active in Kentucky. The most noted of these was Morgan. With a force of from two to three thousand cavalry he entered the State through Pound Gap in the latter part of May. On the 11th of June they attacked and captured Cynthiana, with its entire garrison. On the 12th he was overtaken by General Burbridge, and completely routed with heavy loss, and was finally driven out of the State. This notorious guerrilla was afterward surprised and killed near Greenville, Tennessee, and his command captured and dispersed by General Gillem.

In the absence of official reports of the commencement of the Red River expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent by General Sherman under General A. J. Smith, I am unable to give the date of its starting. The troops under General Smith, comprising two divisions of the Sixteenth and a detachment

of the Seventeenth Army-corps, left Vieksburg on the 10th of March, and reached the designated point on Red River one day earlier than that appointed by General Banks. The rebel forces at Fort de Russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the 14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed forward to Fort de Russy, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it with its garrison—about three hundred and fifty men, eleven pieces of artillery, and many small arms. Our loss was but slight. On the 15th he pushed forward to Alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th. On the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at Henderson's Hill, in which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and four pieces of artillery.

On the 28th he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebel General Taylor, at Cane River. By the 26th General Banks had assembled his whole army at Alexandria, and pushed forward to Grand Ecore. On the morning of April 6th he moved from Grand Ecore. On the afternoon of the 7th he advanced and met the enemy near Pleasant Hill, and drove him from the field. On the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond Pleasant Hill. but was again compelled to retreat. On the 8th, at Sabine Cross Roads and Peach Hill, the enemy attacked and defeated his advance. capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and an immense amount of transportation and stores. During the night General Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another battle was fought on the 9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss. During the night General Banks continued his retrograde movement to Grand Ecore, and thence to Alexandria, which he reached on the 27th of April. Here a serious difficulty arose in getting Admiral Porter's fleet, which accompanied the expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since they passed up as to prevent their return. At the suggestion of Colonel (now Brigadier General) Bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams were constructed, by which the channel was contracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids in safety.

The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after considerable skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached Morganzia and Point Coupée near the end of the month. The disastrous termination of this expedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plans of a movement in force

sufficient to ensure the capture of Mobile.

On the 23d of March Major-General Steele left Little Rock with the Seventh Army-corps, to cooperate with General Banks's expedition on the Red River, and reached Arkadelphia on the 28th. On the 16th of April, after driving the enemy before him, he was joined near Elkin's ferry, in Washita County, by General Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith. After several severe skirmishes, in which

the enemy was defeated, General Steele reached Camden, which he

occupied about the middle of April.

On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks on Red River, and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark's Mill, in Dallas County, General Steele determined to fall back to the Arkansas River. He left Camden on the 26th of April, and reached Little Rock on the 2d of May. On the 30th of April the enemy attacked him while crossing Saline River at Jenkins's ferry, but was repulsed with considerable loss. Our loss was about six hundred in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the "Military Division of the West Mississippi," was therefore directed to send the Nineteenth Army-corps to join the armies operating against Richmond, and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the positions and

lines of communications he then occupied.

Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman, General Canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was collecting near the Mississippi River. General Smith met and defeated this force near Lake Chicot on the 5th of June. Our loss was

about forty killed and seventy wounded.

In the latter part of July General Canby sent Major-General Gordon Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to cooperate with Admiral Farragut against the defenses of Mobile Bay. On the 8th of August Fort Gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces. Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned.

On the 9th Fort Morgan was invested, and after a severe bombardment surrendered on the 23d. The total captures amounted to fourteen hundred and sixty-four prisoners and one hundred and four

pieces of artillery.

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel General Price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached Jacksonport, on his way to invade Missouri, General A. J. Smith's command, then en route from Memphis to join Sherman, was ordered to Missouri. A cavalry force was also, at the same time, sent from Memphis, under command of Colonel Winslow. This made General Rosecrans's forces superior to those of Price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price and drive him back, while the forces under General Steele, at Arkansas, would cut off his retreat. On the twenty-sixth day of September Price attacked Pilot Knob, and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to the Missouri River, and continued up that river toward Kansas. General Curtis, commanding Department of Kansas, immediately collected such forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while General Rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear.

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated,

with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of prisoners. He made a precipitate retreat to northern Arkansas. The impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, shows to how little purpose a superior force may be used. There is no reason why General Rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beaten and driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob.

September 20th the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated Soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, and after a severe fight were compelled to surrender. Forrest destroyed the railroad westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day cut the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad near Tullahoma and Dechard. On the morning of the 30th one column of Forrest's command, under Buford, appeared before Huntsville and summoned the surrender of the garrison. Receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its surrender, and received the same reply as on the night before. He withdrew in the direction of Athens, which place had been regarrisoned, and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of October, but without success. On the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but was handsomely repulsed.

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the morning of the 1st, but did not make an attack. On the morning of the 3d he moved toward Mount Pleasant. While these operations were going on, every exertion was made by General Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest before he could recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his escape to Corinth, Mississippi.

In September an expedition, under General Burbridge, was sent to destroy the salt-works at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy on the 2d of October, about three miles and a half from Saltville, and drove him into his strongly intrenched position around the saltworks, from which he was unable to dislodge him. During the night he withdrew his command and returned to Kentucky.

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting and supplying them for future service. The great length of road from Atlanta to the Cumberland River, however, which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest.

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, Georgia, which was reported in the papers of the South, and soon became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus

enabling General Sherman to fully meet them. He exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive could successfully undertake the offensive against the army that had so often defeated it.

In execution of this plan, Hood, with his army, was soon reported to the southwest of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's right, he succeeded in reaching the railroad about Big Shanty, and moved north

on it.

General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the remainder of his army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden, Alabama. Seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if he attempted to hold Atlanta, General Sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as follows:

> CENTREVILLE, GEORGIA, October 10, noon.

Despatch about Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing Coosa River, twelve miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes over the Mobile and Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas with the troops now in Tennessee, to defend the State? He will have an ample force when the reinforcements ordered reach Nashville.

> W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT.

For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this despatch, I quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter: "I will therefore give my opinion: that your army and Canby's should be reinforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the river; that Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi River, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by the way of the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and put my army in final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce, and the city of Savannah is in our possession." This was in reply to a letter of mine of date September 12th, in answer to a despatch of his containing substantially the same proposition, and in which I informed him of a proposed movement against Wilmington, and of the situation in Virginia, etc.

> CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, October 11, 1864, 11 A.M.

Your despatch of October 10th received. Does it not look as if Hood was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the Tennessee River about Florence or Decatur? If he does this, he ought to

be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee River. If you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home. Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If there is any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that, but I must trust to your own judgment. I find I shall not be able to send a force from here to act with you on Savananh. Your movements, therefore, will be independent of mine—at least until the fall of Richmond takes place. I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent Hood from going north. With Wilson turned loose with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than heretofore.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General,

MAJOR GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN.

KINGSTON, GEORGIA, October 11, 11 a.m.

Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome. He threw one corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta with the Twentieth Corps, and have strong detachments along my line. This reduces my active force to a comparatively small army. We cannot remain here on the defensive. With the twenty-five thousand men and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city; send back all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective army move through Georgia, smashing things, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of my being on the defensive, I would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee.

Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.
W. T. Sherman,

Major-General,

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GRANT.

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, October 11, 1864, 11:30 p.m.

Your despatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee River firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you think best,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN.

It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through to the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading east and west, through Georgia, to effectually sever the East from the West; in other words, cut the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it had been cut once by our gaining possession of the Mississippi River. General Sherman's plan virtually effected this object.

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the mean time to watch Hood. Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across Sand Mountain, General Sherman sent the Fourth Corps, Major-General Stanley commanding, and the Twentythird Corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, back to Chattanooga to report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, whom he had placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save the four army-corps and cavalry division he designed to move with through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal there was little doubt that General Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee, or, in the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and beat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that Sherman should start for the sea-coast.

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of November, he commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and Macon. His coming-out point could not be definitely fixed. Having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could reach, instead of such as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy, however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army—the only considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the Mississippi River—northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open, and Sherman's route to his own choice.

How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of Fort McAllister on the Savannah River, and the occupation of Savannah on the 21st of December, are all clearly set forth in General Sherman's admirable report.

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two expeditions—one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from Vicksburg, Mississippi—were started by General Canby to cut the enemy's lines of communication with Mobile and detain troops in that field. General Foster, commanding Department of the South, also sent an expedition, via Broad River, to destroy the railroad between Charleston and Savannah. The expedition from Vicksburg, under command of Brevet Brigadier-General E. D. Osband (colonel Third United States Colored Cavalry), captured on the 27th of November, and destroyed, the Mississippi Central railroad bridge and trestle-work over Big Black River, near Canton, thirty miles of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. The expedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable results.

pedition from the Department of the South, under the immediate

command of Brigadier-General John P. Hatch, consisting of about five thousand men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad River and debarked at Boyd's Neek on the 29th of November, from where it moved to strike the railroad at Grahamsville. At Honey Hill, about three miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed, wounded, and missing. During the night General Hatch withdrew. On the 6th of December General Foster obtained a position covering the Charleston and Savannah

railroad between the Coosawhatchie and Tuliflany rivers,

Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. events, had I had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting. the 26th of October the advance of Hood's army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but, failing to earry the place, withdrew toward Courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side of the Tennessee River, near Florence. On the 28th Forrest reached the Tennessee at Fort Heiman, and enplured a gunboat and three transports. On the 2d of November he planted butteries above and below Johnsonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three ganboats and eight transports. On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. The gunboats, becoming disabled, were set on fire, as also were the transports, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. About a million and a half dollars' worth of stores and property on the levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire. On the 5th the enemy disappeared and crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River, above Johnsonville, moving toward Clifton, and subsequently joined Hood. the night of the 5th General Schofield, with the advance of the Twentythird Corps, reached Johnsonville; but, finding the enemy gone, was ordered to Pulaski, and put in command of all the troops there, with instructions to watch the movements of Hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival of General A. J. Smith's command from Missouri, and until General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted.

On the 19th General Hood continued his advance. General Thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back toward Nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements. The enemy, coming up with our main force, commanded by General Schofield, at Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but was in every instance repulsed. His loss in this battle was one thousand seven hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two

prisoners, and three thousand eight hundred wounded. Among his losses were six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. Our entire loss was two thousand three hundred. This was the first serious opposition the enemy met with, and, I am satisfied, was the fatal blow to all his expectations. During the night General Schofield fell back toward Nashville. This left the field to the enemy,—not lost by battle, but voluntarily abandoned,—so that General Thomas's whole force might be brought together. The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his line in front of Nashville on the 2d of December.

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the Tennessee River, and that Price was going out of Missouri, General Rosecrans was ordered to send to General Thomas the troops of General A. J. Smith's command, and such other troops as he could spare. The advance of this reinforcement reached Nashville on the 30th of November.

On the morning of the 15th December General Thomas attacked Hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners, including

four general officers.

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. After urging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started West to superintend matters there in person. Reaching Washington city, I received General Thomas's despatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted. All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied but that General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood before Nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of Hood was so complete that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment.

After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued by cavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. On the 28th of December our advanced forces ascertained that he had made

good his escape to the south side of the river.

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee and North Alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and Vol. II.—28

artillery, General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the Tennessee River. A small force of cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, Fifteenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance, capturing considerable transportation and the enemy's pontoon bridge. The details of these operations will be found clearly set forth in General Thomas's report.

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major General Grierson, started from Memphis on the 21st of December. On the 25th he surprised and captured Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona, Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for Hood's army, four thousand new English carbines, and large amounts of public stores. On the morning of the 28th he attacked and captured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and destroyed a train of fourteen cars. Thence turning to the southwest, he struck the Mississippi Central railroad at Winona, destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine-shops and public property at Grenada, arriving at Vicks-

burg January 5th.

During these operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a force under General Breckinridge, entered Fast Tennessee. On the 13th of November he attacked General Gillem, near Morristown. eapturing his artillery and several hundred prisoners. Gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated to Knoxville. Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to near Knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General Ammen. Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman concentrated the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near Bean's Station, to operate against Breekinridge and destroy or drive him into Virginia; destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad into Virginia as far as he could go without endangering his command. On the 12th of December he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's forces wherever he met them. On the 16th he struck the enemy, under Vaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to Wytheville, eapturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight prisoners; and destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and the extensive lead-works near there. Returning to Marion, he met a force under Breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of Saltville, that had started in pursuit. He at once made arrangements to attack it the next morning; but morning found Breckingidge gone. He then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount of stores, and enptured eight pieces of artillery. Having thus successfully executed his instructions, he returned General Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville.

Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad and

send cotton and other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of great strategic value. The navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect. The nature of the outlet of Cape Fear River was such that it required watching for so great a distance that, without possession of the land north of New Inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners.

To secure the possession of this land required the cooperation of a land force, which I agreed to furnish. Immediately commenced the assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D. Porter, of the most formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point. This necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as that of the loyal North; and through the imprudence of the public press, and very likely of officers of both branches of service. the exact object of the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers both North and South. The enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it. This caused a postponement of the expedition until the latter part of November, when, being again called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, I agreed to furnish the men required at once, and went myself, in company with Major-General Butler, to Hampton Roads, where we had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force required and the time of starting. A force of six thousand five hundred men was regarded as sufficient. The time of starting was not definitely arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of December, if not before. Learning, on the 30th of November, that Bragg had gone to Georgia, taking with him most of the forces about Wilmington, I deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its destination before the return of Bragg, and directed General Butler to make all arrangements for the departure of Major-General Weitzel, who had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might not be detained one moment.

On the 6th of December the following instructions were given:

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864.

GENERAL: The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If successful in this, the second will be to capture Wilmington itself. There are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the enemy's forces, now looking after Sherman in Georgia. The directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of where they embark and the amount of intrenching-tools to be taken. The object of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the mainland between Cape Fear River and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river.

Should such landing be effected while the enems still holds Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the race, then the two-per should intronch themselves, and, by ecoperating with the race, effect the reduction and capture of those places. These in our hands, the many sould enter the barbor, and the part of Wilmington would be scaled. Obsailed Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it is built full into the bands of our troops immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attention to expense. If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the second will become a matter of after-consideration.

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Should the troops under General Wested fail to effect a landing at or more Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armica operating against Richmond without delay.

In a Guant,

MARKETHERICAL B. P. BUTLER

General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for this enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go through him. They were so sent, but theneral Weitzel has since officially informed me that he never received the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their existence until be read treneral Butler's published official report of the Fort Fisher failure, with my indersement and papers accompanying it. I had no idea of theneral Butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off from Bermuda Hundred, and then did not dream but that theneral Weitzel had received all the instructions and would be in command I rather formed the idea that theneral Butler was actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. The expedition was detained several days at Hampton Boads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat.

The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without any delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon General Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter.

The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and arrived at the place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the evening of the 15th. Admiral Porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having put in at Reaufort to get ammunition for the monitors. The sea becoming rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Reaufort to replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to the place of rendezvous until the 24th. The powder-boat was exploded on the morning of the 24th, before the return of General Butler from Beaufort; but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the Southern newspapers, that the enemy

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were never enlightened as to the object of the explosion until they

were informed by the Northern press.

On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a reconnaissance, under Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up toward the fort. But before receiving a full report of the result of this reconnaissance, General Butler, in direct violation of the instructions given, ordered the reëmbarkation of the troops and the return of the expedition. The reëmbarkation was accomplished by the morning of the 27th.

On the return of the expedition, officers and men-among them Brevet Major-General (then Brevet Brigadier-General) N. M. Curtis, First Lieutenant G. W. Ross, One Hundred and Seventeenth Regiment New York Volunteers, First Lieutenant William H. Walling and Second Lieutenant George Simpson, One Hundred and Forty-second New York Volunteers - voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could have

been taken without much loss.

Soon after the return of the expedition I received a despatch from the Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, informing me that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. The natural supposition with me was that when the troops abandoned the expedition the navy would do so also. Finding it had not, however, I answered on the 30th of December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I would send a force and make another attempt to take the place. This time I selected Brevet Major-General (now Major-General) A. H. Terry to command the expedition. The troops composing it consisted of the same that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade, numbering about fifteen hundred, and a small siege-train. The latter it was never found necessary to land. I communicated direct to the commander of the expedition the following instructions:

> CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 3, 1865.

GENERAL: The expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, North Carolina, and Wilmington ultimately, if the fort falls. You will then proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear River, and report the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding

North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should exist between yourself and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral Porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of action. It would be well to have the whole programme laid down in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. I would and armament. Thus was secured, by the combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important successes of the war. Our loss was: killed, one hundred and ten; wounded, five hundred and thirty-six. On the 16th and 17th the enemy abandoned and blew up Fort Caswell and the works on Smith's Island, which were immediately occupied by us. This gave us entire control of the mouth of the Cape Fear River.

At my request, Major-General B. F. Butler was relieved, and Major-General E. O. C. Ord assigned to the Department of Virginia and

North Carolina.

The defense of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the force which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now threatening it, I determined to find other fields of operation for General Thomas's surplus troops—fields from which they would coöperate with other movements. General Thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops not essential to hold his communications at Eastport in readiness for orders. On the 7th of January General Thomas was directed, if he was assured of the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send General Schofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible. This direction was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps reached Washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent to Fort Fisher and New Berne. On the 26th he was directed to send General A. J. Smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to General Canby. By the 7th of February the whole force was en route for its destination.

The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military department, and General Schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders of Major-General Sherman. The following instruc-

tions were given him:

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 31, 1865.

GENERAL: . . . Your movements are intended as coöperative with Sherman's through the States of South and North Carolina. The first point to be attained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' will then be your objective point, moving either from Wilmington or New Berne, or both, as you deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the sea-coast—as near to it as you can, building the road behind you. The enterprise under you has two objects: the first is to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march. As soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington or New Berne, you can best use for throwing supplies from to the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will get of these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy. I believe General Palmer has received some instructions direct from General Sherman on the subject of securing supplies for his army. You will learn

therefore defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities. The first object to be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built, from which you can operate against that fort. You want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort Fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters.

My own views are that, if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a portion of their fleet into Cape Fear River, while the balance of it operates on the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher, or cut it off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in possession of the enemy.

A siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required. All other supplies can be drawn

from Beaufort as you need them.

Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured. When you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders.

In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions. You will

not debark at Beaufort until so directed.

General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to Baltimore and place them on sea-going vessels. These troops will be brought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard from. Should you require them, they will be sent to you.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Brevet Major-General A. H. Terry.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was assigned, in orders, as chief engineer to this.

It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from those given for the first expedition, and that in neither instance was there an order to assault Fort Fisher. This was a matter left

entirely to the discretion of the commanding officer.

The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the 6th, arriving at the rendezvous off Beaufort on the 8th, where, owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th, when it got under way and reached its destination that evening. Under cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on the morning of the 13th, and by 3 P.M. was completed without loss. On the 14th a reconnaissance was pushed to within five hundred yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance-work taken possession of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from the fort. This reconnaissance disclosed the fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by the navy fire. In the afternoon of the 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was captured, with its entire garrison

pected, upon reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me; but that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of Savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of January. The confidence he manifested in this letter of being able to march up and join me pleased me, and without waiting for a reply to my letter of the 18th, I directed him, on the 28th of December, to make preparations to start, as he proposed, without delay, to break up the railroads in North and South Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond as soon as he could.

On the 21st of January I informed General Sherman that I had ordered the Twenty-third Corps, Major General Schofield commanding, east; that it numbered about twenty-one thousand men; that we had at Fort Fisher about eight thousand men; at New Berne about four thousand; that if Wilmington was captured General Schofield would go there; if not, he would be sent to New Berne; that in either event all the surplus force at both points would move to the interior toward Goldsboro', in coöperation with his movement; that from either point railroad communication could be run out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came into communication with them.

In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to reduce Wilmington, North Carolina, in coöperation with the navy under Admiral Porter, moving his forces up both sides of the Cape Fear River. Fort Anderson, the enemy's main defense on the west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance before it.

After fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington on the morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated toward Goldsboro' during the night. Preparations were at once made for a movement on Goldsboro' in two columns,—one from Wilmington, and the other from New Berne,—and to repair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supply General Sherman by Cape Fear River, toward Fayetteville, if it became necessary. The column from New Berne was attacked on the 8th of March, at Wise's Forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred prisoners. On the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during the night. On the 14th the Neuse River was crossed and Kinston occupied, and on the 21st Goldsboro' was entered. The column from Wilmington reached Cox's Bridge, on the Neuse River, ten miles above Goldsboro', on the 22d.

By the 1st of February General Sherman's whole army was in motion from Savannah. He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on the 17th; thence moved on Goldsboro', North Carolina, via Fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the 12th of March, opening up communi-

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what steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions accordingly,

A supply of ordinance stores will also be nevenears.

Make all requestions upon the chiefs of their respective departments in the field with me at City Point. A communicate with me by every apportunity, and should you doesn it necessars at any time, send a special look in Portress Monroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph.

The emplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of these re-

quired for your own constants.

The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative duty, to cut home from your base, and attike for the interior to and Sherman. In such case you will not on your cost pudgeness without waiting for instructions. You will report, however, what you purpose doing. The details for varying out these instructions are necessarily left to you. I would urge, however, if did not know that you are always fully also to the importance of it, prompt bettom. Sherman may be holded for in the neighborhood of timblebore any time from the Clifts the Cath of February; this limits your time very materially.

If rolling stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can be supplied from Washington. A large force of radiosed men bear already been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a day

or two. On this point I have informed you by telegraph

I de limane,

MARINTHENERAL J. M. PERSONERALIS

Previous to giving these instructions I had spatied Fight Fisher, accompanied by General Schodield, for the purpose of seeing for my self the condition of things, and personally conferring with General Terry and Admiral Porter as to what was heat to be done.

Anticipating the arrival of theoreal Sherman at Savannah, has army entirely foot loose, Houd being then before Sashville, Tennessee, the Southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take neveral months to regardlish a through line from west to east, and regarding the enpure of Lee's army as the most important operation toward closing the rebellion,— I sent orders to General Sherman, on the 6th of December, that after establishing a base on the sea coast, with necessary garrison, to include all his artillety and cavalry, to come by water to City Point with the balance of his command

On the 18th of December, having received information of the defeat and utter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring secan transportation, it would take over two months to transport Sherman's army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as much toward the desired result by operating from where he was, I write to him to that effect, and asked him for his views as to what would be best to do. A few days after this I received a communication from General Sherman, of date 16th December, acknowledging the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. Also that he had ex-

sand men, besides A. J. Smith's command. The cavalry you have sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available cavalry already in that section, will move from there eastward, in cooperation. Hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. It is so asserted in the Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel Congress said a few days since, in a speech, that one half of it had been brought to South Carolina to oppose Sherman.) This being true, or even if it is not true, Canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance from your standpoint easy. I think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south. The object would be threefold: first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, to insure success to Canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communications and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the points to direct the expedition against. This, however, would not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretion should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the objects named above.

Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what number of men you can put into the field. If not more than five thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient. It is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one leaving Vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week. I do not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as I learn. If you should hear through other sources before hearing from me, you can act on the information received.

To insure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon-train as possible, relying upon the country for supplies. I would also reduce the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns taken. No guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight horses.

Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think

you will be able to send under these directions.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS.

On the 15th he was directed to start the expedition as soon after

the 20th as he could get it off.

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the armies operating against Richmond, that all communications with the city north of James River should be cut off. The enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from the Shenandoah Valley and sent it south, or replaced troops sent from Richmond, and desiring to reinforce Sherman, if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah, which, if successful, would accomplish

ention with General Schoffeld by way of Capo Fear River. On the toth he resumed his march on Goldshoro'. He met a torce of the enemy at Averysboro', and after a severe fight deteated and compelled it to retreat. Our loss in this engagement was about aix hun dred. The enemy's loss was much greater. On the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under due dedication, attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing three gone and driving it back upon the main body. General Slocum, who was in the advance, assertaining that the whole of Judiuston's army was in the front, arranged his troops on the defensive, intronched himself, and awaited temforcements, which were pushed forward. On the night of the 21st the enemy retreated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and seconded in our hands. From there Sherman continued to Goldsborn', which place had been occupied by General Schofield on the 21st occosing the Neuse River ten unles above there, at they's Bridge, where tieneral Topry had got passession and thrown a pontoun bridge on the 22th. thus forming a junction with the columns from New Herne and Wilmington.

Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of Charleston, South Carolina. It was exactased by the enemy on the night of the 17th of February, and occupied by our forces on the

18th.

On the morning of the 31st of January General Thomas was directed to send a cavalry expedition, under tieneral blom man, from Bust Tennessee, to penetrate South Carolina well down toward Co lumbin, to destroy the radioads and military is source of the country, and return, if he was nide, to East Tennessee by was of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing our prisoners flore, if possible. Of the fossibility of this latter, however, theneral Stonetons was to judge Sherman's movements, I had no doubt, would attract the attendium of all the force the enemy could collect, and tacketet the execution of this. General Stoneman was so late as making his start on this expedition and Sherman having passed out of the State of South Carolina), on the 27th of February I directed General Thomas to change his course and ordered him to repeat his raid of last fall, destroying the milrond toward Lynchburg as far as he could. This would keep him between our garrisons in East Tennessee and the enemy. I regarded it not impossible that in the event of the enemy being driven from Richmond be might fall back to Lynchburg and attempt a raid north through East Tennessee. On the 14th of Feb ruary the following communication was sent to General Thomas.

Crrs Barer, Vincenta. Peterman 14, 1985.

General Camby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of about twenty thou-

the first at least, and possibly the latter of these objects. I therefore telegraphed General Sheridan as follows:

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, February 20, 1865, 1 p.m.

GENERAL: As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. Sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look after Mosby's gang. From Lynchburg, if information you might get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the streams in Virginia to the westward of Danville, and push on and join General Sherman. This additional raid, with one now about starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or five thousand cavalry, one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay, with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday last.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN.

On the 25th I received a despatch from General Sheridan, inquiring where Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give him definite information as to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of Charlotte, North Carolina. In answer the following telegram was sent him:

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, February 25, 1865.

GENERAL: Sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposition he meets with from the enemy. If strongly opposed, he may possibly have to fall back to Georgetown, South Carolina, and fit out for a new start. I think, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has passed. I believe he has passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville on his way to Goldsboro'. If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be guided in your after-movements by the information you obtain. Before you could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him moving from Goldsboro' toward Raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from his army to Wilmington or New Berne.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN.

General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each.

On the 1st of March he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of the Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered Staunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated on Waynesboro'. Thence he pushed on to Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an intrenched position, under General Early. Without stopping to make a reconnaissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried, and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete. two hundred wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and seventeen battle-flags were captured. The prisoners, under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to Winchester. Thence he marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. Here he remained two days, destroying the railroad toward Richmond and Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south forks of the Rivanna River, and awaited the arrival of his trains. This necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg. On the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sent one to Scottsville, whence it marched up the James River Canal to New Market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal. From here a force was pushed out from this column to Duguidsville, to obtain possession of the bridge across the James River at that place, but failed. burned it on our approach. The enemy also burned the bridge across the river at Hardwicksville. The other column moved down the railroad toward Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst Court House, sixteen miles from Lynchburg; thence across the country, uniting with the column at New Market. The river being very high, his pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the South Side railroad about Farmville, and destroy it to Appomattox Court House, the only thing left for him was to return to Winchester or strike a base at the White House. Fortunately, he chose the latter. From New Market he took up his line of march, following the canal toward Richmond, destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever practicable, to a point eight miles east of Goochland, concentrating the whole force at Columbia on the 10th. Here he rested one day, and sent through by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, and a request for supplies to meet him at White House, which reached me on the night of the 12th. An infantry force was immediately sent to get possession of White House, and supplies were forwarded. Moving from Columbia in a direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station, he crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the Pamunkey to White House, which place he reached on the 19th.

Previous to this the following communication was sent to General Thomas:

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 7, 1865, 9:30 A.M.

GENERAL: I think it will be advisable now for you to repair the railroad in East Tennessee and throw a good force up to Bull's Gap and fortify there. Supplies at Knoxville could always be got forward as required. With Bull's Gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about all of East Tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of you in the spring, to make a campaign toward Lynchburg or into North Carolina. I do not think Stoneman should break the road until he gets into Virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may be caught west of that.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS.

Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was moving an adequate force against Mobile and the army defending it under General Dick Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry expeditions—one from Middle Tennessee, under Brevet Major-General Wilson, against the enemy's vital points in Alabama, the other from East Tennessee, under Major-General Stoneman, toward Lynchburg—and assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to commence offensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan's cavalry was at White House; the Armies of the Potomac and James were confronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defenses of Richmond and Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies, reinforced by that of General Schofield, was at Goldsboro'; General Pope was making preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under Kirby Smith and Price, west of the Mississippi; and General Hancock was concentrating a force in the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guard against invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary.

After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, it was necessary to rest and refit at White House. At this time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would leave his strong lines about Petersburg and Richmond for the purpose of uniting with Johnston, before he was driven from them by battle, or I was prepared to make an effectual pursuit. On the 24th of March General Sheridan moved from White House, crossed the James River at Jones's Landing, and formed a junction with the Army of the Potomac in front of Petersburg on the 27th. During this move General Ord sent forces to cover the crossings of

the Chickahominy.

On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general movement of the armies operating against Richmond were issued:

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 24, 1865.

GENERAL: On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmond will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemy out of his present position around Petersburg, and to insure the success of the cavalry under General Sheridan, which will start at the same time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the South Side and Danville railroads. Two corps of the Army of the Potomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking the two roads crossing Hatcher's Run, nearest where the present line held by us strikes that stream, both moving toward Dinwiddie Court House.

The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon road and the Jerusalem plank road, turning west from the latter before crossing the Nottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching Stony Creek. General Sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions which will be given him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army of the Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle Military Division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of service, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be added to the defenses of City Point. Major-General Parke will be left in command of all the army left for holding the lines about Petersburg and City Point, subject, of course, to orders from the commander of the Army of the Potomac. The Ninth Army-corps will be left intact, to hold the present line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. If, however, the troops to the left of the Ninth Corps are withdrawn, then the left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held by the army prior to the capture of the Weldon road. All troops to the left of the Ninth Corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given.

General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the present left of the Army of the Potomac. In the absence of further orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left column of the Army of the Potomac, and the colored division the right column. During the movement Major-General Weitzel will be left in command of

all the forces remaining behind from the Army of the James.

The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence on the night of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave behind the minimum number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main army. A cavalry expedition, from General Ord's command, will also be started from Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of April, under Colonel Sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about Hicksford. This, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient. They should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses the Blackwater. The crossing should probably be at Uniten. Should Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon road, he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The railroad-bridge at Weldon being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be

practicable to destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south of the Roanoke. All the troops will move with four days' rations in haversacks and eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much hauling as possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of days' supplies with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in passing. Sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies. The densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at the option of the army commanders.

All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation may be commenced at once. The reserves of the Ninth Corps should be massed as much as possible. While I would not now order an unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. In case they carry the line, then the whole of the Ninth Corps could follow up so as to join or coöperate with the balance of the army. To prepare for this, the Ninth Corps will have rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. General Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. A success north of the James should be followed up with great promptness. An attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has detached largely. In that case it may be regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defense of Richmond. Preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north of the James, except inclosed works—only to be abandoned, however, after a break is made in the lines of the enemy.

By these instructions a large part of the armies operating against Richmond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against the moving column, and return. It cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it. The very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. I would have it particularly enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move promptly, and notify the commander of their action. I would also enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of their corps are engaged. In like manner, I would urge the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Major-Generals Meade, Ord, and Sheridan.

Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in front of the Ninth Corps (which held from the Appomattox River toward our left), and carried Fort Stedman and a part of the line to

the right and left of it, established themselves, and turned the guns of the fort against us; but our troops on either flank held their ground until the reserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavy loss in killed and wounded and nineteen hundred prisoners. Our loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and five hundred and six missing. General Meade at once ordered the other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts. Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched picket-line in front of the Second and Sixth corps, and eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners. The enemy made desperate attempts to retake this line, but without success. Our loss in front of these was fifty-two killed, eight hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven missing. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater.

General Sherman, having got his troops all quietly in camp about Goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them perfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and stated that he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the 10th of April, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his command to bear against Lee's army, in cooperation with our forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg. General Sherman proposed in this movement to threaten Raleigh, and then, by turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston or thereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond and Danville railroad, striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville, or join the armies operating against Richmond, as might be deemed best. This plan he was directed to carry into execution if he received no further directions in the mean time. I explained to him the movement I had ordered to commence on the 29th of March; that if it should not prove as entirely successful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to destroy the Danville and South Side railroads, and thus deprive the enemy of further supplies, and also to prevent the rapid concentration of Lee's and Johnston's armies.

I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report that the enemy had retreated the night before. I was firmly convinced that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for Lee to leave. With Johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary. By moving out I would put the army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by the destruction of the Danville road, retard the concentration of the two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon much material that he might otherwise save. I therefore determined not to delay the

movement ordered.
On the night of the 27th Major-General Ord, with two divisions

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of the Twenty-fourth Corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and one division of the Twenty-fifth Corps, Brigadier-General Birney commanding, and Mackenzie's cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoing instructions, and reached the position assigned him near Hatcher's Run on the morning of the 29th. On the 28th the following instructions were given to General Sheridan:

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 28, 1865.

GENERAL: The Fifth Army-corps will move by the Vaughn road at 3 A.M. to-morrow morning. The Second moves at about 9 A.M., having but about three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the right of the Fifth Corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court House. Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearest roads in rear of the Fifth Corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible. Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville road. If you find it practicable, I would like you to cross the South Side road, between Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. I would not advise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville road, which I would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible. Make your destruction on that road as complete as possible. You can then pass on to the South Side road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that in like manner.

After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this army, selecting your road farther south, or you may go on into North Carolina and join General Sherman. Should you select the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send orders to

meet you at Goldsboro'.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN.

On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. At night the cavalry was at Dinwiddie Court House, and the left of our infantry line extended to the Quaker road, near its intersection with the Boydton plank road. The position of the troops from left to right was as follows: Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, Parke.

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the capture of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was made. I therefore addressed the following communication to General Sheri-

dan, having previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so:

GRAVELLY CREEK, March 29, 1865.

GENERAL: Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie. We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the Jerusalem plank road to Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. After getting into line south of Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's position. General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker road intersects the Boydton road, but repulsed it easily, capturing about one hundred men. Humphreys reached Dabney's Mill, and was pushing on when last heard from.

I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. In the morning push around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your action. We will act altogether as one army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. The signal-officer at Cobb's Hill reported, at half-past 11 A.M., that a cavalry column had passed that point from Richmond toward Petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass.

U. S. Grant.

Lieutenant-General.

MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN.

From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. During the 30th Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddie Court House toward Five Forks, where he found the enemy in full force. General Warren advanced and extended his line across the Boydton plank road to near the White Oak road, with a view of getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, and fortify. General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's Mills. Generals Ord, Wright, and Parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's lines. The two latter reported favorably. The enemy confronting us, as he did, at every point from Richmond to our extreme left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined, therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce General Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the enemy's lines. The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted Fort Stedman, particularly favored this. The enemy's intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw the lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other-

Preparations were at once made to relieve General Humphreys's corps, to report to General Sheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement. On the morning of the 31st General Warren reported favorably to getting possession of the White Oak road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the second division before it had time to form, and it in turn forced back upon the third division, when the enemy was checked. A division of the Second Corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of the White Oak road gained. Sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the Five Forks; but the enemy, after the affair with the Fifth Corps, reinforced the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him back toward Dinwiddie Court House. General Sheridan displayed great generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole command on the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of the horses. pelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of wooded and broken country, and made his progress slow. At this juncture he despatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on Dinwiddie Court House. General Mackenzie's cavalry and one division of the Fifth Corps were immediately ordered to his assistance. Soon after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could hold our position on the Boydton road, and that the other two divisions of the Fifth Corps could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered at once. Thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of Warren, because of his accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was intended, and precipitated intended movements. the morning of the 1st of April General Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back on Five Forks, where late in the evening he assaulted and carried his strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between five and six thousand prisoners.

About the close of this battle Brevet Major-General Charles Griffin relieved Major-General Warren in command of the Fifth Corps. The report of this reached me after nightfall. Some apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling upon General Sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from his position and open the way for retreat. To guard against this, General Miles's division of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him, and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in the morning (April 2d), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines. General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping everything before him, and to

his left toward Hatcher's Run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. He was closely followed by two divisions of General Ord's command, until he met the other division of General Ord's, that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near Hatcher's Run. Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right, and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, while General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions, and joined General Wright on the left. General Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's main-line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his inner line. General Sheridan, being advised of the condition of affairs, returned General Miles to his proper command. On reaching the enemy's lines immediately surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon's corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works,—the most salient, and commanding south of Petersburg,-thus materially shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. The enemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated westward to Sutherland's Station, where they were overtaken by Miles's division. A severe engagement ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened by the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's Station toward Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade from the front of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands his guns and many prisoners. This force retreated by the main road along the Appomattox River. During the night of the 2d the enemy evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and retreated toward Danville. On the morning of the 3d pursuit was General Sheridan pushed for the Danville road, keep- ${f commenced}.$ ing near the Appomattox, followed by General Meade with the Second and Sixth corps, while General Ord moved for Burkesville, along the South Side road; the Ninth Corps stretched along that road be-On the 4th General Sheridan struck the Danville road near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia Court House. He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of General Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord reached Burkesville on the evening of the 5th.

On the morning of the 5th I addressed Major-General Sherman

the following communication:

Wilson's Station, April 5, 1865.

GENERAL: All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach Danville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him last night, reports all that is left—horse, foot, and dragoons—at twenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope to reduce this number one half. I shall push on to Burkesville, and if a stand is made at Danville, will in a very few days go there. If you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job with Lee's and Johnston's armies.

Whether it will be better for you to strike for Greensboro' or nearer to Danville, you will be better able to judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN.

On the morning of the 6th it was found that General Lee was moving west of Jetersville, toward Danville. General Sheridan moved with his cavalry (the Fifth Corps having been returned to General Meade on his reaching Jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the Sixth Corps, while the Second and Fifth corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery. General Ord advanced from Burkesville toward Farmville, sending two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier-General Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges. This advance met the head of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically attacked and detained until General Read was killed and his small force overpowered. This caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled General Ord to get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which the enemy immediately intrenched himself. In the afternoon General Sheridan struck the enemy south of Sailor's Creek, captured sixteen pieces of artillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the Sixth Corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made, which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among whom were many general officers. The movements of the Second Corps and General Ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success.

On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except one division, and the Fifth Corps moving by Prince Edward's Court House; the Sixth Corps, General Ord's command, and one division of cavalry, on Farmville; and the Second Corps by the High Bridge road. It was soon found that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox; but so close was the pursuit that the Second Corps got possession of the common bridge at High Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately crossed over. The Sixth Corps and a division of cavalry crossed at Farmville to

its support.

Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, I addressed him the following communication from Farmville:

April 7, 1865.

GENERAL: The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from my-

self the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

GENERAL R. E. LEE.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at Farmville the following:

April 7, 1865.

GENERAL: I have received your note of this date. Though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

General.

To this I immediately replied:

April 8, 1865.

GENERAL: Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply I would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.

GENERAL R. E. LEE.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

Early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. General Meade followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan, with all the cavalry, pushed straight for Appomattox Station, followed by General Ord's command and the Fifth Corps. During the day General Meade's advance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear-guard, but was unable to bring on a general engagement. Late in the evening General Sheridan struck the railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from there, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital-train, and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army. During this day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about midnight received the following communication from General Lee:

April 8, 1865.

GENERAL: I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. In mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army;

but, as the restoration of peace should be the selectopeet of all, I describe to know whether your proposals would be all ternal end. I summed, therefore, meet you with a view to some side the farms of Northern Vergatia, but as far as your proposal may affect the first believe States for or under my command, and tend to the restoration of respect to the large world be pleased to society as at 10 a.m. to morrow on the old stage read to the linearly between the picket-linea of the two armies.

Newscool

Languaga hanganan telahan a

Early on the morning of the 9th I is turned him an arrows: as follows, and immediately started to join the sodures searched the Apparentes:

April 9, 1865.

GENERAL: Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace; the inciting projected for 10 s.st. to day could lead to no good. I will state, however, general, that I are equally anxions for peace with yourself, and the whole breath substant the mane treeling. The terms upon which peace was be but are well subjectived. Its the South laying down that some they wall has so that received exent, save thousands of human lines, and horses do finally not of projects not yet destroyed. Formula hoping that all our deflective many be neithed without the loss of mother life, I subscribe massif, etc.,

GENERAL R. E. LEE.

A second resident for some al.

On the morning of the 5th General Und's communical and the Fifth Corps reached Appenditor. Station just on the carrier was inchang a desperate effort to break through corresponding. The infanter was at once thrown in. Soon after a write flag was received, requesting a suspension of hostilities pending acceptations for a suspension of postilities.

Refore reaching General Sherolan's beadquarters I reserved the

following from General Lee-

April 9, 1865.

GENERAL: I received your note of this morning on the packet line, whither I had come to meet you and ascertain leftered what terms were embraced in your proposal of vesterday with reference to the assumpter of this army. I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose.

LIEUTENANT CHNERAL C. N. GRANT.

H. E. Lung

The interview was held at Appointtion Court House, the result of which is set forth in the following correspondence

Armontannos Consta Horost, Vizidada, Apal 9, 1866.

GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit; Rolls of all the officers and men APPENDIX 457

to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the United States until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

GENERAL R. E. LEE.

## HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

GENERAL: I have received your letter of this date containing the terms of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

R. E. LEE, General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

The command of Major-General Gibbon, the Fifth Army-corps under Griffin, and Mackenzie's cavalry were designated to remain at Appomattox Court House until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed, and to take charge of the public property. The remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinity of Burkes-ville.

General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers.

On the receipt of my letter of the 5th General Sherman moved directly against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through Raleigh, which place General Sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th. The day preceding news of the surrender of General Lee reached him at Smithfield.

On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sherman and General Johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject to the approval of the President. This agreement was disapproved by the President on the 21st, which disapproval, together with your instructions, was communicated to General Sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, at Raleigh, North Caro-

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line, in obedience to your orders. Notice was at once given by him to General Johnston for the termination of the truce that had been entered into. On the 25th another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 25th, which terminated in the surrender and dislandment of Johnston's army upon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee.

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got off on the 20th of March, moving by way of Hoone, North Carolina. and struck the railroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg, and Hig Lick The force striking it at Hig Lick pushed on to within a few nules of Lynchburg, destroying the important bridges, while with the main force he effectually destroyed it between New River and Eng Lack, and then turned for Greenshore, on the North Caushan radroad. struck that road and destroyed the bridges between Danville and Greenshope, and between Greenshope and the Yadkin, together with the deputs of supplies along it, and employed form boundered prosumore At Salishury he attacked and defeated a force of the enemy under General Chridner, capturing fourteen pieces of artiflery and one thousand three hundred and sixts four prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. At this place he destawood lifteen miles of railroad and the bridges toward Charlotte. Thence he moved to Slatersville

General Camby, who had been directed in January to make preparations for a movement from Module Bay against Module and the in terior of Alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th of March The Sixteenth Corps, Major General A. J. Smath commanding, moved from Fort Chanes by water to Fish River, the Thirteenth Corps, under Major General Gordon Granger, moved from Fort Morgan and joined the Sixteenth Corps on Fish River, both moving thence on Spanish Port and investing it on the 27th while Major General Steele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the radioad leading from Tensus to Montgomery, effected a purction with them, and partially invested Fort Blakely. After a severe bombardment of Spanish Fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th of April - During the night the enemy expended the fort. Fort Blake's was carried by momilt on the 9th, and many prisoners captured, our loss was considerable. These successes practically opened to us the Alabama River, and enabled us to approach Mobile from the north. On the night of the 11th the city was exacuated, and was taken peasession of by our forces on the morning of the 19th

The expedition under command of Brevet Major General Wilson, consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains until March 22d, when it moved from Chickasaw, Alabama. On the 1st of April General Wilson cocamitered the enemy in force under Forcest near Elenezer Church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three guns, and destroyed

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the central bridge over the Cahawba River. On the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city of Selma, defended by Forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns, destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners. On the 4th he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa. On the 10th he crossed the Alabama River, and after sending information of his operations to General Canby, marched on Montgomery, which place he occupied on the 14th, the enemy having abandoned it. At this place many stores and five steamboats fell into our hands. Thence a force marched direct on Columbus, and another on West Point, both of which places were assaulted and captured on the 16th. At the former place we got fifteen hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, the navy-yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other public property. At the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. On the 20th he took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, twelve hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by General Howell Cobb. General Wilson, hearing that Jeff. Davis was trying to make his escape, sent forces in pursuit, and succeeded in capturing him on the morning of May 11th.

On the fourth day of May General Dick Taylor surrendered to General Canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the Mississippi.

A force sufficient to ensure an easy triumph over the enemy under Kirby Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put in motion for Texas, and Major-General Sheridan designated for its immediate command; but on the twenty-sixth day of May, and before they reached their destination, General Kirby Smith surrendered his entire command to Major-General Canby. This surrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of the rebel President and Vice-President; and the bad faith was exhibited of first disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate plunder of public property.

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, carrying with them arms rightfully belonging to the United States, which had been surrendered to us by agreement,—among them some of the leaders who had surrendered in person,—and the disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio Grande, the orders for troops to proceed to Texas

were not changed.

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final triumph, that I have not mentioned. Many of these will be found clearly set forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and brief despatches announcing ATTENDED ATTENDED

them, and others, I regret to may I are not an yet been officially reported.

\* For information touching our landers essiblications I would be expectfully refer to the reports of the communication of dispositions to an which they have consisted


If his liver my forfate to say the armon of looth the West and the East fight buttles, and trem, what I have been I know there is no difference in their fighting qualities. All that it was possible for men to do in leattle they have done. The Western assess commanded their buttles in the Michigan part & aller, and reconstruct the though energy inder of the remnant of the principal arms opposed to Born in South Care line. The armes of the East comments of their leather on the river from which the Army of the Potennae Served sto mater, and received the find surrender of their old antagressian at Appositation Court Homes, Virginia. The epilerical market a crossite of case a disease realization. ized our victories, removed all exclusival pralomies and which we have งงุงเรียบรับรับรับรับรับ ครัฐมากรายบระการรับระดง ระการการการิกัก การการกับ การการการการการการการการการการการก regred recording the regression of the result of the resul in its duty. All have a proud record, said all accinous case well congrafulate themselves and each either for heavist done there full chare in restoring the supremacs of law over every feet of territors belong. ing to the United States. Last them hope for gorgodinal peace and harmony with that enemy when manisced however mustakers the cause, drew forth such hereulean decids of valor

I limas the herman teches,

Very respectfully, your obschoat servant,

I'M HARAMA.

Lientenant General,



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